American minute men of today

Preface

"Give me liberty or give me death." — Patrick Henry.

"In time of peace prepare for war." — George Washington.

"War is hell." — Gen, W. T. Sherman,

"Let us have peace." — Gen. U. S. Grant.

From the cradle days of American liberty to the present hour every patriot has been conscious of the need to stimulate national spirit and patriotic endeavor. Our great statesmen and warriors have charged us to be ready to defend our rights and liberties and to avoid war through preparedness. We need to respond to the present call of the President and this can best be done by every loyal man and woman doing his or her duty to home and country. We want the work of the Republic done by universal service in military and civil branches as far as practicable. We want universal military training for our youth serving not as a task but as a duty.

This book is designed to briefly outline the co-ordinated activities that are embraced in the term — national preparedness for peace through adequate preparedness for war.

General Outline for Nationsd Preparedness on Land and Sea — Covering Military and Naval Tactics, Manoeuvering and Strategy — Functions of Civilian Organizations — Influence of World War.

From the President of the United States down to the humblest citizen there is no topic that is of more intense interest than that of national preparedness. Whete the questions of military, commercial and industrial relations of the United States have been discussed from an academic or practical viewpoint by a few thoughtful and public-spirited citizens, it has now become a matter which everyone is impelled to consider and discuss as something- of immediate urgency.

The complete isolation of America in its relations to the other prime nations of the world has been suddenly terminated and we find ourselves involved, against our will, and contrary to our historical principles, in a situation which means war against the Teutonic Allies. Our nation which has grown from a struggling group of thirteen colonies along the Atlantic seaboard from New Hampshire to Georgia and hardly penetrating beyond the immediate reaches of the coast, has become an empire that stretches across

3,000 miles of continent and embraces 3,000,000 square miles of compact territory besides insular and detached territories aggregating an additional 800,000 square miles. From 3,000,000 our population in the United States has increased to more than 110,000,000 . in the 141 years of our existence as a nation, and we have 10,000,000 people in our outlying possessions.

Throughout our career under a written Constitution we have avoided the complications arising from "foreign entanglements" and have hoped to see ourselves continue as the pre-eminent neutral nation.

In the spirit of peace and not of bravado one of our early Presidents promulgated the Monroe doctrine which declared that the United States would look with disfavor and would, if necessary, forcibly repel further territorial acquisition or governmental aggression by any foreign powers with regard to the Pan-American countries. Our adherence to the Monroe doctrine and our sedulous avoidance of any alliances whatsoever with other nations have kept us free from the threat of war from foreign sources. Our great Civil War was fought and settled without foreign intervention, chiefly because Great Britain preferred to see the North American and South American continents controlled by the Monroe doctrine rather than have this policy defeated and unchecked European aggrandizement permitted in the western hemisphere.

With the outbreak of the world war in August, 1914, President Wilson announced the intention of this country to remain strictly neutral and he has maintained this attitude throughout the trying years of the great conflict. The severance of diplomatic relations with Germany did not come as a result of any untoward act of the United States, but as the culmination of an unprecedented course of infringements of neutrality and violations of international law.

Even in the early months of the world war it was declared by many who looked with prophetic eyes toward the future that the United States must be involved owing to the assaults that were being made upon the inalienable rights of mankind.

It was advocated that this nation prepare for the eventualities of embargoes, trade cartels, hostile demonstrations and even open war against the republic.

Those who spoke for preparedness were classed as "fire eaters," preachers of jingoism and advocates of militarism.

Now that the events of the war have reached a stage where it is seen that the United States is involved and its rights are disregarded, the question of national preparedness becomes of overwhelming importance.

Those who indulge in lavish dreams of the efficiency of a nation of farmers, "arising as one man and marching into battle," untrained and unarmed, tell us that without service, without equipment and on instant call the citizens of the United States can defend their homes, their country and their honor. We know this is not true.

Others who feel the necessity for adequate training and preparation speak of armies of millions, limitless fleets and appropriations that soar into the billions.

We are told by one class of publicists that foreign forces can overwhelm our borders either on the Atlantic or the Pacific coast and that our cities, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington and San

Francisco, can be demolished as if by the hand of a giant and that nothing can save this country from such a fate.

From all this mass of conflicting statements the average citizen is unable to draw a clear conception of the actual necessities of our country.

It is for the purpose of furnishing a reasonable, complete, suggestive and unprejudiced statement of conditions and of the remedies that are at hand that this book is submitted to the American people.

It is not a technical thesis, nor is it designed to be a lurid picture of threatened desolation of America. The common sense and the determined courage of our people are as great assets today as in the days of the American revolution, in the days of the war of 1812, during the Civil War or in our more recent Spanish-American war. What we need most is guidance.

Patriotism and an immediate response to the obligations of citizenship can be counted upon in the present instance. The themes that are discussed in the pages to follow and the plans that are presented are intended to serve as mental guides to those who wish to pursue any one course of action that will help to make America the land, prepared to defend peace by the ability to wage effective war.

Modern Tactics.

Any understanding of military activity must be based upon a knowledge of tactics. This is essentially proven from the fact that movements of men that are not regulated by prescribed tactics are characterized as the acts of the mob and rabble. It is for the purpose of instructing the youth of the country in the proper handling of arms and in the regulated movements of the various formations of troops and naval forces, that schools of military and naval training, are maintained. We have our regular army and navy establishments supplemented by state militia and naval reserve for the purpose of properly educating those who serve under the government or as volunteers.

Modern tactics are shown to differ widely from those which were declared to be practically immutable in the military colleges prior to the outbreak of the world war. Before the day of the Belgian invasion it was believed by tacticians that mass formation and great frontal attacks constituted the proper method for armies to pursue when invading an enemy's country or in taking the field to defend its own territory.

The result of the first few weeks of the German invasion in August and September, 1914, proved that while an overwhelming army, supported by modern heavy artillery, could surround and demolish citadels such as Liege, Namur and Maubeuge, the halt to the forward movement of the armed mass was sufficient to defeat the purpose of the campaign. The objective of the German drive was Paris and the obstacles which confronted the armies in the cities mentioned above proved fatal and frustrated the successful carrying out of the invasion. Time was given to the French, Belgians and their allies to rally in defense and to assume safe positions in open order and trench defense. From the day that the battle of the Marne turned the German invasion into retreat and ultimately into a long trench deadlock, the great field army movements which the general staffs of all the European powers had worked out to perfection in theory, were drastically revised.

Applying the lesson of the present war to America it can be shown that no foreign foe is likely to be in a position to land an mvading army of a half million men or more upon any of our coasts. Yet we find that such a huge expeditionary force and attack in mass formation are not impossible of accomplishment. This should furnish our army and coast defense students with a key upon which to base their plans, and should intensify the efforts to have a mobile force of coast defense artillery supplemented by a sufficient number of riflemen and their auxiliaries to make possible a stubborn and successful trench and open order defense at all points on our coasts and frontiers.

The progress of the world war has proven that on the western front, most territory has to be gained by yards and not by miles. In contrast to this is the adherence to mass movements on the eastern front, w^here Russia, Germany and Austria have followed the professional teachings of tacticians in developing their several invasions, retreats and re-capturing of territory, ;a d fortified cities. In Asia Minor the same method of using armies in the field has been pursued bv Great Britain in the drive to Bagdad and by the return assault of Turkey in repelling this attack, culminating in the defeat of the British at Kut-el-Amara. This was followed by a second campaign by the British which dragged along, but resulted in the re-occupation of Kut, and fall of Bagdad, The Russians under the Grand Duke Nicholas, also, illustrated the move-

■ment of troops over open territory covering the invasion of Asia Minor and the practical subjugation of the Turks in Armenia.

Intensive war is the prevailing method in Europe where the most modern equipment, including air ships and all the engines of destruction embraced under the term of modern scientific weapons, are used, such as gas, torpedoes, liquid fire and the other unusual agencies. In Africa and in all other fields where hostilities have been in progress old-time tactics have K-een followed, due to the fact that native forces have been employed under European officers and oldfashioned equipment has predominated.

Considering the necessities of the United States, it may be said that our expedition into Mexico and along the Texas border in 1916 demonstrated the inadequacy of our equipment in what is now regarded as the indispensable requisites for modern warfare, including airships, satisfactory transit facilities, medical and commissary equipment. From a study of our own limitations and the necessities that have developed in the armies of Continental Europe under the present great conflict it can be shown that the requirements of today and the future necessitate a re-organized army and navy as to units and the tactics under which they must operate. Without attempting to set down fixed rules for military regulation it can be stated that remodelled units must be constituted which are fully self-supporting, both in the army and the navy. In subsequent chapters this theory will be carried out in sufficient detail to be plain to even the most untutored citizen. Here it is sufficient to say that we now know that an individual infantry regiment without artillery, signal corps, cavalry, and medical support, cannot operate against a modernly equipped enemy.

Likewise a major battleship without support cannot engage in successful warfare under modern conditions. The battleship is impotent unless supported by auxiliary forces, including scout ships, cruisers, torpedo boats, submarines and air craft. One of the reasons why less progress is made in the plans for preparedness is that officers in the various branches of the military departments magnify the importance of their own branch of the service and minimize that of others, so that they demand an unbalanced plan of development for national defense. It is now accepted as an axiom of modern war that the eyes of the army and navy are its aviation corps. This does not permit of cavil, and both the army and navy should co-operate in impressing upon Congress the importance of making our air craft adequate to our needs.

The proper development of an aviation corps for both the coast defense and army will insure the United States against invasion or the sudden landing of an armed force, for desultory attack, better than any other method. It can be developed by a system of modern tactics so that air-craft will effectively prevent an enemy from "digging in" even should they, by any unexpected development of fortuitous weather or temporary inefficient defense, land upon our shores. The question of developing tactics for aviation in conjunction with the army and navy is new in American military affairs and we have the benefit of the results now being illustrated daily on the thousands of miles of battle-front in Europe and throughout other areas where war prevails to guide us.

Those who have been able to study from personal observation some of the results of the great war, declare that the drive of the Allies on the western front in France in July, 1916, was made effective by the intelligence which was gathered by means of the airships of the French and English, which had at that time gained ascendancy over the German aviators. Concurrent with the operation of airship tactics must come a complete revision of the tactics for the movements of the army and a very radical change in the drill and manoeuvering of the navy.

It will not suffice for a bureaucracy in any of the departments to oppose changes that make for the more efficient power of the armed forces of our country. Line officers, general staff officers and heads of departments must be brought to a point where they can all co-operate for a general result. This has been done by such conflicting forces as are represented in the Entente Council for War, and commercial preparedness which embraces Great Britain, Russia, Japan, France and Italy, to name only the prime nations that represent the Allies. If these nations and these empires can submerge their individual policies, plans, ambitions and prejudices to procure unity of motion, certainly the United States, with one form of government, and that deriving its power from the free voice of the people, can attain unity for its armed protection and without delay or rancorous debate.

Modern Manoeuvering.

As distinguished from tactics which has to do with the minute handling of men, armies, war material and the actual drill of the various units, the question of manoeuvering must be considered as an important feature of preparedness. In the manoeuvering of forces on land the generals in charge of armies or the officers' in charge of smaller bodies of troops follow fixed rules that time and experience have taught to be wise. These embrace the disposition of infantry forces, cavalry, artillery and the various auxiliary branches of the army. Nothing in the old-time books on military affairs has touched upon such questions as radio communication, aerial operation and observation, attack by gas and liquid fire. These are developments of the present world war and make necessary readjustment of the disposition of troops in the field or their location in citadels, earth fortifications or open trenches. The extraordinary range of modern artillery, which makes possible the bombardment of cities and military positions at a distance of 10 to 12 miles, completely destroys the efficacy of old-time manoeuvering. Another blasting result to the old school comes from the complete observation of troop movements that can be made by means of modern balloons and airships. It is shown by the lessons already taught in the world war that modern field manoeuvers and attempted invasions require from five to ten times the number of fighting units that were heretofore judged as adequate for carrying out such plans.

Had it not been for the aerial observations that were made on the Gallipoli Peninsula by the German and Turkish aviators, the landing of the English and French forces on the peninsula would have come as a surprise and the attack would unquestionably have been successful. Aerial observers were able to warn the Teuton Allies of the approach of the enemy and minutely to direct the operation of field artillery to the positions which the English and French took up.

Another example of the use of air-craft for assisting in manoeuvering in modern war was the Zeppelins in locating the British high sea fleet off Jutland on May 31, 1916.

This modern agency, which has been properly termed the eyes of the army and navy, robs manoeuvering of the element of surprise and renders impossible the wonderful achievements which make Napoleon and other generals of the past famous for their audacious and effective surprises. Modern manoeuvering must contemplate the fact that the enemy is fully apprised of the disposition of troops. There remains, however, to the navy some possibility of counteracting the intelligence which is conveyed to the enemy by aviators. A modern fleet in a movement toward an enemy's force on the high seas can at once change its course and either engage in battle or evade the issue. This is something which cannot be so readily done by armies in the field.

All the teachings of military experts in the past are subject to drastic revision and none fall more completely under the modern ban than those which have to deal with manoeuvers. It is most important that the officers of our army, the non-commissioned officers and even the soldiers and sailors should have a clear conception of what modern tactics, manoeuver and strategy imply. Those who have been close observers on the European battle-fronts declare that the 20th century soldier is an entirely different unit from the stolid infantryman, cavalryman or artilleryman of past years. In both the armies of the Entente Allies and the Teutonic Allies great initiative and intuitive action rests with the individual and this results from the fact that the officers of both belligerents have been compelled to give close instructions in many branches of military action to their men under the high pressure of necessity and under actual fire. Such lessons are quickly learned and never forgotten.

Modern Strategy.

Having reached a point in the discussion of military affairs where it is understood that tactics and manoeuvering constitute the first and second stages of training, it is time to give heed to the wider application of learning thus acquired. This comes under the heading of strategy. All generals in the past have endeavored to acquire renown by developing strategic moves in times of war that would bring a greater force of armed men at a given point than the enemy could assemble, or by the application of strategy to accomplish a surprise attack and secure results by the rapid employment of a numerically inferior force. In all this, secrecy was a necessity. In ancient and medieval times, as well as up to the present era of electrical communication, all generals and naval officers had to depend upon news brought by courier or by the inferior and unreliable methods of physical signalling, such as wig-wagging. Modern war, as the term is now understood, largely does away with secrecy and thus leaves both belligerents stripped of the power of exercising strategy with the element of surprise. The general staffs of conflicting nations soon show by the plan of battle they engage in, and the territory in which they operate, what their objective is and this determines the character of their strategy.

When Germany decided to enter the war the strategy of the general staff sought to crush first France and then Russia. As the quickest means to this end a road to Paris across Belgium was chosen. .Since that time, the first weeks of the world war, there has been no high strategy developed by the German general staff. The moves since the failure of the drive on Paris have been those of an enemy seeking to recover freedom of movement after a disastrous repulse.

The Allies have developed three lines of strategy, each of which is proving effective though slow in development. First, Great Britain by agreement with her Allies assumed the offensive on the high seas and her fleets have dominated the waters of the world since the opening day of the war. The second strategic movement of the Allies was in concentrating a huge expeditionary force at the Egyptian end of the Suez Canal and in attacking the Dardanelles. This was for the purpose of checking invasion of British territory either in Asia or Africa that would be interpreted by the millions of natives in India and Africa and in the Oceanic Archipelago as a sign of British weakness. No loss that was suffered at Gallipoli can be considered as too great for the results attained. At the time that the Russian armies were being forced back by the German drive on the east front in 1915 it was essential for the political solidarity of the British Empire that Russia should not weaken ; that Japan should be given a conclusive demonstration that England was in the war to win, and that the colonials and natives in all of Great Britain's possessions should be shown that the mother country was indomitable and invincible. The GalHpoli campaign assured these ends and saved the Suez Canal.

The third strategic plan of the Allies was to carry out a complete capture of all of Germany's territorial possessions. This has been done to such an extent that of the one million square miles which were under the German flag August 1, 1914, practically all is now in the possession of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Japan, or apparently hopelessly defended.

The battles in France, Russia, Italy and in the Balkan states have been forced, not by the strategy developed by the Allies, but by the circumstances that the Central powers occupied a compact territory and had the advantage of the quick shifting of armies to any of their three chief battle-fronts. If the adoption of a policy of persistent retention of captured possessions and intensive attack on lost territory can be termed strategy the Allies have adopted this with the motto, "All territory held by the Teutons must be evacuated as a condition precedent to peace."

This can be interpreted into the same policy that General Grant adopted when he uttered his famous dictum, "We will fight this out on these lines if it takes all Summer." His tenacity and unceasing fighting won on this basis. The enemy was given no rest and no protection from a persistent battle at one point. The Allies who had war thrust upon them in Europe have been able in the two and one-half years of the conflict to weld an iron ring around the Central powers. This ring holds at all points and is constantly contracting. It is the belief of the world that only one result can come from the continuation of this policy and that is the defeat of the Central powers.

When trench warfare became the settled condition of the western battle-front and to a large extent on the eastern battle-front in Europe, generals, as well as admirals, had to resort to a new method of warfare and surrender the dreams of developing successful strategies. The campaign for a blockade of the Baltic and of the North seas by the British high sea fleet at long distances and with only partial effectiveness, came as the result of modern conditions, the chief of which was the development of the submarine. In the army a supplemental strategic move of the Allies came in the inauguration of the Salonica campaign. This, as in the case of the Gallipoli campaign, which it succeeded as a logical development, was based upon political as well as military reasons. The neutrality, or at least the inactivity, of Greece was insured and the division of the military forces of the Balkans was accomplished, Germany and her allies securing the co-operation of Bulgaria and the Entente Allies securing the late, but serviceable, co-operation of Rumania and the resuscitation of the armed forces of Servia.

Applied to the United States under present conditions the strategies developed in Europe and throughout the world during the past two years and more of war should teach the lesson that naval supremacy is the chief defense and the strongest arm for offense that a nation can possess. Further, the land strength to take the initiative in any field must be preponderantly superior to its opponents and must be completely equipped for all classes of modern military activities.

Where each of the conflicting nations in Europe has the protection of its own lands and its own people as the primary object, the United States has for the theatre of its activity a land of such gigantic proportions that it necessitates our navy and army being larger in all proportions and branches than any other nation of equal population. With the Atlantic Coast, Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific Coast, the Panama Canal zone, and our possessions in Alaska and the insular territories, a dominant navy is a prime requisite.

No military strategy of the United States can be successful which does not rest upon the power of a controlling naval force at the five points above indicated. Such power alone can give to the United States the ability to develop a scheme of military strategy. No nation, great or small, can rely upon a policy of defensive fighting alone. This invites domestic dissatisfaction, leading generally to revolution and intensifies the activity of an enemy. It is, therefore, clear that on strategy our plans must be developed to a point that goes beyond that of mere defensive equipment and operation and reaches a stage that will include adequate preparedness for war.

In the past two and one-half years every gain of terrain in the world war has been the result of a deluge of big projectiles preceding an armed infantry attack. This means that in preparing for the eventualities of war the United States should be supplied with a reserve of munition so large that it could, at any time, inaugurate an offensive and successfully carry a drive with its military forces. Our most effective strategy is to be able to begin a strong offensive action on any or all of the five great possible battle-fronts that the nation must defend and from which it must proceed to meet and vanquish its enemies.

The great questions of strategy as applied to army manoeuvers, naval manoeuvers and tactics cannot be developed instanter by our present limited force or by those which would develop under actual war and the call for millions of men.

It requires the training that is given by a lifetime's devotion to army and navy service as in all countries throughout the world, to have officers capable of handling huge bodies of men and able to evolve proper and effective plans of engagement.

Conclusions From World War.

In a general summary of the events of the war, from August, 1914, to the present day, it is to be noted that Germany, which was the most thoroughly prepared for the conflict, has suffered least of any of the continental countries, in the matter of the invasion of its territory and has shown the greatest power of resistance. The German army was long able to hold at bay in France after their initial drive into the enemies' countries, forces that outnumbered them in the ratio of approximately two to one. It is also to be noted that in the matter of expenditures in the war, the ratio is estimated to be one to two in favor of the Teutonic Allies. Their great stores of munitions and accoutrements were gathered gradually during a period of forty-two years of uninterrupted peace, 1872-1914, and on a scale of prices that was low and based on the competitive bids of their home manufacturers. In sharp distinction to this was the almost hysterical demands of the Entente Allies for adequate supplies to meet the unexpected attack. During the first two and one-half years of the war prices for all classes of munitions and for all articles of commerce that reached England or France, Italy or Russia, rose on an unchecked scale. Month by month the price on such essentials as copper, steel products, horses and foodstuffs, kept mounting. The prodigious efforts made by Great Britain to hold the sea has cost the Empire untold millions in wealth and a substantial percentage of its shipping; the same proportionate toll has been exacted from France, Russia and Italy. Great Britain has been immune from serious land attacks because of the preponderant strength of its navy and has, therefore, been saved from the devastations of war in the Kingdom just as the land forces of Germany have kept the German Empire almost completely free from suffering a similar blow.

For the United States of America to raise an army and build a navy under the pressure of war means that this nation must spend many billions of dollars where, under normal conditions, the same degree of efifiiciency could be attained by the expenditure of probably half this sum. This is the monetary penalty of unpreparedness. But there is a greater penalty exacted from us which comes from our inability to put a million or two million trained men into the field, ofificered by fifty thousand to one hundred thousand men with adequate military knowledge. Government edicts and unlimited money cannot improvise trained soldiers or summon skilful officers to command them. The one outstanding lesson of the world war is that the peace of the United States must depend in the future upon adequate preparedness for military and commercial defense at all times and that we never sink into a state of unpreparedness such as now exists in this country. The experience of our armed forces on the Mexican border is but an indication of how futile would be our early efforts to meet a thoroughly drilled enemy of even small numbers on land.