The philosophy of conduct; an outline of ethical principles

Preface

The purpose of this book is twofold. First ; to present in convenient form the elements of ethical science, by brief introduction to subjects usually included in the course in ethics offered in our colleges and normal schools.

In planning the book for such use, it is presumed that the student will be directed to the fuller discussion of these subjects by the great writers of ancient and modern times ; and that such reading will be worked over, by discussion in class room, and by written exposition of special topics. The book is made as brief as possible, to leave opportunity for this supplementary discussion ; which, in such a subject as ethics, is much more important than anything that can be taken by memory from a text-book. The works that are chiefly had in mind to supplement this introduction are Seth's Principles of Ethics and Green's Prolegomena.

Second ; it is hoped that the views here presented, though not pretending to any great originality, may serve to emphasize some concepts of ethics that have not been sufficiently regarded. Chief among these are the following:

i. Ethics should be treated as a natural science, and the distinction between the methods of treating moral science and the natural sciences entirely abandoned. Its principles are grounded in the same eternal scheme of things, which we call nature ; they are discovered by similar processes of induction, and are as absolute and permanent as the laws of psychology or biology.

2. The distinction, so generally made, between Christian ethics and philosophic ethics rests on a misconception of both. There is but one ethics, and its principles are eternal. Revelation does not alter facts nor principles; it only makes them known.

3. The principles of ethics must not be confused with our

4 PREFACE

conception of those principles. Our laws and customs can never be anything more than our conception of those principles. Our conceptions change, but the principles cannot change. 4 The offices of instinct, taste, and imagination are more fully considered, as important factors of conduct.

In the study of ethics, we are greatly embarrassed by the unsettled state of its terminology. The significance of so many of its most important terms is vague, and their usuage so inconsistent, that it is difficult to understand what has been written, or to be sure that we shall be understood.

The word conscience, for example, is one of the most conspicuous terms in every discussion of moral phenomena, and it is specially unfortunate that it is used, even by careful writers, in at least three distinct and widely different senses. It is used to denote the mind's ability to distinguish right from wrong ; and in such cases means the faculty elsewhere called perception.

It is used to express the sense of moral obligation, or the impulse to act in certain ways, without conscious regard for the ends to be reached by such action ; and in this sense it is simply an instinct.

Again it is used as the equivalent of judgment; as when we say, conscience approves or disapproves. Finally, it is used to express the distress of mind commonly called remorse. It seems best, therefore, to avoid, as far as possible, the use of the term conscience, and to denote each of these functions by its more specific name, perception, instinct, judgment or emotion.

The word law is also ambiguous. Sometimes, especially with the older writers, it means a rule of conduct prescribed by some superior authority which the inferior is commanded to obey, but may disobey. More frequently, especially in all scientific discussion, it means simply an order of events, or method of action — e. g., the law of gravitation. In ethics it is necessary to use the word in both senses, and great care is needed to avoid confusion.

The terms mind and soul are not well discriminated. In these

PREFACE 5

pages we have, for the most part, used the word soul when we meant the whole spiritual man — intellect, feelings and will ; and mind when we referred rather to the intellect alone.

In the whole field of ethics we need to give careful attention to definitions and to discriminate sharply between synonymous terms.

Following these suggestions the reader will, we trust, find the science of ethics not only profitable, but a most attractive field of study. 1 91 6, Lafayette College.

CONTENTS Chapter Page

Book i — Factors of Conduct I Springs of Action 23

II Instinct 26

III Taste 34

IV Habit 42

V Custom 47

VI Imagination . . 50

VII Conscience 56

VIII Moral Perception 63

IX Self-Direction 67

Book 2 — The Principles of Ethics I Motives 75

II Affections 79

III Obligation 85

IV Responsibility 88

V The Standard of Moral Judgment 92

VI Theories of Ethical Standard 95

The Standard Imperative — The Standard Intuitive

VII Theories of Ethical Standard — Continued 107

The Standard Utilitarian — The Standard Evolutionary — Self-Realization 7

8 CONTENTS

Chapter Page

Book 3 — Personal Ethics I Virtue 119

II Christian Ethics 124

III Moral Pathology 132

IV Remorse 137

V The Contents of Virtue 141

Justice, Mercy, and Reverence

VI The Culture of Virtue 152

VII Duty and Duties 161

Duties

VIII Personal Duties 169

Temperance — Common Sense

IX Personal Duties — Continued 1 79

Industry — Thrift — Avarice — Sincerity — Courage — Education

X Social Duties 189

War

XI Social Duties — Continued 203

The Community — Professional Duties — Benevolence — The Family

XII Casuistry „ . . . 219

XIII The Metaphysics of Ethics 226

Introduction

1. Philosophy is an attempt to interpret facts. Its purpose is to explain how things come to pass as they do. It looks behind phenomena to find their causes, and traces these causes back as far as possible toward the ultimate ground of being.

It seeks the principles which underlie the manifestations of physical and psychical energy, and defines the laws of their activities.

2. The Philosophy of Conduct is such an inquiry into the rational activities of men. It seeks a rational basis for the judgments that approve or disapprove the actions, feelings and states of mind of ourselves and others. It inquires into the ground of moral distinctions, and attempts to justify the moral sentiments and the dictates of conscience. It inquires as to the standard of right; first, whether there be any fixed standard; second, whether it can be defined and, third, how it is to be applied and what are its sanctions.

3. Every such inquiry must start with some presumptions > — some principles which may be regarded as certainly true and permanent and settled in the constitution of the universe.

In so large a field as human conduct it is difficult to find many such principles that will command universal assent. Many propositions that are practically accepted may be questioned on theoretic grounds by this or that school of philosophy; some must be regarded as hypothetical, — probable but not demonstrable, and others must be held as the least difficult of alternatives, neither of which seems satisfactory.

On the other hand there is no other field of philosophy that is so richly supplied with data on which to work. Each individual consciousness is a laboratory well equipped for this study, and all history, biography and poetry contribute to our store of ia INTRODUCTION

facts and illustrations of principles.

4. We may assume the following propositions as sufficiently assured to justify their acceptance without discussion.

First; there is a rational basis for conduct. Man is by his very constitution a rational being. Every moral sentiment, each instinctive impulse, all feeling of obligation and sense of Tightness in the normal soul is consistent with reason, and springs from some real necessity in the constitution of the world. There is always a reason why right is right; and, though we may not always be able to discover the reason, we do not doubt that there is one.

Second; there is a real difference between right and wrong; a difference in quality which is fundamental, permanent and not dependent on our judgment. The distinction between right and wrong is not made by our moral sense, but by our moral sense and judgment we discover and recognize the distinction which exists in the nature of things, — in the constitution of the world. Nothing is right because we think it right, but we think it right because it is so. The distinction is objective, not subjective.

Third; there is a fixed standard by which moral quality is determined, just as there are fixed principles of mathematics or physics. Conduct must conform to this standard, just as numbers must conform to mathematical laws.

Fourth ; this standard of right is the measure of human responsibility. Consequences of its violation are just as orderly, certain and inevitable as are the consequences of physical action. The effects of wrong feeling, willing or states of the soul follow in the natural order of our constitution, and are no more subject to our will than are the effects of chemical agents or the order of the planets. We are responsible — that is we respond, react or are affected by our moral states and conduct just as certainly and orderly as we react to physical forces.

5. There is nothing variable, nothing arbitrary, nothing subjective in the laws of ethics. There is no reason to regard the philosophy of conduct as in any manner or degree less positive or less exact than any other branch of philosophy or science. The only uncertainty is our knowledge, but that does not affect the eternal laws and principles.

Systems of ethics come and go, as systems of astronomy or other sciences do; but, as the stars keep on their courses quite unaffected by our systems, so the moral universe goes on unchanged from the beginning of the present order of things.

The distinctions that we make between the various systems of ethics must not be thought of as rival schemes, which may be accepted or rejected by popular vote and so become our laws of conduct. They can be nothing more than our conceptions of the relations, principles and laws which are established in the constitution of the universe. For example, Christian Ethics and Philosophic Ethics are convenient terms to denote particular points of view of conduct, or different sources of knowledge of ethical principles, but they mean nothing more. There is only one ethics, only one scheme of moral government, and this is fixed and eternal. There is no ethics dependent on Christianity, nor any that is affected by Philosophy; just as there is no such thing as Christian chemistry or a Philosophic multiplication table. That which is is. No matter what light we see by, if only we see the things that be. Revelation, as the very word denotes, is but the unveiling of the truth, and has no creative power, and Philosophy can not change the character of right and wrong any more than it can add a cubit to our stature. Thinking a thing to be right can no more make it right than thinking that the square of four is fifteen makes it so.

6. Ethics is first of all inductive. It must begin with a careful examination of the phenomena of its peculiar field. As in all science, the first important matter is the data, — the things given — the facts and experiences from which we may hope to infer the principles which underlie them.

7. The term conduct includes all voluntary, rational activity — everything that is done "on purpose." It does not include mere mechanical movements, nor such bodily activities as are due to reflex nervous energy undirected by the will, such as breathing or swinging of the hands in walking, but only such activities as are guided by choice or volition, whether the action be mental or physical. It also includes states and habits of the soul so far as these are the result of voluntary effort.

8. Strictly speaking, all conduct is mental — psychical. Bodily action has in itself no moral quality. We judge of conduct only in so far as we can reasonably assume a purpose or intention. The acts of a sleep walker or the insane are non-moral, and we do not judge them as right or wrong. But since the act of normal beings is the expression of the will, and in most cases the only index of the will, we commonly include the bodily acts in our concept of conduct, and thus impute to all voluntary bodily actions the moral quality which we infer as belonging to the soul that directed the act.

9. All conduct implies a purpose; all rational activity is directed to some end, it is intended to effect some thing, to attain to some object.

These objects to which our actions are directed may be more or less remote. Few objects are attained to by a single act of will, and the immediate object is in most cases only one of a series, often a very long and greatly involved series, of objects leading to some definite end.

The remote object we call the ultimate object, or the purpose of the series. Of course no object is absolutely ultimate. Our purposes extend vaguely forward indefinitely, but we speak of the end definitely before the mind — the culmination of the series of acts contemplated when the will moves, as the ultimate end or purpose of conduct. It is the consummation of the course of action under consideration. For example, your immediate object of today's study is to learn today's lesson ; but this only that you may master the subject, and that as a part of your education, and that again as a part of your projected scheme of life.

The distinction between immediate and remote purposes is exceedingly important and often difficult to define, for conduct is not a series of disconnected acts, not even a chain of related acts, but a vast and complicated tissue of actions, all more or less coherent, and directed more or less consistently to certain definite ends.

Therefore we speak of a course of conduct, a scheme of action or a system of behavior.

10. The terms purpose and motive and intention are often close synonyms, and are not very well defined even in good usage. For the sake of clearness let us use purpose to denote the particular object we wish to attain, intention to include the whole series of acts involved in the attainment of the purpose — the whole program we intend to execute in the pursuit of our purpose. The motive is that which lies back of our volition. It is the desire or impulse which causes us to choose that purpose. For example, my love of power is the motive which impels me to seek office. I form the purpose of going to Congress, and intend to use the means necessary to accomplish my purpose.

All this is a thoroughly rational process, — it involves the emotions, the judgment, thinking and volition. Every purpose implies a reason why it was chosen. Action without a purpose is called insane, and a purpose not justified by reason is called foolish. The forming of purposes is the chief function of the mind : the pursuit of purposes is conduct.

11. But when we come to the analysis of conduct we find a great variety of factors entering into the formation of these purposes.

We find the immediate cause of our purposes is always a desire of some kind. We exert ourselves only to satisfy some craving, some sort of reaching out after something. What these cravings are depends on many things ; somewhat on the native quality of the soul, due to its constitution, its inherited bent or inclination, the character and strength of its instincts ; somewhat on the effect of all the experiences of past conduct, forming habits and tastes and associations ; and somewhat on the influence of environment and the sympathetic power of social customs of thought and action.

12. These are the chief factors in the formation of our purposes, but the will seems to have a certain independence, and to be able to guide conduct as the sailor steers his ship, not without the force of the wind, but yet not helplessly driven. So we feel ourselves free and self-directed, notwithstanding the fact that our will is moved by motives that are, at least to a great degree, external and beyond our control.

In every case we form our purposes for some reason that seems to us sufficient. However we may insist that we are free to choose one course or another, we always acknowledge the pertinence of the question, why do you choose this course ? We there- ' by confess that as rational beings we act, not from caprice or from spontaneous impulse, but from some cause capable of rational definition, and that anything other than such rational conduct is unworthy of us.

13. This acknowledgment of our obligation to act rationally, to be able to assign, at least to ourselves, a reason for our conduct implies a philosophy of conduct. The function of choice implies a reason why we choose one course rather than another. It implies a judgment that one course is better than another, and all judgment implies a standard by which to judge, a measure by which to mete. All our attempts to appreciate the excellence of conduct, all our sense of honor, or beauty of character, all our feelings of admiration and esteem imply that there are principles, permanent and definable, by which we may rightly judge — some tests of moral quality, something that gives meaning to the terms right and wrong, better and worse.

14. It is true that practical morality has little thought for the philosophy of conduct. Our judgments of right and wrong, our sentiments of approbation or repulsion, seem so spontaneous and so positive that we do not often inquire into the grounds of our decisions. We feel that certain things are right, while others are repulsive to our moral sense, and we feel confident that our judgments and instincts are reliable in such premises, and are content to rest in this.

But however reliable our moral instinct may be, and however positive our conviction that we know right from wrong, such instincts and spontaneous judgments are very liable to perversion, easily warped by passion or prejudice, and need the corrective authority of reason to hold them up to the consistent use of their own proper powers.

14^2. It is the province of Philosophy to inquire into the character of our impulses, to test our spontaneous judgments, to establish the validity of our moral sentiments. It is the office of Philosophy to reduce to some orderly, and if possible, complete, system the loose and partial moral reflections of ordinary experience, to justify the instinctive impulses of our moral nature. It aims to determine the true tests of moral quality, and thus to define the course of highest excellence and the chief end of our existence.

15. It is evident that, before we can define the ends of our existence, we must have some adequate knowledge of our nature, our powers and capacities and relations to other beings which are included with ourselves in the scheme of things which we call nature, or the universe.

What man ought to do depends, first of all, on what he is able to do. The ends he may wisely seek are determined chiefly by his constitution and the constitution of the world. He must "run the race that is set before him'' if he is to run at all. He is shut up to certain limits by the finite nature of his powers, physical and mental. However free we may suppose him to be in his function of choice or volition, he is free to act only within the sphere assigned to him in the order of things. He must conform his purposes to the larger purposes of that world of which he is but a recent tenant, who sojourns briefly amid eternal things.

So we conceive of man as having a destiny distinctly limited, and yet having within those limits ample scope to attain its full perfection, to develop in excellence and happiness and moral beauty according to his own self-control.

"It is," says Burke, "the prerogative of man to be in a great degree the creature of his own making." We may not be able to explain the mystery of free will, but no man practically doubts that he is free to choose his purposes and direct his conduct. He feels that he is not shut up to the fatal effects of forces acting on him from without; but that he is in the midst of influences that act on him as he presents himself to them. Like the sailor, who, though he cannot direct the winds, can steer his ship to the port he chooses, and arrive there by the force of the same winds which drive another ship to another port, so man is driven by his desires, not aimlessly nor fatally, but as he himself directs.

1 6. The philosophy of conduct is therefore much concerned with the powers of the soul and the laws of their activities. In a word, psychology is the basis of ethics.

17. But, while psychology is the foundation of ethical philosophy, it is by no means the whole of it. The study of the forces and laws of our spiritual life leads us to fields much wider than our own personality. The student of physics is concerned not only with the specific qualities of the material in his laboratory, but its relations to the whole physical universe. He knows the handful of sand in his balances only after he has considered it in all its manifold relations, — what the distant sun effects upon it, how the force of gravity pulls it here or there, what the corroding acids will do to it, and how the mysterious laws of crystallization have formed its particles. Then having reduced his knowledge to certain terms of force and motion, he is confronted with the question, what are force and motion. Not only is the scope of philosophy universal, but it is impossible to separate one field of knowledge from another, or to limit our study of any branch of science to any particular group of phenomena. The fields of science overlap, or, rather let us say they blend and intermingle like the colors that compose the light of day. Truth is universal and a unit.

"Flower in the crannied wall, I pluck you out of your crannies, Hold you here, root and all, in my hand.

Little flower; but if I could understand What you are, root and all and all in all, I should know what God and man is."

18. The sources of our knowledge of ethics are chiefly the phenomena exhibited in our own souls, the sense of obligation, the attraction and repulsion due to moral qualities, the bitter pangs of remorse and the sweet satisfaction of an approving conscience are examples of experiences, which, if rightly studied, should yield us knowledge of the principles that underlie the facts. The foundation of ethics must be established by induction, as the foundations of all sciences must be. We must observe and compare and interpret the facts as certified by human experience. This is a task of no small difficulty, for we find a great deal of conflicting testimony, honestly offered, as the experience of different souls; for it is extremely difficult to perceive facts clearly when passions and prejudice and habits are so largely involved. But having done our best to sift and certify this mass of evidence — having gathered and considered the facts of consciousness, we must go beyond the gates of personality, and study the relations in which we stand to all the universe, and the eternal scheme of things. In these relations we shall find the explanation of that moral obligation which we found impressed on consciousness. Here, if anywhere, we shall find the ultimate foundation of all moral law, and an answer to the question why right is right ; for the principles of ethics, like the principles of all other science, are parts of the constitution of the world.

19. The changes. wrought upon the material world by all the forces acting on it have been enormous, but all the forces, working through all the countless ages, have not changed a single property of matter, or modified by one hair's breadth a single law of nature. Evolution has produced new forms, new types and species of animate existence, but evolution lays not her hand upon the constitution of the world. That constitution has never been revised. The force of gravity, the chemical affinities and the mathematical relations of magnitude and numbers are the same today as when God laid the foundations of the earth and gave laws to the universe. So the principles of morals, the quality of right and wrong are from eternity to eternity the same forever.

20. No misconception of conduct is more utterly false, and practically more misleading, than the notion that ethics is somehow a matter of opinion, something determined by taste or convenience or custom. Men change and times change with them, but the principles of moral truth are older than the earth, and shall abide when the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the heavens shall be, as an outworn garment, folded up and laid aside, still the laws of nature, moral laws as well as mathematical or physical, shall abide, steadfast and unchanged.

"We find in law firm footing for the soul, The strength that binds the stars, and reins the sea, The base of things, the pillars of the world, The pledge of honor, and the pure cord of love, The form of truth, the golden floor of heaven. "

Book I Factors Of Conduct

Philosophy of Conduct

Chapter I Springs Of Action

21. We hesitate to use the word "mechanical" to describe the activities of rational creatures, for all activities that involve consciousness are so much more than any machine can accomplish, or mechanical terms express.

Nevertheless our physical organism is, first of all, a machine — a cunningly devised and intricate arrangement of bones, muscles, nerves, and other members, all geared and adjusted to carry on the activities of life, and, however much may be added by the animating soul within it, nothing is taken away from the physical properties, nor any alterations made in the natural laws which pertain to material things.

22. The relation between the physical and mental sides of our being is full of mystery, but there is nothing lawless or fortuitous about it. Our bodies act as they are acted upon. They respond to influences from without and are subject to conditions within, just as any machine, and we may express these reactions in terms of physical science.

Reaction is the convenient term to express the movements which are regularly correlated with states and activities of the nervous system, whether these states are accompanied by consciousness or not. Reaction is a neutral term, denoting a regular order of events, without positively asserting the relation of cause and effect ; but there is no reason why we should hesitate to speak of certain nerve states, or activities, as the cause of certain muscular movements, if by cause we mean one of the essential conditions of such movements. We may properly go further and assert, with Dr. James, that all consciousness is motor ; that is to say, every state of consciousness is definitely correlated with a

H THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT

certain state of brain and nerves which has an immediate and specific effect on the whole physical organism, so that every neural state gives a certain impulse to the body and manifests itself in certain specific bodily movement.

These states of the neural system may be due to external causes, or internal, or both. They may arise from the action of environment on the nervous system and produce action without involving consciousness either before or after the act. Or they may arise from external causes, but arouse consciousness at the same time they impel to action. Or they may be caused by the subjective impulse of memory, habit, or other mental conditions to which external influence furnishes merely the occasion. 23. However these neural states are produced, they are always the immediate cause of bodily activity.

It is necessary that every living organism be so constituted that the activities which are essential to its life and development may be performed without voluntary, or rational, or even conscious direction of the bodily powers. Such functions as breathrng are always automatic and for the most part unconscious. They are called reflex, or purely mechanical, and are accomplished by the organism reacting on appropriate stimulus, just as a wheel turns when force is properly applied. In some cases such reactions are very simple, as when pepper applied to the nostrils causes sneezing. In other cases the reactions are rnarvelously complex, as in the wonderful phenomena called by the general name of instincts. But in all cases the quality of bodily action is due immediately to the character of the impulses given by the motor nerves, and the constitution and condition of the organism acted on. When these impulses are due solely to the external circumstances acting on the physical organism without arousing consciousness, they are purely mechanical, unrational and have no moral quality. When they are accompanied by consciousness they are called instincts, and are always more or less directed by the will. There is no hard and fast line separating

SPRINGS OF ACTION 25

reflex from instinctive impulses, nor any absolute distinction between instinctive and voluntary activities; but just in so far as action is directed by volition is it rightly called conduct.