The creed of Epictetus : as contained in the discourses, manual and fragments

Front matter

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COPYRIGHT DEPOSm

Preface

This volume is the outcome of a thesis presented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the George Washington University in part satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The writer has been led to think that others might be interested in the results of a study which for many years has been an unfailing source of help and inspiration. And it is with the hope that this assurance from others may not be without some grounds that the book is sent forth.

Washington, D. C.

Vll

Doxology

Book Two THE PATH OF PHILOSOPHY

I Class Room and Clinic ... 27 II Entered Apprentice . . . .29 III The Beginner's Personal Appearance .31

ix x CONTENTS

CHAPTER

IV The Shorter Catechism .

V Man's Invincible Nature .

VI The Workman and His Materials

VII Learning the Rules .

VIII Child and Man

IX The Aim of Instruction .

X The Sphere of Philosophy .

XI The Fruit of Philosophy

XII The Test of Culture

XIII Thfj Divine Contest .

XIV What the World Cannot Give

PAGE

Book Three I The Adornment of the Will

II The Primacy of the Will

III Things and Their Use

IV The Heart and Its Treasure V The Friendship of Virtue

VI The Domain of the Will

VII Passwords

VIII The Way to the Heights

IX The Secret of Tranquillity

X What Every Man Seeks

XI True Freedom .

XII Freedom and Servitude

XIII The Freeman

XIV The Only Way . . .

XV Proclamation of Emancipation

CONTENTS xi

Book Four CHAPTER

PAGE

I

Signs of Progress ....

■ 79

II

Seeming and Being

. 80

III

The Marks of a Philosopher

. 82

IV

Pedant or Scholar

. 84

V

For Use in Emergency

. 86

VI

The Citadel of the Mind

. 88

VII

The Power of Reason

VIII

The Rod of Hermes .

IX

The Champion

■ 93

X

The Discipline of the Senses

XI

Use and Disuse

XII

The Blade and the Ear .

The True Stoic

Book Five THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD

I Duties and Their Measurement . 105 II The World Citizen . . . .106

III The Sacred Vocation of Teach-

ing 108

IV Affection, Counterfeit and Real iio V Society in Solitude . . . .112

VI As It Appears to Others . . .113

VII Self-Persuasion 115

VIII The Royal Road 117

IX The Two Handles . . . .119 xii

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PAGE

X

The Compassionate Soul

XI

The Valiant Soul . . .

XII

The Peaceable Soul .

. 123

XIII

The Contented Soul .

■ 125

XIV

The Stoic and the State

XV

The Chief End of Man . .

Book Six REWARDS AND PENALTIES I

The Law Divine ....

II

Ruin and Recovery

III

What Makes and Unmakes j i

Man

IV

Promise and Fulfilment .

V

The Deceitfulness of Riches

VI

The Purchase Price .

VII

For What Will You Sell These

? 142

VIII

Thersites or Agamemnon .

IX

Holding One's Own

X

The Unfailing Law .

XI

The Ample Recompense .

XII

Statutes and Ordinances

Book Seven THE GREAT CHANGE

I Death and the Order of Nature 155 II Deliverance from the Fear of

Death 156

III The Ordinance of Death . .157

IV Act Well Thy Part . . . .158

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER PAGE

V Under Orders 160

VI Safe Passage 161

VII The Good Warfare . . . .163

VIII Nunc Dimittis 164

IX Valedictory 166

Book One I

The Character of the Cynic .

II

The Call of the Cynic .

III

The Cynic and His Body

IV

The Long-suffering of the Cynic

V

The Office of the Cynic

VI

The Commission of the Cynic .

VII

The Burden of the Cynic .

/III

The Cynic and the World .

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION THE FAITH OF A STOIC

INTRODUCTION THE FAITH OF A STOIC

THE saying that great men commonly have short biographies finds ample warrant and abundant illustration in the case of Epictetus. For of this noble soul, whose words of wisdom have afforded strength and inspiration to the choice spirits of many generations, we know neither the year of birth nor that of death. Even his parentage is unknown to us. Indeed, it is by no means certain that his real name has not been supplanted by what looks like a sort of nickname. Of the outward life of Epictetus little more is known than that he was born of obscure parents at Hierapolis. While the year of his birth can only be inferred, the fact that he was teaching in the reign of Domitian makes it probable that he was born about the middle of the first century. In the reign of Nero Epictetus was taken to Rome as the slave of Epaphroditus. By his master — say rather his owner — Epictetus was given an education: perhaps because he was not strong enough for manual labor, perhaps because the youth showed signs of unusual promise, or it may be, as is most likely, simply because his owner, like many of his day, was taken with xviii INTRODUCTION

the fancy and fashion of possessing an accomplished slave. But, however that may be, educated he was. Epaphroditus sent the young man to the philosophical lectures of C. Musonius Rufus, the eminent and leading Stoic expounder in Rome.

And most fortunate Epictetus was in coming under the teaching and influence of so able a philosopher and so wise a teacher. And happily we are not without some intimation of the high regard that Epictetus felt for his teacher. Rufus must have been a Stoic of no mean ability and amply endowed with the power of teaching and inspiring his pupils. For Epictetus pays his master this high tribute : " He used to speak in such a way that every one of us sitting there supposed that some one had accused him before Rufus: he so touched on what was doing, he so placed before the eyes every man's faults." *

Upon the death of Epaphroditus, Epictetus, it would seem, obtained his freedom. For we find Epictetus teaching philosophy in Rome, and there bringing to his work the same rare gifts that he had so warmly praised in Rufus. Upon the banishment of the philosophers by Domitian, Epictetus betook himself to Nicopolis, where he became the acknowledged leader of the Stoic school, continuing his labors until his death at a good old age.

So far as is known, Epictetus wrote nothing; at least no writing of his has been preserved.

1 Discourses, III. xxiii.

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xix

His discourses have come down to us through the reports of one of his pupils. For if Socrates had his Plato, Epictetus had his Arrianus. Flavius Arrianus, not unknown for his public services as senator and consul and for his literary attainments as historian of Alexander the Great, was an admiring and devoted disciple of Epictetus. And it is to the amplification and publication of his lecture notes that we are indebted for what we have of the discourses of Epictetus. We say, for what we have; for unfortunately half of these reports has been lost, four books only being preserved to us.

As these reports have come down to us, they are the amplified notes of a zealous and faithful student rather than the formal and accurate transcript of philosophical lectures. As a matter of fact, they were not prepared with a view to publication, but were made solely for the student's own use. So Arrian confesses : " I neither composed the Discourses of Epictetus in such a manner as things of this nature are commonly composed, nor did I myself produce them to public view any more than I composed them. But whatever sentiments I heard from his own mouth, the very same I endeavored to set down in the very same words, as far as possible, and preserve as memorials, for my own use, of his manner of thinking and freedom of speech. These discourses are such as one person would naturally deliver from his own thoughts, extempore, to another ; not such as he would prepare xx INTRODUCTION

to be read by numbers afterwards. Yet, notwithstanding this, I cannot tell how, without either my consent or knowledge, they have fallen into the hands of the public." 2

It is thus evident that Arrian did not publish his notes of the lectures of Epictetus as a finished literary product; and they ought not so to be judged. They are rather the intimate and personal records made by an apt and admiring disciple. One compensation is that it is likely that thus we get more of the style and spirit of Epictetus than would be the case if the notes had been carefully revised. As it is, the discourses are free and vigorous, and seem to throb with life.

And yet after this is said, it is no disparagement to add that Arrian was more faithful in recording than he was skillful in arranging the discourses of his teacher. 3 These reports, naturally enough, abound in repetitions and redundances. Nor is any order to be detected in the arrangement of the subject-matter. The sublime and the commonplace often lie side by side and the most diverse themes are sometimes considered in the same chapter. What Apollo said of Daphne's unkempt tresses is true here : " If so charming in disorder, what would they be if arranged ! "

Of all this Arrian himself was doubtless quite as sensible as his modern critic. Indeed it was

2 Arrian to Lucius Gellius.

3 So Davidson : " According to modern notions, Arrian would not be regarded as a good editor." Stoic Creed, p. 29.

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxi

presumably to correct these defects and to call order out of chaos that Arrian later prepared the now familiar Encheiridion or Manual. This is an abridgment or condensation of the Discourses, bringing within the compass of half a hundred short sections the main features of the teaching and philosophy of Epictetus. The style of the Manual is somewhat formal and ponderous, though well suited to its purpose. As compared with the reports of which this is an abstract, the Manual lacks spontaneity and inspiration. It is Law rather than Gospel. Nevertheless its brevity and its more systematic arrangement have done much to popularize the noble thoughts of which it is the depository. For generations the Manual has been regarded as a sort of Vade Mecum. More than one choice spirit has, so to speak, slept with the little book under his pillow. Translated into a score of languages, the Manual has enjoyed an immense vogue and it is still a great power for those seeking leading and light. / It is, however, to be feared that with not a few their knowledge of Epictetus is limited to the reading of the Manual, while the vast and varied stores of wisdom contained in the Discourses are overlooked. This is to be regretted not only because it narrows the field of thought, but also because it distorts the ideas of Epictetus. The Manual needs a certain perspective in order to be of the highest service; it presupposes the background furnished by the Discourses. Without this, the Manual, brave and noble as it is, seems xxii INTRODUCTION

harsh and arid. It is as if one should commit to memory the Epistle of James, and leave the Gospels unread.

To others Epictetus is known only through fragmentary selections from the Discourses and the Manual. Indeed it is not unlikely that many admirers of the great Stoic know Epictetus only through these selections. While these are often chosen with good judgment and are more or less representative of the wisdom and genius of Epictetus, they nevertheless fail to give to the reader an adequate idea of the scope, variety and continuity of his thought.

For these reasons it is certain that Epictetus has not yet come to his own. Nor will he take his rightful place among the world's spiritual benefactors and deliver to his readers his full message, until a twofold service is rendered to the reports of his discourses as they have come down to us.

In the first place, there is much in the teaching of every sage that is necessarily local and of but passing interest and concern. In his criticism of Wordsworth, Matthew Arnold says : " To be recognized far and wide as a great poet, to be possible and receivable as a classic, Wordsworth needs to be relieved of a great deal of the poetical baggage which now encumbers him. To administer this relief is indispensable, unless he is to continue to be a poet for the few only, a poet valued far below his real worth by the world." 4

4 Essays in Criticism.

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxiii

In a measure true of most teachers, this observation applies with special force to the works of Epictetus as we have them. For in his discourses there are many allusions and references that have little interest for the modern reader. The effect of these is to confuse, if not to discourage, the reader and to distract his attention from what was really uppermost in the mind of Epictetus. His message will be found to gain immensely when thus relieved of irrelevancies and allowed to reach the reader with the least possible resistance.

In the second place, his teaching needs to be arranged in a natural and orderly way, that step by step the reader may ascend to the summit of his thought. Not otherwise can we fully comprehend his thought with all its grounds, its many implications, and its logical conclusions.

It is to this twofold task of elimination and systematization, an undertaking as delicate as it is difficult, that the present work addresses itself. The aim is not to gather a volume of selections, but so to organize, and present his thought that Epictetus may communicate to his readers "the truth which relates to happiness." 5

The method employed toward this desired end is somewhat different from any hitherto adopted. Ignoring Arrian's division of the material into the Discourses and the Manual, as also his arrangement of the Discourses in books and chapters, the entire subject-matter has been resolved

5 Discourses, I. iv.

xxiv INTRODUCTION

into its thought elements. Thus analyzed, the material has in turn been organized and assembled by its own power of attraction. It is hoped that by this means some contribution may be made towards enabling Epictetus to give plain, coherent, and adequate utterance to his faith.

And what is that faith? What are its qualities? What is its value to us? Without attempting to formulate dogmatic answers to these questions, it is fitting to lay before the reader such material as shall enable him to reach his own conclusions.

At the outset it should be observed that the teaching of Epictetus recognizes two distinct grades of discipleship. He has in mind two orders, so to speak, a lay and a clerical, an outer and an inner circle of adherents. These two orders, as we have called them, are (i) the Stoic, and (2) the Cynic. All Cynics were Stoics, as all priests are churchmen; but not all Stoics were Cynics, as not all churchmen are called to the priesthood. For, in the view of Epictetus, the Cynic is a Stoic with a special calling, fitness, and mission.

It is of primary importance to recognize this division; and the failure to do so has introduced into the teaching of Epictetus no little confusion and has led to much distortion and misunderstanding. It is the more necessary to urge this distinction since it has usually been ignored. Even so great an authority as Zeller speaks of the Cynic as the ideal philosopher or Stoic ex-

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxv

ample. 6 And the mistake has been repeated by most writers on the subject, it being assumed that what was said of the Cynic was applicable to all Stoics alike. 7 Further on we shall have occasion to note how this misunderstanding has vitiated much that has been written on the subject; and we shall have to question some of the judgments based upon this misapprehension.

What Epictetus has to say concerning the Cynic is practically confined to the famous twenty-second chapter of the third book of the Discourses as preserved to us by Arrian. From this it appears that the Cynic must have a distinct call to that life. For he who without distinct prompting from God aspires to so high and holy a calling thereby renders himself hateful to the divine Power. The Cynic, like the poet, is born, not made; or at least not self-made. He must be called, even foreordained. For there is the element of destiny in it. Desire and resolve alone are insufficient. The same Power that ordained the sun to be sun, and not satellite — that Power calls the Stoic to become the Cynic. Cosmic fate enters into the matter. The willingness to lead the precarious life of mendicancy, the impulse to go about reproving and exhorting, these in themselves are no warrant for the Cynic. He may become a Stoic who chooses: to become a Cynic is above our choice. Many may be called — by themselves : but few are chosen by God.

Nor is this " call " a mere vagary. For the

6 Phil. Greece, III. S. 752. 7 See pp. xlvi-xlviii.

xxvi INTRODUCTION

Cynic must be amply endowed by God for his high vocation. Physically, he must be able to live the life of self-denial and self-discipline and not only to survive, but to thrive. His fair countenance and healthful body must bear unmistakable witness that God has called him. Mentally, the keen perceptions of the Cynic and his freedom from every form of prejudice and intellectual timidity are evidences of his divine calling. Morally, the Cynic must be pure and blameless. Not a word of blame for God or for man is ever to escape his lips or to sully his heart. Though beaten like an ass, he is to joy in his tribulations and to love those who persecute and despitefully use him. Clearer than the sun must be his conscience, his only fortress and refuge. Others may hide themselves and seek cover, but not so the Cynic. Not even in a glass house does the Cynic live : he abides in the open, the sky his only roof, the corners of the world his walls. Socially, the Cynic must be unattached. He is to love One and One only, even Him who called him. There is to be no attachment to things or persons, the severing of which would bring distraction, pain, regret, or responsibility. The Cynic therefore is to be unmarried, foregoing the obligations of family life for the prior obligations of his high calling. Likewise he is to be exempt from civil and military service, seeing that already the Cynic is occupying the highest possible office, to which he has been appointed by God.

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxvii

Thus endowed and commissioned, the Cynic is to go about reproving and exhorting men. He is to fear not the face of man, but with the fearlessness of a Hebrew prophet he is to denounce evil in low places and in high. With unerring judgment he is to show men wherein lurk the perils of life and wherein lies their real good. Ever on the alert, the Cynic, without fear or favor, is to point out the way to freedom, happiness, and prosperity. And to crown all, the Cynic is himself to be a living example of all that he has said and counselled, that in him men may behold every fear banished, every appetite mastered, and every hope realized.

It must be obvious that Cynicism, thus delineated by Epictetus, is not for the world, but for the chosen few. And it is an evidence of the sanity and sagacity of the great Stoic that the matter lay perfectly clear in his mind. It is his interpreters who have confused his teaching, as there will be occasion to note. There could be no world, if every one were a Cynic : this would be a better world, were there even a few such Cynics as contemplated by Epictetus.

Passing now from the Cynic to the Stoic, we may examine his general teaching and give some consideration to the ideas that constituted the working faith which Epictetus labored to instill into the minds of all those who sought his guidance.

" In the beginning God." So it might well be said of the leading ideas of Epictetus. This is xxviii INTRODUCTION

indeed the central thought of his system, from which all other ideas have been thrown off, like planets from the sun. To ignore this or to minimize it is at the outset to misunderstand the great Stoic, while rightly to apprehend this is to find ready entrance into the mind of Epictetus. So he himself says : " We are first to learn that God is." 8 While he does not undertake to present in philosophical order the various " arguments " for the being of God, there are yet few forms of this argument that he fails to recognize and utilize. They are, however, widely scattered through his discourses and are presented in such form as would appeal to the general audience that he addressed.

Naturally enough therefore Epictetus invokes the argumentum ad hominem. Do not words themselves bear witness to the existence of God? And does not the language of men imply a natural conviction of His being? Otherwise how came these words to be adopted into the vocabulary of men ? Moreover does not the customary conduct of men imply the belief in God? Is not life itself a voyage, the great adventure? "No man sails from port without having sacrificed to the Gods and invoked their help." 9 And do not sowing and tilling the field involve faith in an underlying Law ? " Men do not sow without having called on Demeter." 10 And furthermore

8 Discourses, II. xiv. 9 Discourses, III. xxi.

10 Discourses, III. xxi.

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxix

is it not generally conceded that the chief end of man is to follow the Gods? " But if there be no Gods, how can the following of the Gods be an end?" u Now this language and these customs are employed by men in general, and they have not seen fit to drop the language or to abolish the customs; they therefore constitute a witness to man's natural belief in the existence of God. Such is the argumentum ad hominem as employed by Epictetus, and it is embellished with fervid, if simple, rhetoric.

Moreover the evidence of teleology is not overlooked by Epictetus. He lays stress upon the evidences of design in nature. " From the very structure of things which have attained their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the work of some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a purpose. Does, then, each of these things demonstrate the workman, and do not invisible things . . . demonstrate Him? If not so, let them explain to us what it is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance." 12 This seems like an anticipation of Bacon's oft quoted words : " I had rather believe all the fables . . . than that this universal frame is without a mind. ... It is true that a little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism; . . . but when it beholdeth the chain of them,

11 Discourses, I. xii. 12 Discourses, I. xvi.

xxx INTRODUCTION

confederate and linked together, it must needs flyto Providence and Deity." 13

Then, again, the visible world with its many and various effects demands an adequate cause. Something from nothing is bad mathematics and worse philosophy. Do not nature's laws necessitate a Lawgiver? Is nature automatic, selfmoved? Or is there a Prime Mover? God is: He is the Force and the Power within and behind visible nature. " For how else do plants, as if at the command of God, when He bids them, flower in due season ? And how else at the waxing and waning of the moon, and the approach and withdrawal of the sun, do we behold such a change and reversal in earthly things ? " 14

Nor did the argument from analogy escape Epictetus. Bishop Butler might have found in the great Stoic many ideas kindred to his own. Is not the universe a great and teeming city? " Has it no Governor ? And how is it possible that a city or a family cannot continue to exist, not even for the shortest time, without an administrator and guardian, and that so great and beautiful a system should be administered with such order and yet without a purpose and by chance? There is, then, an Administrator." 15 And that Administrator is none other than God. With satire as keen as it is delicate Epictetus likens those who fail or refuse to perceive this

13 Essay XVI. Compare Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II. xxxiv.

14 Discourses, I. xiv. 15 Discourses, II. xiv.

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxxi

unto the behavior of people at a country fair. Most of the visitors are content to wander about and admire the cattle and to inquire the price of fodder: while the discerning ones meditate upon the purpose of the exhibit and admire the executive ability rendering the exposition possible. 16 Even so is the world: many observe only the phenomena ; some few penetrate into the meaning of phenomena and thereby find God.

But Epictetus does not stop here. The supreme witness to the being of God is found, not in the laws and phenomena of external nature, but in the mind and constitution of man. For into man God has put a portion of Himself. " You are a fragment of God, you have in yourr self something that is a part of Him." 17 The moral nature of man testifies to the being of God. That moral nature man did not make: it the rather makes him.

For man is endowed with the sense of loyalty to the Good : he willingly acknowledges the obligation, and adopts the word ought. Just what particular thing it may be his duty to do or to forego is a matter to be determined by education and experience; that being an intellectual question, in no wise affecting the prior sense of obligation. Epictetus states the matter thus : " He has done well, he has not done well; he is unjust, he is just; . . . who does not use these names? Who among us defers the use of them till he has learned them, as he defers the use of

16 Discourses, II. xiv. 17 Discourses, II. viii.

xxxii INTRODUCTION

the words about lines or sounds ? And the cause of this is that we come into the world already taught as it were by nature some things on this matter, and proceeding from these, we have added to them self-conceit. For why, a man says, do I not know the beautiful and the ugly? Have I not the notion of it? You have. Do I not adapt it to particulars? You do. Do I not, then, adapt it properly? In that lies the whole question. . . . For if men possessed this power of adaptation . . . what would hinder them from being perfect?" 18 In other words, the moral nature of man functions through the organ of his intellect; and that intellect must be trained: howbeit, that moral nature which thus functions is itself the presence of God in the soul of man. Thus Epictetus anticipates modern thought; and the words of Martineau seem an echo of the thought of the great Stoic : " The revelation of authority, this knowledge of the better, this inward conscience, this moral ideality — call it what you will — is the presence of God in man." 19 Further on we shall have occasion to speak more fully of this and to point out some of its practical applications by Epictetus. 20

But if God is, so also His Providence orders and directs all things. 21 For Epictetus summarily rejects the idea that God is simply the First Cause; he cannot rest in the thought that God cares only for the great things and has no

18 Discourses, II. xi. 19 Seat of Authority, p. 105.

20 See pp. xli-xliv. 21 Discourses, II. xiv.

THE FAITH OF A STOIC xxxiii

concern with the ordinary affairs of men; nor is he satisfied with the suggestion that God rules over men by impersonal general laws : Epictetus is satisfied with nothing less than the words of Homer :

" I move not without Thy knowledge." 22

His God must be also his Father. For the universe, as the name implies, is one : one in authorship, one in substance. One law governs and pervades the whole. " Is not God able to oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive from all a certain communication? And is the sun able to illuminate so large a part of the All . . . and He who made the sun itself . . . being a small part of Himself compared with the whole, cannot He perceive all things ? " 23 It is as if Epictetus had read the words of the Psalmist :

"He that formed the eye, shall He not see?" 24

No easy-going faith is here however. For if there is a Providence, the implications are weighty. If there is a Providence, then to blame God is to dethrone Him. Like Job, the Stoic must stalwartly refuse to " curse God." All judgment and criticism must be withheld. Hence submission and resignation have a large place in the teaching of Epictetus. As the educated per-