Typical recent conceptions of freedom

Front matter

.888

Hollinger Corp. pH8.5

RECENT CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM

Prefatory Note

I am deeply indebted to Professor Edward L. Schaub, of Northwestern University, for his careful and keen criticism and his wise counsel. Without his direction, this essay would never have been undertaken nor completed.

Chapters II and VII (with some changes) have appeared in The Monist and The Philosophical Review, and my thanks are due to the editors of these periodicals for permission to reprint the articles here.

CHAPTER I Introduction Page

Brief Sketch of the History of the Problem of Freedom i

Typical Conceptions of Freedom in Contemporary Philosophy 13

CHAPTER H

I. Dependence of this Denial on Haeckel's General Position. ... 15

n. Haeckel's Arguments for the Reduction of Mind to Matter. . 15

ni. The Law of Substance 19

IV. Mechanistic Determinism 23

CHAPTER VI Bosanquet's Conception of Freedom ^

Page

I. Contrast of Bosanquet's Doctrine with the Teachings of

James, Bergson, and Ward 79

II. Freedom as the Rational Self-Transcendence of the Finite. . 80

III. Criticism of this Conception 83

IV. Freedom as Characteristic of the Absolute 91

Introduction

A recent writer on the problem of freedom has declared it to be one of the most confused and complicated problems in the entire field of philosophy.^ This confusion may, as he suggests, be accounted for both by the number of human interests concerned and by the history of the problem. Freedom has been discussed from the most diverse angles. Sometimes it has been regarded as primarily a psychological problem; again, its intimate relation to problems of the moral life has been stressed; at various other times, its implications for metaphysics, for religion, for science, or for social theory have been in the forefront of attention. A short sketch, therefore, of the history of the problem may serve to bring out its many-sidedness and to introduce us to contemporary conceptions of freedom.

In the earliest period of their philosophical reflection, the Greeks, with a naive trust in reason, busied themselves with problems of the cosmos, giving little consideration to specifically human issues. But the divergence of their world views eventually forced them to raise the question of the nature and possibility of knowledge, and this inevitably led on to many other questions concerning the nature of man. This emphasis upon specifically human problems was accentuated by contemporary social conditions. Old customs, old rites were being discarded,

' Cf. Windelband, Uber fVilUnsfrnhnt, Chap. I.

and the very foundations of law and of society were being subjected to critical examination. The individual came into prominence. Great impetus was given to the study of psychology and rhetoric by the fact that leadership might be secured through their means. Such conditions as these favored the rise of the Sophists. The humanistic and individualistic bent of these thinkers would, one might suppose, quite naturally have led them to affirm the fact of freedom. Whether or not they taught this doctrine, however, we cannot determine; there is no conclusive evidence that they gave serious or careful consideration to it. So far as our present knowledge goes, it was Socrates who first definitely and explicitly maintained the reality of freedom. For this early philosopher, freedom referred primarily to the character of the act. The act that was good was also free; man was free whenever he chose the good. In Socrates' opinion evil is always involuntary, being due solely to ignorance. ^ This identification of freedom with good action was accepted also by Plato. Like his master, Plato often asserted that man never sinned voluntarily.^ In apparent contradiction to this teaching, however, Plato also declared that man was free to choose either good or evil.^ Thus, for Plato, freedom denoted not only virtuous or wise action, but also the possibility of choice. To Aristotle, it was this psychological aspect of freedom that was of paramount interest. Believing that responsibility involves genuine freedom of choice, he undertook a painstaking analysis of volition.^ By this means he showed that evil resulted from habit and training as well as from ignorance, and that ignorance itself was often voluntary. Aristotle's affirmation of the reality of freedom of choice

2 Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia^ Bk. IV, 6, 6; Bk. Ill, 9, 4-5.

3 Cf. Protagoras, 345 E, 358 C; Republic^ Bk. VII, 535 E; Timaus, 86; Meno, 77 D; Sophist, 230 A.

* Cf. Laws, Bk. X, 904 b; Republic, Bk. X, 617 e; Phaedo, 80 E. ^ Cf. Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. Ill, 1-5.

INTRODUCTION 3

is in harmony with the general tendency of his metaphysics. It accords well with his emphasis upon the individual, and with his admission of contingency as well as of rigid teleology in the cosmos. Plato's acceptance of freedom, on the contrary, seems to conflict with his emphasis upon the universal, as well as with the monistic tendency of his philosophy. However, both Plato and Aristotle practically ignored the metaphysical implications of freedom, confining their discussions to its psychological and ethical aspects. The credit for first centering attention upon the metaphysical aspect of the problem of freedom belongs to the Stoics and the Epicureans. This historical fact cannot be completely explained, yet there are certain considerations that throw some light upon it. The foundation for such a discussion had been laid by the work of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Moreover, the decline of Greek supremacy had thrown the Greek back upon himself so that he realized the significance of his own personality as never before. Furthermore, in being freed from some of the artificial limitations of national existence, he became cosmopolitan in his outlook, and was led to the problem of the relation of his life to the universe as a whole. Thus he was confronted with the task of reconciling his new-found individuality with his view of the ultimate nature of the universe. The Stoics, to be sure, never reached a completely consistent solution of this problem. On the one hand, they regarded the universe as completely rational, and as determined by eternal and necessary laws. From this point of view, they subordinated the individual to the whole, and consequently denied freedom in the sense of contingency.^ On the other hand, they exalted man's self-dependence, stoutly aflirming that man's will was so completely in his own power, that not even Zeus could overthrow it.^ The aim of the

' Cf. Diogenes Lurtes, Bk. VII, Ixxii-lxxiv; Cicero, De Falo, xvii; Antoninus, Meditations, IV, 26; V, 8; VIII, 5; X, 5; XII, 26. ' Cf. Epictctus, Disc, Bk. I, i; sec also Cicero, De Fata, XVIII.

Stoics was, of course, to deny freedom as contingency, but to establish it as the willing submission of the wise man to the eternal and rational order of nature. In opposition to this teaching the Epicureans maintained freedom in the sense of sheer contingency. This contingency, moreover, they predicated of atoms as well as of men, and made one of the fundamental principles of their cosmology.^ Thus, then, there are here brought face to face, the view that freedom consists in rational or ethical self-determination, and the assertion that it involves contingency or chance — two conceptions which are still hotly contested in recent discussions of the problem of freedom. The later teachings of both Stoicism and Epicureanism are tinged with a religious coloring. This religious aspect appears even more' clearly in Neo-Platonism, and in Patristic Philosophy. The change which thus took place in the character of philosophical thought emerged from a number of causes. It was due in part to the fact that the conflicts between the various speculative systems and the failure of any to give complete satisfaction bred a distrust of reason. Man longed for salvation. He could not, however, find it in traditional religion, for he no longer believed in the gods of his fathers, nor could he seem to attain it in any of the current systems of thought. The religious longing of the period, moreover, was rendered more intense by the contact of the Occidental with the Oriental mind. Through this contact, Greek and Roman became imbued with a feeling of awe and wonder at the mystery of life, and with a desire for the supernatural. Inevitably this change of feeling reflected itself in the discussion of all problems. The question of freedom came to be centered upon the relation of the soul of the individual to the supreme source of all beauty and goodness. For example, in the philosophy of Plotinos,^ freedom

^ Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Bk. I, 25; Lucretius, De Rerum Naturce, Bk. II, 251-293.

» Cf. Plotinos, Enneads, III, 2; IV, 3, 8; VI, 4, 8, 15.

INTRODUCTION S

consists in the ability of the soul either to turn from "the Good" or steadfastly to seek the good and to strive to return to the One whence it came. Although such freedom on the part of the individual seems incompatible with Plotinos' complete monism, he was constrained to admit it as an explanation of the existence of evil and of moral striving. He taught also that man attains true freedom only in so far as he becomes one with the Good.

The religious note, however strong in neo-platonic thought, was even more dominant in Patristic Philosophy. The early Christian Fathers, in working out their theology, inevitably took over many of the conceptions and problems of the contemporaneous philosophical systems. These conceptions and problems, however, were necessarily altered by being brought into relation with Christian beliefs. Not infrequently new motives for their discussion were brought into play. Such was the case with freedom. Certain elements in Christianity urgently demanded its affirmation. In the first place, Christianity not merely continued the Jewish emphasis on conscience, sin, and responsibility, but it stressed to quite a novel degree the value and significance of the individual. In the second place, it regarded God as supremely Good, and could not therefore make Him responsible for evil. Thus. the early Christian Fathers, like Plotinos, eagerly affirmed freedom as the explanation of evil.^^ Yet there were motives in Christianity which led in the opposite direction. As the church organization became stronger, the individual dwindled in importance. With the development of Christian theology, moreover, the difficulty of reconciling individual freedom with God*s omnipotence and with the doctrine of salvation as a gift of grace became ever more apparent. Hence it was that Augustine,

•oCf. Tcrtullian, De Anima, Chaps. XXXIX-XLI; Clement, Padagogus, Bk. I, Chaps. I, II and XIII, passim; Origen, De Principxis, III, I, 18-19; Contra Cdsum, IV, 3.

in spite of an express affirmation of freedom, ^^ declared that God could control man's will, and that He elected whom He would for salvation. ^^ ^^j^js view of God's election was, of course, not peculiar to Augustine. It was a common, though a disputed, teaching in the Church, and found its way into Protestant theology through the teachings of Calvin ^^ and Zwinglr.

The doctrine that election depends solely on the Divine will raises the question of the nature of God's volition. According to Augustine, God's will must be regarded as absolutely free in the extreme sense of arbitrary or indifferent, since His choice cannot be motivated by any merit or particular characteristics of the individual. The same general problem was raised even more clearly a few centuries later in the famous controversy between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. The former maintained that God's will is determined by his reason, while the latter contended that it is determined by itself alone. According to the one, God chooses a thing because it is good; according to the other, it is good because He so chooses. ^^ The large importance of the theological interest in medieval philosophy should not blind us to the fact that many of its problems have also a purely human aspect and reference. Thomas's discussion of the relation between will and reason concerned not merely God's will, but human volition as well. The problem thus raised is still as pressing as ever, and is fundamental to the discussion of freedom.

With the Renaissance there came a change in the general direction of philosophy. The causes and characteristics

" Of. Nature and Grace, 32; Grace and Free Will, Chap. II; City oj God, Bk. V, Chaps. IX-X; Bk. XI, Chap. XVII.

12 Cf. Rebuke and Grace, Chap. XXVIII; City of God, Bk. XIV, Chap. XI; Nature and Grace, Chap. XXV; Grace and Free Will, Chaps. X, XX.

"Cf. Calvin, Institutes, Bk. Ill, 11, 22.

INTRODUCTION 7

of this change have been so often discussed that we need not recite them in this connection. Suffice it to say that, in the early days of modern philosophy, reason and the method of the mathematical sciences were so in the ascendant that the will was relegated to a subordinate position. Philosophy consequently acquired a monistic tendency. As a result, the value and significance of the finite individual were imperilled, and human freedom was denied. It is true that Descartes affirmed the reality of freedom and used it in explanation of error. ^^ Yet he failed to reconcile this affirmation either with his belief in God's omnipotence, or (what was of more significance for the subsequent development of philosophy) with his metaphysical teaching concerning the dependence of every finite substance upon the Infinite Substance. This latter teaching was carried out to its logical conclusion by Spinoza. In his case, it resulted in a complete monism that involved the absolute necessity of law and precluded the existence of freedom as contingency.^^ In spite of Spinoza's deterministic conclusion, many of his statements at least imply the reality of genuine freedom of choice. Yet it is plain that he intended to deny contingency absolutely and to maintain freedom only in the sense of completely rational activity. In this deterministic view, Spinoza was at one with the materialist Hobbes. Hobbes likewise taught that freedom was opposed, not to necessity, but to external constraint, and that man's volition, like all other facts of the universe, was completely determined and necessary. ^^

An attempt to rescue man from the chain of necessity was made in the philosophy of Leibniz. This philosophy broke with the Spinozistic monism, and, by its emphasis on activity and individuality, led naturally to an aflirma-

'» Cf. Descartes, Meditations, IV; Principles, Part I, Props. XXXIV- XXXIX.

'• Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Props, xvl, xvii; Part V. " Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. 21, Part 2.

tion of the reality of freedom. Leibniz distinguished carefully between ethical and metaphysical freedom, but accepted them both. The former, he declared, admits of degrees, and, in its highest degree, is characteristic of God alone. The latter consists in a denial of necessity, and is the attribute of will as such.^^ Yet Leibniz' affirmation of freedom was not consistently carried through. It came into an apparently irreconcilable conflict with his doctrine of pre-established harmony. Leibniz tried, it is true, to avoid this contradiction by analyzing the meaning of 'possible,' and by contrasting contingent facts with necessary truths. ^^ He, however, did not succeed in showing that a thing is genuinely possible because it and its opposite are alike conceivable, nor that two alternatives can really be possible if all is predetermined. Furthermore, nothing is gained by the isolation of individuals and by the r;mphasis on consciousness so long as the succession of psychical states is regarded as predetermined. A conscious automaton is, as Kant said, none the less an automaton.^^

Meanwhile an attempt was being made to solve the problem of freedom empirically. It was on the ground of experience that Locke was led to maintain the reality of freedom of choice. He asserted that "So far as a man has power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind; so far is a man free." ^^ He objected to the term freedom of the will on the ground that freedom or liberty belongs to the agent and not to the will. Later empirical discussions of freedom utilized a distinction that had already been made between freedom as opposed to constraint and freedom as opposed to necessity. The former, more

18 Cf. Leibniz, New Essays, Bk. II, Chap. XXI; Duncan's Ed., XXVII; Gerhardt's Ed., I, p. 331.

'9 Cf. Duncan's Ed., XXVI, XXX; New Essays, Bk. IV, Chap. VI.

2" Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. I, Chap. Ill (Abbott Ed.,

21 Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, Bk. II, Chap. 21, 8; cf. also the whole chapter passim. •

INTRODUCTION 9

accessible to direct observation, was held in many instances to constitute the very essence of freedom. Thus the term freedom commonly came to have the purely negative connotation of absence of constraint.-- This conception played an important part not only in the history of thought, but also in the world of political and social affairs. It was the fundamental concept of the extreme individualism of the eighteenth century and was the watchword of revolutionists and reformers. It secured a lasting embodiment in the American Constitution and in the Bills of Rights of the American States and of France. Indeed, it is still influential in much of our thinking concerning the function of government. Although this emphasis on the negative aspect of freedom was perhaps a necessary accompaniment of the attempt to free the individual from the absolutism of both state and church, the inadequacy of such freedom was proved by the course of social events. It was discredited by the changes resulting from the industrial revolution and from the evils growing out of the laissez-faire policy. The theoretical insufficiency of the merely negative concept of freedom was disclosed by the work of the German Idealists and of the English Hegelians. But before we can see the force of their criticisms, we must turn to the philosophy of Kant.

Kant introduced a distinctly new element into the discussion of freedom. His critique of the theoretical reason aimed to show that science could not dispose of the problem.-^ This made possible the affirmation of freedom on the ground of the demands of the moral life.-^ In this manner there were introduced considerations of value

" Cf. Hume, Enquiry, Sect. VIII; cf. also the views of Mill, Bentham, and Spencer.

" Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to 2d ed., Part II, Division II; Miillcr, pp. 362 flF., 432 flp.

'* Cf. Kant, Melaphysic of Morals, Sect. Ill; Abbott, pp. 66 fF; Critique of the Practical Reason, Bk. I, Chap. Ill, Abbott ed., pp. i6s ff., 182 fT.

lo TYPICAL RECENT CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM

and worth as well as of mere existence. Kant, moreover, worked out the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, the temporal and the non-temporal. However much the resulting account of freedom may have failed to attain complete consistency,^^ Kant nevertheless blazed the trial which subsequent philosophers have in large numbers followed.

The successors of Kant, disagreeing in their interpretation of the critical philosophy, were led to somewhat divergent doctrines concerning freedom. Fichte, like Kant, regarded freedom as the postulate of the moral consciousness. He went further and made it the very basis of his metaphysics.^^ The emphasis on moral obligation, moreover, led him to a recognition of the contrast between the ideal and the actual, and to an exaltation of the ideal. When we come to Hegel, we meet with an essentially different spirit. Whatever their points of agreement may be, Hegel presents, in opposition to the extreme voluntarism of Fichte, an absolute rationalism. Hegel, however, did not deny the reality of freedom. Rather should it be said that he developed the distinction made by Kant and Fichte between the empirical and the transcendental self, and predicated freedom of the latter. Like Fichte, furthermore, he regarded the transcendental self as the absolute or universal self. He conceived the finite self to be free only in so far as the finite identified his life with the life of the whole. The concrete expression of his freedom was found not in his capricious activity — his mere ability to do as he pleased — but in his lawful activity as a member of the state. ^^

The conception of freedom as characteristic of an in-

25 Kant sometimes implied that the rational self alone was free, while at other times he taught that the self could choose either good or evil. There are serious difficulties too, as has frequently been pointed out, in the conception of transcendental freedom.

2« Fichte, Vocation of Man, Bk. Ill, Open Court Ed., pp. 99 flf.; Science of Rights, Fart I, Bk. I., SammtHche Werke, I, pp. 263 ff.

" Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Introduction.

INTRODUCTION ii

dividual regarded as a member of a social whole was imported into England by Green, as a corrective of those theories which interpreted freedom in the purely negative sense of absence of constraint. The Hegelian conception was in harmony with the new social consciousness, and found ready adoption on the part of many English thinkers. It seemed, indeed, as though the problem of freedom were nearing a satisfactory solution, and as though freedom would henceforth be regarded as the rational activity of the social self as a member of the Absolute. Nevertheless, certain counter-tendencies remained, and in recent years especially, the absolutists' view of freedom has been assailed from many quarters.

The development of science has seemed to many to insure the victory of determinism. By its constant reliance upon the category of mechanical causation, science apparently leaves no place for freedom within its domain. Hence the extension of its field over the realms of life and consciousness has been viewed with alarm by upholders of freedom, who have felt that freedom was being crowded back into smaller and smaller areas, and that eventually it was likely to disappear completely. Yet purely mechanistic determinism has no new category to offer, and still fails to meet the Kantian critique.

The greatest light thrown by science in recent years on the problem of freedom undoubtedly proceeds from the doctrine of evolution. The thought of evolution is, of course, a very ancient one. Yet it exercised neither a profound nor a wide influence upon human thought until the publication of the Origin of Species. At first it seemed that evolution might disprove freedom by bringing fresh evidence in support of mechanism. It is now evident, however, that the theory has implications which lead in the opposite direction. The genetic method, brought into favor by an acceptance of evolution, has shown that mechanical causation of itself does not afford an adequate description of development or growth.

Many thinkers, moreover, have maintained that the reahty of time and of change, involved in the doctrine of evolution, is inconsistent with a belief in universal mechanism. This contention, indeed, forms the basis for many recent arguments in favor of freedom.

Added to the above is a second set of considerations. The study of genetic, abnormal, and social psychology has disclosed the influence of non-rational factors in man's experience. It is an established fact that such factors play a role even in the case of thinking and that conduct is ordinarily determined by habit, imitation, suggestion, or emotion, rather than by reason. As a result there has, in many quarters, appeared a reaction against rationalism, along with an adoption of some form either of voluntarism or of intuitionism. In both cases there are involved motives for a renewed insistence upon freedom.

In the third place, the growth of democracy has focussed attention upon the value of every individual as such. To be sure, the democratic movement has also been accompanied by a continually increasing complexity in modern life. Out of this complexity a vast system of interrelations has arisen, and this has sometimes threatened to engulf the individual. Yet individualism is by no means dead. It still raises its protest against those who would reduce man to a mere cog in a social and industrial machine, or to an expression of the Absolute.

For these and many other less important reasons, freedom is once more being discussed with avidity, there being many motives, new as well as old, and many points of view. It would seem profitable, therefore, to undertake a critical survey of the most typical among the recent doctrines concerning freedom. In view of the great diversity of such doctrines, there is some difiiculty in singling out those which may be regarded as most representative. Our aim has been so to select them as to bring out as clearly as possible the different logical principles underlying the various discussions.

INTRODUCTION 13

We thus consider first a denial of freedom from the point of view of a purely naturalistic philosophy. As representative of this tendency, we have selected Ernst Haeckel, inasmuch as his writings have attained wide popularity and influence. In his exaltation of mechanical causation as the sole explanatory principle of the universe, Haeckel represents the view of many present day scientists and psychologists.

As embodying the view logically antithetical to that of Haeckel, the doctrine of William James is next discussed. Of all modern protagonists of freedom, James asserts its reality in the most uncompromising manner. Rather than be deluded by any form of "soft determinism," he regards freedom as sheer chance. Hence he beings out in a thoroughgoing fashion, the various implications of freedom as contingency. His discussion, moreover, bears witness to many of the difl'erent tendencies in modern life and thought that lead to freedom. It is motivated by a democratic appreciation of individuality, by a Western exaltation of action, by a rugged and courageous attitude toward life, by an heroic acceptance of the demands of morality, and by a constant insistence upon the reality of time.

Our consideration of James' conception is followed by a study of Bergson's view. Like the philosophy of James, the thought of Bergson exemplifies the tendency to emphasize time and activity, and to exalt immediacy at the expense of conceptual thinking. Bergson's treatment of freedom does not perhaps involve any logical principle not present in James' teaching. It cannot, however, well be omitted from any discussion of contemporary conceptions of freedom, since it is often regarded as the most conclusive and triumphant vindication of freedom in modern thought. For Bergson, indeed, freedom is the very principle of all life and activity, and thus discloses the inmost nature of reality.

As an interesting supplement to the more or less naturalistic views of James and Bergson, the spiritualistic conception of freedom maintained by James Ward is next examined. Ward's discussion is motivated throughout by a desire to do full justice to human personality, without losing sight of its relation to God as creative spirit and world ground. Thus Ward is influenced by motives which were dominant in patristic and medieval philosophy, which affected the view of Leibniz and Descartes, which profoundly influenced German Idealism, and which indeed are operative in any attempt to work out a conception of man that shall do justice at one and the same time to his moral, religious, and philosophical demands.

Our study is concluded by a consideration of Bosanquet's conception of freedom. The principal motive in this case is the desire for complete rationality. Bosanquet is thus led directly to monism. Hence his conception serves to furnish light on the question whether monism is compatible with the reality of freedom. For Bosanquet, as for the Stoics, for Spinoza, and for the Neo-Kantian Idealists, freedom is equivalent not to contingency but to rational self-expression, i. e., to the self-transcending activity of the individual as an expression of the Absolute.

Our discussion of recent conceptions of freedom advances no claim of indicating a satisfactory solution of the problem. Its aim is the much humbler one of analyzing the question and of exhibiting the logical implications inherent in various recent treatments of it.

Chapter II I

"The great struggle between the determinlst and the indeterminist, between the opponent and the sustainer of the freedom of the will, has ended to-day, after more than two thousand years, completely in favor of the determinlst. The human will has no more freedom than that of the higher animals, from which it differs only in degree, not in kind. We now know that each act of the will is as fatally determined by the organization of the individual and as dependent on the momentary condition of his environment as every other psychic activity." ^^

Haeckel's categorical denial of freedom, as thus expressed, proceeds from his general world-view. This world-view is based on the doctrine of evolution and on the belief in the universality of the "law of substance." The former leads Haeckel to a materialistic conclusion; the latter, to a mechanistic determinism. Our first task, therefore, will be to consider the question whether the existence of a spiritual principle is precluded by evolution, or by any other consideration suggested by Haeckel. We shall then proceed to the question of the universality of the "law of substance" and to the problem of its relation to mechanism. Finally, we shall examine briefly the adequacy of mechanism itself as a philosophic explanation of the universe.

II

Haeckel never tires of citing facts in support of the doctrine of evolution. Since this doctrine, in some form or other, is now almost universally accepted as true, wc need 2^ The Riddle of the Universe, pp. 130 f.

i6 TYPICAL RECENT CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM

not in this connection stop to inquire concerning the adequacy of the evidence which Haeckel adduces in its support. The only question for us to consider is whether the doctrine of evolution inevitably leads, as Haeckel sometimes argues, to the reduction of mind to matter. Put very simply, Haeckel's argument for this conclusion is that, since man developed from the lowest forms of life, there is no reason to attribute to him a separate immaterial or spiritual principle not found in the forms of life from which he originated. Many objections to this argument at once suggest themselves. It takes for granted the old scholastic idea of rigid continuity according to which nothing new can ever arise. Now there are grave difficulties in this view. Even waiving these for the moment, however, Haeckel's conclusion by no means follows. Rather, the doctrine of continuity, if strictly held, would force him to ascribe to the lowest organism all the capacities and meanings which have appeared in the highest forms of life. For, on the assumption of rigid continuity, the very fact that certain phenomena such as sensation and will have developed in the later stages of the evolutionary process, would show that these phenomena were implicit in the earlier forms of life. Thus, Haeckel would be compelled to understand the protozoa in the light of man, rather than to reduce man to the level of a protozoan. Sometimes, indeed, he seems to do this. With an amazing anthropomorphism he, on occasion, bestows elementary will and elementary emotion upon even inanimate matter.^^ If he held consistently to this view, his system would be in the nature of a teleological hylozoism rather than of a mechanical determinism. As has already been suggested, however, this reading of continuity — this attribution of man's processes to the lower forms of life — is misleading. It involves what Baldwin calls ''the fallacy of the implicit." As a matter of fact, if progress is genuine, there must arise new proc- 29 Cf. infra, p. 26.