The campaign of 1914 in France and Belgium

Front matter

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Book I Preparation ( August 4-20 )

AFTER

I. The Defense of Liege 3

II. The Plans Revealed 12

I. Of Certain Uncertainties — II. In the Vosges and Alsace — III. The Advance in Lorraine — IV. The Fall of Namur— V. England's Part

III. The Terror, from Aerschot to Louvain .... 46

IV. The "Sacred Union" Gl

V. Paris in August 68

Book II VI

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XL

XII.

XIII.

XIV.

XV.

XVI.

(august 21 -september 5)

Paris prepares for the Worst 124

On the Ramparts 142

I. The Strategic Idea— II. West Wing: Battle of the Ourcq — III. Center: The Retreat in Champagne v

VI

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

XVII.

XVIII.

XIX.

XX.

XXI.

XXII.

XXIII.

Book III Toward Deadlock Page

The Eastern Barries 245

I. A Flank Blow that Failed — II. From Amiens to

Lille— III. The Fall of Antwerp

I. The " Race for the Sea "—II. The Battle of the Lys—

III. The Battle of Ypres— IV. The Battle of the

Yser Paris, the Austere 308

Book IV

XXIV. Behind the Western Wall XXV. From Furnes to Ypres XXVI. The Defense of Verdun XXVII. Under Fire in Rheims .

XXVIII. The Lines of the Aisne XXIX. The Government returns XXX. War as It Is .

I. The Costs in Life and Wealth— II. The Deadlock of the Trenches — III. The Farm of Quennevieres — IV. The Christmas Truce

Index 393

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS

PAGE

East Belgian Main Lines 4

Liege, its Railways, Roads, and Forts 6

"Gaps" on the East Frontieb 1G

Lorraine and Alsace 18

First Position of Armies on the East 24

The Lorraine Frontier 27

French Offensive in Lorraine 29

Positions after the Fall of Liege 31

Facsimile of Paris Communique 74

Facsimile of " Bulletin des Armees " 77

" Zone Actuelle des Armees " (August 10) 92

The French Defeat at Charleroi 98

Battle of Mons and Siege of Maubeuge 100

Main Railways and Rivers of Northern France . . . .111

The Retreat from Mons to the Marne 115

" Recurrent Flank Attack " 150

The Defenses of Paris 153

Strategy of the Battle of the Marne 156

Battle of the Ourcq 158

Battle of the Marne 162

The Center: Scene of Foch's Success 168

The Argonne 176

The Defense of Nancy 248

Triangle of the Laon Mountains 255

The British Right above the Aisne 258

The Siege of Antwerp 276

The Western Armies 284

Battle of the Lys 287

Battle of Ypres 295

Battle of the Yser 302

The Four Phases at Verdun 345

The Front at the Beginning of 1915 361

INTRODUCTION

It needs but little research, to lead the fair-minded student to the conclusion that, behind the immediate causes of the great war, there were others of old standing and wider purport, combinations and divisions of interest which, for many years, had brought upon the European family penalties only less heavy than those of open conflict. Several times of late, the same States had narrowly escaped this calamity; and, in the teeth of a growing desire for settled peace, the preparations for war on land and sea were everywhere steadily increased. These increases of armament (as in the Anglo- German naval rivalry, and the German and French return to three-years army service) were always dangerous, not only as direct threats, but, indirectly, as alterations of the balance of means to ends other than national defense, the most important of which ends were the acquirement of (1) foreign possessions, (2) spheres of special or exclusive economic interest, (3) political predominance, either in Europe generally, or in particular areas. Every one of the Great, and several of the small, Powers had fished in these troubled waters; and there was not one of them that could show perfectly clean hands. Even Belgium, not so long since, was being held accountable for the heritage of misrule in the Congo. There were no angelic States ; all had dabbled in the imperial vices, from land-grabbing to diplomatic intrigue. Nevertheless, it may be said that there were many and not inconsiderable differences in the bias of their policy, due, for the most part, neither to original sin, nor to abnormal virtue, but to historical and geographical circumstances for x INTRODUCTION

which living people cannot be wholly blamed or praised, and the political constitutions resulting therefrom.

The new German Empire entered the lists under very heavy disadvantages. Late in appearing, and almost land-locked, it must find foreign possessions and trade difficult to get and hold ; and the problem of defense on two flanks was aggravated by the fact that the provinces on either side contained large populations conquered and unreconciled. At best, great tact and capacity must be required to overcome these disadvantages. Tact, however, was not a Berlin virtue ; and the types of capacity there encouraged were not those called for by the international tasks of the twentieth century. Politically immature, though remarkable in their industrial and civic achievements, the German people had been led into trusting all to State authority and armed force just when the rest of the western world was turning to the opposite ideal of democracy, and free, peaceful co-operation. Bismarck proclaimed the opposition frankly at the outset, and established the combined system of militarism and alliance by which the ambitions of the Central European Powers were to be vindicated. When France and Russia joined hands over this iron wall, its builders affected to be outraged that force should breed force. Then the present Emperor set out to add, to the strongest army in the world, a navy able at least to threaten the strongest navy. England being thus tempted into special association with France and Russia, a cry went up from the Fatherland that it was being " encircled." There was some justice in the complaint, as there was also justice in the retort that if, by phases of action and reaction, Europe had at length been split into two opposed camps, the heirs of Bismarck had chiefly themselves to blame. That the German people were no more satisfied than other peoples with the results of the policy which the conquerors of 1870 had fathered upon them is suggested by the emigrations en masse in the early years of the period, by the feverish agitations of the later years, and by

INTRODUCTION xi

the growth of the one party of protest, the Social Democrats, to be the largest party in the Reichstag. Unfortunately, dissatisfaction with the results did not here give rise, as it did in France, England, and other countries concerned, to a decided dissatisfaction with the means, the process of the Armed Peace, the new Balance of Power, itself. Individually, the German people may have desired peace; collectively, they did not will the means to peace, even to the inadequate degree that these other peoples did.

In a speech at Dublin, during the early days of the war, Mr. Asquith stated what he considered " the end we ought to keep in view." Taking as his text a phrase used by Mr. Gladstone at the time of the Franco-German War, " The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics," he proceeded :

" The idea of public right, what does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and of the future molding of the European world. It means, next, that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities, each for the life of history a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States — they must be recognized as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbors, more powerful in strength and in wealth — exactly as good a title to a place in the sun. And it means finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clashing of competing ambitions, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European partnership, based on the recognition of equal right, and established and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realized either xii INTRODUCTION

to-day or to-morrow. If and when this war is decided in favor of the Allies, it will at once come within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European statesmanship."

Whether, or not, they truly described the aim of the Allied Governments in the war, these words did unquestionably embody the ideal of powerful parties and movements in the Allied and other progressive countries, an ideal served by the increasing weight of democratic opinion in their internal constitution. This ideal — everywhere supported by the organized working classes, elaborated by bodies like the Inter- Parliamentary Union and many kinds of pacifist association, and, finally, expressed in The Hague Conferences and the arbitral court and conventions deriving therefrom — offered the only alternative to the ancient method of settling disputes by trial of brute force. It was an alternative, no doubt, difficult for the rulers of the German Empire to accept — nearly as difficult as the concession of democratic rights at home. Nor did the German people show any will to impose such aims upon their rulers. The Socialists grumbled; a few academic heretics occasionally lauded the idea of international comity ; for the rest, the results of two generations of militarist theory and practice appeared in a slavish obedience under which the olden culture of the nation withered, and manly independence, conscience, chivalry, and all high public aims were at a discount. At The Hague, in all the councils of Europe, Germany came to stand nearly always for the reactionary refusal of better things. Despotic Russia had, at least, spasms of righteousness. The Tsar would have revolutionary petitioners shot down in the street, but would yield them a Duma; would establish a State liquor trade, and then abolish it ; would persecute Jews, but liberate Poles ; would wage a nefarious war in Manchuria, but establish the world's law courts at The Hague. Behind these inconsistencies flames the soul and genius of the Russian folk, for whom no hopes are too high. There has never been a

INTRODUCTION xiii

Russian Treitschke, or a German Tolstoy. France remains, at heart, the land of the Revolutionary formula — liberty, equality, fraternity. England, with all the faults which her children are usually the first to point out, is still the England of Gladstone. Germany has not got beyond the Bismarckian doctrine that might is greater than right. For such a case, the ancient warning was uttered : " he who lives by the sword shall die by the sword."

II

One result of the growth of German power was to revive and stimulate the Austro-Russian rivalry which was an olden curse of the Balkan races. When Austria, in 1908, taking advantage of the situation created by the Young Turk revolution, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the teeth of Russian protests, Germany insisted upon a refusal to submit this matter to the co-signatories of the treaty under which Austria had provisionally occupied this region. Five years later, as we now know, amid the Balkan conflict, Austria and Germany proposed to coerce Servia, but were restrained by Italy. The summer of 1914 presented what seemed in Berlin and Vienna a final opportunity of finishing Russia's patronage and Servia's independent growth ; and again every attempt to assert an interest superior to that of any or all of the parties to the quarrel — the interest of European comity and peace — broke, not upon Russia's, but Germany's obstinate refusal. The risk run was so incommensurate with the immediate stake that the question inevitably arose whether Berlin was not merely repeating the successful bluff of six years before. Against this hypothesis there lies the recklessly clear statement of the German Government that " we were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war." The immediate pretext calls for only a word.

xiv INTRODUCTION

The assassination at Serajevo, on June 28, 1914, of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife excited universal reprobation. If anyone had thought of this foul crime setting the world on fire, he would have been reassured when, eight days later, the German Emperor sailed quietly from Kiel for his usual summer cruise in northern waters. Did the Kaiser know what was afoot, or did the war party seize the opportunity of his absence? However this may be, when he returned to Berlin on July 27, Austria had presented to Servia a thoroughly humiliating ultimatum (July 23) ; Servia had replied (July 25) in a very chastened tone, which was yet accounted insufficient; Russia had begun to intervene (26th) on behalf of the "little Slav brother"; and Germany had appeared once more beside her ally " in shining armor." England, with the support of France and Italy, was energetically acting as mediator, committed to neither side, deeply alarmed at the speed with which the crisis was developing. Well she might be : for, within eight days of the Servian reply and Sir Edward Grey's first peace proposal, the German army was marching across Luxemburg to the Belgian frontier.

The chief events of these eight black days revolve round four points: (1) the military preparations, (2) Germany's bids for British and French neutrality, (3) the invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium, and (4) the mediation proposals.

In all these categories, the main facts are now pretty clear. We know that the Austro-Hungarian army was partially mobilized on July 26; that Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia on July 28; that Russian mobilization in four southern districts (Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan) was ordered on July 29; that on that night the Kaiser held a War Council, and sought to obtain British neutrality; that Belgrade was bombarded on July 30; that Austrian and Russian general mobilizations, and German ultimatums to Russia and France, followed on the 31st, German and

INTRODUCTION xv

French mobilization orders and the German declaration of war on Russia on the next day, and the German invasion on Sunday, August 2. In the diplomatic exchanges, Germany cited the Russian mobilizations as a casus belli; but, according to the French Premier (post, Chap. IV.), the German Government had itself been engaged in active preparations for war since July 25, before the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade. Berlin and Vienna were aware as soon as the Servian question became acute that Russia would not permit them to extinguish this small Kingdom; and they acted throughout as in face of a Pan-Slav conspiracy. If they had been content to play any part but that of the angry bully, there would have been no war. M. Sazonof preferred direct conversations with Austria, but " was ready to fall in with the British proposal, or any other proposal, of a kind likely to lead to a favorable settlement." England held back as she had never done before, during the existence of the Entente, from espousing the cause of her friends. France, equalty disinterested save for the obligation of her alliance, was now doubly restrained by the threatened alternative of losing the friend who could alone help her in the west, or betraying her eastern partner.

Meanwhile, the Austrian army marched to the Save, and the Kaiser's lieutenants set themselves to arrange the most promising kind of offensive campaign. The possibility of a defensive in the west was rejected, or never considered. The need of first crippling France was assumed — though France had not uttered a provocative word. Accordingly, on July 29, after a war council at Potsdam, presided over by the Emperor, England was asked to promise to stand aside, on condition that France should be stripped only of her foreign trade and possessions. Sir Edward Grey refused this bargain, but, still hoping to succeed as mediator, refused also to range England with the threatened States. The German Chancellor had added, with what afterwards proved a remarkable economy of truth : " It depended on the action xvi INTRODUCTION

of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium; but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." To this Sir E. Grey replied: "The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or respect we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either" (July 30). On August 1 the German Ambassador in London put to Sir Edward Grey two further questions on the point, on his own responsibility, without authority from Berlin: Would England remain neutral if Belgian neutrality were not violated? " he even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed." The reply was that the British Government would keep its hands free. This discussion can hardly be taken seriously. The German declaration of war had already been sent to St. Petersburg; troops had crossed the French frontier; and the value of German promises was already gravely compromised. Indeed, Prince Lichnowsky came back to Sir Edward Grey on August 3 to ask him " not to make the neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions." Luxemburg had, in fact, already been occupied, and an ultimatum was being presented to Belgium demanding a free passage.

So far, Great Britain had taken but one step beyond the path of strict neutrality — a step of great importance for France, but motived also by considerations arising from the naval situation in the Mediterranean, where the French fleet was concentrated, and British communications had little independent protection. This step consisted in an undertaking, on August 2, subject to Parliamentary approval, that, " if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." This did not involve war with Germany, at any rate until she had come triumphantly through to the French coast. But when the Belgian cam-

INTRODUCTION xvii

paign was openly declared, no room was left for hesitation. On the afternoon of the day on which the assault upon Liege was begun, Sir E. Goschen waited successively upon the German Foreign Secretary and Chancellor to present the British ultimatum. There was now no pretense of French aggression, as there had been in the ultimatum delivered in Paris. Herr von Jagow excused the invasion frankly on the ground that " they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations, and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as, if they had gone by the more southern route, they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier." On his part, the Chancellor " began a harangue which lasted for about twenty minutes." The central phrase will be for long memorable: "He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word — 'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." On the same day, speaking to the Reichstag, Herr von Bethmann- Hollweg used other words no less memorable : " We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. . . . We were compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong — I speak openly — that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only xviii INTRODUCTION

have one thought — how he is to hack his way through " ( TJw Times, August 11, 1914).

Ill

If any douht remains of the balance of responsibilities for the catastrophe thus precipitated, there is a simple test that can be applied with very clear results. The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium did not constitute the only, or the chief, breach of treaty promises by the Germanic Powers. Reluctantly, no doubt, they had both signed the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and had made themselves, in 1899 and 1907, parties to the establishment of regular methods of arbitration, mediation, good offices, and investigation by commissions of inquiry, methods centering, but not exclusively operating, in the Permanent Court at The Hague. From beginning to end, Austria-Hungary, and, still more decidedly, Germany, opposed every attempt to procure a settlement of a friendly, mediatory, or arbitral character, and until the end when, too late, Austria began to resume direct conversations with Russia, insisted upon coercion pure and simple. It was, they held, " a matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone," between the lad and the giant. As though there should be no doubt on this point, Germany rejected the conference proposal on the specific (and, of course, quite untenable) ground that it would amount to a " Court of Arbitration." Only forty-eight hours were given to Servia to surrender to the extraordinary demands of the i\.ustrian Note. The reply — which, Sir Edward Grey said, " involved the greatest humiliation that he had ever seen a country undergo " — accepted all of these demands save two, and on these proposed a reference to The Hague Tribunal. The Austrian answer was an immediate declaration of war (July 28), quickly followed by a bombardment of the insubordinate capital. Sir Edward Grey tried one mediatory

INTRODUCTION xix

suggestion after another, always strongly supported by the third member of the Triple Alliance, Italy. Several proposals aimed at gaining time and delaying military preparations ; others at joint mediation at St. Petersburg and Vienna by Germany and Italy, England and France; at a Conference of these four Powers to find a solution, or a simple resumption of direct negotiations. " The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence," the Foreign Secretary told Prince Lichnowsky (July 29), " was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest, if mine was not acceptable." We have seen that England risked her own international partnership in order that this mediatory r61e should not be compromised.

One result of first-class importance was gained : Italian neutrality. On July 30, before the final die was cast, the Italian Premier was reported by Sir R. Rodd as having decided to break the partnership which had lasted for thirtytwo years. " The war undertaken by Austria," he said, " and the consequences which might result had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were, therefore, in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance. In such circumstances, Italy would remain neutral." By whatever prudential considerations this decision may have been confirmed, it constituted a verdict by the most friendly of judges; and the impression it made was deepened some months later by the revelation that, in 1913, Germany and Austria had proposed to coerce Servia, and Italy had then declined to act with her Allies in what Signor Giolitti called a " most perilous adventure."

The German people knew nothing of these major facts till it was too late ; and, such was the strange mingling of boisterous self-assertion and sense of martyrdom into which they had been trained, it would have made very little difference had they known. No body of men in modern Germany has ever dared to question the wisdom of its war-lords as did the xx INTRODUCTION

so-called " Pro-Boers " in England in 1899. The stern discipline which was the national ideal — free nations would call it servile obedience — showed no breach, no inconvenient outburst of thought or conscience, during the black week when a trivial quarrel that a stipendiary magistrate could have judged was blown out into a cause for world-wide slaughter. History will show few such tragic spectacles as this collective infatuation, upheld, let us say, with a courage, en durance, energy, and organizing power which only needed some moral element to make them sublime.

There has been altogether too much disposition in the west to learn this Teutonic lesson of obedient " efficiency " divorced from high social ends. The efficiency of the German military machine, whatever virtues may have been sacrificed in its service, was essentially damnable. It challenged every liberal and progressive element in European life. The increase of militarism had, indeed, become general; but nowhere else did it take a form so daringly logical, so mercilessly inhumane. The crime of crimes, the original aggression, having been decided upon, no sort of scruple was permitted to prejudice the chances of success. Every Power has dabbled in the dirty business of espionage; but no other State had imagined anything like the swarm of spies that was suddenly let loose upon Belgium and France. To the last moment, cajolery was kept up in Brussels. Afterwards, men recalled the visit of King Albert to Liege in 1914, when General von Emmich was a guest, and overwhelmed the Belgian Ministers with assurances of friendship. They recalled that, on the afternoon preceding the delivery of the German ultimatum to Belgium, the Prussian Minister in Brussels, Herr von Below, interviewed by a leading newspaper of the city, had freely professed the friendliest feelings, using the words : " Your neighbor's roof may burn ; but your house will be safe." They recalled that, on the evening of August 1, the German Military Attache in Brussels had called upon the chief secretary of the Minister of War, and

INTRODUCTION xxi

congratulated him upon the remarkably rapid execution of the Belgian mobilization. Not content with this call, he had himself telephoned to a leading Brussels newspaper asking it to publish this compliment. I was in Brussels that day, attending an emergency meeting of the International Peace Bureau, and well remember the state of mind prevailing. Everywhere, the little Belgian soldiers were pouring toward the railway stations to join their regiments. The hope of European peace being maintained was ebbing. Some limited breach of the eastern Belgian frontier was anticipated. But any man who had then said that a devastating descent into the plains of Flanders was an integral part of the German plan of campaign, long prepared and to be ruthlessly executed, would have been dismissed as a raving maniac. Such assurances as those quoted above, the ties of the Belgian, Prussian, and Bavarian royal families, a thousand commercial and financial bonds, and the commonest feelings of decency and honor, were all against the supposition. The manifest preparation for this aggressive campaign, on the one side, the manifest unpreparedness of the Allies, even for defense, on the other, may be treated by the pure militarist as merely the results of efficiency and inefficiency. By the mass of ordinary folk, who will suffer the burdens of defense, but regard an aggressive war as the worst of crimes, because it includes all crimes, this contrast will confirm the conclusion to be drawn from the diplomatic documents. The German plan of campaign assumed, and the early weeks of the war proved, the invulnerability, in either direction, of the short Franco-German frontier: it proved, that is to say, that Germany had no defensive need to attack France and Belgium.

In an aggressive war on two fronts, however, Herr von Jagow did but echo a commonplace of the Prussian Staff when he said that " to strike some decisive blow as early as possible was a matter of life and death for them." England's entry made it impossible to strike, or help to strike, xxiI INTRODUCTION

such a blow by way of the high seas. On the other hand, Germany's land-locked position, which had been so loud a grievance, proved in these circumstances a positive advantage for her defense. On land, the aggressors, for a short time, would have an advantage, both in numbers and concentration of forces ; but the advantage would soon pass, and in a struggle of exhaustion the numbers that could ultimately be brought up by Russia and the British Empire must turn the scale. At the outset, Germany could throw a peace strength of 860,000 men immediately into the field. France, two or three days behind in effective mobilization, would only have 790,000 when her Algerian Army Corps had been got over. Meanwhile, a sufficient guard could be left in East Prussia; and Belgium's little army, only about 60,000 men on a peace footing, could be crushed before the British Expeditionary Corps had time to land. Austria- Hungary would have immediately marched 500,000 men against Russia and Servia. Reserves would now be available. " War footing " is a very elastic phrase; but the Germanic Powers, together, could count on putting man against man of France, and having a surplus of between four and five millions to meet the slow-coming hosts of Russia and England. Strange if, before then, a decisive blow could not be struck.