Britain in arms

Preface

THIS is not a war for the possession of a town, a province, or a colony ; we are battling for freedom, for the existence of our race. There is now but one great issue at stake, and that is to decide which of the two hostile groups shall survive and carry on its history through the ages. It is a terrible struggle for life or death, and to it each nation is bringing its last ounce of treasure, its last drop of blood.

Millions upon millions are being swallowed up and lost. When the final signature comes to be written at the foot of the treaty of peace, what will be left of Europe as once we knew it ? Think of the immeasurable devastation ! Of the countless graves ! What reck our soldiers ? The war has claimed our children ; let it take our children's children. We will grudge them not. We will give, and give freely, of our possessions, of our flesh and blood. All the riches of our soil, all the resources of our resolution, we will fling into the crucible. Our minds are made up : we will not die. In our complete self-surrender, the surrender of all that one is vi BRITAIN IN ARMS

and of all that one has, one is inevitably guilty now and then of that almost criminal disability to recognise any but one's own resolution to conquer and prone to forget the ardour of one's allies.

We ourselves are rising to the supreme height of sacrifice. Is it possible, we ask, that over there, away beyond sea and mountain, our comrades in the struggle are righting with an effort, a spirit of determination, commensurate with our own ?

Terrible is the moment when a man asks himself questions such as these. When the oarsman begins to dread that his companion is like to fail, he is near to feeling that the full burden of the task is weighing on him alone.

It is well, therefore, that someone should be heard from time to time telling us the part wrought by each in the fulfilment of the common duty.

Monsieur Destree, in the following pages, speaks to us of England, of the effort she is making on sea and land, and of the resolution by which she is inspired ; and the things he tells us are most splendid and reassuring.

England did not want war. It must be said once more to her credit, and, alas ! to her confusion, that she had not prepared for it. Had not Belgian neutrality been violated, who could sa} 7 when she would have drawn the sword ?

PREFACE vii

But now, behold her in the midst of the conflict. Slowly, but with a stubborn determination that nothing avails to diminish or to daunt, she has transformed herself into a military power.

She has accumulated vast numbers of guns, shells, and men. She has fenced herself about with four million bayonets. Wheresoever throughout all the length and breadth of the earth the noisome German weed had taken root, the British Tommy has turned up his sleeves and set about clearing the ground.

People render thanks to the British Fleet because, without stirring from its stations and without firing a shot, it has destroyed the German menace, blockaded the enemy's ports, and ensured the provisioning of our armies. It is true ! The silence of the long vigil it has kept detracts nothing from its grandeur. But England's miracle lies not there. It is not on the sea that England's miracle has been wrought. Dreadnoughts, cruisers, torpedo flotillas — these, after all, belonged to the England of tradition. The reason why the ancient Northern Island has grown in the esteem and admiration of men is that, for the first time in her immemorial history, she has ceased to be an island, ceased to desire to be but an island.

She has made herself one with the continent of Europe by giving those splendid tall sons of hers viii BRITAIN IN ARMS

who are fighting heroically in the Flanders trenches, by her guns, her convoys, and, above all, by the lofty serenity with which she has accepted (on our historic soil) the destiny of suffering and passionate strife.

And the splendour of the deed resides in this — that it is not the work of an hour, but the inevitable culmination of a history of ten centuries.

Other nations there are that have shed more freely of their life blood on the storied battlefields of Europe. Others have withstood the shock of mightier assaults, and been called upon to oppose with grimmer heroism the onrush of the barbarous foe. No other nation has resolved with such method and inflexibility to see through to the bitter end the task to which it has set its hand. No other nation has been conscious of such a complete metamorphosis in its customs, in the exercise of its rights and its claims to individual freedom.

Monsieur Destree, who is, as they used to say of Gambetta, one of the most ardent " commercial travellers " in Latin culture and the Latin entente, and who only ceases to explain Italy to the French in order to speak of England to the Italians, has said all this and much besides, in a manner that cannot be surpassed.

No one was better qualified than he to speak of

PREFACE ix

the great racial hatred which this ghastly war has at length brought into being from the ashes of long-standing illusions.

"No longer," he recently declared, " can I call any German friend or brother. I cannot take them by the hand, for their hands are too deeply dyed with the blood of my real friends and brothers, with the blood of those toilers of our industrial districts who reposed all too generous a trust in the influence and sincerity of social democracy. With them I will make no treaty, for they have declared that treaties are but scraps of paper to be disowned whenever their interests so direct.

" To this I will never assent, now or hereafter. But to-day, so long as the toilers of Belgium are compelled by a Reign of Terror unparalleled in human experience to bow to the will of their German conquerors, and so long as our land remains under the heel of the foe, it seems to me — and will not cease so to seem — singularly impossible to parley with the invader, even though the mask he wears be the mask of Socialism. And what, forsooth, is the subject on which we are invited to parley ? Upon what questions are we to seek for an agreement ? Did we, before the war, ask favours of Germany, and have we, since the war began, demanded anything save our independence, our liberty, and reparation for the ills that have been wrought us ? What x BRITAIN IN ARMS

imaginable compromise could there be on matters such as these ?

" Even if the questions at issue were of wider import, if it were hoped to make use of Belgium as a cunning means of subjecting us to the Pax Germanica, we could but reply to the emissaries of Germany as we made answer to her soldiers : ' No thoroughfare.' "

Brave words these, and well suited to the burning will to conquer that animates England and Russia, Italy and France, alike.

This book will strengthen the confidence of our brave soldiers and of those who, though not themselves in the firing line, support them with their labours. It will also serve to bring home to those neutral countries who still need convincing, that the Entente Powers must and will be victorious, and chiefly so because they have right on their side, and not only right but might as well.

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU

INTRODUCTORY NOTES

I WENT recently to spend a few months in Italy, where I wished to make known Belgium's real position in the European War ; and, while there, I took part in the movement which led Italy to participate in the great conflict. It was during my stay that I came to the conclusion that the stupendous character of England's effort was not sufficiently realised by our Italian friends ; and I was thus led to lay the facts before them, desirous of affording them fresh grounds for confidence and hope.

I have been asked to write a French version of " Cio che hanno fatto gli Inglesi," and I readily comply with the request, for in France, no less than in Italy, the part played by England has not invariably met with the appreciation it deserves.

But, in performing my task, I must crave the reader's indulgence for bringing before him a work of very modest pretensions, a work which, after all, is merely a resume of facts within the reach of anyone who reads the newspapers carefully, a work in which I have preferred to quote authoritaxii BRITAIN IN ARMS

tive opinions rather than indulge in any reflections of my own, a work conscientiously but hastily put together and exhibiting all the shortcomings inseparable from a topical production. I am undertaking the task because it seems to me that in a protracted conflict such as the present, confidence is just as necessary to the civil population as are munitions to the soldiers in the field. Day after day we are called upon to be on our guard against over-anxiety, weariness of spirit and discouragement, and I know of nothing better calculated to stiffen our resolution than an investigation of the achievements standing to the credit of the English people.

That so formidable an undertaking as theirs has been unmarked by failures and miscalculations it would be foolish to deny. But it would be infinitely more foolish to confine our attention solely to the failures and miscalculations and to take no account of the solid grounds which justify our confidence of victory, and so important are those grounds and so decisive that they leave in our minds no room for misgiving.

England, no less than France, has confronted the crisis with an energy so virile as profoundly to surprise those who thought that exhaustion had come upon her and that she was unworthy of wielding the sceptre that had formerly been hers. Her Navy is

INTRODUCTORY NOTES xiii

still the finest in the world, she is still ruler of the waves ; her wealth is inexhaustible, and she has placed it unstintingly at the disposal of the common cause ; her Army, which scarcely existed at the outbreak of war, is slowly and surely assuming the proportions of the armies of the Continent.

The moment we bethink ourselves of these fundamental truths, the moment we devote ourselves to a detailed examination of this inflexible determination to win, the forebodings of dark days disappear and the certainty of triumph takes their place.

All propaganda work, however modest its scope, which increases international confidence, is a preparation for the better days to come, and every one of us should consider it his duty to undertake it. For a Belgian like myself, it is doubly a duty, it is an attempt to discharge a debt of gratitude due to England and to France. t -q

I take this opportunity of gratefully recording the obligation I am under to my friend, Monsieur Richard Dupiereux, for the generous assistance he has rendered me.

Rome,

End of February ', igi6.

Contents

CHAPTER

I. How England, though anxious for Peace,

FOUND HERSELF INVOLVED IN THE WAR

Chapter I

HOW ENGLAND, THOUGH ANXIOUS FOR PEACE FOUND HERSELF INVOLVED IN THE WAR

"LA PER FIDE ALBION"

NO stock saying has been more vigorously exploited by the agents of Germany than that which speaks of England's perfidy. The countless variations that have been composed on this theme, accepted without thought or enquiry by the superficial, have helped to create a body of opinion unfavourable to England. There are people who deem her capable only of following a policy of selfishness and of being quite ready, if her interests required it, to achieve her aim by means of a more or less questionable character, limiting herself to staking her money on a good sporting chance, and so arranging matters as to leave the real sacrifice to others.

Now that I am about to endeavour to enlighten the public regarding the importance of England's share in the present war, I must beg the reader to divest himself of this prejudice, and to look at the matter in the light of the real facts of the case. If it is desired to estimate England's performance in its true proportions, it is essential not to allow our vision to be obscured by ready-made ideas and by preconceptions arising from ignorance and misapprehension of the true English character.

The English have their faults, no doubt, but perfidy is not one of them. The Englishman — and a few months in England will suffice to prove it — is not given to double-dealing. It was not on him that the gift of speech was bestowed in order that he might conceal his thoughts. He speaks out sincerely, artlessly almost, what is in his mind — no more and no less. Sophistry and subtlety do not belong to him. The Southern races, who are quick to understand, who seize an idea before it is completely expressed, who are prompt to divine innuendoes and mental reservations, are completely at fault when they credit the English with that intellectual finesse familiar to themselves. The Englishman is slow of comprehension, and he does not mean more than his words convey. Anything of an underhand nature displeases him and puts him out. Sincerity, real or assumed, disarms him, because it never enters his head to suspect the existence of trickery and subterfuge. " Honesty is the best policy." Plain, straightforward measures alone can hope to find favour with the English people.

This intellectual slowness may be a drawback, a defect ; in some circumstances it is almost exasperating. The English only realise a danger when they are directly threatened by it, when the peril is before them palpable, imminent, and undeniable. But from other points of view this trait of the English character is a fine quality, for it implies good faith and is calculated to inspire confidence. When at length he grasps the situation an Englishman knows how to act, and to act with stubbornness and tenacity. He makes no empty promises.

The opening of Negotiations

For anyone who has succeeded in recognising these fundamental characteristics of English psychology, the German tale about the war being due to the machinations of England and pursued by her for her own ends, is absurd on the face of it. One must be possessed of a really Teutonic obtuseness to absorb it.

The English diplomatic correspondence has been made public. Nothing could be clearer or more convincing than the evidence these documents afford. They show conclusively that during the latter days of July, 1914, those at the head of affairs in England — and particularly Sir Edward Grey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs — had but one thought and one desire, and that was to ensure the peace of Europe. Not only did they endeavour to localise the scourge, but they apparently never realised that they themselves might be drawn into the fray.

On the 23rd July Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Ambassador at Vienna as follows :

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna

It had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburg should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away.

On the 24th July he telegraphs :

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.

The same day he replied to Serbia's appeal somewhat curtly as follows :

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade

Serbia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Serbian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Serbian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Serbian interests.

Next day, we find the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, urgently representing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia should not precipitate war by mobilising before England had had an opportunity of taking steps to preserve peace.

Saint Petersburg,

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St.

Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey (received

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions.

To this Sir Edward Grey replied :

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

On the 27th July he wrote to Sir E. Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, to inform him of the result of an interview he had had with the German Ambassador in London :

2jth July, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so io BRITAIN IN ARMS

other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known ; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch.

As far on then as the 27th July Sir Edward Grey had seen in these events nothing more than a quarrel between Austria and Serbia. This in itself had no interest for him, and he only occupied himself with the matter because of the consequences that might ensue therefrom — consequences which he hoped, with Germany's aid, to avoid by mediation.

To understand the strange illusions that England was labouring under in regard to Germany, it behoves us to bear in mind the influence which was wielded by Germany's agents in England. Mr. Wickham Steed, Foreign Editor of The Times, one of the most deeply versed in international politics of all European journalists, explained it in a lecture he delivered in Paris :

Towards the end of May, 191 1, the Emperor William had met with a cordial reception in London — as grandson of Queen Victoria — when he came over to be present at the unveiling of the statue erected to her memory. Did the Emperor mistake the nature of the welcome that was then accorded to him ? Possibly he did. At all events he thought he could throw down the gauntlet to France some

ANXIOUS FOR PEACE n

months later without stirring up England. When Mr. Lloyd George's speech put him right on this point he altered his tactics. He set about ingratiating himself with England by slow and subtle means. The celebrated Ambassador, Marshal von Bieberstein, whose appointment to London had awakened the suspicions of the English, had died before he had had an opportunity of undertaking the work he had set himself to perform. The Emperor William appointed in his stead a diplomat of Polish origin, Prince Lichnowsky, who possessed all the necessary qualifications for disarming prejudice. Calm, courteous, and a very great aristocrat, he was a man whose good faith and goodwill were beyond all question. He was most ably seconded by his wife, a very distinguished Bavarian woman, with a somewhat French cast of mind. Prince Lichnowsky, then, quickly succeeded in making himself a considerable influence in London Society. Side by side with him, but out of sight, worked Herr von Kuhlmann, the skilful wire-puller, who, after organising the landing of the Emperor William at Tangier in 1905, had succeeded in gaining for himself the Imperial favour. Herr von Kuhlmann displayed the most multifarious activity. He got into touch with every journalist, great or small, whom he thought capable of advancing his ends. He skilfully beguiled the publicists, and having crowned them with chaplets, caused them to be invited to his Ambassador's board, where they found themselves side by side with the aristocracy of their country. By his genial bonhomie he managed to enlist many sympathies and even to convince the politicians and the staff of the Foreign Office of his excellent intentions. He multiplied the bonds of union between the Embassy and the cosmopolitan coteries of la haute finance and deftly availed himself of the influence of the German Steamship Companies.

Thoroughly to appreciate how ably he went to work, it must be remarked that German diplomacy had been clever enough to select the one means of conciliating English sympathies. Nothing exerts such a hold on the English character as sincerity. Cleverness makes little impression upon it. Brilliance may arouse admiration, but it also arouses mistrust. Straightforwardness, on the other hand, real or apparent, always finds the way to an Englishman's heart — a singular but undeniable characteristic of a nation that has borne for centuries a reputation for hypocrisy and double-dealing. The Balkan crisis then came to the assistance of German policy. At the commencement of the war between the Balkan allies and Turkey, the diplomats and Generals at Berlin and Vienna expected to see Bulgaria held in check by the main body of the Turkish forces, while other Turkish armies were disposing of Greece and Serbia. They calculated that after the defeat of Serbia, Austria would have held out a " protecting " hand to the latter and would have concluded an understanding with the Young Turks whereby she would have had free access to Salonica. It is important to note this miscalculation because at the bottom of it lies one of the chief causes of the present war. The Serbian victory at Kumanovo in November, 1912, was a bitter disappointment for Austria. At Vienna, where I was residing at the time, there was a sort of melancholy presentiment of a destiny that was moving towards its fulfilment, to a death-bed scene as it were. A few days after the battle of Kumanovo, a friend of General Konrad von Hotzendorf s, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, came to explain to me the ideas of the latter, and asked me if I did not approve of them. " The Chief of the Staff," said this friend of his, " is convinced that the only way to save Austria would be to deliver an immediate and heavy blow at Serbia and Russia. We could topple them over," he added, " before they had time to say ' knife,' and the monarchy would be set firmly on its legs again for another fifty years at least."

Germany also counted on the very real need which English politicians had for peace at this period. The Irish question, the great strike, the suffragette movement, the administration of the Old Age Pension Fund all called for the constant attention of parliamentarians. The idea of having to take part in a European conflict brought about by the Balkan question was highly distasteful to British statesmen and almost incomprehensible to the great mass of the people, who had foolishly been left in ignorance of foreign politics. German diplomacy employed every means in its power to foster this reluctance, to add to the popular ignorance and to embitter the domestic feuds. The British Government never suspected this underhand work, nor did it realise any the more that the i 4 BRITAIN IN ARMS

eagerness for peace manifested by Germany at the conference of Ambassadors was chiefly a ruse to gain time for the reconstruction of her Army. In England people felt grateful to Germany for her pacific policy, and of this gratitude Germany made skilful use, taking the opportunity of proposing agreements with regard to the Bagdad railway and other questions still more dangerous. England suffered herself to fall into those traps and did not discover the true state of affairs until after the present war had begun.

The efforts at mediation receive a check

Sir Edward Grey, then, had relied on the support of Germany for the success of his attempt at mediation. He received from Sir M. de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at Vienna, a dispatch (No. 32), stating that the German Ambassador approved the high-handed attitude of Austria, and had declared to him that, so far as Germany was concerned, she thoroughly understood what she was doing in lending her support to Austria. Next day, Sir M. de Bunsen added the following :

Vienna,

2jth July, 1914.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey (received 27th July)

The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-

Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.

About the same time (27th July) France was signifying her acceptance (No. 42) and Germany her refusal (No. 43) of the English proposals. As the German refusal was veiled beneath objections with regard to form and procedure, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to his country's Ambassador at Berlin to fall in with any method of procedure Germany might propose, and the following day, the 29th July (No. 77), he instructed him to inform the Chancellor as follows :

His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

On the 29th July three important telegrams passed between London and Berlin.

The first was Sir Edward Grey's supreme effort to secure a peaceful solution of the difficulty.

No. 84 Foreign Office,

I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would " press the button " in the interests of peace.

To this Germany does not so much as reply. She had determined on war, and now threw aside the mask. She asked Great Britain the conditions of her neutrality.

Berlin,

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey (received 29th July)

He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.