The history of Europe from 1862 to 1914, from the accession of Bismarck to the outbreak of the great war

Front matter

V

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Preface

This book has been written in the endeavor to present a straightforward and impartial account of the history of Europe from the beginning of the chancellorship of Bismarck in Prussia to the outbreak of the Great War.

Emphasis has been laid throughout the entire book upon those events which have affected international relations. The narrative of the domestic politics of the separate states has been curtailed, except where such politics had a distinct bearing upon the part which a state played in international affairs. The alliances and the conflict of interests which have brought about the present Great War have been discussed in detail. The characters and methods of those statesmen who have had the greatest influence in international issues have been developed at length. It has been our plan thus to give the reader a conception of a true history of Europe rather than to present an aggregation of histories of the separate European states.

In order to afford a more adequate understanding of the period, we have endeavored to coordinate events in time. By this means the reader is enabled to gain a knowledge of the general political, economic, and social status in the chief states of Europe at any given range of years.

The campaigns of the important wars of this period have been treated, not with a mass of technical detail, but with sufiicient fullness to enable the reader to understand the chief strategical movements and the reasons for their success or failure.

In the division of the work of preparing this volume, the Professor of English and History has undertaken the political, diplomatic, and economic history of the period ; the Assistvi PREFACE

ant Professor of History the military campaigns, comprising the Danish (1864), the Austro-Prussian (1866), the Franco-German (1870-1871), the Russo-Turkish (1877- 1878), and the entire chapter on the Russo-Japanese War. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the assistance rendered by instructors in the Department of History, especially by Captain Philip Hayes and Captain Sidney V. Bingham. Acknowledgment is also due to Mr. W. L. Ostrander, Assistant Librarian, who has prepared the Index. A number of the maps, namely, Europe 1871, Germany 1871-1914, Austria-Hungary 1914, Balkan States 1856-1912, Ottoman Empire and the Balkan States 1914, Asia 1914, and Africa 1914, have been reprinted from volume II of A Political AND Social History of Modern Europe with the kind permission of its author. Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes.

L. H. H.

A. W. C.

West Point, N. Y.

November, 1917.

PART I The Attainment of German Hegemony In Europe . . 9-184

A. Accession of William I : Political Crisis ... 9

B. Bismarck 15

C. The Political Situation ...... 27

CHAPTER n

A. Germany 30

B. Austria . 37

C. Italy . . . 43

D. Russia 49

E. France 53

A. Internal Politics 60

B. Foreign Diplomacy ....... 66

i. Bismarck and Russia ...... 66

ii. Bismarck and Austria ...... 70

iii. The Schleswig-Holstein Issue .... 74

iv. The Danish War . 78

A. The Schleswig-Holstein Adjustment .... 88

Vlll

B. The Other Powers of Europe and their Relation to a

L possible Austro-Prussian Conflict i. Russia ii. Great Britain iii. France iv. Italy ....

C. Diplomacy Leading to the War

D. The Austro-Prussian War .

E. The Treaty of Peace . , .

CHAPTER V

BiSMAHCK VS. Napoleon III 117-137

A. Napoleon Ill's Attempts to get Compensation . . 117

B. Napoleon's Loss of Influence in France . . . 118

C. Internal Affairs in Germany . . . . . 121

D. Bismarck's Diplomatic Preparations for the Francoi. Austria 125

ii. Great Britain ....... 128

iii. Italy 132

iv. Other States of Europe ..... 133

E. The Outbreak of War . 133

CHAPTER VI The Franco-Gebman War ....... 138-153

CHAPTER VII

A. Bismarck during the Franco-German War . . . 154

B. Events in Europe during the Franco-German War . 158 ii. Italy 161 iv. Formation of the German Empire . . . 163

C. The Conclusion of the Franco-German War . . 166

i. The Commune ....... 167

ii. The Treaty of Frankfort 169

D. European Readjustment following the War . . . 170

i. France 170

ii. Germany 174

IX iii. Italy

iv. Other States

E. International Relations following the Franco-German

War

F. Summary : Bismarck and Prussia, 1862-1875

177 180

180 183

PART II The Maintenance of Gehman Hegemony in Europe

186-279

A. The Near Eastern Problem 187

B. The Bulgarian Atrocities 189

C. Attitude of Great Britain and Russia toward Turkey . 192

i. Great Britain ....... 192

D. The Russo-Turkish War 195

The Congress of Berlin and the Triple Alliance . . 207-223

A. European Intervention in the Near Eastern Question . 207

B. The Congress of Berlin 212

C. The Treaty of Berlin 213

D. Diplomatic Results'of the Congress of Berlin . . 215

i. The Dual Alliance 219

ii. The Triple Alliance . . . . . . 220

European Development, 1880-1890 : I, Great Britain, France, Russia, and the Near East A. Great Britain

i. Parliamentary Reform Bill ii. Irish Home Rule . iii. Egyptian Policy . iv. The Salisbury Ministry V. Death of Disraeli . vi. Effect of Great Britain's Policy of Splendid Isola tion upon the International Situation

B.

C.

D.

i. Domestic Politics ....... 237

ii. Foreign Policy : Colonial Expansion . . . 241

The Near East 246

i. The Execution of the Terms of the Treaty of

Berlin 246

ii. Bulgaria 248

iii. The Effect of the Balkan Changes upon the International Situation ...... 252

European Development, 1880-1890 : II, The Powers op THE Triple Alliance

A. Italy ....

i. Internal Developments ii. Foreign Policies

B. Austria-Hungary .

i. The Dual Empire ii. Austria iii. Hungary

C. Germany

i. Bismarck's Domestic Policies ii. Bismarck and the Foreign Situation iii. William II and the Resignation of Bismarck

PART III The Formation of a Defense against German Hegemony IN Europe

281-474

A. Formation of the Dual Entente .....

B. Effect of the Dual Entente upon the International

Situation ........

C. Attitude of Germany toward the Dual Entente, 1891- i. Internal Affairs in France ..... ii. French Colonial Policy ......

283-316 283

289 290 292

XI iii. Russian Colonial Expansion 293

iv. German Attitude toward Great Britain . . 294 D. The Formation of the Entente Cordiale . . . 295 i. Trade Rivalry between Great Britain and Germany 295

ii. German Naval Increase 299

iii. German Colonial Development .... 302

iv. Effect of German Activities upon Great Britain 304 v. Diplomatic Situation in Great Britain and France

leading up to the Entente Cordiale . . . 308

(1) Internal Conditions in France .... 309

(2) Foreign Policy of France 312

vi. The Formation of the Entente Cordiale . . 314

Colonial Enteepbises 317-340

A. European Economic Conditions which favored Colonial

Enterprises 317

B. The Field for Colonization ......

i. Africa 320

C. Status of the European Nations at the Beginning of

the Colonial Rivalry : Great Britain, France,

Germany, Italy, Russia 327

D. Colonization in Africa . . . . .

Colonial Rivalet in Asia, and the Russo-Japanese Wae 341-364

A. Russo-Japanese Rivalry in Asia .....

i. Russian Expansion ...... 341

ii. The Chino-Japanese War and its Results . . 343

iii. Chinese Affairs ....... 346

iv. Russian Relations with China; Japanese Intervention 347

V. Outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War ' . . . 348

B. The Russo-Japanese War ...... 350

i. Japanese Plan of Operation ..... 350

ii. Comparative Armaments 351

Xll iii. Naval Operations 353

iv. Military Operations 354

A. The Moroccan Crisis . . . . . . . 365

i. The Algeciras Conference ..... 370

ii. The Algeciras Treaty 371

B. Great Britain's Naval Preparation to resist German

Aggression 373

C. Great Britain's Diplomatic Preparation to resist Ger-

man Aggression . . . . . . 377

i. Anglo-Russian Hostility 378

ii. Advantages of Anglo-Russian Friendship for Great

Britain 379

iii. Advantages of Anglo-Russian Friendship for iv. The Anglo-Russian Entente .... 384

D. The Triple Entente . 385

CHAPTER V

The States of Europe, 1905-1911 : I, Great Britain

A. Final Years of Unionist Government

B. Liberal Success (1906)

C. Liberal Program, 1906-1909

D. The Budget and Finance Bill of 1909 . E. Conflict Between The Two Houses

F. The Parliament Bill of 1911

CHAPTER VI

The States of Europe, 1905-1911 : II, The Continental

A. France . . . 411

B. Russia 420

C. Austria-Hungary ....... 425

i. The Struggle for Hungarian Independence . . 425

ii. Electoral Reform in Hungary . . . . 428

iii. Electoral Reform in Austria . . . . 431

Xlll

CHAPTER VII

A. The Near Eastern Situation

B. The Turkish Revolution

C. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis .

CHAPTER Vm

Conditions in Morocco ....

A. Internal Dissensions in Morocco

German Interest in Moroccan Situation i. The Casablanca Incident ii. The Berlin Agreement, 1909 The French Expedition to Fez

German Intervention in Morocco : the Agadir Incident The Moroccan Convention and the Congo Convention

B.

C.

D.

E.

438-455 438 441 444

PART IV The Conflict of Alliances

475-573

A. The Turco-Italian War, 1911-1912 .... 476

B. The First Balkan War 483

C. The Second Balkan War 496

A. Unrest in the Balkans ...... 504 ii. Bulgaria 506

iii. Serbia 507

iv. Effect of Balkan Unrest upon Austria-Hungary and

B. Domestic Problems in European States . . . 511

i. Great Britain — Irish Home Rule . . . 511

C. General International Situation in Europe . . . 530

i. Increase of Armament ...... 530

ii. German Diplomacy ...... 531

XIV

The Outbeeak of the Great War

A. The Murders at Serajevo ....

B. The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum

i. Austro-Hungarian and German Motives ii. The Serbian Reply ....

C. Declaration of War, Austria-Hungary vs. Serbia

D. Declaration of War, Germany vs. Russia and France

A. Great Britain 562

B. Italy • 573

Bibliography . . . . 581

Index 591

LIST OF MAPS

PACING PAGE z'

The Germanies 30 ,

Campaign in Schleswig-Holstein, 1864 ...... 82

Sketch Map to Illustrate Austro-Prussian War, 1866 . . . 100 "^

Koniggriitz Morning, July 3, 1866 108 "^

Sketch Map to Illustrate Franco-German War .... 142 ^

Gravelotte-St. Privat, 18th August, 1870 .' . . . . 146 '^

The Battle of Sedan, 1 September, 1870 150 "^

Sketch Map to Illustrate Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878 . . 198 '

The Balkan States, 1856-1912 214 •

Austria-Hungary, 1914 262 '^

The Bagdad Railroad . . .302

Sketch Map to Illustrate Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 . . 350

Liao Yang 358

Sketch Map to Illustrate Battle of Mukden, 23d February-9th

Ottoman Empire and the Balkan States ..... 496 l/

Foreword

The chief interest in international affairs in Europe during the half century preceding the outbreak of the Great War revolves about the political ambitions and methods of the Prusso-German state. At the beginning of this period Prussia, the least of the five Great Powers in Europe, was inhabited by a capable, energetic, industrious, and on the whole contented people, apparently satisfied with their international status and intensely desirous of pursuing their natural course of development along peaceful lines : at the close of this period Germany, the greatest military power the world has ever known, was under the guidance of an unscrupulous and aggressive minority who, dissatisfied with any position in European politics or world politics less than that of dictator, were willing to embroil Germany in war to gain their ends. The German people at large remained the same, capable, energetic, industrious, and peaceful, but German diplomacy had acquired a new character. The abnormally rapid development of its territory, population, commerce, and resources, its easy and overwhelming victories in war, and its sensational successes in international politics led the government of Germany into the belief that Germany was a super-nation, directly endowed with rights and privileges which all other nations must recognize and accept, and that they (the government) were the persons intrusted with the duty of establishing and maintaining these superior German rights. They were B 1 aided in their purposes by the fact that the German people, although not materially changed in character, had become accustomed through long generations of obedience to state authority to accept unquestioningly the decisions and dictation of their government. The successes of the unscrupulous diplomacy of Bismarck in the years between 1862 and 1890 gave a warrant for the arbitrary authority exercised by the government in foreign affairs after 1890. The people of Germany, having seen the power, prestige, and prosperity which resulted from Bismarck's autocratic regime, were inclined to trust blindly the supposedly superior wisdom of their governors. And these governors, intrenched in their positions by an outworn autocratic system (albeit with democratic forms), rode down ruthlessly all criticism and opposition and proffered the gage of battle for supremacy in European and world politics.

The events accompanying the change in the aims and methods of German diplomacy are divisible into four stages : — 1, the coalescence of the German states, with Prussia at their head, into an empire so powerful- as to be able to dictate European policy ; 2, the maintenance by constructive measures of internal policy and by acute diplomacy of Germany's hegemony in European politics ; 3, the recognition by the other great powers outside of German influence of the dangers of continued German leadership, and the consequent formation of a defensive coalition ; and 4, the challenge of Germany and her allies to this coalition, resulting in the Great War.

The first period, extending from the beginning of Bismarck's chancellorship in 1862 through the formation of the German Empire and the first years of its prosperity (1875), is in many ways the most important. The dominating personality of Bismarck in Prussia, accompanied by the extraordinary success of his diplomacy, established the ideals of the government of Germany for the subsequent periods. For five years at the beginning of this period

(1862-1867), Bismarck governed Prussia with little regard for that constitution which was supposed to guard the people's liberties ; during this period he deliberately brought about three wars — the Danish (1864), the Austrian (1866), and the French (1870) — to increase the power and prestige of Prussia; in the pursuit of his aims for his country, he destroyed the dictatorship which the Austrian Hapsburgs had so long been accustomed to exercise over the German states, and he toppled the French Emperor from his throne ; and at the last he was the chief instrument in binding the states of Germany into the most powerful empire in Europe, and in putting the imperial crown upon the head of the King of Prussia. The policy of blood and iron justified itself by these results. Bismarck became the idol of the Prusso-German people. His diplomatic methods, dishonest and unscrupulous as they often were according to his own accounts, were accepted on the authority of his success as necessary and proper, and became the study and standards of German diplomats of a later period.

During the second stage, extending from 1875 to Bismarck's enforced retirement from active political life in 1890, the German chancellor continued to be the dominating figure. His task, however, was different. He had gained in the momentous events of 1862 to 1875 the position of supremacy which he desired for the Prusso-German state : it was his aim now to consolidate its resources and to maintain its prestige. Such a disturbance in the European family of nations as had been caused by his policy in the first stage was certain to cause suspicions and jealousies of Germany's ambitions — he had to allay these and steer for the new nation a peaceful course while it became accustomed to its conditions. His statesmanship during the great constructive period of fifteen years was not less notable than that of the previous thirteen, but it was entirely different and much more admirable. His efforts in this stage, too, were crowned with astounding success. In domestic affairs, he furthered industrial and social measures which had much to do with the marvelous advance of Germany in material prosperity and unity of sentiment. In foreign affairs, he succeeded in retaining the friendship of Russia, even during the trying years following the Congress of Berlin, and in keeping France isolated and helpless. When he laid down his authority in 1890, Germany was still the supreme power on the continent of Europe ; — the maintenance of this supremacy for nineteen years is a convincing evidence of his genius.

The third phase began with Bismarck's enforced retirement from political life in 1890 and lasted until 1911. The new Emperor of Germany, William II, proposed to be ruler in fact as well as in name, and to keep a firm control of the imperial policy. His inexperience, however, was fatal to Bismarck's plans. Within a few years Russia and France had concluded a hard and fast offensive and defensive treaty ; a decade later Great Britain and France ended a century of discord and misunderstanding by concluding an entente ; and in 1907 Russia and Great Britain completed the triangle by coming to an agreement upon the most menacing of the issues that existed between them. Thus German diplomacy had allowed a hostile Triple Entente to be formed against the central empire. Though avowedly defensive in nature, this Entente was capable of being converted into an offensive alliance at an instant's notice. Germany's recourse, when her diplomacy failed, was to her armaments. Her government, looking back to the diplomacy of Bismarck in the years when he established Prusso-German hegemony in Europe, prepared to revert to this policy of blood and iron to maintain its hegemony in the face of a hostile coalition. Its ambitions now transcended the bounds of German territory in Europe and extended to distant overseas colonies. Germany was to be, not only dominant in European politics, but dominant in world politics as well. With such purposes the government took measures to strengthen enormously the German army and to put upon the ocean a navy second only to that of England.

The final stage, from 1911 to 1914, is the shortest of the four. As the aims and ambitions of the German government became more clearly distinguishable, the determined opposition of Great Britain, France, and Russia became more inevitable. The atmosphere of mutual suspicion between members of the two opposing groups of powers became thicker. The Entente nations interpreted each move of Germany as a step in a deep-laid intrigue to weaken their power, whether such move consisted in a link of the Bagdad railroad, a loan to Turkey, or a concession in China ; and similarly, the German government viewed every move of the Entente powers as an effort to thwart Germany's legitimate aspirations to a "place under the sun" appropriate to her size and power, whether such move consisted in an Anglo-Russian sphere of influence in Persia, or a French protectorate in Morocco. Under such conditions the conflict could not long be delayed. In the summer of 1914 a relatively insignificant quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was accepted by the German leaders as an opportunity to assert German dictatorial rights in Europe. No doubt both Germany and Austria-Hungary hoped that no war would result, and that Russia — the nation whose vital interests were most immediately affected — would retire from her position, but the Central Powers ran consciously the risk of war. With startling rapidity the situation developed until on August 1 the Great War began.

Such, briefly stated, are the four stages of the period of European history extending from 1862 to 1914. In our account of the details of these stages, we have at the beginning laid all emphasis upon the history of Prussia, subordinating the account of events in the other states of Europe except as those events were directly affected by Prussia. Later in our account we have attempted to treat more fully the course of development in the other states, still limiting our story, however, to those facts which bore especially upon the international political situation. In the final chapters, the developments in Germany, while still prominent, are not stressed more than those in the other great states. We have thus consciously tried to represent by space and emphasis the relative importance of the individual states in the international history of Europe.