The diplomatic background of the war, 1870-1914

Front matter

Gass

Book

1 ^ i

Preface

The study which follows does not profess to be a detailed history of the diplomacy of the past forty-five years. It attempts merely to correlate in their logical sequence the most significant events of recent European history and to show how the great disaster was the inevitable result of their reaction upon each other. The author's aim is to indicate the manner in which German primacy in continental politics, first acquired by Bismarck and maintained by William II, led, in combination with the economic and moral transformation of the Empire, to Germany's new conception of the role she must play in world politics. The effect upon British policy was such that a far-reaching diplomatic revolution took place, and was succeeded by the series of crises which marked the diplomatic conflict of the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. The last of these crises, that of 1914, was the most serious and could not be settled peacefully, partly because Germany felt it essential at this time to reinforce her prestige, partly because her vital interests in the Near East seemed to be at stake.

I am deeply indebted to those who have given their constant and invaluable assistance : to Professor S. B. Hemingway, Dr. E. W. Nichols, and my sister, Mrs. G. C. St. John, for criticisms and suggestions; to Professor S. L. Mims, for aid in the reading of proof; above all to my wife, who has made the book her own by untiring labor in the construction of every chapter and in the reading of every page of proof.

Yale College, March 6, 1916.

Table Of Contents

PAGE

Chapter I. Introduction

Chapter II. Bismarck and the Triple Alliance. Problems confronting Bismarck after 1871 — Disruptive elements in Germany — Necessity of international peace — Fears of the other Powers — Special danger of French attempt at revenge — Bismarck's hope of creating an alliance between Russia, Austria, and Germany — Relations of Prussia with Russia — Relations with Austria — Beust and Andrassy — Magyars accept an understanding with Bismarck — Andrassy's eagerness for an entente with Russia — The League of the Three Emperors — Characteristics — Bismarck unable to transform it into an alliance — Collapse of the League — The war scare of 1875 — Mutual suspicion of France and Germany — German threats — Intervention of Russia — Effects — The Near Eastern Crisis — Conflict of Austrian and Russian ambitions — Russo-Turkish War — Peace of San Stefano — Congress of Berlin — Russian disappointment — Hostility towards Germany — Bismarck concludes an alliance with Austria — Hopes to include Italy — Relations of Italy with France and the Teutonic Powers — Anti- French sentiment in Italy after 1871 — Effects of French occupation of Tunis — Formation of the Triple Alliance — Effects — The hegemony of Germany ........

x TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Chapter III. The Dual Alliance. Germany's position threatened by a Franco-Russian rapprochement — Geographical factors favoring such a combination — Checkerboard diplomacy — Relations of the two nations in the past — Factors of separation — Effect of the war scare of 1875— Effect of the Congress of Berlin — And of the Austro-German Alliance — Franco-Russian understanding postponed by Bismarck's diplomacy — Growing sentiment in both countries favoring an alliance — Effect of the death of William I and the accession of William II — Effect of the dismissal of Bismarck — Financial assistance given by France to Russia — Attitude of the French Government — Visit of Admiral Gervais' fleet — Conclusion of the Dual Alliance — Moral effects — Lack of practical results — Policy of the Kaiser — Encouragement of French colonial policy and Russian expansion in the Far East — Sentimental rapprochement of France and Germany — Effects of the Kaiser 's policy — Germany retained her control of continental diplomacy . 38

Chapter IV. German World Policy : Economic Factors. Relation of German diplomatic influence to her economic development — Character of the economic transformation of Germany — Growth of the population — And consequent economic problem — Shifting of population — Rise of new industries — Effect of German unification — Growth of banks — Of mineral and metal industries — Development of foreign trade — Factors in German success — Cheapness of German goods — Their serviceability — Scientific salesmanship — Statistics of German commerce — Development of German shipping — Growth of Hamburg — Of the great steamship lines — Creation of a navy — Necessary adjunct to large mercantile marine — Opinion of von Biilow — Enthu-

TABLE OF CONTENTS xi

PAGE

siasm for naval development — Colonial movement —

The Bagdad Railway — Desire for political world

power — New aspect of German ambitions . . 61

Chapter V. German World Policy: Moral Factors. Psychological transformation of Germany — Exact definition of German attitude impossible — Its varying shades — Universal longing for expansion and power — The Kaiser's speeches — Desire for world prestige — Characteristics of German mentality that explain this attitude — Belief in the world mission of Germany — And in the right to carry out this mission by force — Fostered by University teachings — Treitschke and his doctrine — The righteousness and beneficence of war — Aggressive tone adopted in certain quarters of Germany — Confidence in Germany's strength and in the weakness of her rivals — In other quarters German attitude tinged with fear — Resulting tone of defiance — German attitude not translated into a single policy — The Pan-Germans and the Colonial party — Other shades of opinion — Effect of German attitude upon other Powers ...... 89

Chapter VI. British Foreign Policy. Importance to Germany of the British attitude — Principle of British policy — Greatness and security of her colonial and maritime empire her single aim — Explanation of apparent contradictions — Relations of Great Britain with France — Rivalry in Egypt — British purchase of Suez Canal shares — British intervention in Egypt, 1882 — French bitterness — The British in the Soudan — Gordon — Kitchener's expedition for the recovery of the Soudan — Meeting with Marchand at Fashoda — Diplomatic crisis — Surrender of France — French hostility towards Great Britain — British relations with Russia — Quarters in which their interests conflicted — The xii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Near East>— The Central East— The Far East- Russia on the Pacific — Interests of Great Britain in China — The acquisition of Hong Kong — Effects of the rise of Japan — Russia, Germany, and France forbid Japanese acquisition of Port Arthur — The advance of Russia in Manchuria — British fears — Anglo- Japanese alliance — British hostility towards Russia during Manchurian war — Relations of Great Britain with Germany — Good feeling between the Governments preserved by Bismarck and Salisbury — Colonial rivalry alleviated by compromises — Various treaties — Possibility of Anglo-German alliance — Sudden reversal of British policy . . 115

Chapter VII. The Diplomatic Revolution. Character of the diplomatic revolution — Change in French policy — Accession of Delcasse to power — Relations of France with Italy — Ameliorated by dismissal of Bismarck and fall of Crispi — Franco-Italian conventions — French Mediterranean policy — Morocco — Delcasse 's attitude towards Great Britain — Accession of Edward VII — Commercial interests favor a Franco-British reconciliation — Efforts of Edward VII— The Convention of 1904— Effects— Settlement of African questions — Step towards the restoration of the balance of power — Tendency towards a British understanding with Russia — Issues between the two nations — Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 — Its scope and effects — Its importance — Change in the international diplomatic situation since 1898 — Restoration of the equilibrium 140

Chapter VIII. The Conflict op Alliances. Effect of the diplomatic revolution upon German policy — Germany convinced of necessity of maintaining diplomatic prestige of the Empire — Belief that Germany's position was threatened by new attitude of France — Necessity of reinforcing German pres-

TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

tige after 1904 — The Moroccan affair— Disembarkation of the Kaiser at Tangier — Veto placed upon French Moroccan policy — Resignation of Delcasse — Humiliation of France — The Conference of Algeciras — The Bosnian crisis — Relation to Young Turk Revolution — Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina— Protests of Serbia and Russia- Overridden by Austria and Germany — Restoration of German prestige — French aggression in Morocco — International conditions suitable for another blow on part of Germany — German gunboat Panther despatched to Agadir— German demands—Resisted by France who finds support in Great Britain — Circumstances in Germany not favorable for enforcing her demands — Compromise effected — Disappointment of Germany — Certainty of a renewal of the conflict .... 166

Chapter IX. The Near Eastern Question. Importance of the Near Eastern Question— Its character in general — Aspects of the problem in the nineteenth century — Dismemberment of Turkey in Europe — Serbian and Grecian independence; — Later independence of Rumania and Bulgaria — Aspirations of the great Powers in the Near East- Russian interests— At first opposed by Great Britain—At close of the century Anglo-Russian accord in Near East foreshadowed — Austrian interests in the Balkans — More vital in recent times — Austrian hostility towards Russia — Germany's interest in Near East resulted from world policy — Plans for development of Mesopotamia— Support given to Turkey and Austria— Importance of the Young Turk revolution— Its character— Its effects— Annexation of Bosnia by Austria— Effect upon Serbia— Young Turk regime in Macedonia— Effect upon Bulgaria— Young Turk attitude towards xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Crete — Venizelos — Policy of Greece — Young Turk opposition to Italian development in Tripoli — Italy declares war on Turkey ..... 194

Chapter X. The Balkan Wars. Significance of Italy's attack upon Turkey — Attitude of the Powers — The Italian army in Tripoli — The deadlock — Treaty of Lausanne — Attitude of the Balkan States — Factors favorable to their union — The formation of the Balkan League — Hope of preserving peace with Turkey — Beginning of first Balkan War — Bulgarian victories at Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas — Greek and Serbian successes — Peace negotiations — Renewal of the war — Turks yield — Treaty of London — Terms — Question of Albania — Effects of its settlement upon Serbian policy — Bulgarian desire for Macedonia — Attitude of Germany and Austria — Bulgaria attacks Serbia and Greece — Defeat of Bulgaria — Entrance of Rumania — End of second Balkan War — Treaty of Bukarest — Attitude of great Powers — Especially of Austria and Germany — Teutonic Powers determined to revise Balkan settlement — Necessity of a conflict with Serbia — Murder of the Archduke . 221

Chapter XI. The Crisis of 1914. Summary of international conditions in 1914 — German anxiety aroused by the Triple Entente — And by the failure of German efforts to break it — Necessity of an alteration in the Balkan settlement — Circumstances favorable for action — Austrian assistance assured — Abstention of the other Powers probable — Weakness of Russia — Decadence of Franee — Great Britain incapable of interfering on the Continent — Character of the stroke planned by Austria and Germany — In the Balkans — The Austrian note to Serbia — Character of the Austrian demands — The two impossible conditions — The Serbian reply —

TABLE OF CONTENTS xv

PAGE

Pronounced unsatisfactory by Austria — War declared on Serbia — Attitude of Russia — Determined to protect Serbia — Attempts of Sir Edward Grey to find peaceable solution — International conference suggested — Refused by Germany — Austria refuses to continue conversations with Russia — Austria's belief that Russia would stand aside — New formula suggested by Russia refused by Germany — Russian mobilization — Opposite effects upon Austria and Germany .... 245

Chapter XII. The Diplomatic Break. Effects of Russian mobilization — Austrian concessions — Resumption of conversations with Russia — Accepts principle of mediation — Contradictory attitude of Germany — The Kaiser's warning to Russia — The German ultimatum — Its character — Russia refuses to demobilize — German declaration of war on Russia — On France — Germany 's hope of peace with Great Britain — German offer of neutrality agreement — Refused by Great Britain — German conviction of British pacifism — The question of Belgian neutrality — British belief in the necessity of the independence of the Lowlands — Belgian neutrality guaranteed in 1839 — Construction of German strategic lines on Belgian frontier — Germany 's demand to Belgium — Refused — Effect on British policy — German invasion of Belgium — Her justification — Great Britain enters the war — German invasion of Belgium forced by military necessity — German aggressive action in crisis of 1914 necessitated by principles of the policy adopted since 1871 . . 266

Index 295

THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR

1870-1914

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist in the streets of the chief town of Bosnia. Doubtless not more than the merest handful of the millions who read the news on the following day, realized that the murder would carry in its train consequences of extraordinary moment. The popular mind had become accustomed to assassination of royalty. The Empress Elizabeth of Austria, King Humbert of Italy, King Carlos of Portugal, King George of Greece, had all experienced a similar fate and the international diplomatic situation had not been affected. Who could guess that this new crime would prove to be of greater significance! And yet within five weeks of the murder and apparently as a direct result, the five greatest Powers of Europe were battling in the most terrific war of history.

It very soon became obvious that so great a catastrophe could not have resulted solely from the assassination of a single man, even though he were archduke and future emperor. Other forces must have been at work, of wider scope and more vital significance. The murder was merely the occasion of the conflict, the spark igniting the magazine ; if it had not been for thirty years' accumulation of powder, there could have been no explosion. History shows that great events find their genesis in influences which work for a long time separately and silently, bnt which when brought together by some comparatively minor factor, are powerful in their union to produce results of the utmost magnitude. So it was in the case of the war that broke out in 1914. And to comprehend, even in the most general fashion, the influences which by their combination resulted in the titanic conflict, a survey of the previous forty-five years of diplomacy is essential.

Even the most superficial consideration of the generation that followed the Franco-Prussian War, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the factor of vital significance during this period was the development of the new German Empire. It was Germany that forced the new conditions which contained the germs of the international struggle. Not that German policy was more aggressive or more nationally selfish than that of the other states ; but that simply by her entrance into the circle of great nations and by her extraordinary growth, new elements were introduced into the diplomatic situation, which were destined to result inevitably in conflict. The other states were simply passive, in the sense that they pursued their policy along much the same lines as those followed previous to 1871. Germany was the active agent.

By defeating France and forcing upon her a humiliating peace in 1871, Germany attained her political unity and at once secured a position of unquestioned weight in the councils of the great Powers. A decade later, she organized the Triple Alliance, which guaranteed the support of Austria and Italy and soon assured to her a preponderant role in European diplomacy; by means of this coalition of the three states of central Europe and despite the Dual Alliance of France and Russia which was formed in 1891, Germany practically controlled the Continent from 1882 to the end of the century.

This position of primacy she utilized skillfully to secure a period of uninterrupted peace on the Continent, which gave her the necessary opportunity for organizing her imperial political institutions and developing the industrial and commercial activities essential to the economic life of the nation. With increasing intensity, the Germans created new industries, built up their mercantile marine, opened up new markets, laid down vessels of war, dreamed of colonies. And as a result partly of economic necessity and partly of a moral transformation that came over the Empire, German policy began to concern itself not merely with European matters, but with everything that went on over all the globe. It was the inauguration of Germany's ™ "World Policy."

It was inevitable that the policy of the other states should be affected by the successful growth of Germany, and when they recognized its true significance, a new period opened in the history of European diplomacy. The more far-sighted in France and Great Britain perceived with inexorable lucidity that Germany's new policy must necessarily threaten the position of their own countries. In the face of the common danger they agreed to put an end to their traditional enmity and, together with Russia, to form a tentative combination, which was designed merely to preserve the balance of power threatened by the growth and ambitions of Germany. The latter Power, disquieted by this apparent barricade to the realization of her hopes and in order to reinforce her prestige, adopted a policy of bluster, which was at times successful, but which culminated in welding the loose understanding between the three Powers into a comparatively solid force of opposition.

Under such conditions there arose a diplomatic conflict scarcely less bitter than the war which was to succeed it. On the one side stood the Entente Powers, unalterably convinced that the development of the German world policy spelled their ultimate or their immediate ruin; on the other, Germany, equally determined in the belief that failure to win for herself a position in world affairs comparable to her influence in European matters, meant economic and national disaster. Between such opposite poles there could be no compromise. With each successive crisis the tension increased. Finally, in the summer of 1914, the strain suddenly exerted upon the thread of fate proved too severe and it snapped.

If, as seems obvious, the development of Germany — military, naval, economic, national — was the essential leit-motif of the international drama which was to have such a tremendous denouement, we ought to remind ourselves briefly of the circumstances under which united Germany came into being. The foundation of the German Empire in 1871 was, perhaps, the greatest political fact of the nineteenth century. Both because of the immediate effects of the process of unification and because of the ultimate consequences, which were not at once revealed, any survey of recent diplomatic history must go back to the great triumph of Prussia and Bismarck in 1871.

Previous to that date, Germany as a political state was non-existent. The hundred and more kingdoms, principalities, duchies and cities which were loosely bound together in the German Federation, formed something more than a geographical expression, for they were sentimentally united by language and by pride in a common literature and music; but they formed nothing like a nation in the political sense. From disunion comes weakness, and all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Germany was the prey of Europe. Although the two chief German states, Austria and Prussia, were reckoned as great Powers, their mutual jealousy had on more than one occasion left Germany impotent before the attack of a powerful foe on the east and on the west.

For centuries the dream of a politically united nation had filled the minds of Germans. The dream went back to the days of Charlemagne and Frederick Barbarossa, the red-bearded emperor who, according to legend, was not dead but sleeping, and was destined to awake and reunite Teutonia and rule the world. From the time of Otto the Great, all through the Middle Ages down to the days of Wallenstein, the unity of Germany formed the subject of the most exalted plans. But whenever a definite attempt was made to transform the vision into fact, the mutual hatred of the warring German states proved disastrous and the dream of union was never realized. The forces of disintegration always triumphed over those of consolidation.

"With the fall of Napoleon, it seemed for a moment as though the hope of unification might be fulfilled. The burst of patriotism which informed the war of liberation against the French Emperor was enforced by the conviction that the national aspiration was about to be satisfied ; the youths who pressed on from Leipsic, driving the French across the Rhine, fought the more fiercely in the belief that they were fighting for a united Fatherland. The stirring war songs of the period are all imbued with the idea that once Germany was freed from the foreign yoke, she would be united. But the hopes of the peoples were deceived by the princes. The popular enthusiasm for national unity based upon liberalism was not in accord with the designs of the diplomats and sovereigns who planned the map of Europe in 1815, and Germany was left disunited.

A generation later, in 1848, the German Liberals made another effort to attain national unity. For the moment the reactionary Austrian Government was paralyzed by a revolution which spread through all the Hapsburg possessions; the King of Prussia was intimidated by the Berlin mob; and the Liberals, meeting at Frankfort, had free hand. But their attempt was again frustrated by the opposition of the princes. Austria, which soon recovered her control and stamped out revolution, refused to sanction a centralized Germany founded upon liberal principles. And the King of Prussia would not take the imperial crown from the hands of the people, " picked up out of the mud," as he said; he would reign as emperor only by the grace of God and at the invitation of his fellow princes.

The failure of the German Liberals in 1848 was succeeded by the far different method of Bismarck, which ultimately proved successful, although the cost was great. The Liberals had hoped that unification might be accomplished peacefully through a national Parliament, representing the German people, and that the result would be a liberal confederation, not unlike the United States of America. In the mind of Bismarck, the sole means of union was to be found in the Prussian King and army. Austria, the great stumbling-block to unity, must be driven out of Germany by war; the other German states must be compelled by force to accept union under the Prussian domination. With the strongest army in Europe as his instrument, Bismarck carried this policy into effect by means of three wars : the war of 1864 with Denmark, of 1866 with Austria, and of 1870 with France.

It was in 1862 that Bismarck was called to ministerial power in Prussia, and he lost no time in developing his policy. Under William I, who had been a soldier from his youth and had made the campaigns against Napoleon, the Prussian army had been thoroughly reorganized, and offered to the diplomacy of the new minister the material force necessary for the success of his plans. A quarrel that sprang up in 1863 between the King of Denmark and the German states, over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented the opportunity he desired. Persuading Austria to act with Prussia, Bismarck brought on a war with Denmark in 1864, in which the smaller Power was naturally overwhelmed. Denmark surrendered the two duchies to the rulers of Austria and Prussia.

Realizing that so long as Austria remained a member of the German Confederation, Prussia could not hope to unify Germany under her own control, Bismarck did not seek to prevent the quarrel that soon developed over the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein. In both his military and diplomatic arrangements he was thoroughly prepared for the struggle with Austria that was to decide the hegemony of Germany. The Prussian army had been brought to the highest degree of efficiency by the Minister of War, Roon, and was led by that master of strategy, Moltke. Bismarck had received from Napoleon III a guarantee of benevolent neutrality, in return for vague promises of compensation for France along the Rhine. He obtained the active assistance of Italy in his attack upon Austria by promising that Italy should win the province of Venetia.

The war with Austria, which broke forth in 1866, was brief and decisive ; it completely fulfilled the hopes of Bismarck. Austria, defeated in a seven weeks' campaign and with her main army crushed at Sadowa, agreed to withdraw from the German Confederation, and allow Prussia to organize a centralized union of the North German states under Prussian domination. Hannover and some five smaller states were annexed to Prussia outright, despite their protests.

It was the first step towards national unity ; the new North German Federation was solidly constituted and led by Prussia formed a powerful political entity. But it was incomplete. There still remained the states of South Germany, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, who were jealous of Prussia, resentful of the position of mastery that she was securing, and who appeared determined on remaining aloof. Bismarck perceived that to bring them into the union a third war would be necessary, preferably directed against France, the national enemy of Germany ; a war in which the states of both North and South Germany should fight together side by side.

By a series of diplomatic manoeuvres, which force our admiration if not our approval, and favored by the rash and bellicose attitude of the French Government, Bismarck precipitated the Franco-German War in 1870. With equal skill he saw to it that the struggle was regarded as a national and not merely a Prussian quarrel, and that South Germany stood by the North German Federation. The entire country was a unit, and the sentiment of national consciousness aroused by battling against a common foe was enforced by the common victory. The brave, but ill-equipped and miserably officered French armies proved totally incapable of coping with the Germans, who were splendidly organized and directed by the genius of Moltke. Overwhelmed at Sedan in September, 1870, the French Emperor surrendered; four months later Paris capitulated, and the Provisional Government of France accepted the German terms. In order that France might be stripped of future powers of offence and defence, Alsace-Lorraine was taken from her, and she was forced to pay an indemnity of five billion francs (Treaty of Frankfort).

Through this national victory over France, Bismarck's hope of persuading the South German states to enter the union was realized. While the German guns were still thundering outside the walls of Paris, at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, painted with all the scenes of the triumphs of Louis XIV, the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor and accepted by the rulers of all the German states. A consolidated unified Germany, in which the principle of centralization triumphed over all factors of disunion, became a definite fact.

Thus was born in Europe a new political state, whose entrance upon the international stage was destined to have the most far-reaching consequences. The whole set of international conditions which rested upon the division of Germany disappeared. France was humiliated and her material power broken, at least for the moment. The creation of united Germany brought with it the completion of Italian unity, for upon the withdrawal of the French troops, which had been stationed at Rome to protect the Pope, Victor Emmanuel was able to make of Eome the capital of his kingdom. German unification also reopened the Near Eastern Question, for Bismarck, in order to win the benevolent neutrality of Russia in 1870, had agreed to her violation of the neutrality of the Black Sea, which had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris in 1856; Russia could once more send her warships down to the Bosphorus and again threaten Constantinople.

More important than the immediate political results were the moral effects of the methods employed by Bismarck in the unification of Germany. Instead of coming through the application of liberal and nationalistic principles, as the idealists of 1815 and 1848 had hoped, it was consummated in direct contravention to those principles. It was the product of force not unadulterated with trickery. The theory of brute strength, of "blood and iron," had triumphed. By the incorporation of a Danish duchy, by the forcible annexation of Hannover to Prussia, by taking Alsace- Lorraine without the consent of its inhabitants, Bismarck had frankly given effect to the doctrine that might is right. The generous nationalistic theories of the French Revolution were crushed under the fist of military armaments, and for them was substituted the

good old plan, That he should take who has the power, And he should keep who can.

The effect upon Germany was inevitable. Having witnessed the failure of the liberal and the success of the Bismarckian method, the German people "conceived thereby a faith in force, a veneration of power and might that has directed in large part the subsequent course of German life and history." 1 The material prosperity that followed upon the military and political success of Bismarck only enhanced their belief that "iron is gold."

The world did not realize at once the full significance of the Prussian victory and the acceptance of Prussian methods by Germany; and the ultimate consequences of Prussian domination in Germany were not completely manifested until the twentieth century. For, after securing the unification of Germany, Bismarck was careful to allay the fears caused by his methods and extraordinary success. During the twenty years that followed the birth of the German Empire, he made use of quite different weapons than those by which he had carried out his earlier policy. War and brute force had served their turn ; what he desired after the war with France was a period of uninterrupted peace in which he might consolidate the Empire and foster its economic development. Above all he was anxious to preserve the new diplomatic prestige that Germany had won on the Continent of Europe. The study of how he worked towards these ends is essential to an understanding of contemporary international relations.