The prisoner of war in Germany; the care and treatment of the prisoner of war with a history of the development of the principle of neutral inspection and control

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Preface

material presented, unless otherwise stated in the text.

Statements made by prisoners, when not denied or contraverted by the German authorities, are here presented, as stated. I have received the reports made by the other attaches of the embassy at one time or other assigned to this work, i.e., Messrs. Jackson, Osborne, Dresel, Ohnesorg, Kussell, Webster, Taylor.

I have, however, used none of the material of their reports. To Dr. Karl Ohnesorg I am indebted for assistance in a personal way, in the use of his notes and translations of some of the matter in the Appendix, and without his aid and assistance this survey would not have been made nor this report submitted. I am equally indebted to Dr. A. E. Taylor for moral support.

To write anything on the Prisoner of War situation in Germany without giving credit, in the eventual analysis, for the ideas and ideals underlying the principles of treatment of the problem to our ambassador to Germany, Mr. J. W. Gerard, would be falling far short of just appreciation. His fine sense of justice and fair dealing, his keen, almost automatic analysis of complicated situations, his open indignation of anything that savored of unjust or inhumane treatment, made him the ideal custodian of the rights of the Prisoner of War. The German officials were somewhat afraid of him because "they did not understand him, ' ' and they did not understand him for

PREFACE

the simple reason that he was not the usual type of diplomat. A master at differentiating facts from half facts and theory, with his case complete, he acted directly and without circumlocution or useless verbiage, demanding rather than requesting a correction of evils in reference to the Prisoner of War situation. He often went direct to the camps himself to obtain at first hand information with which to complete his case. In the game of delay and procrastination they found in him a queer type of ambassador who was not willing to be content with a protest but at unexpected moments, until he secured results, restating his case and even after months of delay demanding redress. He stood, and always, at a hostile court an example of the best type of patriotic American, stood indeed for what this exemplifies — fair play and decent treatment for the helpless and oppressed. Without his support the efforts of the inspection of the Embassy for the Prisoner of War would have been futile and barren of results, and the principles of neutral control would not have been developed to a principle of international usage.

I am indebted for much valuable aid in the preparation of material, analysis of reports, etc., to my secretary, Miss Julia Guillou.

Contents

CHAPTER VAGE

I The Problem of the Prisoner of War . 1

II The Army Corps and Their Prison Problem 12

Chapter I The Pboblem Op The Pbis0nek Of Wae

IN the general romance woven by the popular imagination around the subject of war, there is no more pathetic and appealing figure than that of the prisoner in the hands of the enemy. In order to stimulate the patriotism of the people, to create the proper atmosphere towards the enemy it is considered essential to attribute to him the faults of heartless cruelty, a lack of all humane principles, and to lay at his door the impossible of all crimes, including rape, massacre and murder. One of the most eminent men in Germany made the statement that * ' all of the nations at war have gone crazy and of all of them unquestionably we (the Germans) are the craziest." It is certainly true that a nation at war loses that fine balance of judgement that the same nation in peace might ordinarily have. That a nation at war may present all the manifestations of hysteria in its conduct and mode of thinking has almost

i been the rule of the nations involved in the present war. That peculiar quality of the hysteric, the hypersensitiveness to suggestion, is a predominating quality. The whole nation is willing to believe anything in the public prints and the public prints are willing to present to its readers anything that is presented to them, it matters little how absurd or incredible the matter may be. Tales of the heartless and ruthless murder of the wounded prisoner, of deliberate starvation, the lack of care, etc., early found their way into the newspapers of all the nations at war. While these tales produced a very definite sentiment against the enemy they at the same time created a decided feeling of worry on the part of that portion of the population whose relatives were included as prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy.

A soldier who had been killed in action was mourned as a sacrifice on the altar of patriotism. Time, the great healer of such sorrow, eventually led the relatives from a condition of mourning to one of pride in their offering. The prisoner of war, on the other hand, while in the hands of the heartless and brutal enemy remained for months and even years a matter of continuing solicitude and worry on the part of all the relatives and an increasing rather than decreasing circle of friends. The effect the published tales of brutality on such a large part of the population interested in the prisoner of war sooner or later would lead to a demand to the Government that the condition of the prisoner should be ameliorated. One need only glance at the diplomatic correspondence between the British Foreign Office and the American Embassy during the first six months of the war to realize the very grave concern of the British Government concerning the care, treatment and fate of the British soldier, a prisoner in Germany. Urgent demands from the American Ambassador in Berlin in the early months of the war for clothing for both officers and men, with reports from prisoners who had escaped to England and Russia of harsh and brutal treatment both in the transport to the prison camps and within the camps, led his Majesty's Government to make protests to the American Embassy. This was followed later by an attempt to arrange some definite sort of inspection. On account of lack of food in some of the prison camps the German Government had agreed to accept food packages for the prisoners. At the suggestion of Mr. Chandler Anderson a request was made that certain officers of the Quartermaster's Department of the United States of America be assigned to the Embassy at Berlin to control the distribution of food and clothing; nothing, however, came of this. From December 26, when this suggestion was first made, to March 17, when the German Government accepted the idea of inspection, this matter was the subject of repeated and urgent communications on the part of the British Foreign

Office, the American Embassy at London, at Berlin, and our own State Department. The German Government did not appear to take very much interest in the matter but was eventually forced to the general idea.

As a counter proposition to the British suggestion, the Berlin Government, through the American Embassy, requested that an inspection of the German civilians and soldiers who were interned in Great Britain should be made by an attache of the American Embassy in Berlin. *

A general permit to "visit the places of internment of prisoners of war in the United Kingdom" was given to the American Embassy on January 27, 1915. Every facility was offered for a complete inspection of all the camps in the United Kingdom. A comprehensive report was filed at

i The American ambassador asked me to-day whether the American Embassy would be allowed, as reports were being made in Germany about the treatment of German civilians in England, to send some one to visit the Germans interned in Newbury and Newcastle.

The ambassador also said that he had received specific complaints from Germans interned in Queensferry.

He has given me the following copy of a letter from the American ambassador in Berlin.

The object of the Ambassador's enquiry is simply, by bringing out the facts, to prevent false statements from doing harm in Germany, and at the same time, I assume, to contribute to the remedying of any grievances that may exist.

The American Ambassador in Berlin is, I know, doing all in his power to secure good treatment for British subjects in Germany and I think that it would be desirable to let the American Embassy here have full information as to our treatment of Germans.

I have, etc.,

Foreign Office, November 13, 1914. E * GbeT '

the Embassy in Berlin on February 27, 1915, and transmitted to the German Government.

In the meantime the German public became very much concerned over the internment of German civilians in England and Ireland. 1

While reprisal action was immediately taken in Germany the force of public opinion and the very large numbers of German civilians involved, unquestionably influenced the German Government to accept the British proposition for a recip-

i MR. GERARD TO MR. PAGE

American Embassy, Berlin, November 8, 1914. Sir:

Although it may already be too late to be of much practical effect, I feel it my duty, in the interest of humanity, to urge you to obtain some formal declaration on the part of the British Government as to its purpose in ordering the wholesale concentration of Germans in Great Britain and Ireland, as is understood here to be the case. It is known here that many of the Germans interned belong to the laboring classes, and that their position is actually improved by their internment, and it is recognised that the British Government has the right to arrest persona when any wellfounded ground for suspecting them to be spiea exists. Great popular resentment has been created by the reports of the arrest of other Germans, however, and the German authorities cannot explain or understand why German travellers who have been taken from ocean steamers should not be permitted to remain at liberty, of course under police control, even if they are compelled to stay in England. The order for the general concentration of British males between the ages of 17 and 55, which went into effect on the 6th instant, was occasioned by the pressure of public opinion, which has been still further excited by the newspaper reports of a considerable number of deaths in the concentration camps. Up to the 6th considerable liberty of movement had been allowed to British subjects in Germany, and, as you were informed in my telegram of the 5th, many petitions were received from them setting forth the favorable conditions under which they were permitted to live and to carry on their business, and urging the similar treatment of German subjects in rocal inspection. As far as the prisoners of war were concerned the British Government had already permitted Mr. Lowry, an attache of the American Embassy at London to keep in close touch with all the British prison camps. He was permitted freely to visit and inspect them. Nothing was therefore to be gained from the German standpoint. The possibility of the withdrawal of this privilege, however, and the force of public opinion in Germany led to an eventual agreement.

This agreement was as follows: "Principles for securing information concerning the condition of prisoners in belligerent countries : —

"1. The belligerents undertake to transmit to those countries whose subjects are held by them as prisoners of war, whether combatant or noncombatant, a compilation of the provisions which they have adopted for the treatment of prisoners to include those relating to lodging, clothing, and food, as well as correspondence and the forwarding of money and presents in kind. In case any supplementary regulations have been issued in single detention camps, such regulations shall be made known to the diplomatic or consular repre-

England. I cannot but feel that to a great extent the English action and the German retaliation has been caused by a misunderstanding which we should do our best to remove. It seems to me that we should do all in our power to prevent an increase of the bitterness which seems to have arisen between the German and English peoples, «nd to make it possible for the two countries to become friends on the close of the war.

I have, etc.,

James W. Gebard.

sentatives who have charge of the protection of the prisoners when they inspect such camps.

"2. General permission to inspect the detention camps shall be given to the chiefs of the diplomatic missions who have charge of the protection of the prisoners, as well as to the diplomatic or consular officers of their country who may be designated by them. They shall announce visits to the commanders of the camp to hear their wishes and complaints. The conversations shall not, however, embrace other subjects than such wishes and complaints, except with the express permission of the commander of the camp. Before leaving the camp, the diplomatic or consular representative will notify the commander of any wishes and complaints, and will not submit to the superior authorities of the commander unless the commander declares himself unable or unwilling to consider the wishes or to remedy conditions forming the subject of complaint."

In accord with this agreement permission was granted to certain members of the Embassy Staff to visit all places of internment provided that notice of the expected visit should be given in advance to the commandant of the camp. This latter provision was not altogether acceptable to the British Government and was eventually modified so as to permit the inspection without previous notice. It will be seen later that while the idea that prompted this protest was that preparation for the inspection might be made it was afterwards clearly proven that such notice did not militate against proper and complete inspection.

The permission granted in form is as follows :

AUTHORIZATION PERMISSION Dr. D. J. McCarthy

' 'Is hereby permitted to visit without previous notice, all prison camps and hospitals in which English and Servian prisoners of war and civilians are interned. Working camps and prisons can likewise be visable after application to the Representative of the Army Corps without previous notice. The local authorities are requested to afford the above named protection and assistance.

" According to the official regulation for the inspection of the camp the holder of this permit is allowed to converse with the prisoners alone out of hearing of the camp authorities. Conversations with such prisoners of war who are undergoing punishment can be held only in the presence of a near witness. Dr. D. J. McCarthy will before the beginning of the inspection present himself personally with this permission to the commandant of the camp or his representative, in hospitals to the chef or surgeon in charge, in prisons and working camps to the officers in charge. This permission is not valid for the camps, etc., in districts under the Bavarian, Saxon or Wurtemberg ministries of war.

"He is requested to return this document to the Prussian Ministry of War, when the purpose for which it has been issued has been completed.

' 'It will be here noted that four separate permits were issued by the Ministries of War respectively of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Wiirtemberg. It was understood politics would not be discusssed and the inspection of the Embassy agreed not to discuss the war or subjects foreign to the matters directly concerned with the detail of inspection."

Like privileges were granted to the American Embassy in London for an inspection and control of camps for the internment of German soldiers and civilians in Great Britain. A similar agreement was entered into between the Central Powers in France under control of the Spanish Embassy. An understanding rather than an agreement existed, that the Spanish Embassy should do the same for Russian prisoners of war. This was assumed on account of the fact that the Spanish Government represented the Russian interests in Germany.

The Ambassador at Berlin immediately assigned several attaches of the Embassy to this work and requested some of the American consular agents to visit camps near their respective consulates.

It is rather interesting to note that from the simple permission in Section 2 to visit army camps in order to listen to complaints, that there grew out of this by degrees a full and complete military inspection, embracing not only a careful survey of all the physical conditions within the camp but a detailed inspection of the prisoners themselves ; a review of sanitary conditions, diplomatic matters in reference to the exchange of wounded men, correction of hospital abuses and review of judicial matters in reference to court martials, etc. Once the principle of inspection was established surely the very military German commandant could not very well object to a military inspection. A military inspection included all of the above.

When one glances over the early reports of camp inspection they appear fragmentary and incomplete ; this is largely due, however, to the difficulties above mentioned and to the fact that the general idea had to be slowly developed against resistance and ofttimes refusal to make the inspection complete. To develop and establish a principle of inspection to bring it up to its present status of scientific completeness, is I take it, a definite achievement ; a precedent for use in future wars, if unhappily there should be such. It will indeed relieve much suffering. I have no doubt that in the future this matter will be established as a principle of International Law, and be embodied in Conventions such as those established at the Hague. It was indeed fortunate that in this work the Embassy had the services of a military surgeon, an expert in sanitation, who with unsurpassed tact laid the foundations through two years of the development of this idea. I refer to Dr. Karl Ohnesorg, Assistant Attache at the American Embassy at Berlin.

Chapter II The Aemy Corps And Their Prison Problem

WHILE the German Foreign Office in response to public opinion and as a result of protests based on the reports of Major V — (see Appendix) and others might agree to reciprocal inspection, the German Army Corps and German officers resented any inspection by a neutral and more particularly by members of the Diplomatic Service, who were, with a single exception, not even military men. One can well imagine the mental attitude of a general in the German Army towards a youthful attache who presumed to criticise anything that he did.

During the first six months many problems were presented which gave rise to considerable friction between the inspection service of the Embassy and the German authorities. That some misunderstandings should develop was naturally to be expected. The problem was altogether new and the machinery for carrying it out was at first rather limited. It became evident, however, from the beginning that the decentralization of the German Government due to war conditions was responsible to a large extent for not only a lack of harmony in co-operating with the idea of the in-

ARMY CORPS AND PRISON PROBLEM 13

spection but even to a greater degree in securing redress for evils existing.

The Empire is divided into twenty one army districts. In war time the government of each district is placed in the hands of a general and his staff, technically known as an army corps command. For all practical purposes this represents the full governmental authority of the district assigned to the army corps command. Under the military system and during a period of martial law the power of the general in command was practically absolute. While theoretically he is responsible to the Ministry of War of the individual German State in which the army corps district is located and while this is responsible in a way to the Central Government at Berlin the army corps commander has so much authority that it would appear as if this authority were final. This is confirmed by the attitude of the army corps commanders not only in a military but often in a general way.

The attitude indeed of some of these commanders became so bumptious that it became a matter of discussion in the Eeichstag. Notwithstanding the military government during the war, the Reichstag still holds its sessions to listen to the chancellor and to discuss matters which the speaker may permit open for discussion. After the Liebknecht affair this power was delegated to the speaker. In the discussion before mentioned one of the delegates to the Reichstag read a letter sent by one of the army corps commanders in reply to one of his constituents who protested to the injustice of the censorship in reference to business matters. The army corps commander replied that he and his delegate might protest as much as they liked but that he had the power and would do as he pleased in the matter. In this letter he stated: "We (the army corps commanders) are the ministry. We are the Bundesrat. We are the imperial chancellor. We are the Beichstag. ' ' He only stopped short of saying : ' ' We are the Kaiser." This delegate stated: "I am not surprised at this sentence, for the Gotthanlichkeit (Likeness to gods) which these commanding generals have assumed on the basis of the authority they have taken over, can scarcely be surpassed.

This attitude of the army corps commanders found like expression in the attitude of the various State Ministries of War of Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg towards the Central Prussian Ministry of War in Berlin.

While in theory the Ministry of War in Berlin is in supreme control, as a matter of fact, it was often found that orders issued by it were not carried out by the Ministries of War of the Individual States or the army corps commanders in their district. A bureau existed in the Prussian War \ Ministry which was supposed to have control of all prisoners of war. This was found to be so only in theory. War Ministries of the individual states had direct control of all the prisoners within

ARMY CORPS AND PRISON PROBLEM 15

the limit of their respective states. This principle was insisted upon to the extent that individual permissions from the respective ministries of war had to be secured before prison camps in their districts were visited. The permission granted by the Prussian Central Minister of War was not sufficient and would not be honored.

It was a matter of experience that where any conflict of authority arose the Central Minister of War usually conceded the point to the local state ministry or to the individual army corps com- 'mands. Matters often became so involved that one gathered the suspicion that problems pressed by a neutral embassy could be delayed or their solution prevented by this diffusion of authority. In matters of this kind one always had the feeling that the German Government was all arms and legs and no head. This was true not only in problems concerning the prisoner of war but in diplomatic matters generally. It was easy enough to get hold of an important member but when serious matters were at issue it was absolutely impossible to find the head. This condition of affairs was all the more serious in the prisoner of war situation.

While the Central Government was at times sensitive to outside or at least neutral public opinion the army corps commands were often totally indifferent to it. Here the contrast between the military point of view and that of the German people as represented by their Central Government was very evident. Not only were the German people like the Foreign Office sensitive to outside criticism of the prisoner of war situation but were often at great pains to defend their treatment of the prisoner even when they knew nothing more about it than what occasional contact with those assigned to working on the farms and on the roads gave to them. While direct criticism was as a rule not published, articles in the public prints concerning reprisals and other matters always led to a certain amount of information leaking out which gave a clue to foreign criticism. The Central Government with more information as to neutral feeling and opinion was disposed in a general way to avoid the occasion for increasing resentment over the treatment of the prisoner of war. The army corps commanders on the other hand representing as they do the principles and methods of thought of the German Army were concerned wholly with obtaining results in the most direct way, and did not care what the outside world thought of them or their methods. The shortest distance between two points was the shortest line to them. It was quite immaterial that human rights and human beings should stand in the way of such a line of action.

The German military mind is trained to efficiency. Efficiency means results. The prisoner of war problem is a military problem. The military idea of the shortest line to results irrespective of human rights and human feeling was applied to the prisoner of war problem even when

The littlest Russian soldier prisoner with his Prussian " guard of honor "

ARMY CORPS AND PRISON PROBLEM 17

the industrial complications made the working problem predominate over the military aspect to such an extent as to make the latter negligible.

When it became necessary to make the prisoner of war work, a failure to obtain results would be a reflection on their military efficiency. Here the same principle was evolved as that in the Belgian deportation; methods harsh, brutal and often inhuman were justified in order to secure results and good practice. If a deported Belgian or a prisoner of war was starved to exhaustion and died in the process, he was still to be forced into a position where he would work, otherwise their military system was wrong, and how could that be? I have no doubt that facing an identical situation where their own men were involved, they would have had as little hesitation in using similar measures'.

Officers high in rank were placed in charge of prison camps, the rank of general was not uncommon. The commandant of the camp was therefore very often the same military grade as the army corps commander, who was the military governor of the district over which he presided. He represented the military idea and enforced it throughout his entire staff. It was not surprising therefore that the prisoner of war problem was properly or improperly handled just in so far as it gave military results and not in accord with any humane principles. It was stated to me on one occasion by a German army inspector of high rank in excuse for the flagrant violation of almost every; human consideration in one of the German prison camps, that the military authorities had placed a general in charge of this camp and had expected him to produce results. They had left the administration of the camp to him, assuming that he had the rank to enforce authority over his own subordinates and the brains to do it properly, but that unfortunately he followed too closely the letter of the regulations, etc.

The commandant of the civilian camp at Euhleben in a personal reply to a published report concerning his camp when it was stated that criticism was not aimed at him personally but to the food conditions in charge of an officer of the ministry of war replied: "I am my camp; any criticism of my camp is a criticism of me personally."

Many of the commandants of the German prison camps like Graf Schwerin at Ruhleben were men of kindly impulses and sincerely interested in the welfare and comfort of the men assigned to their keeping and for whom on the part of the prisoner of war there was sincere affection. They were, however, a part of the military system and could not entirely escape it. Such men were often handicapped by the military regulations, sometimes by the facilities at their disposal for the care of the prisoners, sometimes by the organization, as in the food situation at Ruhleben and sometimes by their own lack of executive ability

&RMY CORPS AND PRISON PROBLEM 19

to properly use materials at hand or to force their own organization through the military red tape. [The commandant at Parchim in charge of a camp of thirty five thousand men stated to me that, ' ' recalled to military duty from his own business he had firmly resolved to come out of this difficult and disagreeable duty with a clean conscience. ' ' He succeeded in infusing this spirit through his entire staff with the end result that care and consideration for the prisoner of war was evident throughout the camp.

It may be stated that as a rule that not only the staff but the noncommissioned officers and the members of the guard all take their cue as to the / treatment of the prisoner of war from the com- * mandant. If the commandant is influenced by humane principles and a kindly spirit one may expect to find the entire camp with this atmosphere. If, on the other hand, the commandant is a military martinet with brutal and inhuman instincts the whole atmosphere of the camp even down to the lowest positions is harsh and inhuman. "Alles hangt von commandant ab" (Everything depends on the commandant), was a frequent saying on the part of those who had the work in charge. As a matter of experience one could almost tell from his estimate of the commandant at the time of the formal call before the inspection of the camp what sort of a camp he had to expect. Strangely enough when one looks over the history of the prisoner of war one is impressed with the fact that not only now but far back into the middle ages that "Alles hangt von commandant ab."