The diplomacy of the Great War

Preface

-■-: The object of this book is limited. It has the same rela- ^ tion to a treatise on diplomacy that a high school "algebra" has to a text-book in "celestial mechanics."

Very little has been written in America on European diplomacy. We have not been interested in the subject. Suddenly the roar of cannon has broken in on our ordinary life and month by month as the War drags on the vital necessity of knowing more about Europe becomes apparent. Many people ask: "What is it all about? "^ The more determined ask: "Where can we find out about it?" In our larger public Hbraries there is a great deal of material, but interest in such matters had been so sHght that this material was not fully catalogued. What the libraries have to offer in our own language is mostly from EngHsh sources and as Great Britain is a party to the dispute it is unadvisable to hear only one side.

A general wish is evident among us to do something towards a settlement of the conflict, not merely to hasten the cessation of hostilities, but especially towards the estab- Kshment of decent relations between our European cousins after the War. All chance of success in this direction depends on our having some conception of the issues at stake.

So it has seemed to me worth the effort to attempt an introductory text-book, a first-year course in European diplomacy, more especially, as for many years the subject has fascinated me.

Sooner or later the War will burn itself out. The diplomatists will gather around their traditional "green table" to see what they can save from the general bankruptcy. The news of their proceedings will come to us in fragments, cablegrams to our daily papers, articles on one or another phase of the situation in our magazines. This information

VI PREFACE

will seem chaotic and often petty. One morning we will read of acrimonious debates about WaljQsch Bay in South West Africa, the next of a wrangle over the harbor dues of Trieste. There will be suave but virulent discussion over whether the name of the capital of Galicia should be spelt after the German or Russian, Pohsh or Ruthenian fashion. There will be apparently undue excitement over the question whether the majority of the population of the little town of Temesvar is Roumanian or Magyar or Serb.

I have tried to draw a sketch map into which such isolated details will fall naturally and intelligibly.

The book is divided into four sections. The first is an account, almost stenographic in its condensation, of the development of international politics in Europe since the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This period is too recent to admit of definite history. There are few important events on which there is any general agreement. The more nearly we approach the present the greater becomes the difiiculty. I have tried to meet it by a study of as many and as various documents where there is no definite consensus of opinion.

In Part II. there is a consideration of the new ideas which have grown up about the functions of diplomacy during the last generation.

Part III. is pure hypothesis. I have suggested a solution which may, but probably will not, result from this War. This suggestion is not a prophecy but simply a means by which to display how these more modern ideas of diplomacy would apply to problems raised by this War. In so far as the actual results differ from the outcome I suggest it will be possible to judge how far these new ideas of diplomacy have prevailed.

Part IV. deals with the diplomatic relations between the United States and Europe. This War is an important point, perhaps a turning point in our history. We may continue along our traditional policy of non-interference in the disputes of Europe, or we may be drawn into active participation in world politics. Few decisions which

PREFACE vii

face our generation will have more effect on those to follow.

As my object is essentially elementary, I have not burdened the text with foot notes. These thumbmarks of erudition would have small value to any but specialists, residing in Europe, for most of the sources to which they would refer are not easily available to American readers. I have appended a condensed and critical bibliography of the books I have found most valuable. The amount which has been printed on the various phases of the subject is stupendous. The official pubKcations of the different foreign offices — Yellow Books, White Papers, etc., are voluminous. Thousands of books of all value and from all points of view and in every language have been issued. And of most importance is the endless flow of articles in reviews and daily papers of Europe.

The one common note of all this mass of material is its partiality, its partisanship. The War itself becomes more comprehensible as one discovers the fanatically patriotic bias of learned historians.

The memories of my childhood have, I think, helped me somewhat to meet this difficulty. I was born and bred in a "border state" and the wounds of our great war were only half healed. I remember a schoolmate telKng quite seriously how the Yankee soldiers had wrecked the plantation of his grandfather on Sherman's march and of the abominations they had committed. "All the Yankees are like that," he said, and he believed it. I could not. My father was a Yankee and I knew he was a very decent sort of person. Quite as often I heard equally vindictive denunciation of the "Rebs." But I knew too many Southerners to believe these stories either. One of my friends went to a school where he was taught that the Confederate Army won the Battle of Gettysburg. We fought the battle over again several times and although I was bigger than he, I never convinced him that the North really won.

In rather vague terms our Bible promises us that the viii PREFACE

Messiah will come again to marshal the forces of Hght in a last great war against the powers of darkness. There is small chance that, in any combat with merely human generals, the lines will be so sharply drawn. Until it comes to that last stupendous struggle the student of history will be surprised and a Httle sceptical if his researches show him an army commanded by a real saint or a nation led by a thorough-going villain — or blood being shed in a spotless cause. We may be very sure that leading figures in the history which our times are making are quite like their predecessors in times past. The more closely we study them the more surely we will find them human beings with aspirations and efforts and defects and pettinesses very similar to our own.

Almost the first act of the Congress which was elected with Lincoln was not to free the slaves but to revise the tarifif upwards. The records of the Crusaders, of their intrigues, their treasons, their love of spoils, show that the Holy Sepulchre was only one of their preoccupations and not always the principal one. And more than one of King Arthur's knights turned aside from the quest of the San Graal to kiss a pretty girl or pick up a bit of loot.

So, not expecting to find superhuman virtue or vice on either side, I have tried to be impartial. But I must confess to a very definite fondness for France. If I could not enjoy our American privilege of being misgoverned by American citizens of foreign descent (from the Mayflower to the latest immigration); if I had to submit to "foreign domination" I would rather be ruled by the French than by Germans. Unfortunately the choice is not so simple. The Allies of France make it somewhat easier for me to persuade myself of a large degree of impartiaHty.

Undoubtedly the fact that my mother tongue was English, that I have chanced to live much more in France and Russia than in Germany, has given my impression a certain unavoidable bias. My judgment might also be changed on many points if I knew the Hungarian and Slav languages,

PREFACE ix

and if I could read German as easily as French. But I have done my best to see straight and I certainly am not tempted to partisanship as much as are the patriots of the various belligerent nations.

The book will have met its purpose if it helps the American reader to understand the moves on the diplomatic checker board after the War.

The chapters in Book IV. are based on articles which appeared in The Century Magazine.

It would be quite impossible to acknowledge in detail my personal indebtedness to the many European friends who during the recent years have so often helped me with their advice and their special information.

Table Of Contents

Page Preface v

BOOK I TEE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION Chapter

I. The Congress of Berlin, 1878 3

II. The Europe of Bismarck 13

III. Das Deutschtum 24

IV. The Resurrection of France 36

V. The Anglo-German Friendship Cools 54

VI. L'Entente Cordiale 69

VII, The Algeciras Crisis 84

VIII. Eight Years of Tension, 1 906-1 9 14. A. Morocco-Bosnia 102

IX. Eight Years of Tension. B. The Balkans 124

X. The Fatal Year 150

Book II

XI. The Rights of Nations , 163

XII. Dollar Diplomacy 178

XIII. The Colonial World 190

XIV. The Growth of Public Opinion 206

zi xu CONTENTS

Book III

THE LIQUIDATION OF THIS WAR Chapter Page XV. The Military Outcome 219

Xyi. Diplomatic Tactics 228

XVII. The Demands of the Entente 235

XVIII, The Division of the Spoils 241

XIX, The Fate of Turkey 248

XX. If Germany Wins 257

XXI. The Problems of Power 262

XXII. Democratic Control 270

Book IV The United States And Europe

XXIII. Our Traditional Policy 281

XXIV. The Problems of the War 291

XXV. National Defence 305

XXVI. The United States and Peace 313

Index 335

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GREAT WAR

Book I The Struggle Of A Generation The Diplomacy Of The Great War Chapter I

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878

Some writers on the history of diplomacy begin the "Modem Epoch" with the founding of the German Empire after the Franco-Prussian War. The Treaty of Frankfort which ended that war — lo May, 187 1 — took Alsace- Lorraine from France and struck at the industrial life of the Republic by a colossal war indemnity. Some of the seeds of hatred which are bearing fruit now were planted then. But the Congress of Berlin, seven years later, gives a more convenient starting point for a brief review of recent diplomacy.

The Congress of BerHn was the last of the kind. It followed the traditions of the ancien regime. It was essentially monarchical. The delegates, when they had finished their work, had to report not to their peoples but to kings. They were free to intrigue and conspire without any fear of democratic publicity.

Disraeli, the British Premier, returned to London in triumph. "Peace, with honor," he announced. Under the sinister tradition of secrecy, all the other delegates could make the same claim and the nations they were supposed to represent could not know whether the peace they brought home was honorable or not.

A number of ideas, then hardly born, have grown amazingly in Europe since 1878. Perhaps the most important — an incident of the general progress of democracy — has been the idea that the people have a right to know what the diplomats are doing in their name. The Congress of Berlin was the last important diplomatic conference which entirely ignored public opinion. It was the end of an epoch.

Also from quite another point of view this congress furnishes a good starting point. It was the last great victory of Prince Bismarck. It was the apotheosis of his career.

The congress was summoned to settle the Near Eastern question. Russia's victorious war against Turkey had once more brought up the thorny problem of the Balkans.

The malady of the Sick Man was of the purulent kind, which had made a stench in Europe for many years. With rather monotonous persistence, various doctors had proposed cures, but their jealousy — the traditional hostility of the Great Powers — had prevented any effective treatment. For some unaccountable reason, after a long series of unspeakable atrocities, the Bulgarian massacres especially caught the attention of Europe. Everyone agreed that something ought to be done about it. But everybody suspected everybody else and for many months nothing was done beyond exchanging diplomatic notes.

Russia, claiming a vague sort of protectorate over all christians of the orthodox church, professed a special interest in the fate of the Balkan Slavs. But rightly or wrongly — probably rightly — the English felt that the Tsar cared very Kttle for "bleeding Bulgaria" and a great deal for a good excuse to conquer Constantinople. Austria, feeling that she had "legitimate aspirations" and a "manifest destiny" in the Balkans, was opposed on principle to any increase of Russian influence in that quarter. So the statesmen of London and Vienna blocked the Tsar's efforts to get some united action out of the Great Powers on behalf of the Bulgars.

At last, after much muttering and many threats, the Russians lost patience and decided to go in and settle the matter alone. In those days the fighting quaHties of the Turks were ranked very high. All Russia's enemies, hoping for her defeat, urged her to go ahead.

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 5

Before Russia opened hostilities she arranged some sort of a treaty with Austria at Reichstadt. It was typical of the way things happen in diplomacy. The text has never been published. All we know about it is from occasional allusions to it and shrewd guesses. Russia wanted to be sure that Austria would not jump on her back in the midst of her struggle with the Turks. And as payment for this promise of benevolent neutrality she recognized Austria's claim to a predominant interest in the two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Russia started her campaign by sending a notice to the little country of Roumania that her armies were going to pass that way and that the Roumanians must not object. The Roumanians — unHke the Belgians in 19 14 — did not object.

At first it looked as if the general expectation would prove right and that Russia would be defeated. As usual she was slow in getting started, her army was poorly organized, her generals inefficient and corrupt. But after months of reverses, the campaign was saved by the Roumanians, who decided to change from benevolent neutrality to active cooperations. These new reinforcements arrived before Plevna at the critical moment. The Turkish military power was crushed. The christian armies marched to the very walls of Constantinople (they were kept from entering by the fear of European intervention). In the little suburb of San Stefano the Sultan was forced to sign a humiliating treaty.

By this treaty most of the Balkan christians were freed from Turkish rule, but its main feature was the creation of a large independent principality of Bulgaria. It was generally assumed in Europe that this new nation — a unit composed of Slavs — would be an adjunct of Russia, in reality a new province. Such undoubtedly was the expectation of the Tsar. Although Constantinople and the control of the Straits were left to the Turks, Bulgaria was to have ample ports on the iEgean Sea, and if Bulgaria was only another name for Russia, it meant that at last the great empire of the North had reached warm water. British naval control of the eastern Mediterranean was threatened. Of course the Austrians were equally displeased to find that they had guessed wrong and that the war, instead of ruining Russia, had greatly increased her hold on the Balkans.

So London and Vienna joined in claiming that the fate of Turkey was not a private quarrel between Tsar and Sultan, but a matter of European interest. The affair could not be "locaHzed," it was of such importance that it could only be settled by an international congress.

Germany was in a deUcate situation. Bismarck would have preferred to keep on good terms with both Russia and Austria. There was an ancient tradition of friendship between the Hohenzollerns and the Romanovs. During the long struggle between Prussia and Austria for predominance in the German federation and more recently during the war with France, Bismarck had made this Russian friendship the foundation stone of his poKcy. But he was no longer merely the prime minister of Prussia, he was now chancellor of the German Empire. And from this new point of view the friendship of Austria was more valuable to him than that of Russia.

This was plainly a crisis where it was necessary to be "reahstic." So Bismarck secretly pledged his support to Austria and reassured Russia by protestations of undying affection. And Russia, relying on the debt of gratitude which the kaisers undoubtedly owed to the tsars, came to the congress — like a sheep to the shambles.

The Congress of Berhn was the most brilliant ever held. Ordinarily such affairs are settled by mere ministers plenipotentiary and ambassadors extraordinary. But three prime ministers — of the three great empires — were present. Bismarck presided in person, Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli) represented Great Britain, and Prince Gortschakov headed the Russian delegation. Austria, Italy and France sent

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 7

their ministers of foreign affairs — Count Andrassy, Count Corti and Monsieur Waddington. Most of these gentlemen were in uniform. All of them were bejewelled with decorations.

The seances were held in the rather gaudy ball-room of the Chancellerie. In the middle of the great room a long table was covered with the traditional green cloth of diplomacy. The head of each delegation had a highbacked chair. Lesser chairs were provided for the lesser lights. And down at the far end of the table a space was reserved for the Turkish delegates, whose red fezzes gave an added touch of color to the brilliance. Close by was a buffet where the hospitable German government offered endless supplies of port wine and sandwiches.

A great many books have been written about the Congress of BerHn — objective criticisms and personal memoires by the participants. It is clear from all of them that very httle happened about the "green table" which really mattered. The work of the congress was not done pub- Kcly. The important deals were put through in secret. It was an almost perfect example of what ordinarily decent men would agree an international congress should not be.

In the weeks preceding the opening — 13th June, 1878 — at least a dozen secret agreements had been arranged by the different parties. Bismarck, while posing as a disinterested presiding ofl&cer, had pledged his support to everybody.

England and Russia had signed a "convention" on 30th of May, which in the course of the congress they both tried to break. And on the 4th of June, England had signed a secret treaty with the Sultan. Disraeli was primarily interested in checking the Russian advance, but he persuaded the Sultan that it was only out of his great love for Turkey that he had insisted on revising the treaty of San StefanO — and in return for this disinterested service he demanded Cyprus. This treaty was secret but Disraeli communicated it to Austria, so it got out. For some days the Turkish delegates — at the foot of the table — were the only people at the congress who did not know of its existence! And in the corridors, during the congress, DisraeU, in spite of this defensive alHance with the Sultan, secured the French vote by offering them the Turkish province of Tunisia — which, by the way, the ItaHans thought was being promised to them. All through the congress Austria and Russia were trying to tear up the treaty they had signed at Reichstadt.

Anyone who is inclined to doubt that such honorable gentlemen could lend themselves to such sinuous doubledeahngs, should read Bismarck's " Memoires." The threads of most of these intrigues were in his hands and he stands out distinct from other statesmen and diplomats by his amazing frankness. Machiavelli was only a theoretician. The Iron Chancellor tells us simply and naively just how he practised politics.

Even more interesting sidelights on the congress are furnished by the ^^ Souvenirs inedits" of Caratheodory Pasha, the chief of the Turkish delegation.

"We were already in the third week of the congress when the bomb was exploded" — i. e., the news that the English were preparing to repudiate the Anglo-Russian convention, which was favorable to the Turks. "Broken-hearted by the news, I reminded the Marquis of SaHsbury that he had given his signature and begged him to honor it. The foreign secretary admitted the binding nature of the engagement but told me he would get around this. He would resign, so that he could be replaced the next day by another minister of foreign affairs, who would not be bound by his signature."

But the most impressive part of this Turk's account of the congress is where he tells of the insults he had to swallow. Not knowing of the Anglo-Russian agreement, Caratheodory Pasha was unprepared for the discussion which followed its announcement. He asked for time to -consult his government. "The Prince Bismarck spoke to the

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 9

Ottoman delegation with extreme harshness: 'If the plenipotentiary has anything to say, he must say it at once and without delay, and even if he wishes to take the floor immediately I cannot permit him to use his opportunity to make objections,'"

"The Prince Bismarck," he writes in another place, "did not miss any occasion to point out that the Oriental question, in so far as it concerned the peoples and forms of government which are outside the circle of European civilization, ought not to interest Europe except for the effect it might have on the relations between the Great Powers. It was only on this count that he deigned to interest himself in us,"

The very existence of Turkey was at stake. But no one paid any attention to what the Ottoman delegates had to say.

Next to the Turks, the people most intimately affected by the decisions of the congress were the various christian nations of the Balkans, They were not even allowed to have a voice in the discussions. Delegations of Serbs and Montenegrins, of Roumanians and Greeks hung about in the anterooms of the Chancellerie, longing to lay their grievances and their hopes before this high court of Europe. They were treated Hke troublesome children.

Quite as shocking as the plenipotentiaries' lack of interest in the human aspect of their task, was their almost unbehevable incompetence. They had not taken the trouble to study the problems they met to solve. The Near East offers a most complicated question in ethnology. Not one of them was an ethnologist. A large part of their work consisted in drawing frontiers. There was not a geographist among them. And of course they knew nothing about economic problems. They were lordly gentlemen — not business men.

They were diplomats, but some of them at least did not even know their own profession. The incident of the Caucasus frontier was worthy of comic opera. It is sufficiently lO THE STRUGGLE OF A GENERATION

amusing — and typical — to warrant a rather long quotation from the unpubHshed memoirs of Count Schouwalov, who was the second Russian delegate.

*'I do not exaggerate in saying that he (Prince Gortschakov, the Russian prime minister) was incapable of pointing out on a map, even approximately, the different countries of the Balkan Peninsula or, for example, the location of Kars and Batoum." ... "So I was considerably disturbed one morning when the Prince told me that he left all other questions to me but that he reserved especially for himself the case of Batoum" (and the Caucasus frontier). — "He would treat directly with Lord Beaconsfield about that." Count Schouwalov told Lord Salisbury, the second English delegate, about this decision of his chief. "He replied to me in vexation: 'But, my dear Count, Lord Beaconsfield cannot arrange that. He has never even seen a map of Asia Minor. ' "

The matter dragged along till the end of the congress. Prince Gortschakov and Lord Beaconsfield could not come to terms. It looked for a while as if negotiations would be broken off and war result. But at the last moment it was announced that an accord had been reached.

Count Schouwalov explains that the Russian general staff had prepared a special confidential map for them on which was drawn two frontiers. One represented the border as arranged between Turkey and Russia by the treaty of San Stefano. But some concessions would certainly be necessary, so the general staff had drawn a second frontier considerably further back, which represented the utmost they were willing to give up. The delegation was instructed to demand the San Stefano frontier and to concede, if necessary, mile by mile back to this ultimate line. Russia was prepared to go to war rather than give up more. Of course these maximum concessions should have been guarded as the most strict secret of state.

"This last session, consecrated to the question of Asia, had an air of solemnity. On its issue depended peace or

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878 II

war for Europe. The president asked the two negotiators, Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakov, to take places side by side and explain the nature of their accord. The two gentlemen sat down and each spread out a map specially drawn for the occasion. The rest of us, standing up, formed a group behind them. At once I saw the terrible confusion which was coming. The map of Prince Gortschakov contained a single frontier, that of San Stefano, and the Prince declared with emphasis that 'my lord' had accepted it. He, on the contrary, replied to each word of the Prince by a laconic 'No.' And he indicated on his map the frontier they had agreed upon. And, to my great surprise, this line, with all its twistings and turnings, was exactly the one we were authorized to accept as the extreme concession.

"The denials, which the two plenipotentiaries exchanged, began to envenom the discussion. Each one insisted bitterly on his frontier. At last Prince Gortschakov stood up and gripped my hand. 'There has been treason,' he said to me, 'they have had the map of our general staff.'

"I found out after the session that the evening before Prince Gortschakov had asked for a map of Asia Minor. Some one had entrusted to him the confidential map with the two frontiers. He not only showed it to Lord Beaconsfield but had lent it to him for a few hours so that Lord Salisbury could see it."

The results accomplished by these diplomats, with their incompetence and their spirit of intrigue, was — what could be expected.

Benoit Brunswik, in his careful analysis of their work, "Le Traite de Berlin," gives a judgment which is on the whole the kindest I have found in all the literature on the subject. In his introduction he admits that the work of the congress has been severely criticised. "... this treaty does not give satisfaction to any interest, does not respond to any aspiration, does not condemn any ambition ... it touches many questions and does not satisfy any. Its decisions are based on contradictory motives, are opposed to sane logic, indifferent to justice and insensible to honor." But the alternative to accepting this sorry patchwork was a general European war. "The treaty," he writes, "is the result of a compromise between the English fear of a Slavic advance and everybody else's fear before the threatening war. It is a document of opportunism, the fruit of hostile rivalries."

Unfortunately, the history of diplomacy is full of such documents.

"Peace, with honor," Lord Beaconsfield could report. It is not fair to charge him with h3^ocrisy. The brand of chicanery, which we would now call disreputable, in those days came within the definition of diplomatic honor.

That is why I choose the Congress of Berlin as the starting point for modern diplomacy. Our more recent times have not been free from similarly disgraceful intrigues, but prime ministers no longer call them honorable. All the world — or at least a large majority — has changed its ideals of common decency in such matters, since 1878.

Chapter II

A STUDY of the Congress of Berlin is a sad matter for anyone who Hkes to believe that honesty is the best policy. Bismarck, whose sinister genius for intrigue inspired most of the crookedness, accomplished exactly what he wanted.

Territorial expansion was not at the moment his ambition. He wanted — and secured — two things from this crisis.

First of all he wanted an ally. Under his guidance Prussia had fought three successful wars, against Denmark, Austria, and France. Germany had ceased to be a mere geographical expression and had become a great empire. But Bismarck was shrewd enough to reaKze that grandeur acquired by such strong-arm methods does not make one popular. And immediately after the war with France he began to be haunted by his "coahtion nightmare." He feared that Europe would unite against him, as a few generations before it had united against the great Napoleon. His "Memoires" show that his principal worry was the danger of an Austro-French alliance. These two nations, whom he had so recently humiliated, seemed logical allies. To guard against this hostile combination it was necessary to make friends with one of them. Of the two, he chose Austria, and in order to make Austria forget her anger over her recent defeat it was necessary to render her some resounding service.