American rights & British pretensions on the seas

Front matter

GIass_ Book.

The Facts — and the Documents

AMERICAN RIGHTS & BRITISH PRETENSIONS

II The Summit Of Arrogance

GREAT BRITAIN does not, however, now limit herself to "war against commerce of every description between the people of a neutral and those of a belligerent State"; she has gone on to declare war against commerce of every description between the people of neutral States among themselves. It is no longer the complaint of American exporters merely that they may not sell innocent goods to the noncombatants of Germany ; that outrage has taken its place as only a minor feature of the campaign of which our traderights are the victim, a campaign which has reached the length of forbidding our selling to or buying from any European country except under British supervision and with British permission in the case of each and every shipment of goods.

The first steps in the hostilities against us were those considered above, namely : the extension of the definition of contraband to include practically all articles of commerce; and the presumption of a hostile destination in all cases. Within a few months after the beginning of the war — on November 2, 1914 — England closed the English channel to navigation, planting mines in the seas north of the British Isles and notifying the world that entrance into those waters was hazardous. The effect of this was to compel trans- Atlantic vessels to take the northern route and to put into a British port to secure a British pilot — and submit to British examination.

On March 11, 1915, there issued an Order in Council which the calmest and most well-considered judgment can only describe as probably the most insolent public document of modern times.

On March 11, 1915, His British Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, was pleased to order and did order that

"No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the first of March, 1915, shall he allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port.

"No merchant vessel which sailed fromi any German port after the first of March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port.

"Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a German port after the first of March, 1915, having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port."

Is it possible that the people of the United States understand these words and what they mean? Is it possible that they understand that during many months the power of Great Britain has forbidden a merchant vessel passing between America and Germany under any circumstances, or its passing between America and any port on the continent of Europe except by British permission and after British examination?

Can the American people be aware that Great Britain refuses to allow, and for many months has not allowed, an article suspected to be owned by a German, or to have originated on German, Austrian, or Belgian soil, to cross the Atlantic Ocean? Are we really aware, do we understand, that for months every ship going and coming between American ports and neutral European ports has been stopped and examined by the British naval constabulary and either held or unloaded or given a British license to continue her voyage? Have we apprehended the meaning of the language which, on the publication of the March 11th Order in Council, our own Government addressed to the British Government, namely, that "it would constitute, were its provisions actually to be carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace?" And can we then be indifferent to the fact that for months those provisions have been actually in effect ; that for months England has been practicing "an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights" of the United States?

Today the American Government is unable to assure merchant ships flying the American flag that they may cross the Atlantic to any port except by permission of the British Admiralty. To-day an Iowa farmer or a Texas cattle-raiser is forbidden, by the English Government, to sell his products to European customers whose families need food. Not a barrel of flour nor a ham can be landed in Rotterdam or

THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE

Copenhagen without England's permission — which is unobtainable. Not a bale of cotton can be shipped except on the same terms.

Not a case of medicines nor a box of Christmas toys, much desired by our people, can be obtained^-for it is more important that England should punish the chemists of Elberfeld and the toy-makers of Nuremberg than that American hospitals should get medicines and American children have a merry Christmas. So there lie piled up on the wharves of Eotterdam and Copenhagen and Malmoe, mountains of boxes of goods for which we are anxious to trade our own products, but which England forbids the ships to touch, because they are "goods of enemy origin."

The British position is that Germany has committed illegitimate acts, and that this gives England "an unquestioned right of retaliation." Whether or not it is becoming to England to use the illegal acts of her enemy to excuse unlawful acts of her own, even in respect of the enemy, it can hardly be claimed that the retaliation should be visited upon the United States, an innocent neutral. England is assumed to be the enemy of Germany, not of the farmers, planters and merchants of the United States, but it is the merest statement of fact to say that thousands of the citizens of the United States are being interfered with in the ordinary pursuit of their livelihood, not to say in the enjoyment of the ordinary comforts of life — and unnecessarily interfered with — by the economic war which Great Britain is waging upon the United States under the excuse of its war with Germany.

It was only after considerable hesitation that the British Government allowed itself to use the word "blockade" in describing the measures it had put in hand March 11th to stop commerce with Germany. It is not a physical fact. It does not apply alike to all countries; Sweden, Norway and Denmark are freely trading with German ports in the Baltic, access to which the British deny us.

It forbids access to neutral ports. It is not maintained by ships; the fact is the British navy is, most of it, safe in harbor, while the so-called "blockade" is enforced, so far as it is physically enforced, largely by mines.

How tremendous a departure from all known and accepted principles of international law is this new long-distance paper blockade ! Historically, the theory of blockade by sea is closely connected with that of siege by land. The original theory of the blockade was that it was intended to reduce a seaside fort by means of investment on all sides. It was often questioned (for instance, by perhaps the greatest American jurist, John Marshall, afterwards Chief Justice, then Secretary of State, in an instruction, September 30, 1800, to Mr. King, American Minister in London), whether the rule of blockade could be applied to a port "not completely invested by land, as well as by sea." Mr. Marshall was convinced that the extension of the doctrine to towns invested by sea alone was "an unjustifiable encroachment on the rights of neutrals."

Even though the principle of sea blockade independent of siege by land did establish itself, certain specified requirements have always been insisted upon. Among these are the following — the particular form of statement being that given by Prof. T. A. Walker, of Cambridge University. [Manual International Law, III, 77, 78.]

I. A Blockade to be Binding Must be Real.

It is legally essential that there be a blockade in fact. A mere proclamation of blockade unsupported by the presence of an actual blockading force, i. e., a "paper blockade," is in no way binding upon a neutral.

II. A Blockade to be Binding Must be Effective.

The presence of an adequate force is an absolutely essential condition for a valid blockade. The powers of the Armed Neutrality required for the validity of a blockade that it should be maintained by vessel "anchored and sufficiently near" to make the attempt to enter manifestly dangerous . . ."

It may be convenient to have brought together at this point some of the pertinent authorities on the subject. The rules of the Declaration of Paris and of the Declaration of London are given later, under the heading "Official Documents." The quotations below are from Secretaries of State of the United States:

To guard against the abusive extension of the term "blockade," it will be necessary explicitly to describe its meaning, and to confine it as in the declaration of the Armed Neutrality, "to a port where, by the disposition of a Power which attacks it, with vessels stationed sufficiently near, there would be evident danger to enter it." [Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, Minister to England, June 8, 1796.]

The law of nations requires, to constitute a blockade, that there should be the presence and position of a force rendering access to the prohibited place manifestly difficult and dangerous. Every jurist of reputation, who treats with precision on this branch of the laws of nations, refers to an actual and particular blockade. [Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr.

Thornton, October 27, 1803.]

No maxim of the law of nations is better established than that a blockade should be confined to particular ports, and that an adequate force shall be "stationed at each to support it. The force should be stationary, and not a cruising squadron, and placed so near the entrance of the harbor or mouth of the river as to make it evidently dangerous for a Vessel to enter. [Mr.

Monroe, Secretary of State, to Mr. de Onis, Spanish Minister, March 20, 1816.]

The fictitious blockades proclaimed by Great Britain and made a pretext for violating the commerce of neutral nations have been one of the greatest abuses ever committed on_ the high seas. During the late war they were carried to an extravagance which would have been ridiculous, if in their effects they had not afflicted such serious and extensive injuries on neutral nations. Ports were proclaimed in a state of blockade previous to the arrival of any force at them, were considered in that state without regard to intimations of the presence of the blockading force; . . . the British cruisers during the whole time seizing every vessel bound to such ports, at whatever distance from them. [Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. Monroe, Minister to England, January 5, 1804.]

The British Government in defending its long-distance blockade has made reference to precedents set by the American Government, especially to the Springbok case and the Peterhoff case. But a study of these cases [5 Wallace, 1, and 5 Wallace, 28] will clearly show that in neither of these instances the decision of our courts provides any support for the present British contention.

The Peterhoff — to take the time for but one instance — was a British vessel which, during the Civil War, cleared with a cargo for the Mexican port of Matamoras, just across the Eio Grande from Brownsville, Texas — then occupied by Confederate troops.

The vessel was taken by United States authorities, but the court's decision held that "the ship and cargo are free from liability for violation of blockade." The temptation to include in the blockade our navy was conducting the little Mexican port across from the Confederate camp at Brownsville was surely no less than the desire to include in the present British blockade all the great city ports of neutral Europe. But the United States court resisted that temptation.

It said:

It must be premised that no paper or constructive blockade is allowed by international law. When such blockades have been attempted by other nations, the United States have ever protested against them and denied their validity. * * *

We must say, therefore, that trade between London and Matamoras, even with intent to supply, from Matamoras, goods to Texas, violated no blockade, and cannot be declared unlawful.

Trade with a neutral port in immediate proximity to the territory of one belligerent, is certainly very inconvenient to the other. Such trade, with unrestricted inland commerce between such a port and the enemy's territory, impairs undoubtedly, and very seriously impairs, the value of a blockade of the enemy's coast.

But in cases such as that now in judgment, we administer the public law of nations, and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular advantage or disadvantage of our own or another country. We must follow the lights of reason and the lessons of the masters of international jurisprudence.

Much in contrast with this sober, law-re vering reasoning is the position assumed by the British Government today. In its note of July 24th, Sir Edward Grey says: "A blockade limited to enemy ports only would leave open routes by which every kind of German commerce could pass almost as easily as through the ports in her own territory." It is therefore absurd, is the English conclusion, to say that they may not close those neutral routes. "If the blockade can only become effective by extending it to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, such an extension is defensible."

As a rule, goods which are of German ownership or origin are refused shipment from neutral ports, but in some instances such goods have been accepted by ship-masters and have started on their voyage to America, only to be seized by British authorities. What are the rights in such cases?

The question whether goods which are the private property of citizen of a belligerent country may be seized at sea, if on board a neutral vessel, cannot be regarded as decisively settled. In early times the private possessions of citizens of an enemy country were regarded as good spoil wherever found. Nowadays, it is unpermissible for a belligerent to seize private property of citizens of the enemy country, when found on land. With regard to private property of citizens of an enemy country, found at sea, the law is not quite so clear. While there would seem to be no difference in the inviolability of private property by land and by sea, practically the international conscience cannot be said to have advanced to the point where there is absolute unanimity that enemy goods must be respected, if they can be captured on the water. The doctrine "free ships, free goods," has always been popular in America, but, as a matter of fact, we can hardly rest upon it as an accepted axiom of international law or practice. Indeed, our own courts, except in cases where definite treaties prescribe a different rule, have with practical uniformity upheld the seizure of enemy property, if contraband, even when sailing under a neutral flag.

True, a score of our treaties with foreign Powers recognize the principle "free ships, free goods." We have no treaty with Great Britain in which either party recognizes the principle. However, both the Declaration of Paris and the Declaration of London hold that privately owned property is inviolable at sea.

Of course, goods once the possession of an enemy, but which have been sold to citizens of a neutral state in the ordinary ways of trade and in good faith, are exempt from capture or interference.

As for goods of origin in belligerent territory, precedents and opinions are contradictory; it cannot be averred that there was any clearly predominant decision up to 1909, when the London Conference declared against the seizure of property at sea on the ground that it was the product of the enemy's soil. During the present war, the British Government has stopped shipments from Belgium, as "goods of enemy origin," the local government of Belgium being today administered by Germans. Thus, while we are exhorted to contribute, and have contributed many thousands of dollars for the relief of Belgian distress, we are not permitted, by Great Britain, to offer the most practical form of relief, namely, by the purchase of Belgian goods.

It is of course- apparent that, once the principle of the long-distance blockade is asserted, the mere matter of miles ceases to be of any consequence at all. If England is free to close the whole coast of Europe by a constructive blockade somewhere out at sea, there is no impropriety in her station-

THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE ing cruisers at the mouth of New York harbor, the Delaware capes and Hampton Roads, to seize contraband — whatever she pleases being "contraband." The United States Government early in the war made representations to Great Britain that the presence of war vessels in the vicinity of New York harbor was offensive, and the cruisers were for a while withdrawn. But they were soon busy again on our coast, and now were not satisfied merely to waylay or capture vessels starting on the Atlantic voyage.

On October 26th, the Dutch steamer Hambom, on the way from New York to Cabairen, Cuba, for bananas for the American market, was captured by a British cruiser and taken to Halifax as a prize.

A few days later, we found that the voyage from New York to Norfolk, Virginia, had become dangerous. For more than a year American ships bound to foreign neutral ports had constantly been seized and their cargoes taken off for England's benefit. But our ships still retained the proud privilege of travelling without molestation between our own home ports.

On October 30th, the British Government took away this privilege. On that day one of the British blockading cruisers off Sandy Hook captured the steamship Hocking, an American vessel, flying the American flag, owned by Americans, steaming between two American ports. She had, and could have had, no contraband on board, for nothing can be contraband passing between two American ports. But, as a matter of fact, she was in ballast, without a pound of cargo in her. The cruiser put an armed prize crew on board the Hocking, hauled down the American flag, ran up the Union Jack, and took the prize into Halifax, where she will lie for months, and almost certainly be confiscated on the ground (which is positively denied), that German capital is invested in her.

If this ship was not safe, no American coast-wise trading ship is safe. However, up to the present time, American vessels are permitted to navigate the Great Lakes and the Hudson River. On Nov. 11th, the Yinland, of Danish registry, but on the way from New York to Norfolk, was chased by the British blockaders after leaving Sandy Hook, but escaped by running close inshore and creeping in thick weather down the coast.

Thus far no vessel has been pursued into a port of the United States, though the Zealandia, an American steamsh ip, was, on Nov. 5th, while anchored off Progresso, Mexico, at the usual discharging place (there being no ship-landing at Progresso), within the 3-mile limit, boarded and searched by an armed party from the British cruiser Iris.

However, it is not the purpose to go, at this point, into details concerning captured ships; another chapter will do that. Other chapters will take up for more extended discussion particular features of the British campaign against neutral commerce, such as the interference, through iron-clad trade agreements, in our domestic business; the cable censorship, ably used as an aid to the demoralization already wrought by the censorship of cargoes ; the blacklisting of many specified ships in the neutral trade, etc., etc.

All these devices for the injury of rival trade, outrageous as they are, are only outgrowths of the central iniquity which makes them possible — England's violation of the neutrality of the sea. No indictment could be more complete than that which the facts cited, though incompletely, in this book, bring against the King and his Council and the Admiralty of England as the contemner of international law and the enemy of the rights of nations at peace. No one can peruse the cases set down in detail in later pages of this book without astonishment at the height to which British pretensions have been allowed to mount. The Government of Great Britain has virtually set up in the midst of the busy seas an arbitrary court, claiming unheard of powers and exercising the most tyrannous police functions ; seizing and haling into the dock, as suspects, all travellers upon the ocean highways, and visiting many of them with heavy penalties for unproven, and indeed unprovable, offenses. This lawless assizes of the seas, contemptuous alike of its own precedents and of the rights of others, scarcely stoops to the pretense of citing authority for its actions, which are determined solely by its brutal will, and enforced, though indeed largely through intimidation, by the gigantic power of its naval police. The extent of the earth's surface over which this extraordinary court is permitted to wield its self-arrogated jurisdiction, the magnitude of the interests which its actions vitally affect, and the supineness with which sovereign States submit to the erection, upon the ruins of their self-respect and the debacle of their highest commercial and political interests, of an island's municipal statutes into international formulas, unite to render this one of the spectacles of history.

A contemplation of that spectacle suggests that the hour imposes upon the United State a duty of supreme historical importance.

Ill

AMEBICAN manufacturers and exporters to-day are unable; because of British interference on the high seas, to send goods direct to customers in any neutral, non-belligerent European country.

Deliveries of goods to such nations can be effected only after the cargoes of vessels have been examined by British authorities in such ports as Kirkwall, Leith, Shields, Hull or Liverpool, to whichall vessels — American, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish — are forcibly diverted, at a great financial loss. Even then, the continuance of a ship's voyage and the delivery of consignments are uncertain, because, on the mere suspicion that goods may be resold to Germany or her allies, cargoes Jire often discharged and held for Prize Court proceedings. American exporters are obliged to suffer losses in the deterioration of perishable goods, in the charter cost and operating expenses of ships detained, and in, what is more serious, the destruction of business relations enjoyed for years with foreign customers. In consequence of British rulings certain goods, such as rubber, wool and tin, manufactured in the United States, cannot now be sold to customers in Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark, or any neutral country, except through British brokers, located in London.

These brokers charge a commission on sales thus made. American goods thus sold, must be shipped via England, which necessitates great expenses in loading, reloading and in warehouse tolls.

Shut off from direct relations with their legitimate customers, American merchants are thus rendered helpless in the disposition of goods and the establishment of prices.

Thus American business abroad, fostered and developed for years at great expense, has been usurped by British interests which can themselves, under present conditions, without hindrance or competition, supplant American manufacturers.

Every American enterprise engaged in foreign trade has suffered from Great Britain's maritime policy. Even trade with South American countries has been interfered with and damaged. The loss inflicted has fallen upon manufacturers, importers, exporters and ship-owners. No class of goods has been exempt from British detention and seizure. The mere suspicion on the part of any British authority engaged in the examination of ships is sufficient for the holding of a cargo for Prize Court proceedings.

According to the basic principle of English common law, which places the burden of proof upon the accuser, and by the Declaration of London, which presumes that all cargoes are innocent of an enemy destination until proven guilty, the policy pursued by Great Britain is illegal and in violation of the established rights of neutral nations. Beversing these principles, Great Britain first assumes that all cargoes are suspect, and acts accordingly. Thus, any and all ships may be held and cargoes seized. American shippers are asked to guarantee that goods sent to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland will not be re-sold by their purchasers to Germany or her allies. By what right can Great Britain ask this of American merchants? How can such guarantee be logically given? The captain of any British patrol boat, hailing and taking into port an American, Norwegian, Danish or Dutch boat, at his discretion may assume that the cargoes may be resold to Germany. The American shipper, as well as his customers, has no recourse from long detention, actual seizure and Prize Court proceedings. Vessels are often brought into Kirkwall and other British ports even after the cargoes had been examined by representatives of British consuls at American ports and the holds officially sealed before the ship set sail. Whether the cargo be seized or the vessel allowed to proceed, a financial loss is inflicted upon exporters and ship charterers.

Bealizing their helplessness under the monopoly exercised by Great Britain upon the sea, regular lines, like the Scandinavian- American and Norwegian- American, voluntarily call at Kirkwall for inspection. Other lines using the English channel, such as the Holland-American Line, stop at the Downs.

The mere deflection from their regular course of voyage means an expense in the burning of coal and in delay. If her papers are deemed beyond criticism or suspicion by the British officer examining the cargo and the vessel is allowed to proceed, there is a delay of at least forty-eight hours.

In most cases ships are detained several days. In other cases the period which they are held has ranged from one to sis months.

The damage inflicted, and the gross injustice of such detention upon the mere suspicion of some petty examining official, are obvious.

Vessels of lighter tonnage pay a charter fee averaging from |400 to |500 a day.

Larger vessels pay from $1,400 to $1,500 a day. The charter cost for a trip may average about $45,000 to $50,000. Each day's detention in a British port means so much loss, which is, of course, not paid by the British Government, but must be deducted from the profit on the cargo should that cargo have the good fortune to be passed and finally reach its destination.

To illustrate the working out of the conditions generally explained, certain specific cases may be cited. These are to be regarded as illustrations merely, as it would be impossible to furnish a full list of ships detained and cargoes held :

The steamship Edward Pierce, owned by an American concern and flying the American flag, sailed November 25, 1914, from New York for Copenhagen and Gothenburg.

This vessel was detained at Falmouth from December 8 to December 13, the master being told that consignments of flour and peas were suspected, although these had been sold direct to parties in Copenhagen. The vessel was finally permitted to proceed, the loss in charter fees during the delay — on mere suspicion — amounting, according to the owners, to $7,000. The steamship George Eawley, owned by the same concern, sailed from New York, November 15, 1914, for Copenhagen. This ship was held at Falmouth.

The master was informed by the custom officers that they were compelled to detain the ship on account of flour, wheat and oil on board. They later informed the master that the British government suspected the destination of 550 barrels of oil. On January 1, 1915, the master was directed to proceed on his course, with the full cargo. The satisfaction of British suspicion in this case, requiring a delay of thirty-three days, cost the owners $14,000 in charter fees and other expenses.

On February 9, 1915, the steamship Antilla, American, sailed from New York for Malmoe and Copenhagen. The ship was stopped February 24 by a British cruiser and ordered to proceed to-Kirkwall with a prize crew on board. The ship was taken to Dundee on March 23. The cargo aboard this vessel had been loaded under the inspection of watchmen appointed by the British Consul in New York, and all of the ship's manifests had been certified and signed by the British Consul before the ship sailed. Despite this fact, and the presentation of the British consul's certificate, the ship's papers were seized by the Admiralty authorities at Dundee, and part of the cargo, consisting of machinery, hardware, graphite and foodstuffs, was discharged. The vessel itself was held until April 27, when it was allowed to proceed with only the remainder of the cargo. The damage in this case, according to the owners, amounted to $98,000.

On April 6, 1915, an officer from the British cruiser Teutonic boarded the American ship, Joseph W. Fordney, sailing from New York to Malmoe, when the ship was four miles off the Norwegian coast but inside the headlands of Norway. Despite the fact that the captain showed that the hatches of the ship had been closed under the supervision of the British consul at New York with the consular seal, a prize crew was sent aboard and the vessel was ordered to Kirkwall, where customs officers seized all the ship's papers. The vessel was ordered to Dalton Bay and thence to Portishead, where it arrived April 27. There the cargo was arbitrarily ordered to discharge, without explanation, and the vessel was released, sailing for New York on May 17.

These are only isolated and typical illustrations of Great Britain's treatment of American ships carrying American goods.

Even in cases where cargoes are allowed to proceed, the expenses incurred by British interference often wipe out any chance of profit. The loss in charter fees and operating expenses of ships are repeatedly increased by the capricious orders of British officials. Often ships ordered to Kirkwall are not examined there and the matter settled, but are compelled to proceed to Leith, Newcastle, Hartlepool or Middlesborough, and are sometimes thus sent from port to port, only in the end to have the cargo seized for Prize Court proceedings. These delays occupy periods ranging from several days to many months. The steamship Carolyn, American, for instance, sailed from Savannah, Ga., March 30, 1915, with a cargo of cotton for Botterdani. The ship put into Kirkwall for inspection on April 28. It was then ordered to Leith, where the cargo was detained. The ship was discharged only on May 21, the delay in this case covering a perod of twenty-three days.