An essay on the plan of salvation

Front matter

AN ESSAY

ON THE

PLAN OF SALTATION.

Preface

THE following Essay was written, and is now offered to the public, from a full and deliberate conviction that truth, rightly understood and believed, tends to the general and permanent happiness of mankind; — that the doctrines therein contained are true; — and that they are truths in which we are all particularly interested, and which cannot be too attentively examined, or too generally understood. If either of these positions be erroneous, it must be confessed that error has had an influence in giving birth to the present publication. But admitting them to be correct, they are deemed sufficient to furnish justifiable motives for publishing this book, nothwithstanding its defects, or the obscurity of its author.

The general design of the Essay, as signified by the title, is to point out and ascertain, with some tolerable degree of accuracy, the rules of evidence by which alone the human mind can be successful iu the search of truth; — in order especially, to apply those rules, or to use them with attentive regularity, in the investigation of the important and great principles of Christianity, concerning the redemption of mankind, and the general plan of saving them from sin and misery, by our Lord Jesus Christ. It is entitled an Essay on the Plan of Salvation, because the design of it was, not to investigate precisely and exclusively, the doctrine of the atonement, but to view that interesting doctrine in its connexion with the general plan of restoring fallen creatures, and in its relation to the moral attributes and government of the great Creator. The reader will find that one whole chapter was written before the subject of atonement was introduced; and that chapter may be considered, by some, to be totally foreign from the plan of salvation, and to contain matter which cannot, with propriety, be included under such a title. It may be necessary, for the sake of such readers, to obviate the objection in this place, lest an unhappy prepossession should cause them to stumble at the very threshold, and to cast the book by with inditterence, before they come to tha main subject to which their attention is solicited.

It must be acknowledged by every reflecting mind, that a clear view of the method by which truth is to be discovered and ascertained, is of great advantage in the pursuit of it; and that confusion in our conceptions of the proper grounds of credence, is a very general and fatal source of error. A man is in little danger of taking his enemy for his friend, or his friend for his enemy, who has a clear and steady conception of the constituent principles of friendship and of enmity; because he can apply those principles to each particular case, without much danger of being mistaken; but he who is at no pains to regulate his view of this subject, is liable to take

PREFACE.

that for a proof of friendship which is a proof of the contrary, and thus to expose himself to the insidious arts of intrigue and deception. In like manner, while we remain unacquainted with the rules of evidence, or have but an indistinct and obscure view of them, we are liable to take that for a sign of truth which is a giga of falsehood, and to wander in the wilderness ef delusion, till our adherence to sophistical evidence will become habitual; and then surely we shall be in a fair way to take bitter for sweety and sweet for bitter; — darkness for lights and light for darkness,

\i cannot therefore be justly considered a matter of indifterence,' much less of censure, that in an Essay upon the great doctrines of religion and morality, on which our present and eternal happiness depends, an attempt should iirst be made to distinguish between true and false evidence: for how can truth be discovered or proved, but by the use of sound and genuine rules of proof, and by carefully guarding against those which are false and delusive? And how can this be done, if we be at no pains to distinguish the one from the other?

Nor can it be justly said, that such an examination of evidence "belongs not to the plan of salvation: for is it not God's method of saving sinners, to bestow his spiritual blessings upon them in consequence of i\\^\r embracing the truth? And how can truth be discovered or believed, but by means of that evidence which distinguishes it from falsehood? All men will agree surely, that truth cannot be embraced without being distinguished from falsehood: and how can this be done, if we are indifferent to the method by which they are to be distinguished? As the plan of saving sinners Implies, therefore, our understanding, believing and obeying the truth; and as truth cannot be understood, believed, nor consequently obeyed, but by means of proper evidence, this first chapter, upon the nature and rules of evidence; and the distinction between the sound and the unsound, properly belongs to an Essay on the plan of Ji^alvation.

It is true, that in illustrating this subject, notice has been taken of our intellectual or judging faculties, and some may perhaps object, that a disposition has been manifested to wander too far into the regions of philosophy; but when we consider that some philosophers have done more to involve the evidence of truth in confusion and obscurity, than almost any other men, it can hardly be thought improper to follow them in their ingenious speculations, so far at least, as to detect the stratagems, by which they have laboured to conceal the evidence of religious truth, and of moral obligation, from the human mind. Infidelity, it is well known, affects to come forth under the sanction of philosophy: It eagerly embraces the ingenious theories of some acute metaphysicians, ag the ground of its opposition to Christianity; therefore we cannot disarm our unbelieving opponents, without attacking the hypotheses of that science^ falsely so called^ on which they take their stand, and by mean^ of which they have imposed upon the understandings of the unwary, have made a plausible defence against the dictates of conscience and reason, and have been but too sueceȤ|u| ja the establishment of a pernicious scepticism.

PREFACE.

But it is vain to hope, that all the objections can be obviated in A preface, which will be apt to occur agaiust the doctrines of this Essay; for it is extremely probable, not to say morally certain, that there will be some hundreds. And for this plain reason, that the author, from the beginning to the end, has been governed by a conviction that he ought to follow evidence wherever it should lead, without ever suppressing or departing from any part of it, through the fear of deviating from the sentiments of any man, or any number of men in the world. Hence one part of the subject may differ from one sentiment, long sanctioned by authority; another part from another; and upon the whole, every denomination of christiaus may peradventure find something that will be esteemed objectionable.

Indeed, there is reason to presume that some who entirely approve the leading doctrines here advanced, and whose friendship the writer of these pages has long had the happiness to enjoy, will be obstructed in their progress through the Essay, by some considerable objections. Without attempting to predict what particular points will be considered erroneous, it may suffice to notice objections that are more general. These may perhaps be the following: (1.) That the subject is treated in a manner too abstruse and metaphysical, and (2.) that the peculiar boldness and novelty of several parts of it, are of a suspicious character, and indicate a strong presumption, that some very serious errors have been adopted.

In answering the first, it may be sufficient to say, that great eare and pains were used to make the subject as simple and intelligible as its nature would possibly admit of; and though some things have been introduced that are abstruse in their nature, because it was impossible otherwise to do any justice to the subject, yet it is presumed, there are few things introduced, but such as may be understood by common minds, provided their method of reading and understanding subjects be that of attention and diligent thinking. And I hope no person w ould request a man to write a book that may be understood without thinkiug. Must it not be a very superficial and frivolous performance, that can be comprehended by a careless inattentive glance, that is hardly sufficient to keep the reader from falling into a profound sleep? And however intelligible, conclusive, or important a treatise may be, it will contain nothing clear, convincing or interesting, to an wnthinking mind: because his intellectual supineness renders him incapable of entering into a subject, or of properly relishing any truths it may contain. The discourses of our Saviour and his apostles are remarkably simple and perspicuous; yet the man who presumes he has a right understanding of them, without close and habitual meditation, is in a greater error, perhaps, than those of whom he is disposed to complain.

As to the second objection, the candid and friendly reader is assured, that great solicitude occupied the mind of the writer, through the whole of this Essay, to guard against error: if the reader will devote an equal degree of attention to discover and point out erroneous opinions, that was employed to avoid them, he will doubtless be entitled to a fair hearing; and whatever aid his

PREFACE.

f/iendly strictures may afford, will be received with gratitude. — But as to those persons, if any such there be, who upon the first careless glance are entirely prepared, aud think themselves fully qualified, to fix the charge of heresy upon a publication, their sovereign and masterly decision, I think, is beneath the attention of every reflecting mind. Their great and capable minds, it would seem, are under no necessity to submit to the drudgery of close and laborious thinking, in order to distinguish truth from falsehood; but are at once prepared, with intuitive infallibility, to judge of every book and of every subject, without the pains of ex^ aniination, or even almost without reading or hearing them. — What is the evidence on which they decide? Such as the following: the thing is a novelty: — 1 never heard it before: — my father never believed it: — It is not believed by our party:^-! am sure it is false. — Hoping the reader will pardon me for supposing it possible, that there may be persons of this sort in the world, 1 drop the present allusion, and proceed to notice a few other particulars.

It is not impossible, that some persons, into whose hands this book may chance to fall, will be grievously offended, because so little deference appears to be given to creeds, established by the authority of divines, or to the opinions of the learned; especially tothoseof philosophers and doctors of law and divinity. They may perhaps think this performance, however destitute of the grace of novelty in other particulars, affords a new species of im-^ pudence and self-sufficiency.

It is indeed a very pleasing reflection to an enlightened mind, that there are many men of learning in the world; — men who have a complete knowledge of the different languages, as also of science in general; — it would be a blessing if their number was increased ten fold;— and every friend to human improvement must consider it desirable to be possessed of their advantages: — but though a degree of deference is due to their authority, yel if any one should conclude that authority alone is a sufficient ground for all our opinions, it might not be improper to propose to him a few plain queries.

1. Are divines and philosophers the only men to whom God has given the right to think and judge for themselves.^ 2. Must all persons who have been unhappily deprived of their advantages, either hold their peace, or frame all their opinions aceording to the exact model furnished by their learned superiors, however the clearest evidence may seem to lead to a contrary conclusion? 3. Is a man incapable of reasoning or judging correctly, because he is not a critic in foreign languages, or has not become master of astronomy or navigation.^* 4. If any person were charged with having no independence, — of framing all his opinions according to the fashion or authority of great men, without having any opinion of his own, — would he not consider it a reproach, and be disposed to repel the charge.^ 5. Is it not very inconsistent then, for any person to complain of another, for using that freedom of thought and independence, the want of which cannot be imputed to himself, without being received as a reproach, or even as an insult.^

The reader, it is hoped, bearing these queries in mind, will peruse the following sheets with some indulgence, and will not b^

PREFACE.

hasty in attributing that to a want of respect for great men, which originated only from a desire to avoid the unreasonable prepossessions of fashion and authority.

As to the manner, or execution of this work, it is not to be doubted that the judicious reader will meet with many deftciencies; some from errors of the press, some from the inability of tlie author, and others from the peculiar disadvantages under which he laboured. A candid and liberal indulgence is solicited; and if any harsh or uncharitable expressions have been permitted to pass, it is hoped, that, being imputed to inadvertency, more than malevolence, by impartial and generous minds, they will be forgiven.

This book may be thought by some to copy too much after the modes of expression used by moralists, philosophers, or even So-- einians; and though the sentiments may be true, yet the expressions may be thought not sufficiently evangelical. Instance, the frequent use of the words virtue, rectitude, morality, &c.

This has been done for the sake of precision and perspicuity; Those words, though sometimes limited to external conduct only, are frequently used to signify the whole of christian righteousness^ obedience and holiness. Does not the law of God enjoin perfect holi* ness? And is it not truly denominated the moral law? Then does not the word morality, comprehend the whole of that law which enjoins the perfect love of God, and of all mankind.^ And ivhy should christians, or men of reason, dispute about words, and be oifended at each other for particular modes of expression? To reject truth on this account, is like a person refusing to partake of the common sustenance of life, because it is not served up in tbat kind of table furniture which is most agreeable to his fancy.

And suppose there should be a considerable deficiency of style, or even a few serious errors of opinion, if the doctrines are true in the general, and worthy of all acceptation, they surely ought not to be rejected with disgust or indifference, because a few errors escaped attention, and unhappily found their way into this publication. To reject a treatise in this way, is to act like those persons who reject or despise a whole religious community as hypocrites, because a few of its members have been found to be deceitfuL Would such an objector be willing his own character should be treated in this manner, and be unequivocally exploded as a bad character, because a few blemishes had been discovered? Reader, wilt thou slay the truth with the error, and that the truth should he, as the error? That be far from thee. Shall not every candid person imitate the judge of all the earth in doing right?

But if Dr. Brown be correct in his views of mankind, this will he a very unfashionable, and therefore unpopular book: "As few men have the courage" says he, "to sacrifice their interest, their pleasure, or their fame to their regard for truth and justice, the great concern is, to speak and act, not as reason and virtue dictate, but as interested views, in conforming to the opinions, humours, and manners of others, may require. For, how is the favour of the greater part of men to be caught, but by adulation and servile respect? And what so efficacious for incurring their displeasure, as that manly and generous conduct and conversation, which indicate less solicitude to secure favour, than to enjoy self-esteem, a greater

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love of mankind than respect for individuals? Hence, most mea Lave an opinion for every company they frequent, and change' their sentiments oftener than their dress. — Politeness is making constant demands— propriety imposing new laws — men are always the slaves of custom, and seldom follow the bent of their own genius and temper. Society is a species of stage, on which the actors appear in their turns, and play their parts. He is most applauded, and bears the highest price, who appears least himself, and personates most successfully the assumed character.

" The man who presumes to think, to speak, or to act, differently from the generality, even in matters of singular importance to the common good, is looked upon as an unsocial savage being, who, separating himself from his species, is entitled to no share of their regard and afteetion. It is well, if he is not exposed to thef severest effects of resentment and hatred." Brown^s JVatural Equality of Men, page 130 and 134.

According to this bold representation, which Dr. Brown has had the assurance to make, it would appear, that an honest maa is not to expect much esteem in this world; but that, in order to be popular, a man's chief concern must be to conform himself to the fashion. Such a concern had little influence in producing the present Essay, and therefore, judging by the above representation, it is not difficult to foresee its fate.

THE AUTHOR.

Baltimore^ September i2, 1813,

Introduction

X^EAviNG the busy multitude to pursue their momentary schemes, I sit down, thoughtful and retired, to consider myself, my origin, my Author and my end. 1 live in the world, possessed of various faculties to think, and feel, and remember, I know not how. I want to know what I am, whence I am, and whither I am bound.

I find I am a creature capable of being eitlier happy or miserable, and that happiness and misery are within my pow er, and, in a considerable degree, depend upon my voluntary actions. There are many objects around me, some of which are calculated to hurt me, and others to minister to my wants. There are millions of creatures in the world, beside myself, some possessing similar faculties to those which I possess, and others of another kind. They also are capable of happiness or misery, and it depends upon my choice, whether 1 act in a way calculated to injure them, or to promote their felicity. Our nature, our feelings, and our wants are common; and the question presents itself, whether I should consider my own convenience alone, and gratify myself in every particular, however others may be injured; or, whether 1 ought to regard the general welfare, and sacrifice some of my private gratifications, to promote the native liberty and enjoyments of my fellow men? The latter appearing to be self-evident, I feel bound to use my thinking pow ers, that I may learn, not only the means of happiness and misery to myself, that 1 may pursue the one and avoid the other; but also what is calculated to guard others from misery, and to promote the tranquillity of universal society.

B vi. INTRODUCTION.

Happiness is the end of general knowledge; and any part of knowledge that has no tendency to this end, (if any such there be) is altogether useless and insignificant. I find that I desire happiness by an uncontrolable necessity in my nature: I need no increase of knowledge to stimulate me to pursue this end; but the means of it are as diversified as the works of God, and my ignorance of them is such that there is need of perpetual meditation to discover them; and I presume there would still be great room for improvements, were my life protracted for ten thousand years.

As the means of happiness, when known, must be applied or reduced to practice, I conclude that in all my reflections I should have a reference to the regulation of my conduct; and that which shews me immediately how to act right, is the most important of all knowledge. He who pursues knowledge without any regard to practice, is like a man sitting by the way side, enquiring of every one, that he may learn the road to any certain place, in order to sit still and never follow the directions he receives with so much apparent solicitude.

In vain may he pretend that disinterested benevolence influences him to acquire knowledge, that he may direct others into that path of right conduct, in which he refuses to walk himself; for his own supine indifference refutes this pretension and evinces to every attentive spectator, that his benevolence is so very superficial that it only recommends that which he esteems not worth pursuing. It is some.selfish principle, and not a genuine love of truth, which influences the empty speculations of such an individual; and it is well if he does not spend more time in learning how to excuse and justify his own indifference to virtue, than he does in teaching others how to pursue and enjoy the benefits thereof. Believing, as his conduct proves he does, that he can be more happy in the neglect of right conduct than in the practice of it, he will directly or indirectly recommend the same immorality to others, and will excuse or defend the delusion, by all the insinuating sophistry in his power.

I am not only ignorant, I find, of many things which it «oncerns me to know; but 1 am perpetually liable to fall into error, which is worse than ignorance. If I use my intellectual faculties a» 1 ought, I may through Divine assistance, I conclude,

INTRODUCTION. vil

acquire all that knowledge which my Maker has made necessary for my present state of being, as well as to prepare me for •ternal happiness hereafter; but there are many things which I cannot know, because the Almighty has not given me the means and the power to know them. If I believe nothing concerning them, bnt live contented in a state of ignorance, in matters which God has put beyond the reach of my understanding, I shall continue safe and happy; but if I form hypothesis, and resolve to believe without evidence, I shall fall into delusions that may have a pernicious influence upon my virtue and tranquillity.

Hence it appears necessary for me to be at due pains to distinguish between those things which may be known by mankind*, and those which surpass the limits of human understanding, lest I should spend my time in fruitless endeavors to comprehend that which is incomprehensible. In so doing I should weary myself in vain: I should darken counsel by words with^ But knowledge, bewilder the understanding of others, as well as Biy own, and involve truth in the shades of impenetrable obscurity. I should waste and abuse the time and talents which the Parent of goodness has lent me for a season, and should remain ignorant of truths which might be knowTi, by preposterously neglecting tltem to pursue those subjects w^hich God has reserved for the contemplation of superior intelligences.

To distinguish between things knowable by me, and those which are not so, I purpose to regulate my studies chiefly by this single rule; When a subject of apparent difficulty presents itself, if the impossibility of conceiving it more clearly do not appear self-evident, I must give it a full trial; I must avail myself of the most happy season, when my thinking faculties are in the best order, and labor to understand it w ith all necessary attention and perseverance: if in this attempt my conceptions become more clear and distinct, I receive it as evidence that I am not out of my proper sphere; but if e\ery attempt be Iruitless— 'if my pains and labors serve no other purpose than to weary my spirit, and involve the subject in greater obscurity, I take for granted that this is a subject beyond the grasp of my understanding, and must immediately give up the pur* suit^ viii. INTRODITCTION.

Among the vast variety of subjects within the compass of human thought, I ought to select those for my most serious and attentive investigation, that appear to have the most essential relation to the solid and perpetual happiness of mankind. Those of secondary importance should have but a secondary degree of attention, especially as our stay in this world is so short, that we must necessarily remain ignorant of many particulars for want of time to examine them.

By the study and communication of truth, I hope to glorify my Creator, and to promote the welfare of my fellow creatures, as well as my own, by exhibiting those amiable and august perfections of the Deity, which are the foundation of all felicity in every part of the universe, I hope, through the mediation of my Saviour, to answer, in some degree, the end of a rational being, and to stand approved before Him whose vast intelligence scrutinizes the secret thoughts of every creature. 1 hope to contribute my mite to the support of truth and righteousness among the descendants of Adam, and to assist, as I may be able, the benefactors of mankind, in defeating the dark designs of malevolence, which have appeared in all ages, and which have sometimes threatened to banish all truth and virtue from the world, and to fill it with the intolerable darkness of superstition, or of open atheism.

But how shall I guard against splitting upon the rocks or running upon the shoals which stand threatening on either Land.^ How many good men have fallen into great mistakes? In attempting to steer our vessel upon the calm and unruffled current of reason and revelation, that we may reach our desired haven, much caution is needful to guard against the dangerous whirlpools of passion and of prejudice. Many, alasl have missed their course in a dark and a cloudy day, and having run a ground were unable to get forward and have long stood exposed to the waves of prejudice and passion; while others to avoid a similar fate, have unhappily kept at too great a distance, and thereby have fallen on the rocks upon the other shore. " Nothing is more common," says Mr. Fletcher " than for men to run into one extreme under the plausible pretence of avoiding another."

Shall 1 presume then, that I will be able to avoid all dsm-

INTRODUCTION. ix,

ger, and to keep constantly on the even channeL^ I dare not presume so. Yet I cannot believe that all men are destined to run into dangerous errors of necessity, without charging my Maker foolishly. And "to run away" from the search of truth, on account of danger, "is but a coward's trick:" the examples which history aftbrds, of the multiplied and dangerous errors of mankind, ought indeed to make us wary; but they ought never to cause us to fold up our hands and do nothing, under the whimsical imagination, that we shall mend the matter by laying an embargo upon our rational faculties.

God gave us talents that we might improve, not bury themj and I must be permitted to presume that a right use of them will lead to the end intended: and unless that end was to deceive mankind with various delusions, I conclude we may avoid all dangerous mistakes, provided we move cautiously, after having taken due pains to set out right. If we take a wrong direction when we first set out upon a journey, the farther we advance, the more we w ander out of the way. To avoid this, let us begin by examining what method God has established to lead his creatures to the knowledge of his truth. Let us labor to conceive and ascertain the proper method of distinguishing truth from falsehood, that we may trace out the causes which have led thousands so far into the wilderness.

AN ESSAY

ON TH£

PLAN OF SAJLVATIOI^.

Chapter I

UPON THE METHOD ESTABLISHED BY THE CREATOR, THROUGH WHICH MANKIND ARE TO DISTINGUISH TRUTH FROM FALSE- HOOD.

SECTION I. Ji general view of truth and evidence

GroD has given us power, by means of various faculties of our nature, to conceive many things, to distinguish between them, to compare them together, and to notice their connexion or repugnance to each other. The exercise of these faculties produces in us an immediate belief or conviction that some things are true and others false. Of all this we are conscious, as of our own existence; and if \ye^ discredit the evidence of consciousness, we may at once abandon all farther inquiry and resign ourselves to "the great profundity obscure" of universal scepticism. I know my own existence; I find by consciousness alone; and if I cannot have a sure knowledge of this it is certain that I can know nothing else. If I exist not, I have no faculties, and of course no capacity of knowing; otherwise knowledge is acquired aud truth discovered, by the intellectual faculties of nothing.

By the word truth, in its general application, I understand those propositions, or decisions of the judgment, which accord liJ AN ESSAY ON THE

with the real existence, properties and relations of all thingsthose which do not thus accord with real existence, properties and relations, are false.