Russia and the great war

Front matter

RUSSIA

AND THE GREAT WAR

GREGOR ALEXINSKY

Preface

The success obtained with the British public by my work on " Modern Russia," of which the second edition followed the first in the space of ten months, has inspired me with courage once more to address my readers in a book devoted to my country.

The subject of this new book is " Russia and the Great War." But in writing it I wished not merely to write a book for the moment exclusively, of value only for to-day, and of no interest to-morrow. It is not the external and dramatic aspect of the great war waged by Russia and her Allies that interests me the most. On the contrary, my readers will find in my pages neither descriptions of battles nor tragic or picturesque narratives of the incidents of battle. My aim has been something quite different from this. I wish to inform my English readers concerning the principal phenomena of Russian life before the war, and to explain the relations between these phenomena and the war itself.

8 PREFACE

What were the events of international politics which preceded the war, and what causes forced Russia to take part in it ? What was the internal situation of Russia on the eve of the war ? Can we say that the Russian people, or its Government, or both together, desired this war? How was the war received by society, and by the popular masses in Russia, and what was the attitude of the various nationalities and political parties of my country toward the world-war? Why did certain of the Russian "revolutionaries " and Socialists experience a strange dread of the victory of Russia, and even express a desire that she should meet with defeat? In what manner did the Governments of the countries at war with Russia seek to exploit, to their own profit, the hatred of the Russian revolutionaries for Tsarism ? Why does the Russian soldier fight better when opposed to the Austrians, Germans, and Turks, than he fought during the war with Japan? What prospects will lie open before Russia at the end of the war ? What may Europe expect from Russia, and Russia from Europe, after the demolition of the Prussian militarism which threatens both Russia and Europe ?

Here are the numerous questions which I deal with in the present volume, and which I seek

PREFACE 9

to answer. In my arguments and expositions I have sought always to remain objective and impartial, so far as that is possible in the phase of the human tragedy through which we are passing. Each of my assertions is based on facts and supported by documents. I do not wish to trouble the minds of my readers by clamorous indignation ; I prefer to convince their minds by an objective analysis. For, in the words of a Russian writer —

Words and illusions perish ; facts remain.

G. A.

April 1915.

Part I Before The War Page

I. The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the Russo-Japanese War. The movement towards the Far East and the recoil towards the West. The economic interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near East. — II. The supporters of the "Asiatic policy." The confidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist . . 19

I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or defensive ? — II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry between Germany and England. The Anglo-Franco- Russian eniente and its political character . . -32

I. The Balkan War and the Balkan League.— II, The Turco- German friendship. — III. Austria in the Balkans and her conflict with Serbia and Russia. The problem of Constantinople and the Dardanelles . . . -47

PAGE

I. The economic relations between Russia and Germany. The commercial exchange between these two countries. The success of German trade in the Russian market facilitated by the anti-Semitic policy in Russia. — II. The Customs \ Treaty of 1904 and the problem of its renewal. The necessity of abolishing the Protectionist system in Russia. Why was not the Russo-German economic entente realized ? ....... 59

I. The internal life of Russia before the war. Economic progress and the re-birth of the popular movement. — II. The policy of the Government. Recent success of the liberative movement. The poHtical strike and the popular demonstrations of July 1914 in Petersburg . . -74

CHAPTER VI

I. The Russian finances. The increase in the Budget. The revenues. — II. The expenditure — how divided. Military expenditure. — III. The reserves available. The new loan of 1914. Its strategical and military destination . . 82

CHAPTER VII

I. The evolution of the Russian Army since the middle of the nineteenth century. — II. The military forces of Russia compared with those of Austria and Germany. — III. The Russian Navy . . . . . . -95

CHAPTER VIII

I. Did Russia desire the war ? The two Russias, popular and governmental. The pacific tendencies of the Russian peasants and working-men. — II. Official Russia and its

PAGE attitude towards the Austro-German coalition. The poHtical, military, and ideological recoil of the Russian Government from the Austro-German expansion. — III. The war and the Revolution. The Russian reaction and the Prussian . 105

Part II In The Bloody Fray

I. The diplomatic documents and the political reality. The opinion of a little Chinese scholar and a great European scientist. — II. The international tension in July 191 4 and the question of responsibility. The Austro-German aggression and the part played by Russia. Could Russia have anticipated the war ? . . . . . -123

I. The Russian Government and Russian society confronted with an unexpected war. — II. The session of the Duma. The agreement between the majority of the parties and representatives. — III. Why the Extreme Left did not vote for the military credits . . . . '134

I. The action of the Government. The administrative measures taken in relation to the war. — II. Financial measures; the new taxes and loans. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol. — III. The domestic policy of Tsarism during the war . . . . . . . .155

PAGE

I. The nationalist problem and the war. The various nationalities of the Russian Empire before the international war. — II. The Polish problem. Why have the Russian Poles become Russophiles ? — III. The Armenian problem. — IV. The Ukraine.— V. Finland.— VI. The position of the Jews. Their conflict with the Poles. — VII. The nationalist problem in the Baltic Provinces . . . -179

I. The dread of a Russian victory among the revolutionaries and Socialists of Russia. The workers do not share this dread. The declarations of Kropotkin and Plechanov. Why is the propaganda resulting from this apprehension erroneous and harmful ? — II. The German, Austrian, and Turkish Government's endeavour to corrupt the Russian revolutionaries. The noble reply of certain of these latter to the agents of the Austro-Germans and the Turks. Russian revolutionaries in the French Army . . 229

CHAPTER VI

I. The activities of public institutions and private initiative. The " Union of the Zemstvos " and the " Union of the Cities." — II. The rural communes and co-operative associations in the campaign against the misfortunes produced by the war. — III. The intellectual youth of Russia and the war. — IV. The Press in Russia during the war . . . 258

CHAPTER VII

I. On the field of battle. The Russian soldier in the present war. Mobilization. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol and its effect on the Army. The military chiefs. — II. Treason in the Executive. — III. Why the Russian soldier is fighting better against Germany, Austria, and Turkey than he fought against Japan. The " liberation idea " and the war . 277

Part III After The War Page

I. The possible results of the war. Territorial changes and the problem of an enlargement of the Russian frontiers. — II. The possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. Are they necessary to Russia ? . . . . 297

I. The political and economic results of a German defeat and the destruction of Prussian Imperiahsm. — II. The defeat of Germany is to the advantage of the German revolutionaries and the Socialists of Germany and of all Europe ........ 306

I. Why is the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance preferable, from the point of view of Russian liberty and democracy, to the alliance of Russia with the German and Austrian monarchies? — II. The intrigues of the Russian reactionaries during the war. Their propaganda in favour of a separate peace with Germany. The necessity of an alliance of the democratic elements of the Allied countries if these intrigues are to be disarmed . . . . -312

I. The future evolution of Russia. Various opinions held in Russian society concerning this evolution. — II. The national question after the war. — III. The role of the French and English democracies in the Russian people's struggle for liberty. — IV. What has Russia to give to the world ? . 322

PAGE

I. Russia and England, Their economic relations. The necessity of a system of Free Trade in these relations. — II. The intellectual relations between Russia and England. Concerning certain " deviations " of English sympathies . 343

Part I Before The War

I. The evolution of the foreign policy of the Russian Empire after the Russo-Japanese War, The movement towards the Far East and the recoil towards the West. The economic interests of Russia in the Far East and the Near East. — II. The supporters of the "Asiatic policy." The confidential memoir of a Russian diplomatist.

I

The war with little Japan marked a decisive moTnent in the contemporary history of the external policy of the great Russian Empire. To be more precise, it constituted first a check and then a change in the direction of this policy. Before the war the Russian eagle had hovered in full liberty above the Asiatic Orient, continually extending its wings over new territories, until at length the Pacific Ocean was attained. But the Rising Sun of the young Japanese Empire was to scorch its pinions. Its flight toward the Far East was suddenly arrested, and as early as 1906, at a secret meeting of the leaders of the Russian Government, one of these latter declared that after the debacle occasioned by the Russo- Japanese War, the Empire of the Tsars must perforce renounce the old aggressive energy of its customary external policy, in order to " assume a more prudent and more conciliatory attitude."

Thus there ensued a period of arrest in the march of Russia toward the Far East, and the Muscovite bear found himself at the parting of the ways, like the hero of a popular Russian legend. Which was the road to follow ? Should he continue to tread the ancient track? But the yellow sun of Japan was still visible on the Eastern horizon. Or would it be better to return toward the West? Behold the black eagle of Gennany, with its beak of steel, and always on the alert !

Doubtless the best and simplest policy would have been to remain at home, to seek no new adventures, whether to East or to West. But unhappily man does not always adhere to the best or the simplest solution. And the historical past had left Russia a heavy burden in the shape of an inheritance of military and diplomatic ties^, and alliances and counter-alliances, whose automatic action might well result in dragging Russia into an external conflict, or in forcing her to involve both friends and enemies in such a conflict. " Moreover, there were forces in the interior of the country which would not willingly bow to the necessity of modifying the tone of the State's external policy. There were several groups among the higher ranks of the aristocracy and the Army for whom the lesson of the Russo- Japanese War passed almost unperceived, and who were eager to take their revenge upon the field of battle — but on what field was a matter of indifference. There were groups of capitalists, moreover, who would not be content with a patient and peaceable effort to regenerate the great home market, which was nevertheless capable of yielding them a greater revenue than all the Manchurias and Persias of the world together. They hankered after foreign markets, which were to be conquered by brute force.

" The East China railway should have created new markets for us, and have connected Europe and the East by a trade route. The Russo- Japanese War destroyed these hopes. The railway has lost 700 versts of its best and most productive portion ; we have lost the port of Dalny (Talienwan), which was equipped to perfection. We cannot hope great things from the exportation of our merchandise to Southern Manchuria, where the Japanese are the masters. Our trade with Mongolia is equally in a stagnant condition. . . . Our position in the Far East being compromised as a result of the war, the eye naturally returns toward the West, and above all to the Near East. A series of Chambers of

Commerce has been established— Anglo-Russian, Russo-Belgian, and so forth. At the same time companies have been formed for the exportation of general merchandise, and especially for export to the Balkans. . . . But, notwithstanding the simultaneous efforts of the Government, and the commercial and industrial circles, the exportation of manufactured articles is increasing far too slowly. Our position in the Near East is weak. In the West there is nothing to hope for. ' Friendly ' Germany is pushing us toward Asia, but in Persia our affairs are in a bad way, and threaten to grow still worse in the futurethanks to the German competition. We have lost the market of the rich southern portion of Manchuria, and the market offered by its northern portion is poor and unstable. Foreign competition is successfully driving us out of Mongolia. Hence the tendencies which are now apparent among us, which demand the employment of armed force, that we may retain possession of these markets ; so that we find ourselves on the eve of new colonial adventures. ... In a word, the historical phase which was passed through before the Revolution is about to be renewed."

Such is the description of the political situation of Russia in Eastern Asia after the Russo- Japanese War, in respect of the economical basis of that policy, as it appeared to a worthy

Russian economist whose book was published in 191 I .»

But while a few small political and economic circles hoped for a continuation of the old orientation of the foreign politics of Russia— that is, the continuation of the march toward the Far East — there were others— and among them were many Liberals— who insisted that Russia should concentrate her attention and her energies on regions less remote, notably on Asia Minor, the shores of the Black Sea, and the Balkans. It must be admitted that this tendency is founded on interests and considerations of an important nature. Russia is one of the " granaries of the world." Her foreign trade consists above all in the exportation of cereals.

" A glance at the statistics of our cereal exports will show that their centre of gravity since the year 1896 lies in the ports of the south. During the last twelve years the part played by the regions of the south, south-east, and south-west in the foreign trade of Russia has been still further enlarged. In 1909, 76 per cent, of all the wheat, 91 per cent, of all the barley, 53 per cent, of all the rye, and 83 per cent, of all the maize exported from Russia was exported from the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov." =

' See the great economic work of M, A. Finn-Yenotaevsky Sovremenno'ie Kliozidistvo Rossiyi ("The Modern Economy of Russia"), Petersburg, 191 1, pp. 408-12.

Cereals are the principal article of Russia's foreign trade. The ports of the Black Sea are the chief outlets for the foreign export of Russian grain. From this you can judge the importance of the Eastern Question, the question of the Dardanelles, etc., for the whole of Russia, from the point of view of her economic interests.

Add to these the problem of the commercial relations existing between Russia and Germany, which are connected by a highly developed commercial exchange, the nature of which I shall presently explain. Finally, consider the position of Germany and Russia on the Baltic, which is the second-* great route of the foreign trade of Russia, and which is really in the possession of the powerful German Navj, and you will readily perceive that the economic interests of Russia in the West are far greater than in the Far East, and that Russia cannot completely ignore what is passing in Asia Minor, in the Balkans, and on her western frontiers.

II

Certain Russian politicians were even of opinion that Russia ought resolutely to abandon the old direction of her military and diplomatic policy, which looked toward the Asiatic Orient, and that this policy should confine itself to Europe and the Balkans. This opinion was disputed by the supporters of the Asiatic policy.

One of these latter, Baron Rosen, who had been Russian Amhassador in Belgrade, Tokio, and Washington, and who was a colleague of M. Witte at the time of the negotiations with Japan which took place at Portsmouth, published, in 191 3, a very interesting confidential memoir dealing with this subject, of which the issue was withdrawn from circulation — it is said by order of the Government. I believe my readers will feel grateful to me for quoting the essential portion of this memoir.'

" After the check occasioned by the last war," writes M. Rosen, " and the defeat of our entire policy 'in the Far East— a policy qualified as a mere adventure by people who did not realize the vast importance to Russia of her interests in those regions, a policy which deserved that epithet only because it was not in time supported by all the forces of the State— the idea seems firmly to have rooted itself in the mind of the public that Russia should once more seek the centre of her political interests in Europe."

M. Rosen does not share this opinion. He does not believe that Russia has any historic mission in the Near East ; he does not consider the " Slav idea " to have any real basis ; he is not of opinion that it corresponds with the real

^ A detailed account of this memoir, with many quotations, was published in the French review Le Correspotidant, September 19 1 3.

interests of Russia. So far the defence of the " Slav idea " has had none but neg^ative and harmful results for Russia. It dragged the country into the war of 1877-8, which cleared the ground for the Revolution ; it was the cause of the estrangement between Germany and Russia in the time of Bismarck, and the dissolution of the alliance of " Three Emperors " which guaranteed the western frontier of Russia. Finally, says M. Rosen, it " also pushed us to the conclusion of an alliance with France which has involved us in interests entirely foreign to Russia : namely, the French desire to be revenged for Sedan and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and, of late years, the Anglo-German antagonism, which will be the ground on which the coming European war will be fought."

For M. Rosen " the great Slav ideal " is merely the " verbal gymnastics of writers and orators of the Slavophile camp *' . . . devoid of any real foundation.

" All undertakings inspired by this idea— as, for example, the Slav Bank, the exhibitions of Russian products, the Russian libraries in Slav countries, etc., either remain in the condition of mere projects, or drag themselves through a miserable existence. ... In the domain of material civilization, Russia has no need of the Slav world, nor the Slav world of Russia. In the Slav States of the Balkans our industry, which has at its disposal a vast home market defended by extremely high protective tariffs, could only at a loss compete with the Austro-German industries ; as for the Slavs of the south, their commercial relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, their neighbour, will always be more advantageous than their relations with distant Russia.

" From the intellectual standpoint, the Slavs of the Balkans (and still more those of Austria), despite a somewhat factitious Germanophobia, evidently prefer — and this is very natural — to tap directly and at first hand the Western sources, and principally those of Germany. ... As for the sympathies of the Austrian Slavs, which we are told are irresistibly pro-Russian, it is only too obvious that their flirtations with us have one sole object, and that essentially a selfish one : it is, to flaunt before the Austrian Government the bogy of Pan-Slavism under Russian hegemony, in order to obtain from it the desired concessions. . . . Our continual advances, in the press and in the speeches of certain amateur politicians, toward the Austrian Slavs, have in the end impelled Austria to retort by very undesirable and even dangerous advances to our own ' Mazeppists,' ' Ukrainophiles, and other elements hostile to the Russian Empire, which enter-

' The supporters of the policy inaugurated by the famous Cossack hetman Mazeppa.

tain treiacherous dreams of the dismemberment of Russia."

Baron Rosen pronounces in favour of an understanding with Austria.

" The only cause of armed conflict with Austria that can be foreseen is precisely the opposition which we are offering to her Balkan policy. . . . This antagonism is the cause of a state of affairs very dangerous for us, thanks to which, every time any disturbance occurs in the Balkan Peninsula, arises the possibility that Austria will intervene as the Power chiefly interested by reason of her geographical position, and for us the possibility of a conflict with her, and therefore of a European conflagration."

Russia, M. Rosen holds, ought to reconcile herself to the Austrian penetration of the Balkans.

" Austria, like Germany, is passing through a period of growth. . . . The only possible outlet is indicated by her geographical position ; rejected by the Germanic Confederation, she has turned her eyes toward the Slav south. The movement of Austria toward the Slav south does not clash with the real interests of Russia. On the other hand, Austria will meet with complications which should sufficiently make her aware of the value of amicable relations with Russia."

An alliance between Russia and Germany appeared to M. Rosen to be even more necessary.

Allied with France and England, Russia finds herself in a camp hostile to Germany. M. Rosen believes that the entire responsibility of this hostility falls, not upon Russia but upon Erance and England. " In the forefront of the causes of this reciprocal hostility we see the irreconcilable antagonism between France and Germany, founded on the French idea of revenge for Sedan and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. To this cause has been added, of late years, another, which is the Anglo -Germanic antagonism founded on commercial, industrial, and colonial competition, and rivalry in the matter of naval armaments. These two motives are absolutely alien to the vital interests of Russia."

During the first twenty years which followed the war of 1870-71, France was so weak and Germany so powerful, that, " thanks to the enormous disproportion of the forces at their disposal, war was for one of the parties a superfluity and for the other an impossibility." Such a situation M. Rosen regards as ideal, and he is greatly disturbed by the fact than an alliance with Russia has re-established the equilibrium of forces. It is true that during those twenty years Germany enjoyed a hegemony in Europe, and that to-day she wishes once more to achieve that hegemony. But this tendency of Germany toward hegemony is dangerous only to Western Europe, not to Russia, says M. Rosen, who finds it " absolutely impossible to comprehend " how the German domination in Europe can be opposed to the interests of Russia, which is rather an Asiatic Power. " By abandoning to Germany supremacy in the Western portion of Europe, and by dissociating herself completely from all rivalries between European Powers based on interests purely European, Russia would assure herself of the security of her western frontier, and would have her hands free for the accomplishment of her mission in Asia." r To yield Europe to the Prussian Moloch and to take Asia in exchange — such, according to M. Rosen's opinion, is the supreme national duty of Russia. Such an alliance with Germany would be the more profitable to Russia in that it would enable Germany to undermine the naval supremacy of England, and such a decrease of power is in the interests of Russia — so Baron Rosen believes.

Russia's confidence in Erance and England rests " on fragile bases," he says, and " the confidence of Germany is incommensurably more precious to us."

Commenting upon the ideas expressed in M. Rosen's memoir, of which we have given a detailed summary, a French review remarked that these ideas revealed " an atavistic Germanism," and that " if it had amused HerrBethmann- Holweg to give his advice to the Russian

Ambassador in Berlin, this is the advice he would have given."

Let us now analyse the actual international position of Russia before the war, so that we may judge whether the Germanophile counsels of Baron Rosen did really constitute good advice, and whether they corresponded with the true interests of the country.

I. Russia in the Concert of the Powers. The Franco-Russian Alliance. Was the position of France offensive or defensive ? II. The Anglo-French Alliance. The rivalry between Germany and England. The Anglo- Franco-Russian entente and its political character.

I

Despite the lamentations of the supporters of her " Asiatic orientation," the recoil of Russia from the Far East and her " return " to the West was an accomplished fact. This fact confronted the Russian State, with the complex problem of its attitude toward the other European States, and its position in the famous " Concert " of Great Powers. To a very appreciable extent this position was no doubt determined by the recent history of Russia's foreign policy, which has been charaicterized by the Franco -Russian Alliance and the Anglo -Franco-Russian entente.

The Franco-Russian Alliance is of a double character — financial and politico-military. Doubtless the economic and financial element was preponderant at the birth of this strange union of the republican democracy of France and the monarchical autocracy of Russia. Yet we cannot deny the importance of the political and military considerations which have pushed France into the arms of Tsarism. These considerations have made themselves felt more especially of late years. After Russia's defeat in the war with Japan, after the ruin of almost her entire navy, and the heavy losses in men and material suffered by the army, the military power of Russia was gravely compromised. Germany immediately profited by this breach of equilibrium, consolidating her international position, both economic and political. One may say, without exaggeration, that the great misfortunes suffered by Russia during the war of 1904-5 brought prosperity to Germany.

In the first place, Germany succeeded in exploiting the very embarrassing situation of her eastern neighbour in the year i 904, by securing from Russia a Customs Treaty highly profitable to German trade and industry. At the same time Germany was redoubling her efforts to increase her military forces, and this increase became most rapid immediately upon the enfeeblement of the Russian army at the close of the war. In the year 1905 the German Empire took a gigantic stride in this direction ; for in that year the Reichstag voted a Military Law which increased the armed forces of the Kaiser, not merely from the numerical point of view, but also from that of the technical material of war. During the seven years that followed the efforts of Germany in the direction of preparing for war became continually more and more intensive, and France was left far behind in the matter of military expenditure.

During these seven years Germany expended £300,000,000 on her military forces, while France spent only £236,000,000. This represents a surplus of £64,000,000 for the period of seven years, or more than £9,000,000 annually. The use which Prussian militarism has made of its supremacy is well known. By exploiting the weakness of Russia the Kaiser's Government has on several occasions, since the year 1904, systematically provoked France. The culminating point of this provocation was the famous coup d'Agadlr of 191 1, when the Kaiser threw into the scales of a diplomatic conversation the weight of a warship, and, by means of this cunning stroke of blackmail, obtained, without a shot being fired, a considerable portion of the French possessions in the Congo.

In speaking thus of the systematic provocation practised by Germany, I do not in the least intend to represent France as an inoffensive white lamb devoured by a ferocious wolf. Modern France is a country like other capitalist nations— an armed nation, a nation with a colonial policy, etc. But in the social and economic structure of France there are characteristics which render her more pacific and, if I may so express myself, more defensive than aggressive Germany. France is a country of great financiers on the one hand, and of small hoarders on the other. It is a country of large and small investors. But the investor, the stock-holder, is the most pacific type of the modern bourgeois ; which is easily comprehensible, for in case of armed conflict the investor is the worst sufferer, by reason of the fall of securities of all descriptions. The predominance of the investor in the bourgeois society of France explains the fact that in spite of the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine by the Germans — in spite of "the wound in her side which France," to quote M. Viviani, " has for half a century silently endured " — the idea of a war against Germany was not really attractive to the French mind. The Germans were perfectly well aware of this fact. In 1909 the well-known German professor and patriot, Herr Delbriick, published an article ' in which he demonstrated that it was beyond a doubt that the majority of the French people did not desire war with Germany, and that the idea of la revanche had lost a great measure of its power. France is the banker of Europe, says Professor Delbriick, and a European war might result in the stoppage of the payments ^ Preussische Jahrbiic/ier, January 1909, vol. 134.