The war of positions

Preface

IT is unfortunate that authors of books are so rarely known to their readers. This is especially true of books dealing with professional matters. In such cases one would like to be assured that the author really knows his subject, and is not merely a tyro feeding his readers with self-derived knowledge.

In Lieutenant Colonel Paul Azan we have a fine type of the French officer, a representative of that noble, glorious, and chivalrous Army which has for three years challenged the admiration of the world, friend and foe alike. He has learned his subject, not only theoretically, but also practically, through long service in the trenches and at the expense of honorable wounds. It is to be regretted that all who read his book cannot know the author personally.

A War of Positions, such as is being waged to-day, has never been known before — at least not on anything approaching the present scale. It has been made possible by the mutual action and reaction of firearms and of field works, aided on both sides by the recent progress of all sorts of technical inventions.

In the exposition of his subject Lieutenant Colonel Azan has presented the fundamental principles of the war of positions in an exceptionally clear and able

PREFACE

manner. While written primarily for the soldier, the book is full of interest for the layman, and will enlighten the latter as to why it is so difficult to attain a military decision between antagonists fairly equal as to numbers, resourcefulness, and industrial development.

JOSEPH E. KUHN,

Brigadier General, General Staff, President Army War College.

I

Army War College,

Introduction

THE present war, with its multitude of new forms, has come as a surprise to that school of writers who believed that they could find the secret of victory in certain immutable precepts.

They might have avoided this misconception by a study of history. There they would have learned that although the same great principles of strategy brought victory to Hannibal, to Caesar, and to Napoleon, yet tactics have undergone countless fluctuations in the course of centuries, on account of the development of armament.

The curve of tactics is ever varying, yet always continuous. Among those forces whose resultant determines its direction, two in particular have greatly increased in recent years, the destructive power of cannon, the resisting capacity of field works. A careful evaluation of the importance of these forces in the recent wars of the Transvaal, of Manchuria, and of the Balkans has made it possible to sketch this curve day by day, to note its sinuosities, and to follow its development in a new direction.

Yet all this time certain arm-chair theorists, closing their eyes to actual facts, have still remained in the domain of speculation. As a basis for their doctrines, they have taken the victories of Napoleon, or the battles

INTRODUCTION

of 1870. In their wake a number of men of intelligence have been drawn by their imagination or by their enthusiasm into the realm of hypothesis and fancy, to the entire neglect of those quahties of reflection and judgment, which constitute the true value of a leader.

In the present war a similar state of affairs has been seen. How many military critics have proclaimed the impossibility of laying down general rules, on the ground that the conditions of battle were constantly changing! From time to time they have announced the passing of a new milestone in the evolution of tactics; it was merely the milestone which their intelhgence had passed on its road towards reality.

Since October 1914 the tactical curve has undergone but shght modifications. The two opposing forces of artillery and field works have, perhaps, gained still further in importance, each one developing in order to overthrow the other. But the essential principles of strategy and of tactics which govern the course of the present war have really changed but little since that date, nor can they ever vary but by slow degrees.

This work, in which an attempt is made to state these principles, is written for those who have not, as yet, taken part in this war, in order to spare them a difficult and dangerous apprenticeship. Perchance it will also give food for study and reflection to those of my young comrades who are seeking day by day, at the price of untold efforts, suffering, and bloodshed, to hasten the hour of victory.

PAGE

Peeface

. . iii

Introduction

PART I General Characteristics 5

Different Forms of Warfare 7

CHAPTER II Combat on a Front Fronts in General 12

Normal and Intensive Attrition 13

Principles of the Offensive on a Front 15

Role of the High Command in an Offensive 18

The Defensive 21

R6les and Functions of the Different Arms OF the Service

Infantry 23

Artillery 26

Engineers 27

Cavalry 29

Aviation Corps 31

PART II POSITIONS Definition of Positions and their Elements 37

Trenches 38

P^an of Organization 40

OutUne of the First Line Trench 41

Interior Shape of the Trench 43

Communicating or Doubling Trenches 46

Support Trenches 48

Covering Line for Artillery 49

Boyaux 50

Shelters, Observation Posts, etc 52

CHAPTER II Trench Duties

Liaison 54

The Stay in the Trenches 60

Role of the Commanders 61

Activities of the Troops 62

Supply of the Trench 64

General Principles of Relief 67

March of a Unit from its Cantonment to the Trenches . 68

Replacing of the Unit in Line 69

Return of the Unit Relieved 74

PART III ATTACK ON A POSITION General Remarks on Offensive Combat

Part Played by the Different Arms in the Engagement . 82 R61e of the Command 85

Detailed Study of the Two Opposing Positions .... 88

Material Am^nagement of the Departure Position . . 91

Smashing the Enemy's Position 95

Physical, Professional, and Moral Training of the Troops 100

Formations Adopted for the Attacking Units .... 103

Mechanism of March and of Combat 104

Struggle Inside the Position 110

Night Fighting 116

Orders, Reports, and Liaisons 118

Liaisons during the Attack 121

Liaison of the Attacking Troops with the Artillery . . 123

Forwarding of Reserves, Munitions, and Food .... 125

Organization of the Conquered Position 126

CHAPTER IV Maintenance of Contact with the Enemy 129

Continuity of Movement beyond the Position .... 130 Disorder and Demorahzation of Troops in Retreat and

of Reserves 133

Taking the Enemy's Lines in the Rear 136

Role of the Command 137

CHAPTER V March of Approach Preparation of the Approach 141

Execution of the Approach 142

R61e of the High Conamand 145

PART IV DEFENSE OF A POSITION General Observations on Defensive Fighting

Preliminary Remarks 151

Organization of the Defensive

Detailed Study of the Two Positions 154

Material Am^nagement of the Position 155

Physical and Moral Preparation of the Troops .... 157

Role of the Command 158

Maintenance of the Troops under Bombardment . . . 160

Defense of the First Line 162

Fighting in the Interior of the Position 164

CHAPTER IV

Retreat

Re-alignment of the Front 166

Retreat under Hostile Pressure 168

CHAPTER V

Retour Offensif

Objects and Methods 171

Conclusion 172

Part I The Present War

War, as it is waged to-day, presents a new aspect. This is not exactly the same in all countries; since the length and geographical nature of the fronts, as well as the strength and quality of the armies in Belgium, France, Italy, Serbia, and Russia are not comparable. Everywhere, however, the general characteristics of the war remain the same, since they are the result of two essential factors: the destructive power of heavy artillery and the defensive efficiency of field works.

It is a mistake to say that there are different principles of war for different fronts, or different countries. War between two adversaries, who possess sufficient forces, similar arms, and equivalent moral courage, is always dominated by the same principles, and produces the same effects. If it takes a different form, it is because one of the adversaries is notably inferior to the other. Such, for instance, is the case when an army without artillery and without munitions is opposed to one provided with all the modern engines of destruction. Under such circumstances, war assumes the aspect of the chase, and involves similar momentary risks; but there can be no doubt as to the outcome; victory is certain, and cannot be long delayed.

General Characteristics

The development of armaments has profoundly affected the conditions of combat between two armies.

The infantry of each side suffers enormous losses when it is exposed to the fire of machine guns, of field or of heavy artillery; moreover, in order to hold its ground, it is obhged to dig itself in. Furthermore, it must surround itself with accessory defenses, in order to avoid surprise by the enemy's infantry.

Consequently the assailant is held in one position. When he tries to envelop the flanks of the enemy, troops are rushed to the menaced point, stop him, and hold him in the same way in a position beside the first one.

And so the lines extend farther and farther until both ends rest simultaneously on impassable barriers, the sea or neutral countries, which are the lateral limits of the fronts.

Thus it is that, after the first encounters, a long ribbon called a trench is unrolled automatically along the front of each army. Between the two trenches is a neutral zone of variable width, at the most of some hundreds of yards.

If, in the present war, the adversaries could have foreseen from the beginning the part which " the trench " was destined to play, they would have made other preparations. Each would have built a veritable " Chinese wall," destined to guarantee the integrity of his national territory. From the very first day, the struggle would have assumed the aspect that it has since acquired. This is exactly what happened on the Austro-Italian front.

The trench dug along the front of each of the armies does not remain in the form of a single line. The points which are most important by reason of their eventual strategic or tactical value are strongly organized ; they become centres of resistance, made up of a redoubt, around which extend systems of trenches.

One or many centres of resistance, along with the trenches wliich surround or unite them, constitute a position.

Each position occupies a zone of very variable extent. This zone corresponds ordinarily to the task, offensive or defensive, which a large unit, army, army corps, or division, is expected to perform.

A position has both an offensive and a defensive function. It is in the shelter of its intrenchments that the attack to be carried out by a large unit is prepared: it is also by means of this organized position that an advance of the enemy can be repelled.

The front of an army is made up of all the positions placed side by side in an unbroken line, and resting throughout its depth on well chosen successive lines.

Behind the front, other positions are prepared and maintained, especially at points of strategic or tactical importance, in order to arrest an eventual retreat of the troops from the front line.

Combat between two opposing armies consists in attacking and defending positions. The offensive as well as the defensive may be local, multiple, or general, according to whether [6]

it occurs in a limited zone, in several different zones, or along the entire front.

A general offensive, in the proper sense of the word, is impossible on a very widely extended front; to execute and maintain it would demand immense resources both in men and materiel. Therefore a combat characterized by a multiple offensive in a certain number of zones and by a multiple defensive in the complementary zones, along a widely extended front, is termed a general offensive.

Different Forms of Warfare

The present war may be called a war of positions.

It seems to resemble a war of sieges, but really differs from it in many respects; in certain special contingencies, however, it permits a real war of sieges to take place.

Lastly, it stamps its special characteristics upon war of movement, in those exceptional cases in which the latter becomes possible.

Whenever two adversaries are approximately equal in power, the war of positions is the only one possible. Admitting that the line of resistance of one of them may be temporarily pushed back on a large extent of front, and that two or even three successive lines of positions may be carried, there always remains in the rear another line of positions, under the cover of which the vanquished party may reorganize his forces; the parts of the front adjoining that which has given way accept the necessity of retirement and set themselves to work to straighten out the line. War of movement is, therefore, restricted to the space which separates the positions captured from the positions behind them.

If, on the other hand, a victorious offensive definitively cuts the enemy's line, war of movement may find wider scope. Either the beaten troops become demoralized and, if pursued with energy, throw their own reserves into disorder — thus causing a disaster which the resistance of a few fragments of the line will have great difficulty in repairing; or else the remnants of these troops, falling back on imshaken reserves, are able, with them, to rally on new positions; in this latter case eaqh fragment individually experiences war of movements, though it tends to establish itself, for actual fighting, in a position which it either reinforces or prepares afresh.

War of movement is thus, for the time being, generally imposed by the stronger on the weaker side; in fact it logically betokens the beginning of victory. But it modifies itself more or less rapidly, according to the courage or the tenacity of the defeated troops, into a war of positions; it thus permits the equilibrium of combat to be reestablished and a new line of resistance to be formed. Then the war of positions begins again.

There are, nevertheless, circumstances in which the war does not present the aspect of two lines of opposing positions, each endeavoring to force the other back, but in which it resumes the features of a war of movement.

These instances are as follows:

1. When one of the armies is insufficiently supplied either with men or materiel, to cover the fronts which it must hold;

2. When one of the armies, having its front well supplied, lacks sufficient reserves either in men or in materiel, to go to the rescue in case a breach is made. This might occur when a belligerent, enfeebled by the wastage of the war, did not soon enough accept the necessity of shortening his front.

3. When the armies facing each other have to manoeuver over a large space in comparison with the amount of their effectives — as in East Africa or Equatorial Africa, in Mesopotamia, etc.

In these different instances, the troops are no longer held in by a continuous barrier which prevents manoeuvering. And yet, when they come into contact, they all consolidate their positions by digging trenches, by providing them with accessory defenses, by utilizing their artillery to the best possible advantage. Thus the actual combat, which follows these preparations, takes on the same character as the war of positions.

Movement, when it becomes possible, is limited, furthermore, by a reason other than the encountering of organized positions; this is the difficulty of transporting an adequate supply of materiel and of provisions.

Bold and rapid manoeuvers, such as used to be carried out, have become very difficult. Napoleon could say that he " made war by the legs of his soldiers," because his success came through bringing up his infantry by forced marches, in order that, at the critical moment, they should intervene on the battle field.

To-day, it is the heavy artillery which must be moved in order to win. For this, railroads are necessary, or at least excellent roads that will support immense burdens. As the defeated army is certain to destroy, or at least to injure, its lines of communication in its retreat, it becomes necessary to repair them. The preparation of gun-emplacements, and of ammunition depots, demands much labor; for the heaviest guns it is even necessary to construct platforms. The installation of telephones betv/een the observing stations, the guns, and the commanders is a long affair. The artillery fire must be adjusted on new targets. All these preparations take time. Lastly, tliis artillery will be of very little use in the battle if it is not furnished with an enormous amount of ammunition, capable of being supplied without interruption; this one great need, with which are connected so many others relative to the suppljdng of the troops, makes essential a system of communications in which railroads, coming as close as possible to the front line, are necessary.

Rapidity and range of movement in the present war are, consequently, proportional to the mobility of the heavy artUlery.

The most important feature of moving from one position to another no longer consists in the approach of the infantry and of the field artillery, but rather in the transportation and in the setting up of the heavy artillery. Movement is made easier if it be possible to keep in hand a supply of heavy materiel loaded on wheels or tractors, ready to follow instantly in the wake of victorious troops.

Detachments of all arms excepting heavy artillery, but including field pieces, motor-carried guns, and armored cars, may have important results in a pursuit; they may also promote success by effecting a surprise or by making a diversion. But they cannot assault a strongly organized position defended by seasoned troops.

To gain victory, it is essential to have heavy artillery in as large quantities as possible, furnished with up-to-date means of transport, and supplied with abundant ammunition.

This heavy artillery must be of the rapid-fire type, since in the same length of time a rapid-fire gun will throw as many projectiles as several slow-firing ones, since it can be much more easily moved and installed in a new position, and since it demands fewer men to handle it.

The considerable breadth of the zone in which an attack must be carried out, from one position to another, demands immense expenditure of ammunition, and causes rapid deterioration of the guns. Only intensive manufacture can keep up with this prodigious consumption of cannon and shells.

Thus the present war is, from many points of view, a war of materiel.

Fronts in General

A irofit is, from the strategic point of view, an unbroken liAe of positions, limited in length by an insurmountable obstacle at each end.

A front is generally subdivided into a series of zones, each of which, by an extension of meaning, is called a front. This occurs particularly when several allied nations share the same front; in such cases one speaks, according to the nationality of the troops engaged, of the Belgian front, the English front, the French front.

Whatever may be the number of fronts held by a single nation or by several allied nations, one essential principle must dominate in the conflict: the perfect coordination of efforts.

For a nation, acting independently, this coordination is ensured by the Commander-in-Chief. For a group of alUed nations, it is secured by a single body, a sort of Superior Council, whose orders are executed by the Commanders-in-Chief on each front.

The judicious distribution of human effectives or of material reserves, the opportunities of bringing them into action, the intensifying or easing up of attacks on this or that front are thus regulated by a supreme authority whose sole aim is to win.

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Victory is obtained by the destruction of the armies of the enemy. On every front, therefore, this is the result which must be attained.

Normal and Intensive Attrition

Combat on a front is the sum total of the daily engagements which occur there, both offensive and defensive.

Its aim is the destruction of the enemy's army.

This array is protected by a trench, a long barrier bristling with positions. It has at command reserves which are distributed behind the principal zones, ready to move toward any threatened point.

The endeavor is to compass the destruction of this army by attrition.

Attrition is the loss in men and in materiel imposed upon the adversary during a definite period.

Attrition in men is irreparable. Even supposing that a higher birth rate may more than compensate the losses of a nation, this increase will be of no advantage to the armies for twenty years. Attrition in men is estimated by adding together the killed and the permanently disabled. Its real importance is determined at any given period by comparing two numbers: the total number of men who were subject to mobilization at the beginning of the war or have become so since, and the total number of the killed and unfit.

Attrition in materiel may be repaired by increased activity in the factories. Thus its real importance is estimated by the difference between production and consumption; it depends, furthermore, on the difference between the stock of raw material and the demands of manufacture. If either one of these differences diminishes to the vanishing point every increased demand for consumption and every accidental delay in production may mean disaster.

Attrition is the more dangerous for a nation, all of whose fronts are being engaged, in that it possesses the less reserves. There comes a moment in fact when the dearth of effectives is reflected not only in the number of troops at the front, but also in the number of workers in the factories. Then it becomes necessary either to shorten the front, or to diminish industrial production.

Attrition, on the contrary, is less dangerous for a nation which has a considerable reservoir of human reserves.

In any event, it is always necessary to keep a close watch on attrition in materiel, since the number of cannon adequately furnished with munitions is often more important than the number of battahons in the line. Hitherto, it was the infantry of the two opposing sides that came into collision; the victory went to that one which at the last moment could avail itself of further reserves to throw in against the troops already exhausted by the combat. But to-day the effect of artillery on the earthworks and guns of the enemy is the decisive factor in success; victory goes to that army which has guns in good condition and abundant munitions, as against an enemy whose suppUes have given out. The flinging of innumerable infantrymen against batteries that are still intact results in nothing but useless slaughter.

Normal attrition occurs in zones wliich are stationary, in other words, in trench warfare. It carmot lead to any decisive result. On the other hand its effectiveness must never be lost sight of, and is frequently pointed out to the troops engaged, because it stimulates their morale and their activity during those periods when operations have slowed down.

Intensive attrition occurs either through offensive operations which are conducted for the purpose of seeking out the enemy in his entrenchments, and which cost him heavy losses in men and in materiel, either through capture or destruction ; or by defensive actions which prohibit the enemy from access to occupied positions.

It is the methodical offensive of the infantry, prepared and accompanied by a powerful artUlery fire, which at a given moment causes a break in the balance of power between the two armies by reason of intensive attrition throughout a large zone.

Principles of the Offensive on a Front

The offensive on a given front is always general, in the sense that all zones are constantly preparing for conflict, and are continually studying the methods of conducting a successful advance.

Attacks are actually set in motion, however, only in a few zones, since it would demand unlimited reserves both in men and in materiel to sustain them over the entire front.

The principle of economy of forces in a general offensive, therefore, makes it advisable not to attack in certain zones. In particular, it is wiser to rest on the defensive when opposite positions the taking of which would have no important tactical results, or which would necessitate sacrifices disproportionate to possible gains.

The zones of attack are determined by the Commander-in Chief. They are always considerable in extent, from fifteen to twenty miles or more, and ordinarily correspond to the strength of an army. Attacks executed on a narrower front force the troops into a salient, and thus expose them to considerable losses without obtaining any result.

The zones of attack are the object of thorough preliminary study, which bears on the organization of the terrain, as well as on the configuration and the defense of the enemy positions. This study takes into account the measure of completeness reached by the preparations for the offensive in all zones. The troops in the trenches should devote themselves linremittingly to these preparations.

Each zone, whether or not it be in the plan of attack, has at call its own reserves. General reserves, in as large numbers as possible, are at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

Different attacks are not necessarily simultaneous; if they occur in succession it tends to disconcert the enemy.

One of them is ordinarily considered the principal attack. It has as its object the capture of one or of many successive positions. It aims to enlarge the breach already made, and to bring about the fall of the positions on either side of it.

Secondary attacks are as far as possible made at other points. Their purpose is not only to make the enemy uncertain as to the direction of the principal attack and to hold in place the reserves of the different zones, but also to disorganize and break the enemy's lines and to cause him to move back.

Every attack ought to be conducted with extreme vigor, until its predetermined object is entirely accomplished. The chief officer charged with executing it should assure himself beforehand that he has at his disposal the means necessary to carry it through. It is not for him to ask whether his is the principal or secondary attack, but merely to take to heart the idea that his success may give the victory to his country.

Luck plays a great part in battles. An attack considered at the beginning as secondary may become the principal one, if its crushing success in the zone where it occurs brings about unhoped for results.

Thus, every partial attack, having no other aim than that of " making a demonstration " ought to be avoided. It can result in nothing useful. Even the capture of a few trenches does not deceive the enemy, and often costs the troops engaged heavier losses than an attack of great magnitude.

Two conditions are essential to the success of an offensive: secrecy of preparation and rapidity of execution.

Secrecy is obtained by the disciplined discretion of the troops and of the civil population; by the constant carrying on of work of the same character along the whole front; by the ceaseless watchfulness of the aviators, which prohibits reconnaissance by the enemy's aviators.

Rapidity is ensured by the habits of order and discipline of the troops; by knowledge of and obedience to the rules relating to the occupation of positions; by the foresight of the generals and their staffs during their preliminary studies and the period of preparation.

A successful attack makes a breach in the front line of the enemy, a breach which becomes deeper and wider each day through the fall of lateral and successive positions.

The result is that other parts of the front, in danger of being attacked from the rear, are obliged to fall back in order to straighten the line.

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This is the movement for which all the troops in line are watching. Through incessant activity they try to keep the enemy fixed where he is; they thus prohibit him from retiring his artillery and clearing the men from his trenches; they inform themselves concerning his situation and his intentions by every possible means, especially at night.

On learning of the expected retreat they follow up the enemy's troops closely, harass them in every possible way, and pursue t^em without respite. Not only do they thus secure a large section of territory, of which the possession may be useful; but above all they bring about the capture or destruction of men and materiel in large quantities, which is a sure token of victory.

R6le of the High Command in an Offensive

The Commander-in-Chief chooses the zones of attack, determines the effectives which he will devote to each of them, and fixes the day on which the attack shall take place.

He confides his purpose to each of the army commanders whose business it is to direct an attack. He indicates to each of them the zone which is to be his, the task entrusted to him, the effectives and material resources at his command, and the ultimate aim for him to attain.

Each army commander acting on these data attends to the distribution of his army corps and to the drawing up of the reserves at his disposal; he indicates to every commander of an army corps his zone of attack, the part he is to play and his successive objectives; he gives all the orders necessary for the reconnaissance of the enemy's positions, the preparation of the terrain, the organization of supplies.

Every army corps commander gives orders relative to the preparation and execution of the attack within the limits of his own zone and his own particular mission.

When the date agreed on for the attack is near, the Commander-in-Chief, who has been kept constantly informed as to the state of preparation for the different attacks, makes certain that this preparation is absolutely complete. He launches the attacks at the moment which seems to him opportune, either simultaneously or in succession.

During every attack, exactitude and continuity of information from the top to the bottom of the official ladder are one of the essential conditions of success.

The army commander continually reports to the Commander-in-Chief the objectives reached, subsequent possibilities, and diflSculties encountered. For this it is necessary that he himself should be accurately informed. It is moreover essential that he should have precise information, in order to be able to play his personal part, limited though it be, in the action which he has prepared, since he has to send in his reserves at the right moment if the attack appears to be approaching success, and must not waste them uselessly if the attack has encountered insurmountable difficulties.