The diplomacy of the war of 1914

Preface

In this brief account of the causes of the War of 1914, it has been possible to touch upon only the more important points. After the war is over, the results of patient research may make clear the truth of accusations and counter-accusations. I have, however, made an effort to present the questions from a really impartial and neutral point of view, even though the result may not find approval from the partisans of either side. After all, man as a rational being is most deeply concerned in the rational efforts of mankind to avoid the ills the political body is heir to, and in the end will turn from the din of battle to that preliminary conflict of brains and policies as portrayed in the dispatches of the diplomats.

The importance of the official documents issued by the beUigerent Governments has been questioned, and it is well to remember that they are specially prepared for publication, and further, that the diplomats, when reporting to their Governments, do not lose from sight the advantage of having their dispatches in a form suitable for publication at short notice. The most secret and delicate negotiations may occasionally be effected through the intermediary of a special and confidential messenger or by means of the telephone. Nevertheless, the basis and permanent structure of the British diplomacy is doubtless to be found in the papers laid before the Houses of Parhament and in the discussions and explanations given in Parliament. If any doubt as to the value of these public documents has existed, it must have been dispelled by the recent publication of the Austrian Red Book, which confirms in a most remarkable manner almost every important statement of the British White Paper. ^

1 Some of the official publications relating to negotiations preceding the war give evidence of having been prepared with great haste. No. 141 vi PREFACE

Documents do not, however, give adequate information of the personal factor which is so important in all matters of diplomacy. The documents are, as it were, the skeleton which needs to be built up with the Uving flesh of the personal characteristics of the actors; but any attempt to accomphsh this successfully must await the results of long and careful investigations. It was only years afterwards, through the publication of letters and memoirs, that the world learned the truth in regard to Bismarck's diplomacy during the formative period of the German Empire.

I shall not attempt in this book to do anything more

of the French Yellow Book speaks of the time limit of the German ultimatum to Belgium as seven hours; the Belgian Gray Paper shows (no. 38) that it was twelve hours. Again, the French Yellow Book (no. 18) speaks of the Russian Ambassador as being about to leave for the country {pour la campagne), whereas he was really leaving for his own country, as is shown by no. 55.

In another case it is interesting to note how the same incident, M. Sazonof's proposal of the conditions for a peaceful settlement between Austria and Russia, is treated in the dispatches of three different countries. According to the French Yellow Book (no. 103), M. Sazonof said to the German Ambassador: "The Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal to you in his name"; the Russian Orange Paper (no. 60) gives M. Sazonof's own statement that the German Ambassador asked him if he could not indicate upon what conditions Russia might yet agree to arrest her military preparations; in the British White Paper (no. 97) the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg reports: "German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French of which following is a translation: . . ." The English account, though fuller, coincides with the Russian, while the French conveys a different impression.

In the course of the narrative of events I have referred to some other instances. No. 5 of the French Yellow Book, which was so severely criticized by Drs. Dernburg and Helfferich {post, p. 155), is not, as the criticism might lead us to think, a document containing material received July 30, 1913, but a statement drawn up at the French Foreign Office summarizing the correspondence received during the preceding two years in regard to opinion in Germany. An examination of the document in question will suffice to make this clear. (See Sun, February 2, 1915.) Another case of error is found in the case of enclosure 3 in no. 105 of the British White Paper {post, p. 285).

PREFACE vii

than draw attention to the more salient traits of the important personages, as disclosed in the documents themselves; and for the sake of clearness shall bring certain of the statesmen and diplomatists before the reader by their official titles only.

In the analysis of the documents, it has seemed better to bring out each successive link of the chain forged to involve the unhappy powers of Eiu-ope in this war. Some repetition has been necessary for the sake of clearness, and at times I have been 'o'bUged to sacrifice the chronological order so as to adhere to a logical exposition in the unfolding of the events of the opening scenes in the greatest drama of human history.

I have reduced as much as possible the extracts from the various official papers published by Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Austria- Hungary, and Servia. It is my belief that the piecing together of the documentary evidence under logically arranged headings will be of value to all those with an interest in international affairs, since the perusal of the documents themselves to get at the gist of the material requires a considerable expenditure of time on the part of even an experienced diplomatist. Then, too, almost every one of the original documents treats of a number of different matters or negotiations which by their interrelation confuse the reader. No system of paraphrase and excerpt can, however, replace the use of the original documents. To facilitate comparison with the original source, in each case the reference has been placed in parentheses immediately after the extract, so as to save constant and irritating interruption through the use of footnotes. I must warn the reader that citations not referring to direct or ''modified" quotations do not necessarily confirm the statements which they follow, as their purpose is rather to direct him to the documents which bear upon the matter under discussion.

In the ''modified extracts" from the British White viii PREFACE

Paper, the German White Book, the Russian Orange Paper, the Belgian Gray Paper, the French Yellow Book, the Austrian Red Book, and the Servian Blue Book, the exact sense has been preserved as nearly as possible, although it has often been necessary to transpose or modify the quotation. When an extract has been so treated or modified, the fact is indicated by the marks (")> — tliat is, one quotation mark at the beginning and one at the end, — and in addition the source is given in parentheses immediately after, with the words, "modified quotation." When the words of the documents are quoted verbatim, as in direct quotation, it has been shown by the ordinary quotation marks (" "), even when within a modified quotation. In the case of a quotation within a quotation, the usual system has been followed.

These extracts were made from the original documents, except in the case of the Servian Blue Book. I have made use of the official, authorized English translation of the German White Book except where the English was either too uncouth or else not clear, when I have retranslated the original German. In the same way I have used the various translations of the London Times, the New York Times, the official translation of the Austrian Red Book, and the translations published by the British Government as White Papers, attempting, where I have found the translation faulty, to make corrections or to substitute a better. The admirable enterprise of the New York Times in placing the important official documents before the general public has been of immense educational value to the whole country, and incidentally has rendered it unnecessary to encumber the appendix of this book by adding reprints of these pubhcations.^

^ The American Association for International Conciliation has also reprinted many of the most important publications, and has generously distributed them widely and free of cost. The American Journal of Inter' national Law prints the official publications in its Supplement, vol. 8, no. 4 (October, 1914); vol. 9, no. 1 (January, 1915). An official translation of the Austrian Red Book has been placed on sale.

PREFACE ix

Various other documents of general interest, bearing on the causes of the war, have been included in this volume.

I do not attempt to mention all those who have helped in the preparation of this material. I cannot, however, pass over without acknowledgment the assistance I have received from Professors Munroe Smith and John Bassett Moore, of Columbia University, to whom I owe more than one important suggestion, while Professor James T. Shotwell also has given me the benefit of his valued criticism of the subject-matter and the arrangement of the material. Mr. Henry F. Munro has been kind enough to go over the proof, and Miss Isadore G. Mudge, of the Columbia University Library, has greatly facilitated my search for material and examination of sources.

E. C. S.

Columbia University, May, 1915.

Chapter I Review Of European History

1. The European Concert 3

2. Belgian neutrality 4

3. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente 7 -^

4. Crises 9

5. Fashoda 10

6. The Algeciras Conference 12

7. The Casablanca affair .18

8. Bosnia and Herzegovina 19

9. Agadir 22

10. The Turco-Italian War 24 /

11. The Balkan Wars 26

12. The situation just before the War of 1914 34

Chapter II The Austro-serb Conflict

1. The terms of the Austrian note 41

2. Efforts of the powers to secure an extension of the time limit . . 59

3. The powers influence Servia to make a conciliatory reply ... 62

4. Servia's reply 64

5. Austria rejects Servia's reply . . .78

6. The powers urge Austria to delay military operations and accept

the Servian reply as a basis for discussion 81

7. Austrian assurances 84

8. Austria declares war on Servia 85

9. Austria explains the purpose of her action 89

Chapter III The Austro-russian Discussions

1. Russia's interest in the Austro-Servian conflict 96

2. Russia beUeves Austria's action is directed against herself . . . 105 xii CONTENTS

3. Russia considers immediate action necessary 108

4. Russia partially mobilizes against Austria 109

5. The Tsar asks the Kaiser to try his mediation 112

Chapter IV Germany's Situation

1. Germany's interest in the dispute 117

2. Germany declares that the Austrian note was not communicated to

her beforehand 119

3. Germany pledged to support Austria 123

4. Germany insists upon the "localization" of the Austro-Servian

conflict 126

5. The responsibility Russia will incur by supporting Servia . . 131

6. The situation between Germany and Russia becomes acute , . 133

7. Germany delivers an ultimatum to Russia 142

Chapter V France Supports Russia

1. Germany asks France to use her influence with Russia . . . 147

2. France believes Germany intends to precipitate a war . . . 155

3. France supports her ally 163

4. Military preparations in Germany and France 166

5. The German ultimatum to France 174

Chapter VI Mobilization

1. The meaning of mobihzation 178

2. The issuance of the order for general mobihzation .... 181

3. Intermediate military preparations 183

4. The fatal succession of mobiUzations 184

Chapter VII The Breakdown Of The Concert

1. European diplomacy in the Balkans 195

2. Sir Edward Grey proposes a conference of the powers . . . 197

3. Germany makes objection to mediation 205

4. Russia proposes to Austria to enter upon "conversations" . . 213

5. The powers employ their good offices at Vienna and St. Peters-

burg 227

CONTENTS xiii

6. Efforts to discover a formula for mediation 229

7. Germany asked to "press the button" 231

8. The San Giuliano suggestion for mediation upon Servia's uncondi-

tional acceptance of the ultimatum 234

9. The Cambon suggestion of mediation after Austria's occupation

of Belgrade 236

10. The Grey proposal for a collective guaranty of the powers . . 239

11. Germany asks Russia to propose a formula 242

12. Austria agrees to mediation 252

13. The failure to reach a compromise 264

Chapter VIII Sir Edward Grey And The English Diplomacy

1. The important role of England 268

2. Efforts to prevent war 270

3. Efforts to organize mediation 270

4. England refuses to take sides 273

5. The Anglo-French Entente 282

6. England declares that she is not interested in a Balkan question . 293

7. England warns Germany that she will not hold aloof if France is

involved 295

8. Germany's bid for English neutrality 297

9. Divergence of opinion in England 303

10. England's vital interests 311

11. England's inquiry relative to Belgium's neutrality . . . .316

12. England asked to guarantee the neutraUty of France . . . 328

13. Germany's detention of English vessels 336

14. Germany invades Luxemburg 337

15. England agrees to protect the French coast 339

16. The British ultimatum 352

Chapter IX Belgian Neutrality

1. The history of Belgian neutraUty

2. The obligation to respect the treaty of April 19, 1839

3. The obligation to make good the guaranty of neutrality

4. The right to make war and the equality of states

5. Anglo-Belgian conversations

6. Effect of Belgium's preparations against Germany

7. Alleged violations of Belgian neutrality ....

8. The violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg

9. Some considerations concerning Belgium's right to resist

10. Gennany accuses England of misrepresentations in regard to

Belgium 441

11. Germany's plea of necessity 445

Chapter X Italy Remains Neutral

1. Italy desirous for peace 457

2. San Giuliano's helpful suggestions 462

3. Italian cooperation with England 465

4. Italy declares she will remain neutral . 467

Conclusion

1. The interest of the United States in the war 474

2. Suggested and alleged causes of the war 475

3. Displacement of the balance of power 476

4. The immediate causes of the war 479

5. The determining causes of the war 491

6. The world's answer 495

7. Formation of a Super-Empire 496

8. The "Peace power" 500

9. Germany's nationalistic conception 502

10. Nationalism and internationalism 508

11. The results 514

CHAPTER XII Questions and answers 519

Questions without answers 528

Chapter XIII Documents Political Aims Of The Powers

Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796. (Extract.) . . 530 Bismarck's Speech in the Reichstag, February 6, 1888. (Extract.) . 533 Apocryphal Will of Peter the Great (the Sokolnicki Text) . . .537 The Declaration of the American Delegation at the First Hague Conference 539

CONTENTS XV

THE ALLIANCES

Treaty of Alliance between Austria and Germany, October 7, 1879 . 540

Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan, July 13, 1911 . 541

Anglo-American cooperation in regard to American affairs. (Extract from speech of the Queen on the opening of Parliament, 1896.) . 542

Anglo-American Arbitration. (Extract from speech of the Queen on the opening of Parliament, 1897.) 543

The Monroe Doctrine. (Extract from American Diplomacy, by John Bassett Moore.) 543

Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, April 8, 1904 544

Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning the interests of their states on the continent of Asia, August 31, 1907 .... 546

Treaty between Japan and Russia guaranteeing the present territory of each, the integrity of China, and the principle of the "open door" in that empire, August 14, 1907 550

Convention between Russia and Japan concerning Manchuria, July 4, 1910 551

The Formation of the Triple Entente. (Diplomatic Correspondence published by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 1914.) . . . .551

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS A German Historian predicts War with England. (Extract from an

article by Hans Delbruck, 1912.) 560

The Price of a German-EngUsh Entente. (Extracts from an article by

Hans Delbruck, 1911.) 561

References to the Anglo-German secret treaty of 1898 relative to the

eventual dismemberment of the Portuguese colonies .... 562 Anglo-German Agreement in regard to the African possessions of Portugal, 1913 562

Portugal won't sell yet; division of her East African Colonies when she

does. (New York Times, January 1, 1914.) 563

Interview of October 28, 1908, with Emperor William II. (London

Telegraph) 563

Colonial Development and Removal of Conflicting Interests, by Sir

Harry Johnston 566

Commercial and Economic Competition, by Karl Rathgen . . . 567 Speech of the German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, in

the Reichstag, December 2, 1914 568

Cardiff Speech of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, October 2,

1914 569

THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN DISPUTE

Article 25 of the Treaty of BerUn, July 13, 1878 572 xvi CONTENTS

Secret Appendix to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Servia, February 29, 1912 572

Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government, July 23, 1914 574

Servia's reply to the Austrian note, July 25, 1914 576

Negotiations of the Spanish and American Governments following the destruction of the Maine 579

Comparison between the action of the United States in 1898 and Austria in 1914 583

The Case of Servia. (Extract from a speech by Lloyd George, September 21, 1914.) 586

The Austro-Servian Conflict. (Extract from an article by Constantin Theodor Dumba, 1914.) 587

Criticism of Servia. (Article by Count Albert Apponyi, 1914.) . . 588

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY

Richelieu rejects a proposal for the partition of Belgium and suggests another plan 595

The Barrier Treaty between Great Britain and Holland, October 29, 1709 596

Belgium and the Balance of Power 597

The Barrier Treaty Vindicated, by Francis Hare, 1712. (Extract.) . 598

The Neutralization of Belgium by the Treaty of April 19, 1839; international treaties regulating the neutrality of Belgium .... 600

Treaty between Great Britain and Prussia relative to the independence and neutrality of Belgium, August 9, 1870 603

Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia relative to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Duchy of Limburg, May 11, 1867 .... 603

Declarations made by France and Prussia to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg, July 17, 1870 . 605

Extracts from Parliamentary Debates regarding the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, 1867; 1870 606

Belgian Neutrality. (Gladstone's letter to Bright, August, 1870). . . 624

Anglo-Belgian Military Preparations. Documents made public by the German Government after taking possession of the Brussels Archives:

(1) Report of General Ducarme to the Belgian Minister of War;

(2) Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to his Government 626

Remarks introductory to the Secret Documents, by Bernhard Dernburg 631 Violation of Belgian neutrality by England and Belgium. (Semi-official view expressed in the North German Gazette.) .... 634 Statement relative to the publication of the Belgian Documents, from , M. Havenith, Belgian Minister at Washington 635

CONTENTS xvii

The Nature of Neutrality, etc. (Extracts from World Organization as affected by the Nature of the Modern State, by David Jayne Hill.) . . 638

The Alleged Inherent Right of Self -Preservation (extract), by John Westlake 640

The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens 642

Thucydides: The Melians' Defense of their Neutrality against the Athenians 645

THE WAR

The Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the settlement of international disputes, Article iii 651

The Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the opening of hostilities . 651 The Larger Meanings of the War. (Extracts from an article by

Franklin H. Giddings.) 652

Appeal to the Universities of America, signed by Rudolf Eucken and

Ernst Haeckel 653

America and the Issues of the European War, by Charles W. Eliot . 655 Germany's Treaty Record: a letter by Bernhard Demburg answering Dr. Eliot 661

Chronologt 667

List of Citations 686

Index 693

THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATORS ^

AT LONDON

Mr. Asquith, British Prime Minister.

Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador.

AT BERLIN Herr von Bethmann-HoUweg, German Chancellor.

Herr von Jagow, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador.

AT ST. PETERSBURG

M. Sazonof, Riissian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador.

Count Pourtales, German Ambassador.

Count Szapary, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.

AT VIENNA

Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Herr von Tchirsky, German Ambassador.

AT PARIS M. Poincar6, President of France.

M. Viviani, Premier of France, and Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador.

AT ROME Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

AT BELGRADE M. Pashitch, Servian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

' In this list are included only the most important names which it may be expected that the reader will remember. A complete listing, under both name and office, of all actors in the negotiations, including those here mentioned, will be found with page references in the index.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations used to denote the various ofiicial publications are the following: ^

(3) R. O. P. (Russian Orange Paper.)

(5) F. Y. B. (French Yellow Book.)

(6) A. R. B. (Austrian Red Book.)

(7) S. B. B. (Servian Blue Book.)

' The British White Paper was also published as a small blue book and the Russian, Belgian and French publications have been issued in a convenient form as British White Papers.

Chapter I Review Of European History

The European Concert — Belgian neutrality — The Triple Alliance and The Triple Entente — Crises: Fashoda (1896); Algeciras (1906); the Casablanca afifair (1908); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908); Agadir (1911); theTurco-Italian War (1911-12); the Balkan Wars (1912-13) — The situation just before the War of 1914.

1. The European Concert

It is impossible to understand the causes of the outbreak of the present war without some knowledge of the sahent features of history which led to the aUgnment of the great powers into two camps known as the Triple AlUance and the Triple Entente. The questions of the present moment, such as that of the neutrality of Belgium, have their roots deep in the past, and their elucidation must be sought in the history of the relations of the European states.

Modern Europe, as we know it to-day, was patched together at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The principal independent states of Europe, which took part in that settlement, formed the European Concert. They had been drawn together by the common danger of French domination and had succeeded at last in overwhelming Napoleon. During the Congress of Vienna, it looked as if the jealousies over the spoils stripped from France would divide the victors into two camps, and start another war. Russia, wishing to acquire all of Poland, offered to compensate Prussia with territory taken from Saxony. This gave Talleyrand his opportunity, and France, Austria, and England agreed to make common cause, by force of arms if necessary, to prevent this dangerous aggrandizement of Russia and Prussia. But the powers had had enough of war, and so found a way to settle their differences by a ruthless carving-up of territories in disregard of the principle of nationahty, and even that of ''legitimacy," a term which served the same purpose of a shibboleth that the ''observance of treaties" now fulfills. The able diplomacy of Talleyrand took advantage of this disagreement to reestabhsh the diplomatic equality of France, and the five powers, — England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, — working together as the Concert of Europe, dictated to all the other states and completed the territorial transformations and adjustments which suited their counterbalancing interests and jealousies. Proceeding with stumbhng and halting gait, constantly in danger of faUing, the European Concert continued to be, up to the outbreak of the War of 1914, Europe's supreme hope and only protection against the occurrence of a general war. Although acting as a sort of shock-absorber to break the force of the territorial transformations found necessary and inevitable in the course of years, the European Concert has neither maintained the status quo nor perfected the balance of power, but by compromising between the two has managed to keep the peace. Throughout this long period, the principal concern of the Eiu-opean Concert has been to watch over Balkan affairs in order to prevent the starting of a conflagration in the Near East.

2. Belgian neutrality The Congress of Vienna, which stripped France of the immense possessions she had acquired since 1792, divided them up so as to meet the desires and secure the agreement of the coalition which had overthrown Napoleon. Prussia, Austria, and Russia received their parts on the Continent, but England did not desire to place hostages there, and made no demands for territory, seeking her compensation elsewhere. It was natural that she should keep the colonial possessions captured from France by her fleets. The others could not refuse her what she already held. She wished also to retain certain of the Dutch possessions, as the Cape Colony, which she had seized when Holland was incorporated into the French Empire; at Vienna it was proposed to give the Belgic provinces to Holland as compensation. Austria gladly exchanged her provinces for territories nearer Vienna.^ But this union of Belgium and Holland under the same king was contrary to the sentiments of the Belgian people, and fifteen years later they revolted.

France was very anxious to take them over, and there was some Belgian sentiment favorable to this plan; but this would not have satisfied one of England's fundamental principles of poUcy, which for centuries had been to keep the Belgic provinces out of the control of France. Through these provinces and Holland flowed some of the principal rivers of Europe. They possessed besides great importance as industrial centers. Their union with any great power would inconvenience England, because of the facility of attack afforded by the proximity of Belgian and Dutch harbors to her shores, and also because her commerce might thus be excluded from these rich territories drained by their rivers. Lord Palmerston, therefore, in 1831, true to England's traditional poUcy, strove to give to Belgium an independent position. But it was evident that a small, rich country with a magnificent strategic position would be coveted by her powerful neighbors, France and Prussia; in the course of future campaigns conducted across her territory, she might, at the settlement of peace, fall to one or the other. The interest of England seemed best served, therefore, by making her perpetually neutral;

^ At the time, Prussia was even more anxious to have a strong "buffer" or "stopper" state to prevent France from invading her territory, and the general distrust of France made all the powers ready to fall in with the proposal.

the other powers had to acquiesce in this project or acknowledge ambitions of aggrandizement, which might lead England to make a coaUtion against them until she obtained assurances that such designs had been abandoned. Accordingly, it was agreed that Belgium should be perpetually neutral, and the principal powers — England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia — joined in guaranteeing her independence and perpetual neutrahty.

It is no secret that France still pursued the main purpose of her diplomacy and mihtary exertions since the time of Richeheu — that is, to annex the neighboring provinces of Belgium and to secure her natural outlet toward the north, thus regaining control of her own fluvial arteries of commerce. Under the great Napoleon she had accompUshed the union of Belgium with France and had given the benefits of her reformed judicial system to a country which was already united to her by many ties, such as language and rehgion. But England came and put asunder these two peoples whom the evolution of history had united.

In the course of years, another Napoleon upon the throne of France had hoped again to incorporate Belgium into France, as was done at the epoch of the Revolution, and the French Ambassador, Benedetti, proposed to Bismarck a partition of Belgium, just as Russia had proposed and successfully brought about the partition of Poland in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Bismarck prevailed upon Benedetti to write out this proposal in his own hand, which he took for reference to the King of Prussia, and on the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War exhibited it to the diplomatic corps at Berlin. The inevitable result was still further to prejudice England against the brilliant adventurer upon the throne of France. Negotiations were entered into with each of the belligerents, and a separate treaty signed with each to make common cause against the other in case of a violation of Belgian neutrality. During the Franco-Prussian War, the perpetual neutrality of Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, the only perpetually neutralized states of Europe, was faithfully respected by all parties. In the course of generations, Europe has become accustomed to this artificial situation and has taken for granted that it would persist.

The general pubhc has not appreciated the difference between ordinary neutrahty and perpetual neutrality. In the present war the United States is a neutral in the ordinary sense, but may terminate that condition at any moment by declaring war and becoming a belligerent; or any other power may declare war upon the United States with the same effect. So also in the case of Holland, Germany or England may terminate Dutch neutrahty by declaring war against her. Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, on the contrary, are placed under a special regime based on international agreements signed by the powers interested, according to the terms of which their territories must remain perpetually neutral, and this condition may not be modified to suit the convenience of any belligerent or of the perpetually neutral country itself. Such a condition is often spoken of as neutraUzation.