The war and humanity; a further discussion of the ethics of the World War and the attitude and duty of the United States

Front matter

James M.Beck

Class iJ i". I q

CORtRIGHT DEPOSIT.

Foreword

I MOST earnestly hope that there will be a wide circulation of Mr. Beckys War and Humanity, It is the kind of a book which every self-respecting American, who loves his country, should read. I believe that its circulation throughout our whole land would have a very real effect in educating public opinion as to the duty of America in this great world crisis. Surely, we cannot permanently rest content, unless we prepare ourselves both in soul and in body to do our duty as a nation in the world. There must be thorough military and industrial preparedness in this coimtry; there must be an aroused and quickened patriotism, and a stem determination to see that the rights of our country, and its citizens, are everywhere respected; and there must be a keen sense of intervi Foreword

national duty, and of the shamefulness of neglecting this duty.

Such is the spirit Americans ought to possess, and this book of Mr. Beck's is a potent aid in the creation of such a spirit.

Theodore Roosevelt.

Introduction

The success of The Evidence in the Case^ must be the author's justification, if any, in putting into this permanent form his subsequent contributions to the controversial history of the war. In a sense this book may be regarded as a sequel to his earlier discussion of the ethics of the present world crisis.

The leading motif of The Evidence in the Case was the moral obligation of nations to justify their acts in the forum of the general conscience of mankind, and as the present volume deals with subsequent developments of the World War, which raise the same questions of moral responsibility in the Supreme Court of Civilization, the connection between the two books is obvious. While a portion of this book discusses the attitude and duty of the United States in this world crisis,

" The Evidence in the Case. A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 19 14, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records." G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. (First Edition, November, 1914. Thirteenth Printing, January, 191 7. French Edition, La Preuve, Paris, Cres et Cie. German Edition, Der Tatbestand, Lausanne Press, Payot et Cie.)

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yet, as its title indicates, its theme is much broader and its appeal is not so much to the national as the universal conscience.

"The Distress of Nations" deals with the world-old problem of war and peace and briefly discusses some of the many suggested remedies and their obvious limitations.

''Where There Is No Vision" analyses the historic causes and psychological reasons for the neutrality of America and their bearing upon its future influence as a Master State of the world.

"The Foreign Policy of George Washington" considers one of the suggested reasons for the failure of the United States to intervene in a more effective way in behalf of outraged humanity.

^"The Submarine Controversy" discusses the limitations, which the conscience of mankind has imposed upon belligerents in the exercise of force.

''Belgium and the Cavell Tragedy" suggests the rights of non-combatants in conquered territory, and illustrates them by a recital of the most pitiful tragedy of the war.

"America and the Allies" seeks to acquit the American people of that complete indifference to the moral aspects of the war, which has been so erroneously attributed to them by foreign critics.

Introduction ix

"The Vision of France" finally suggests the spirit, in which France has met and every nation should meet, the problems of the present crisis in civilization.

These chapters represent in an amplified and more literary form the substance of addresses which the author, as his contribution to the public opinion of the time, made in the cities of Toronto, New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, Montreal, London, and Paris. The first edition appeared in November, 191 6, and two editions were speedily exhausted.

The author then undertook in the middle of January, 191 7, this revision of the book in order to bring down the narration of events to the beginning of the year. While doing so momentous events were happening in swiftly accelerating succession, to which only brief reference can now be made.

On December 12, 1916, the Central Powers made overtures for peace, but on conditions and under pretences that made it impossible for the Entente Powers to entertain them. The conditions were fatal to any "peace with victory" for the Allies, and the pretence was the unwarranted claim that Germany was the victor in the stupendous conflict.,

Swiftly following this attempt to induce the

X Introduction

Entente to enter into negotiations, President Wilson, although frequently warned unofficially by the Entente Powers that the intervention of America to bring about peace would be regarded as unfriendly, issued on December i8, 1916, an identic communication to all the belligerents which invited them to state the terms of peace. The communication was tactless in implying that this country and its President were in ignorance as to the causes and issues of the conflict, and in further intimating, in an equivocal and ambiguous manner, that the objects of the war, as stated by the several belligerents, disclosed no substantial diflerences in purposes and objects

This naturally incensed the publicists of the Entente nations, however much for prudential reasons their press was induced to put a soft pedal on too outspoken criticisms.

Germany promptly refused to state its terms except at a peace conference, while the Entente Powers on January 11, 191 7, stated their terms, which in their sweeping demands were such as only a victor could impose and a completely vanquished foe accept.

Thereupon on January 27, 1917, President Wilson, nominally addressing the Senate of the United States, but in effect the whole world, stated, in a

Introduction xi

notable and eloquent rhapsody on peace, the terms upon which after the war was over the United States would abandon its policy of isolation and join all nations in ensuring the future maintenance of peace. It is impossible as this book goes to press to discuss the terms in detail of this very important message. Some were too vague to allow accurate discussion of their wisdom or even meaning, some were plainly impracticable until the millennium, while some were so wise and just that all civilized nations could without hesitation accept them. The strength and value of this extraordinary documxcnt lay in its frank recognition that the United States could no longer sit silently by, while a conflagration was raging throughout civilization. In this respect, it had the "vision," without which this country cannot realize its true destiny, and which the author will discuss hereafter in the chapter ''Where There Is No Vision."

The weakness of the document lay in the fact that with incredible tactlessness President Wilson stated that this country would not co-operate with other nations in maintaining peace with justice, unless the present war was permitted to end in "peace without victory." He gave his own interpretation to this most unfortunate phrase. It was to be such a peace as would not xii Introduction

permit the victor to impose terms upon the vanquished. In other words this war was to end in a compromise, and to be regarded hereafter by posterity as a drawn battle in which there was neither victor nor vanquished. No other practical meaning can be given to this unfortunate phrase. If, after the war is over, there is neither victor nor vanquished, such result would mean a condonation of the worst crimes of modem times, a compromise of necessary demands for future peace and security, and a mere exchange of material advantages, which would be a most inadequate return for infinite sacrifices. No belligerent would accept such a result, except imder the duress of inevitability.

The efiect of this pronunciamento upon nations, which have sacrificed billions of treasure and millions of lives, can readily be imagined. That this result should not have been anticipated by the distinguished draftsman of the message passes comprehension.

In this stupendous war there will be no peace without victory. One or the other group of nations will triumph, and upon the nature of that triimiph the whole welfare of civilization for the future will necessarily depend. The author has Httle doubt as to the character of that triumph. It will rest

Introduction xiii

with the heroes of the Marne, of Ypres, and of Lemberg.

It is true, as the President says, that ordinarily a victory imposed upon the vanquished leaves behind it resentments and bitter memories, which are ill calculated to bring about permanently peaceful relations, but the present war is of that nature that in my judgment by no conceivable possibility can good-will come among the belligerent nations for another generation. The wounds are too deep, the intensity of feeling too great, and, above all, the clash of ideals is too acute and irreconcilable for these two groups of nations to end the war in a spirit of reconciliation. To expect otherwise is to expect the impossible.

Bitter as will undoubtedly be the feelings of nations after this war, such spirit of international rancour would be as nothing to that which would be, if the war resulted in an inconclusive result — a ** peace without victory."

In considering the possibility of any reconciliation within a half century, no one can ignore the tragic feelings and sufferings of millions of peoples, who have suffered the bitterest losses in treasure and life, and whose bitterness would be infinitely increased, if they were forced to believe that these sacrifices had been in vain. The author has stood

XIV Introduction

in the trenches with the brave soldiers of England and France and knows full well how bitterly they would scorn a *' peace without victory.*'

Such a ** lame and impotent conclusion " would leave a spirit of dissatisfaction among the European nations so acute that such a so-called peace would be only a truce, and a very short truce at that. Indeed, it is very probable that it would cause such profound dissatisfaction among the masses of the European nations that revolution would rock more nations than one, and Europe might witness an internal upheaval, greater in sorrow and terror than anything the world has yet v/itnessed.

Apart from these objections to Mr. Wilson's visionary ideal of "peace without victory," the graver and m.ore fundamental objection is that it ignores the fact that this war is not a mere sordid struggle for territory, but a gigantic clash of conflicting interests. ^ There is an everlasting right and an everlasting wrong about this stupendous war, and unless the right shall triumph a liberal civilization may perish in the world.

The necessary moral triumph cannot be gained by mere exchanges of territory or the trading of economic advantages, much less by phrases and platitudes. The cause of international justice can

Introduction xv

be vindicated only by a clear demonstration on the field of battle that such cause is more powerful than the forces which have flouted the reign of law in international relations.

."An inconclusive peace would compromise the ideals of civilization, and put the twentieth century on the moral level of the sixteenth. It would bring to naught the sacrifices of the living, now fighting in the trenches. It would be a wanton insult to the dead, who have given — to use Lincoln's fine phrase — "the last full measure of their devotion." As Lincoln again said at Gettysburg in that classic peroration: "We should now highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain. "

A "peace without victory" would crucify the cause of international justice afresh and put it to an open shame.

The practical effect of President Wilson's peace overtures cannot be ignored. Germany had for the moment the clear advantage of its diplomatic intriguing. The morale of her opponents was temporarily impaired by the well meant but misguided attempts of the United States to force peace negotiations.

At this moment Germany made another of its stupendous blunders. The invasion of Belgium xvi Introduction

probably lost it an early and conclusive triumph. It certainly cost it the good-will of the neutral world and brought about that complete moral isolation, which is its chief weakness and which the mighty powers of its armies cannot overcome. The last error may prove to have been more fatal than the first. Just as the United States was committed to a policy of "peace without victory, " which sooner or later might have forced the belligerents into premature negotiations, Germany issued, on January 31, 191 7, a notice to the neutral nations and especially to the United States, that its pledges with respect to submarine warfare w^ere withdrawn and that she now proposed to "run amuck" on the high seas and destroy all merchant vessels within so-called zones of operation around England, France, and Italy.

The threat was especially insulting to the United States in its suggestion that that country could operate once a week a passenger steamer to England, provided it was painted from stern to bow in stripes and this country would guarantee among other ignominious conditions that it did not carry any contraband.

This proved the last straw. President Wilson on February 3, 191 7, handed the German Ambassador his passports and recalled the American Ambassa-

Introduction xvii

dor from Berlin. He explained this action to the American people and the world in a speech which lacked neither force nor dignity. The tone of quiet confidence in the right and of courageous intention to vindicate the rights of his countrymen was admirable. The notable address concluded with this impressive warning:

I cannot bring myself to believe that they [the German Government] will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the wilful prosecution of the ruthless naval programme they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded; if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress, to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral governments will take the same course.

xviii Introduction

Some may regret that President Wilson suggests no further action by his Government, unless "American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed. " This seems to intimate that a ruthless submarine warfare, which destroys in contravention of international law only the lives and ships of other neutrals and belligerents, will not be regarded by the United States as requiring any further action than the severance of diplomatic relations, which severance differs from a verbal protest only in degree and not in kind.

But those who with the author regret that President Wilson's dignified remonstrance was not put on the broader and more fundamental ground of the rights of non-combatants without respect to nationality (a matter which will be discussed hereafter in more detail in the chapter on the "Submarine Controversy") should bear in mind that this narrowing of America's just contention may have justification in the possibility that public opinion in America would not sustain its Government in any more advanced position. This objection, if sound at all, cannot mar the value and worth of President Wilson's action. As he thus treads the path of honotir and dignity, all Americans, of whatever party, race, section, creed,

Introduction xix

or ancestry, whether in the past his eulogists or critics, should loyally stand behind their leader.

Let it appear to the world that we are in fact as in name the "United States of America.'*

The loyal response that the American people made to President Wilson's action is most gratifying. The anticipated disloyalty of foreign-born citizens, which a year ago frightened so many timid politicians in Washington, has failed to materialize. As the author writes, all classes, creeds, races and parties are supporting the President with substantial unanimity. It vindicates the author's opinion, as expressed hereafter, that all that America needed in this crisis of humanity was brave leadership.

The spirit of the nobler America is neither dead nor sleeping. Under the surface an intellectual and moral fermentation is in progress, such as the United States has not known since the days of the slavery agitation.

To the spirit of patriotism, which swept over America at its President's clarion call to duty, there was almost no dissenting note, save that of William J. Bryan, and a small group of extreme pacifists who at once attempted by appeals to the public and specifically to Congress to paralyze

XX Introduction

the united will of America to vindicate, its long violated rights.

No more stirring and pathetic story has been narrated in this war than that which tells of the French officer, whose trench had been almost wholly destroyed by a destructive fire and who, with all his men, was lying in the trenches dead or wounded unto death. Silence reigned in the trench where seemingly none was left to defend, and the enemy troops charged across the open ground to take possession of it. Suddenly this officer, in a spirit of feverish ecstasy, arose to his feet and cried **Debout,les mortsT' and to that clarion cry his wounded companions-in-arms responded by rising to their feet and in one last supreme effort hurled the assailants back.

If I could rename this book, as this revised edition goes to press, I should be tempted to address it specifically to that element of the American people, who regard this World War with the same curious indifference as though it were taking place in Mars, and who apparently feel that Americans only concern is its own enrichment, and I would say to them in the very title of this book but in a different sense than that with which the dying French officer rallied his stricken men, **Debout, les morts!'^

Introduction xxi

What will follow is at the moment "in the lap of the gods.*' Even, as these lines are written, German submarines are sinking neutral merchant ships without warning and on one of these, the California, not only were women and children again cruelly murdered, but the life of at least one American citizen was put in jeopardy. Whether this severance of diplomatic relations shall be followed by more drastic action, or not, it nevertheless morally aligns America with its sister democracies as a militant force in civilization.

The value of this action to the United States is immeasurable. It saves it from a yawning abyss of disaster. Had America failed to act and show a willingness to make sacrifices for the basic principles of civilization, the hand of every nation might hereafter have been against her. President Wilson's action, provided he does not hereafter falter and make a mockery of his vigorous stand, has saved for the United States the respect of the wbrld (including Germany, which overestimated America's unwillingness to fight for its rights), the leadership of the neutral nations, and the good- will of our sister democracies in Europe, with whose triumph the interests of America are so vitally concerned. America is not *'too proud to fight."

xxH Introduction

When at no distant day the triumph for international justice shall be won, then the United States will enter the councils of the nations with a higher rank and influence than if she had contented herself in the greatest moral crisis of civilization with the selfish and untenable standing of complete neutrality.

Its position will be the stronger and its influence the greater because in that world conference it will have no purely selfish purpose to serve.

Its only direct concern is for the effective vindication of the rights for which it has now expressed its willingness to unsheath its sword.

What should be the nature of that demand?

For nearly two years past the German Government has refused to ''disavow" the Lusitania, By its note of January 31, 19 17, it has "avowed*' it anew. For this shameless and most terrible of crimes, the United States should at the Council of Nations dem.and that the Kaiser, who caused the Lusitania to be sunk, shall forfeit his crown.

When the author was in London and Paris in the summer of 191 6, a subject that was uppermost in the minds of the Entente publicists was whether those nations should not announce that they would make no peace with the HohenzoUem dynasty. This proposed policy was not without embarrass-

Introduction xxiii

ment, growing out of dynastic considerations and the nature of their governments. Opinion was divided as to the policy of such a declaration but not as to its justice.

The United States, as the greatest Republic of all time, and from its very beginning a leading interpreter of democratic institutions, can make this demand more fittingly than the Entente Powers. There would be a " peace without [complete] victory," if the House of HohenzoUern, which from the time of Frederick the Great has cursed all nations, (and most of all Germany,) and which added the rape of Belgium to that of Silesia, were permitted to continue its baleful influence upon the world and the growth of democratic institutions. Neither the Lusitania nor the crime of Belgium will be fully atoned while the Hohenzollerns remain in power.

The United States has no lasting cause of quarrel with the German people. President Wilson did well in making in his address of February 3d a clear distinction between that people and its government. The "mystic chords of memory " remind us that the misled and betrayed German people have been our friends, and their blood is so intermingled with our own that a lasting enmity be tween these two great peoples is or ought to be xxiv Introduction

unthinkable. If they have sustained the Kaiser and liis war, it is because they have been deluded by the baseless fiction that their great nation was suddenly and treacherously attacked by England, France, and Russia. They will at no distant day know the truth, and "the truth shall set them free.** Germany's high qualities of courage, steadfastness, and infinite self-sacrifice are worthy of all praise. Who, that reflects upon the acute suffering of their women and children, can be indifferent to their sorrows? I venture the prediction that no nation will ultimately profit more by the stupendous sacrifices of this war than the land of Goethe, Schiller, Bach, Beethoven, and Wagner. It only needs to be relieved from the incubus of Hohenzollern tyranny to become an infinitely greater people than ever its poets, prophets, and seers have dreamed. With the Hohenzollerns dominating its destinies with mediaeval despotism, it will not have a true friend in the world. A truly democratic Germany will, despite all present bitterness, be cordially welcomed into the full fellowship of the commonwealth of nations. The continuance of that despotism is a menace to Democracy and Civilization. As the cry rang through Europe in 1814, ''Enough of Bonaparte!" so let the cry now sound through Civiliza-

Introduction xxv

tion (in the words of Voltaire), "Ecrasez Vinfdme! " A final word by way of introduction. My readers must bear constantly in mind the fact that these addresses (first printed in November, 191 6) were published before President Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Criticisms that were true when written of a policy of inaction are no longer true of the new policy of action. For the same reason the author's statement as to the attitude of the Entente nations toward the United States must now be modified. In the Chapter "Where There Is No Vision," I suggested that the impairment of America's prestige was

not necessarily permanent and it is not too late for the United States to vindicate its position in civilization as one of the Master States of the world.

This possibility has become a reality and unless President Wilson, having put his hand to the plough shall return to the old furrow, the resentment, which the Entente nations have felt toward the United States since the sinking of the Lusitania and especially since the attempted mediation, is now likely to diminish rapidly.

The author's incidental criticisms of President Wilson's policy of inaction, which subsequent xxvi Introduction

events have thus necessarily modified, have served, as other criticisms of public-spirited Americans, to develop a militant opinion in America in behalf of a more vigorous foreign policy. For these criticisms there need be no apology. They were necessary at the time they were written, for if some Americans had not vigorously protested against a policy of barren neutrality in a supreme moral crisis of the world's history, the ''very stones in the streets would have cried out against us."

To make these criticisms under any circumstances was naturally a distasteful, even though a necessary, task, but when an author essays the difficult and at times ungracious task of discussing history in its moral aspects, he must above all things be loyal to truth, and truth rises above all considerations of nationality. While "setting down naught in malice, " he must also ''extenuate nothing. " Otherwise he puts into circulation the counterfeit of truth.

In such a sifting of the nations as is now in progress, it is best and wisest, even from the standpoint of patriotism, for an author to state the truth as he sees it. The oil of anointing, which was once supposed to sanctify the head of the monarch and give him infallibility, has not fallen upon

Introduction xxvii

the head of the President. The guarantees of free speech and a free press were intended to give to the public that opportunity for open discussion, in which a RepubHcan form of government Hves and moves and has its very being. Germany is today in an abyss of disaster on account of a rigid censorship of that which Bismarck called **the reptile press," which has blinded a great people and driven them into a gulf of infinite suffering.

America will not learn the great lesson of this crisis unless its people fearlessly recognizes the mistakes which have been committed in its name, and if America is to avoid similar error in the future, it must recognize that the policy of "peace at any price, " to which President Wilson, presumably from the highest motives and in a spirit of pacific idealism, consistently adhered for more than two years and until Germany affronted him and the American people by its cruel and insolent challenge, was a mistaken policy and nearly destroyed America's prestige in the commonwealth of nations. It failed to gain for the United States either the friendship or respect of a single nation. As the result has proven, it did not even have the merit of maintaining a real peace, for while the severance of diplomatic relations does not necesxxviii Introduction

sarily involve the status of belligerency, yet, with those relations severed, it is idle to pretend that America is now at peace with Germany. From August the first, 1914, until February the third, 191 7, the United States, at great sacrifice to its standing as a great power, consistently cried "peace, peace," only to find on February the third, 1917, that **there was no peace" and could be none as long as Germany was willing to affront the United States and all the world by its rude and ruthless challenge to civilization.

This is written with full recognition of the vigor, with which President Wilson finally recognized the deliberate purpose of Germany to trample laws, human and divine, underfoot. By handing the German Ambassador his passports, Mr. Wilson gave to this wanton challenge its fitting reply. Germany had never abandoned its submarine policy. Even when it suggested peace in the last days of 191 6, it was developing as rapidly as possible an immense submarine flotilla— a new and more terrible Spanish Armada, — to be launched on February i st, and let us hope with a like result. The German Chancellor's plea for ** humanity" was but a verbal cover under which the prodigious preparations at Kiel were in progress.

Introduction xxix

President Wilson bravely faced the inevitable, and if in so doing he reversed a policy, which he had consistently pursued for more than two years and v/hich this book has ventured to criticise, he showed in such reversal the greater moral courage.

His experience was not unlike that of Sir Edward Grey at the beginning of the world war. The English Foreign Minister was also a pacifist of noble ideals. When Germany treacherously assaulted civilization, Sir Edward Grey could not quickly put by the pacific ideals of his lifetime, and for some days England hesitated on the verge of an abyss, for had England deserted France in its hour of trial, it is possible that the fate of the British Empire would have been sealed. Fortunately for civilization, Germany committed the stupendous blunder of invading Belgium, and this left to Sir Edward Grey, the unwearying friend of peace, no alternative except to commit his great Empire to the ordeal of battle. Men who saw him in those final days, saw tears in his eyes, as he beheld his pacific plans fall as a fragile house of cards.

Similarly President Wilson cherished from the beginning of the great connict the persistent purpose to save his country for the "processes of