Trained citizen soldiery; a solution of General Upton's problem

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Class. U n ^KJ

Book 1LKl(L-

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CHAPTER I. Failure of our Present System

T, ^ . In round numbers the cost of our army, Peace Cost . _ • ,

on our present scale of pay, is about

$1,000 per man, per year. This is in time of peace, with every expenditure reduced to the minimum. The appropriations run about a milUon dollars for every thousand soldiers, whether privates in the ranks, or brigadier generals on the retired list. The lowest estimates for a "first line" army to meet the first shock of w^ar with a civilized enemy, is half a million men. This force would at once call for a half a billion dollars per year, merely on a peace basis. It would call at once for one-half of the total revenues of the government. T|7 ^ , But the peace cost of this force is no basis on which to estimate its cost in time of war. Then the whole power of an equal or superior enemy would be actively engaged in trying to destroy this military machine. Horses, clothing, guns, cannon, aeroplanes, artillery projectiles, the most expensive material, all of which is most carefully husbanded in time of peace, would be expended like water in time of war. Cavalry horses may cost about $150 each. In time of peace a horse is normally good for about ten years of service. In time of war the destruction of horses is simply frightful. In war time they are much more expensive than in time of peace. The projectile and charge of a three-inch gun may cost twenty dollars. In time of peace their expenditure is limited to target practice, but in a battle the only limit is the number necessary to win, if enough can be procured for that purpose. The same principle applies in all directions. If it costs three dollars per man per day to maintain the army in time of peace it would be conservative to estimate three or four times that cost in time of war. Ten dollars per man per day would be a conservative estimate for the war cost of the same force.

An Impossible No country in the world ever tried Condition to finance a war on a basis of $3 per

man per day, nor anything like it. No country could possibly finance a war on such a basis, not to speak of ten dollars per man per day. In our country the military system is financed on the theory of hiring military service in open competition Avith other bidders for labor. It is about the same rotten condition that put the throne of the Caesars on the auction block of the Praetorian Guards. Any National Defense founded upon that idea, bought service, is bound to fail. If a country is not worth fighting for, and if its citizens are not willing to fight for it, without a thought of profit, it ought to become a minor and subject country, and will do SO- No country ever yet maintained itself for any great length of time by hired, or mercenary military service.

The Correct The truth is, that every man owes to Theory his country her defense, exactly as he

owes to his mother the duty of protection and defense. He is under both moral and legal obligation to do his fair share of that military service, which is her ultimate defense whenever his country needs his services for that purpose. If she compensates him at all for his military service, his proper share of it, as long as other men do their equal share, such compensation is an act of grace.

But where part of the citizens of a coun- ^-,. 1 . try shirk their military duty, leaving it ^ all to be done by a few, then those who do it are equitably entitled to reimbursement of their losses incident thereto, and to pay for their time, for so much military duty as they perform in excess of what would be their proper share if all citizens did their just share of military duty.

__ _^_ . When a nation comes to the death

The Ultimate i 4? .i t -^ j-u tit

_ - grapple 01 the L<iege or the Marne,

Duty of n 4.U • J • J

^, . ' . nne spun theories and wire drawn

Citizenship . . o 4.- ^ • 1

^ exemptions 01 peace time tail.

Mother Patria then expects and must compel every man to do his military duty, his due and proper share of the National Defense. She has an equal right to expect and to require him to make adequate personal preparation in time of peace to perform that duty efficiently when the occasion arrives. Without suitable personal preparation the citizen cannot be, nor become an efficient soldier, no matter how willing he may be, nor how brave he may be. Men ignorant of their duties, and of how to care for themselves in campaign, are a source of weakness, not of strength in times of emergency in war. An army, in peace or in war, ^'

J' T . , nanced on the theory that the citi-

Avvlyins; the -v. j 4. j. j-u

^ to 2;en owes a military duty to the

Correct Theory . • -..^ .n

^ country, is a very diiierent linan-

cial proposition from one on a basis of industrial competition. Our country can finance the biggest army, and the biggest navy in the world, on the theory that National Defense is a patriotic obhgation, that every citizen owes as a matter of duty his personal military service to the country, and with that duty, as a part of it, the equal duty of personal preparation in time of peace, to perform his military duty in time of war efficiently. It cannot finance even a "fkst line" for a modern war on the basis of industrial competition, without immediately facing a bond issue, heavy taxation, and ultimate bankruptcy. It has been twice brought to bankruptcy by that system, fortunately at times when financial disaster did not entail military disaster; but in modern war bankruptcy means immediate military disaster, because the material for war is now so much more expensive than formerly, and successful war cannot be carried on without this expensive material. We can finance anything that can be humanly done, if we go about it right; but it is not within human power to do the impossible. It is not humanly possible to conduct modern war on a mercenary basis. We must return to the true basis that every citizen owes personal military service to his country, just as he owes the duty of defense and protection to the mother who bore him. Return to that theory, carries with it at once a solution of all our problems of National Defense, whether financial or material or military. Precedents for Universal military service was

r^T T 4. h/t'tj. the original doctrine in our Obiigatory Military rr^, -t • i

g^j.^1^^ ' country. The militia laws of

1795-6, provided that every able-bodied male citizen between 18 and 45 years of age should be enrolled in the militia, and should receive annually a suitable period of military training. These laws went further ; it was provided that every citizen should furnish his own arms and equipment. These were prescribed by the law. The period of training was not long, but the principle of obligatory service was thus asserted, by the very founders of our government, the very men who framed our present Constitution, and the period of training was ample for the necessities of that time. All men were experienced in the principal duties of a soldier in those da^^s ; shooting, walking, riding on horses, the care of animals, and life in the open, were the daily routine of the citizen of that time. The laws of that time prescribed an adequate course of military training for the needs of that time, considering the nature of the material and personnel then available. No doubt, if additional training had been necessary it would have been required. The routine life of the American has changed since then. Hunters, pioneers, woodsmen, men used to care for themselves in the life of the open, are no longer available in adequate numbers for the National Defense. These things, learned at that time by daily experience, must now be taught. Similarly, equipment has changed. It is no longer practicable to require each citizen to furnish his own arms, because militar}^ weapons are not common, are not accessible to the average citizen. They are more expensive. They have been standardized, and the use of the standardized type is necessary in modern war.

But the principle is the same. The government then required every man to be enrolled, and to be adequately trained for the military service. We must return to this theory, whether or not we actually utilize all citizens. Once we return to the theory and practice of the Founders of the Republic we can finance the National Defense, and due preparation therefor, without even inconvenience to our industries; even with positive benefit to them.

We must return to that theory mi- Remits of the j^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ National humilia- Present System ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^1^.^^^^ humiliated

as a nation. American commerce is unsafe upon the high seas. American industries are being assailed insidiousty even at home. American lives are not protected on sea or land by our flag. American Citizens traveling on legitimate business or pleasure, or engaged in legitimate business in other countries that was initiated, as in Mexico, with full consent of the country of its location, have been plundered, outraged by wanton lust, and murdered by cruel violence. Our present system not only does not protect them, but renders it impossible for the government to protect them. Even our soldiers, engaged in peacable protection of our own citizens within our own territory, have been shot down by lawless bandits, under the eyes of their own officers, who were restrained by orders from protecting them, because our country is not prepared even to chastise a lawless bandit, with a corporal's guard of following.

A nation that cannot, or dare not, command the respect of its neighbors for its innocent citizens.

residing or traveling abroad on legitimate business or pleasure, that cannot, or dare not, resent the assassination of its own soldiers, who are operating under lawful orders, will soon cease to command the loyalty or respect of its citizens at home as well as of its enemies.

It is thereby doubly and justly humiliated, both at home and abroad.

CHAPTER II. A New System

_, .^-ryi O^i^ present system has bankrupt- Specific Faults -, . , 4. j. • j u j

2 ' ed the country twice, and would do of our so again in a single year of mod-

^ ern war. Its laults are:

1. Irresponsible expenditures by 48 different states in time of war, to be eventually paid by the Federal Government.

This one fault is suicidal. It is the worst fault, and an ineradicable fault, of the militia system. That system must therefore be abandoned, except for its constitutional piu'poses. All attempts to "federalize" the militia must fail, because of this fault, which is inherent in the militia system.

2. Dual control of military forces. War cannot be made with divided control. The militia and "State Volunteer" system carries dual control, partly by state authority and partly by federal authority, by virtue of the limited constitutional authority under which such forces are organized. They are raised and officered by the states, and operated partly under state and partly under federal authority. They can be used only for three specific purposes mentioned in the Constitution. Such a force can hardly be classed as a military force at all in the proper sense of that expression. Such a force may have uses; but such uses will not be found on battlefields like those on which the fate of France, Belgium and England are now being decided.

3. An impossibly high rate of pay and allowance for any war force. This has grown up under a system of volunteer service, in which men have to be secured in competition with the industrial activities of the nation.

The officer or man who permanently gives up civil occupations is fairly entitled to such compensation as will enable him to live decently. In all my acquaintance in the army, extending over a period of nearly 30 years, I know of only one officer who has saved any considerable sum of money.

The pay of these officers and men is not j^ I too high for the service they render, in consideration of what they have given up to render that service. If anything it is too little to enable them to live as they are required to live and to also make any sort of provision for the future. The mistake is in fixing the pay and allowances of a war force, a temporary force, on the same basis. It is a mistake to say that the man who renders a temporary service is rendering the same service as the one permanently on the job, even though the temporary man may seem at any moment to be performing the same duty as the permanent man.

Th M'Vf Both in peace and in war, every man ^7 . 7 owes military service to his country.

He owes his proper share of that duty, which would he the amount of military duty one man would do if all were doing their proper share. Those in the United States who do not wish to perform this duty have been permitted for many years to shirk its performance, and the government has hired a few to do what all should have done. The military shirk paid what taxes he could not evade, and that has been his share. The few have paid their equal share of the taxes, and have performed their own military duty, and have also performed the share that was due from all those who have avoided military duty, who have not cared to volunteer for the military training which, alone, can fit any man to do his military duty efficiently.

In time of war, it is the nation's right, its only means of self preservation, to compel the peacetime shirk to perform his military duty in person. The shirk does not thereby earn one cent of pay, nor a stiver of allowances; he is merely paying in this way a solemn, patriotic obligation which he owes to his country. Whatever pay or allowances he receives, come from the bounty and generosity of his country, not as a matter of right or wages.

Furthermore, since the progress of the art of war necessitates much preparatory training that cannot be given after war is imminent, in order that this military duty may be efficiently performed the country has an equal right to require that every citizen take this necessary preparatory training in time of peace, and the nation incurs no obligation by such training to pay that citizen a cent. The nation merely collects what is due to it. The personal performance of a military obligation, equally incumbent upon all is required as an indispensable means of National Self Defense. Thus far, no obligation to pay anybody a cent has been incurred by the nation.

But for its permanent corps of military instructors, who not only perform all their personal military duty, but also give up all other vocations and dedicate themselves solely to this, adequate pay is due. They earn it.

When the problem of financing the National Defense, is approached from this basis, it is capable of solution, and from no other. Germany, France, Argentina and Switzerland, have solved it on this basis. Three of these countries are republics; so it is idle to say that there is any difficulty inherent in a republican form of government.

. In the United States, the power to pro- ^ . vide for the National Defense is vested

^ in the Congress, by the words "Congress shall have power to levy and maintain armies." This power is limited by the provision that no appropriation for this purpose shall run longer than two years, the legislative life of the representatives who initiate the expense.

The power is ample. It is practically unlimited, or limited only by the necessities of the case and the will of the people. In the beginning of our present form of government, is was exerted by the Congress under the militia clause of the Constitution, but in every crisis, where the peril to the nation has justified it Congress has exercised the power to go direct to the people, without the intervention of the several states, under the more general authority above quoted. Thus in 1863, after the "State Volunteers" and militia systems broke down, draft laws were enacted; and in 1899, "Federal Volunteers" were authorized to meet the emergency in the Philippine Islands.

The power of Congress to enact effective laws on this subject is unquestioned. A crisis has arrived in our national life, when it is absolutely necessary that this power be exercised effectively, and at once. Failure to do so, will insure worse national humiliation than our country has yet suffered, just as soon as the victor of the present clash in Europe shall emerge ready and eager to reimburse its losses at the expense of our rich and defenseless country. Who can doubt that the powers which have plunged half the world into war's red ruin, will be as ready to pillage our rich cities as they have been to disregard all the solemn treaties which were negotiated to prevent just what is now happening in Europe? Our only safety as a nation lies in timely preparation, not for aggression, but for self defense, and the time to make that preparation is all too short if the very next Congress were to enact the necessary laws in the first week of its session.

This is no time for "pork barrel" appropriations, nor for "political trading" for partisan advantage. The public man who advocates the unnecessaiy expenditure of a dollar of public funds, the appointment of a single incompetent officer as a trade for his support of the bill, the delay of a single day, is a traitor worse than Benedict Arnold. History will pillory every such politician for public execration ; but it will glorify every statesman who helps at this crisis, while there is yet time enough to save the nation, to initiate the only system that can possibly be effective.

_, , TTr-77 I have studied with much care the Plans that Will i n .u /-( i ox ^ x.

plans 01 the General htaiT, as published in 1912, and have found much therein of great assistance in developing a satisfactory plan. Much of the reasoning in that pamphlet is sound ; many of the deductions are correct ; but the plan does not work out on an adequate scale, nor go sufficiently into detail, to be workable as it stands.

I have studied the newspaper accounts of the Continental Army, to be proposed to the next Congress, and have seen its two vital defects, either of which will prevent it from accomplishing the desired result as far as National Defense is concerned. These two defects are ;

1. It depends entirely upon voluntary enrollment for the Continental Army, and does not offer any adequate inducement for such enrollment. A plan that does not insure the necessary enrollment is bound to fail.

2. It proposes to run the war establishment upon the same basis of pay and allowances that has been established for the small regular army in time of peace, as a measure of necessity in order to secure voluntary enlistments in competition with the industries of the country. Such a scale of expenses would bankrupt the country in six months, and the national defense v/ould fail, just as surely through bankruptcy as it would through defeat in the field.

Other serious defects need not be mentioned, and there are many of them. As a political measure for the purpose of capturing votes in the next election, it has many elements of strength; but with two capital defects, either of which would cause the plan to break down utterly in case of war, there is no need for further comment.

_^ _, _ _ The very fundamental con-

The Fundamental -,... o i j.t. o. -n

_, _. . _. . _ dition oi anv plan that will

Conditicm: Financial . ^ - ,

_ . 7 .7. promise success is to so ar-

Practicability xu ^ • i -j ^ -a.

^ range the nnancial side 01 it

as to make the burden of National Defense in war with a civilized power supportable. It would not be supportable under the present system, nor under the proposed "Continental Army." Successful defense must safeguard the nation from financial exhaustion; for that would bring defeat just as surely as failure in battle. No system based on competition with industrial activities to secure men can be successful. Any such system must attract men by pay, and bounties, and allowances. Such expense will be absolutely ruinous in modern war; it was ruinous in the Revolutionary War, and it brought national bankruptcy in the Civil War. It remains to indicate a system in accord with American Institutions, that will not do this; one that can be supported by the minister, the peace advocate, the mother, the teacher, as well as by the military man ; one that cannot be possibly used for an aggressive war, but that will insure the very strongest possible development of our resources in the very shortest time, at the very least expense, if we should ever be compelled to fight a defensive war against wanton aggression by a predatory power.

Classification : Men called to the military service will necessarily be of two classes :

1. Permanent personnel, the few required for permanent organization; a professional nucleus.

2. Transient personnel, the many required in emergencies, when the very life of the nation is at stake.

The permanent personnel, will give up all civil opportunities and their life career will be military. They will perform more than their normal share of military duty, and sacrifice more than their normal share of comfort, prosperity and liberty of action, during the whole of their active life. Their compensation will have to be fixed high enough in money and in other military inducements to attract to this profession competent men. The military profession now embraces the technic of all other professions in order to attain reasonable proficiency. More than in any other art, the Master of the Military Art, must be master of all arts ; for in his profession he will have occasion to use all of them. For the few commissioned officers of this small permanent personnel, we need men of first-rate ability, men of broad mind, of large and practical ideas, who know how to do anything.

On the other hand, we do occasionally get men of first-rate ability, the peers of Edison, Ford, Deering, John Hays Hammond; but we get very few of them because the inducements offered, will not hold such men. It is not the pay, but the lack of opportunity to rise in the profession, according to their work and their merits, that prevents such men from accepting a military career. Where rank is not reached by longevity in the army, it is reached by sheer favor in most cases. The mere fact that we are still groping in the dark for a suitable military system for our country attests the point.

The necessary inducements must be something more than mere pay ; they must include some sort of a system, by which men of first-rate abihty will have assurance of an opportunity to get forward in the military profession to positions commensurate with their ability and work. The issue involved is bigger than the interests of any man, or class of men ; it is one that is vital to the nation, because men of first-rate ability are needed in the military service, both in peace and in war, and needed as directors; more needed, perhaps, in peace than in time of war. Opportunity to work and to get forward is what such men demand. They will not stay in a profession that denies them this opportunity. Therefore, "seniority promotion" will have to be modified enough, in some way, to permit such men to get forward into the directive positions.

The army pay is ample, as it now is, without any increase, and is not excessive for the small permanent personnel. The necessary modification of the system of promotion will be proposed later in this study.

rr, . , The transient personnel assumes the Transient , ^ ^ i-i- ^ i a.

-r> 7 character oi a soldier lor only tempor-

IT er Sonne L

ary service; long enough, in time of

peace to learn the essential elements of the military

art necessary for them to know, and in time of war,

long enough to restore peace. They do not give up the opportunity of civil life; on the contrary, their military service is frequently of aid to them in civil life through the associations formed by them in their military service. They render to their country only their minimum military obligation. They are not by that service entitled to receive a cent of pay. They are only discharging an obligation due from them to the nation, in return for all the incalculable benefits conferred upon them, by the free and civilized institutions to which they were born. They do this in order to preserve those institutions, and those benefits for themselves and their posterity. So long as the burden of personal military service is shared equally by all citizens, no compensation is due to any of them for it. National safety cannot be assured on any other basis ; and, moreover, this basis is right and just to all.

In our country, however, the number of

Voluntary ... -i ^^ n -t. • •

_, . ^ citizens available lor military service is

Service i . .u j.u u

so much greater than the number required for it, and our traditions in favor of voluntary service are so strong, that since some sort of system for the selection of the men for military service is necessary, a system is preferable by which an adequate number of voluntary applicants can be secured, thereby exempting the great mass of our citizenship from active mihtary service, except in great emergencies. A system of voluntary military service is preferable for us, provided it be within the financial reach of the country, and gives adequate insurance against the predatory tendencies of possible enemies. A system that will facilitate such voluntary service, while still reserving the right and asserting the authority of the nation to enforce obligatory military service when necessary, is preferable to conscription, and the country can well afford to incur a reasonable expense to institute such a system.

^. o ^r-T The best judgment of our ablest

Size of Military .... ,. .

' T^ 7. military men agrees that we

Insurance Policy , 1 -i ui -t» •

"^ must make available lor immediate action, at all times a trained force of about 500,000 men. This force must be trained, equipped, organized in time of peace, and ready for instant action; but need not necessarily be separated from industrial activity until the occasion for its use arrives, if any way can be found for its training and organization consistent with normal industrial activity of its members. The best military men we have are agreed that such a force would be an adequate insurance against war; would probably prevent war from ever being made upon our country, by any other country or group of countries.

The Permanent Personnel can be a part of this force, and it can be utilized in training the remainder of this force. Sound considerations of economy require that the permanent personnel should be used in both these ways, as far as practicable. The permanent personnel would thus have two functions.

1. Ordinary military service in time of peace; a sort of police duty.

2. The work of a great Training School for Minute Men, in which the rest of our emergency forces shall be shaped up and organized for instant action in peace time.

The regular army has never been used as such a training school in the past. The training school for war, in all our past wars, has been the school of War, the most expensive possible school for such training. Always the most expensive school of training, under modern conditions it is also the least efficient, and is sure to lead to disaster. Trained troops can be met successfully by none but troops equally well trained, and the great peril before our country at present is that it will be overwhelmed by the European Victor, with tremendous numbers of the best trained veterans of the greatest war in history. So many grievances against our country are being nursed by all the contestants, and so rich is the prize that awaits the aggression of the victor, that there can be no doubt of the pretext nor of the peril. It is useless to discuss the subject with anyone who cannot see, or will not admit these facts. No appeal can be made to such intelligence. The appeal to save our country by timely military preparation, if there yet be time, is to those who can see the peril, and are willing to do what is possible to avoid its effects.

CHAPTER III. Preliminary Data for Estimates of Cost

In order to make any intelligent estimate of the cost of adequate prepa- ^^ . ration two things must be determined;