The European war of 1914; its causes, purposes, and probable results

Front matter

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Preface

^ ^T^HE contents of this little book were prepared some months ago, but its appearance has been intentionally delayed until this time. I am not sure that its publication even now is not premature.

It is a fact of history as well as personal experience that the majority is generally on the wrong side of every great question in the beginning. I myself have seen this country in hysteria four times during my own conscious existence. The first time was the Anti- Abolitionist craze, when the North as well as the South rose in what men then fancied to be righteous indignation against these assailants of the existing order and the public peace, the despised Garrisonians, but what really was only the rage of a guilty conscience trying to deaden itself to the knowledge of the sin it was supporting. And then in less than five years I saw these same men leading the vast choir of the majority and singing the battle hymn of freedo;n.

Preface

The second time was the greenback craze and the third time was the free-silver craze, when, in spite of the jejuneness of the subject, the great majority were so affected by it and worked themselves up to such a pitch of self-righteousness against the rascals, who would make the debtor pay in appreciated money, as almost to silence their contention for a sound and honest currency. It took all of the official and moral power of four Presidents, Grant, Hayes, Cleveland, and McKinley, to stem this torrent of popular holiness, make men exercise a little common sense, and feel a little common honesty. And yet I hardly know a man today who is not ashamed if his grandfather was touched by either of these follies.

And now for six months we have had the Anti-German craze, perhaps the most unreasonable of all — for who is so blind as not to perceive with a glance that the united triumph of the Autocrat of the Land and the Autocrat of the Sea means their dominance of the world ; and what have the Germans ever done

Preface

I to us to deserve abuse at our hands — but perhaps the most explicable of them all, for if the majority has so little correct understanding, in the beginning, of domestic questions, such as I have cited, how can it be expected to have any comprehension whatever of a great foreign movement, epochal in civilization, such as that with which the European world is now convulsed?

It was quite inevitable that the attention of the vast majority should be riveted primarily upon some of the nearer lying, more unimportance, incidents di the movement, and that these should be misinterpreted and these misinterpretations become exaggerated until they should finally assume the form of caricature and catchword. There are some evidences at present that we are beginning to emerge from this spell of excited and misguided feeling and to look at things more calmly and objectively. It is this which has encouraged me to release this little volume for publication at this juncture. March, igi^. J. W. B.

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I The Occasions of the War ... i

II The Proximate Causes of the War . 45

Chapter I

^T^O a man who, for nearly fifty years, has been accustomed almost daily to read and Interpret diplomatic papers, and whose profession It was for nearly forty years to teach others how to read and interpret them, it seems a remarkable phenomenon that the British White Paper has been, with such unanimity, in this country, assumed to show that Sir Edward Grey was the prime apostle of peace throughout the period of active diplomatic intercourse just preceding the outbreak of the war which Is now devastating Europe. I have read all of the numbers of this paper through many times and can repeat verbatim the language of those which are pivotal and crucial, and I am quite sure that

I there is another way to interpret that paper, a way more consistent in theory, more intelligible throughout, and more naturally connected with preceding movements, than the interpretation so generally regarded in this co,untry as the only possible one.

In approaching this subject I will ask my readers to keep three things well in mind. The first is that this British White Paper does not present the causes of this war nor its purposes, but only the occasions of it. The causes of the war lie far back of anything contained in this paper. They are, as will be demonstrated more fully in the next chapter, the determination of Russia to dominate the Balkan lands and to extend her empire to the Bosphorus, the ^Egean, and the Adriatic ; the determination of France to make conquest of Elsass-Lothringen, and the determination of Great Britain to repress the political, industrial and commercial growth of Germany. These three things constituted for years before the outbreak of this war the chief perils threatening the life and prosperity of the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So long as they could be kept apart, peace could reign in Europe, but when they were brought together in what was first called the Triple Entente, and this Entente was developed into the Military Alliance of August, 19 14, then peace left the world, when to return God only knows. This British White Paper is simply the history, from the British point of view, of the way in which this development was accomplished. In the second place, let it be always kept in mind that diplomatic papers are not sermons by sincere God-fearing clergymen, nor scientific essays whose purpose is the demonstration of truth, but that the language of them is frequently chosen and employed to cover up the real purpose and to produce results different from, sometimes contradictory to, those professed to be desired. In reading diplomatic papers, one must be able to read not only between the lines, but behind the lines and before the lines and around the lines, and one must never forget that the resuits actually produced were those probably intended by the successful party.

In the third place, one must remember that most diplomatic correspondence Is verbiage and is modified by secret verbal agreements. One must be able to select the parts which contain the gist of the proposition or the argument and free it from the nebulosity with which it is surrounded, for the most part intentionally surrounded, and to apprehend the verbal understandings which give them their real meaning.

Naturally, the first thought of the world after the brutal murders of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on June 28, at Sarajevo, was what Austria-Hungary would do about it. Nobody entertained the idea that such crime would be allowed to pass unpunished. The Austro- Hungarian government began immediately an investigation which lasted until the close of the third week in July, and on July 23 it made declaration of what it had discovered and what it intended to do.

It affirmed that it had found that the assassination of the Prince and Princess was planned in Belgrade; that high Servian officials were implicated in it ; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officials and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, the society for exciting revolution among Austrian Servians against the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally, " that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chief officials of the Servian frontier service."

The Austro-Hungarian Government furthermore declared that the assassinations at Sarajevo were connected with, and the natural outcome of, subversive movements for disrupting the Austro-Hungarian Empire and detaching certain of its parts, which had been for years in progress in Servia; that these movements were participated in by members of the Servian race living or sojourning in the Austro-Hungarian Empire ; that the Servian government itself knowingly allowed these movements to go on unhindered in the press, in the schools, and in the revolutionary societies, in spite of the promises which that government had, March 31, 1909, made to the Austro-Hungarian Government of friendly and neighborly conduct; and that the Austro-Hungarian Government could not, in view of this situation, " pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they had maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched at Belgrade and thence propagated in Austria-Hungary," but were now in duty bound to put an end to the intrigues which formed a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Empire.

On the basis of these statements and explanations the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded of die Servian Government that it should publicly proclaim in its official journals that the government condemned the propaganda against Austria-Hungary and repudiated it, regretted the participation of Servian officials in it, deplored its criminal results, and warned both officials and private persons that it would proceed with the utmost rigor against anybody who should thereafter be guilty of attempting to promote it.

The Austro-Hungarian Government also demanded, more specifically, the suppression of publications inciting the people to actions against the peace and integrity of Austria-Hungary, the dissolution of all societies in Servia whos€ aim was the promotion of this propaganda, the elimination fro.m the public instruction of everything encouraging the same, the removal of all officials from the public service guilty of promoting this propaganda, the arrest and trial of those officials shown by the Austro-Hungarian inquiry to have been implicated in the assassinations of June 28, the prevention of illicit traffic in arms and explosives from Servia across the frontier between Servia and Austria-Hungary, the dismissal and punishment of the Servian frontier officials who had facilitated the work of the assassins, and explanation of the utterances of high Servian officials approving the murder of the Prince and Princess.

Finally, in order to make sure that the Servian Government would sincerely meet these requirements, the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded that representatives of Austria-Hungary should be allowed to cooperate with the Servian Government in the inquiry as to the accomplices on Servian territory in the murders of the Prince and Princess, and in the suppression of subversive movements directed against the integrity of the Austro- Hungarian Empire.

This was a firm and decided demand, but it was required by the necessities of the situation. Here was a turbulent community — I will not call it a state, because one of the chief characteristics of a state is that it is organized, legalized morality — a turbulent community guided largely in its acts and purposes by insurgents, conspirators, and regicides, a community which had already twice, between 1908 and 19 14, by its lawless conduct brought Austria-Hungary tQ the verge of war, a community which had, between the same periods, been under solemn and express pledges to Austria-Hungary to cease its Intrigues and machinations against that country and to live in frank and friendly relations with it, but which, in constant disregard of this pledge, and of its duty independent of the same, continued to weave its plots for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and finally instigated the foul murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian crown, with the purpose of producing just what has happened, namely: a European war for the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian and the German Empires. The demands, therefore, on the part of Austria-Hungary that this criminal conspiracy and these criminal acts against her existence should immediately cease, as well as the press and school propaganda encouraging them, and that the chief conspirators should be brought to justice, and that this should be undertaken under such cooperation on the part of Austro-Hungarian representatives as would make it realo The ^European War

sonably certain that It would be effectively accomplished, were well within the boundaries of the provocation.

Only a little more than a year ago our government demanded that a Mexican Government should step down and out because our President believed that Huerta had had some part In the assassination of his predecessor, Madero, and our government enforced this demand. Let us suppose now that our own Vice-President and his wife had gone for an official visit to Austin, Texas, and had there been assassinated. In the execution of a plot hatched In Mexico City, In which the highest officials of the Mexican Government had been found to be Implicated, and for the accomplishment of which the weapons had been furnished from the Mexican Governmental arsenal, and that the murderers and weapons had been knowingly passed across the frontier by Mexican officials, and that all this had been done as part of a conspiracy formed In Mexico, by the leaders of the country In and out of the government, for detach-

The Occasions of the War ii

ing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from the United States and re-connecting them with Mexico — what would the United States have done? In view of what she did do, I think it fair to say that she would have slapped Mexico off the face of the earth, and that in case any other power in the world had interfered she would have told it to attend to its own business and stand aside or it would be slapped aside also.

The question between Austria-Hungary and Servia was thus one involving the honor and existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a question, therefore, in which, according to the existing canons and practices of diplomacy, no other power had any right to ' interfere, and which, according to these same canons and usages, was not subject to arbitration. Moreover, the purpose of this demand was entirely punitive. It was not an issue under which Austria was seeking her own aggrandizement or to disturb the balance of power in Europe. She solemnly declared that she would annex no foot of Servian terri- i tory, and as a matter of fact she was striving to maintain the balance of power in Europe disturbed and thrown out of joint by the machinations of the powers of the Triple Entente through the Italian Tripoli expedition and the recent war of the Balkan powers against Turkey.

I have in my possession at this moment a statement from an important officer of the British Crown, which is dated September i6, 1 9 14, and contains the following paragraph:

My own private opinion is that Grey has utterly outmanoeuvred the Germans. He began the game by getting Italy to annex Tripoli. Practically that was the end of the Triple Alliance, as now we have a million of hostages in North Africa, and Italy dares not stir against us. Then came the Balkan League financed by England and France and, but for the idiotic vanity of King Ferdinand, we should have had the war then. For the last three years England, France, and Russia have been steadily preparing for the struggle and Germany stupidly played the enemies' game.

The seduction of Italy, thus, from the Triple Alliance, and the Balkan war against

Turkey, ending in the driving back of Turkey and in weakening her as a weight against Russia in the Balkan peninsula, were the things which had, by the beginning of the year 19 14, so changed the balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente as to threaten the very existence of the Austro- Hungarian Empire. All the powers in both of these combinations understood this perfectly and Great Britain more than any other, and Sir Edward Grey more than any other man consciously brought it to pass.

Immediately after the assassinations at Sarajevo, which revealed to Austria-Hungary that the conspiracy against her existence had become active, the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey struck out upon a line entirely consistent with the antecedents to which I have called attention, a line destined to bring war, a line which has brought war, and a line which if not intended to bring war is evidence of great dulness in the mind of its inventor. Before the demands of Austria-Hungary had become known, he began inquiring of the

German Ambassador in London and, through Great Britain's representative in Berlin, of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, about them. The German Ambassador declared that he had no information on the subject, but the British Charge in Berlin telegraphed to him. Grey, that the German Foreign Minister

insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no Interference from outside in the discussions between these two countries; that he had, therefore, considered it Inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarlan Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. — (British White Paper No. 2, July 22, 1914.)

This was absolutely the correct attitude diplomatically towards the subject, and It was the insistence of Great Britain and the other powers of the Triple Entente to depart from it which started the ball rolling in the wrong direction.

On the next day Sir Edward Grey had a rather sharp discussion with Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, in which he protested against a time limit, which Count Mensdorff had indicated might be contained in the Austro-Hungarian demands, and virtually threatened him with Russian interference. Count Mensdorff called attention, in justification of a time limit, to the fact that Servia had utterly disregarded her plighted word, given ^vt years before, to live on neighborly terms with Austria- Hungary, and had pursued her hostile purposes against Austria-Hungary, and that it had become necessary for Austria-Hungary to protect herself promptly. Moreover, Count Mensdorff indicated to Sir Edward Grey that St. Petersburg was the place where restraint should be exercised. — (British White Paper No. 3.)

On July 24, the contents of the Austro- Hungarian demand upon Servia were communicated by Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward Grey, and the latter immediately declared to the former that he had "never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character," and remarked that Great Britain would enter into an exchange of views with other powers. — (No. 5.J

On the same day Sir Edward Grey received a dispatch from the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg which manifested a high state of excitement on the part of the Russian government. It ran: Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had been first consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His (Britannic) Majesty's government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. The Ambassador went on to say that in his opinion Russia and France had already determined to intervene between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Russian Foreign Minister had informed him that he thought that Russian mobilization would have to be carried out. — (No, 6, July 24.)

Here now was the great opportunity for a peace-loving British Foreign Minister, If he were genuinely peace-loving and not a pretender, to get In the finest work of his life. What would such a British Foreign Minister have replied to the excited requests from Russia to Intervene In this Austro-Hungarian- Servlan question. I think he would have said:

This is a local question between Austria-Hungary and Servia, a question in regard to which we have no right to intervene, and we must keep our hands off. Moreover, it is a question involving the honor and existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a question, therefore, which, according to the canons of diplomacy, is not arbitrable, and we should not insist upon, or propose, its arbitration. It is true that we may think the demands on Servia peremptory, but we must consider that foul murders have been committed, the murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife, and that Austria-Hungary claims that this has been accomplished by the cooperation of Servian officials in execution of a plot formed at Belgrade, a plot for disrupting the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

And we must remember that Servia is a restl8 The European War

less, turbulent community, a community in which, only ten years ago, high officials, the leaders of the party still in power in Servia, wantonly assassinated their own King and Queen and pitched their dead bodies out of the window to be kicked and spat upon by the mob, a community which has long been the firebrand of Southeastern Europe, while Austria-Hungary is a great, highly-civilized state which has rendered inestimable service to the culture and civilization of Europe, among many other things, in halting and settling the Magyars, in defending Europe against the invasion of the Moslem, and in holding the Slav, the Magyar, and the German together in the bonds of a peaceful empire for the last fifty years.

We must trust the word of Austria-Hungary, which during the last few years has manifested great forbearance toward Servia, that she will exact only a just measure of satisfaction for the crimes that have been committed against her. If it should prove later that she is going beyond this and is encroaching upon general European interests, then will be the time for us to interfere. To do so before then would be immoral and provocative on our part.

Now do we find anything like this from Sir Edward Grey In the numbers of the British White Paper? I cannot discover it, but instead of it we find just what, as it seems to me, a very clever diplomatist would do, who desired to bring about a war of extermination against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and at the same time throw the responsibility for it upon the shoulders of his victims. Now what would be the elements of the plan of such a foreign minister intent upon such a purpose? Would it not be as follows?

1. To assume the correct diplomatic attitude for his own government of non-interference in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia, but at the same time to encourage Servia to resist the demands of Austria-Hungary by pronouncing them extravagant and peremptory.

2. To encourage some other power, in this case Russia, to interfere between them by representing that Russia had some special legitimate interest in intervening, some special right to intervene.

3. To propose arbitration of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary raised by the intervention of Russia in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

4. To represent Germany as responsible for the failure to bring about arbitration of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary, without explaining that this was really arbitration of the question between Austria-Hungarj^ and Servia.

5. To do nothing to restrain Russian mobilization.

6. To encourage France to sustain Russia.

7. To refuse to enter into any understanding with Germany on any conditions.

8. To find, at the last moment an issue, an apparently unselfish issue, under which to enter into the great struggle.

Now let us see from the evidence contained in the British White Paper Itself If this was not the exact course of the diplomacy followed by the British Foreign Minister.

(First.) Did he encourage Servia to resist the AustrO'Hungarian demands?

On July 24, he said to the Austro-Hungarlan Ambassador In London " that he had never before seen one state address to another Independent state a document of so formidable a character," criticising particularly the demand made by Austria-Hungary that Austro-Hungarlan representatives should be allowed to cooperate with Servian officials in the investigation relating to the participation of Servian officials and subjects in the assassination at Sarajevo, and in suppressing the movements against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the same time, he disclaimed any concern on the part of his government with the merits of the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia. — (British White Paper No. ^.)

On the same day, he telegraphed to the British Charge d!Af aires at Belgrade that Servia ought to give Austria-Hungary fullest satisfaction should it be proven that Servian officials had had any part in the Sarajevo murders, that Servia ^^ ought certainly to express concern and regret ;'' for the rest, however, that " the Servian government must reply to the Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests*' * (No. 12.) Xhe Charge was authorized to repeat this to

the Servian Government after consulting his French and Russian colleagues at Belgrade. That the Servian Government understood completely the position of the British Government as encouraging Servia to resist the Austro-Hungarian demands is clearly manifest from the telegram sent by the British Charge at Belgrade to Sir Edward Grey after the reply of the Servian government to the Austro-Hungarian note, which telegram reads: " I have been requested by the Prime Minister to convey to you the expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th inst, in the House of Commons.'' — (No. 8^-)

(Second.) Did Sir Edward Grey encourage Russia to intervene in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia?

On July 24, he instructed the British Ambassador in Paris that if Russia took the view of the Austro-Hungarian demands on Servia, which it seemed to him any power interested in Servia would take,"^ he would

be powerless to do anything with Russia. (No. 10.) Of course this communication was immediately imparted to the French Government and from the French Govern^ ment to the Russian Government.

On the 25th, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the peremptory character of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia made it almost inevitable that Russia and Austria-Hungary would quickly mobilize against each other. (No. 24.)

On the 25th, he instructed the British Ambassador at Vienna to support the steps taken by the Russian Ambassador at Vienna in making a demand upon the Austro-Hungarian Government for an extension of the time limit imposed by the Austrian note for the Servian reply and for furnishing data on which the Austrian note was based. (No. 26.) Here was not only an encouragement to Russia to intervene in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia, but a participation in that intervention, and that, too, after the disclaimer of any concern on the part of his government In the merits of the question, as noted in No. 5.

On the 27th, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Germany and Austria-Hungary ought to understand from the concentration of the British fleet that Great Britain might not stand aside. — (No. 47,)

(Third.) Did Sir Edward Grey propose mediation of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary raised by the intervention of Russia in the question between Austria- Hungary and Serviaf

On the 25th of July, he telegraphed to the British Charge d^Af aires in Berlin that he had said to the German Ambassador In London that Russian and Austro-Hungarian mobilization would apparently soon take place and that he had suggested mediation between them by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. — (No. 2^.)

On the 26th, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador In Paris his proposition for mediation in so general and comprehensive terms that when it was repeated to the British Ambassador in Vienna and communicated by the latter to the Russian and French Ambassadors there, these men said that while they felt satisfaction with the proposition ^^ they doubted whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro- Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.^^ * — (Nos. ^6 and 40.)

On the 27th, he informed the British Ambassador in Berlin that he had said to the German Ambassador in London that the Servian reply had gone farther than could have been expected and that the German Government should urge moderation at Vienna. — (No. 46.)

His proposition at that moment was that the German Government should urge upon the Austro-Hungarian Government to make the Servian note, which rejected the crucial demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- * Italics mine, J. W. B.

ment, a basis for discussion. The German Government felt great embarrassment in doing this, feeling that it might irritate the Austro-Hungarian Government, but yielded to the British request.

That the German Government was correct in this forecast was immediately shown by the answer of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the proposition, namely, that it was too late for that, and by the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Servia. (No. ^ ^,) Evidently the German Government was diplomatically correct in its desire to treat the Austro-Hungarian-Servian question as a matter between those two states alone, and that in yielding to the persuasions of Sir Edward Grey to step in, where neither it nor any other government had any right to interfere, had come dangerously near to getting a snub from its only ally.

The position of the German Government was now most embarrassing. It had no such influence over the actions of Austria-Hungary as has been ascribed to it by the all-wise newspaper editors. Austria-Hungary is the proudest state on the European Continent and one of the oldest. Its imperial-royal house wore the crown of Charlemagne for 500 years, and, in its view, the German Empire is a newcomer. Its diplomatists are among the most skilled and accomplished statesmen of Europe. Of course, they were justly offended at Russia's assuming to forbid Austria-Hungary from securing such satisfaction for her grievances against Servia as she considered necessary to her honor and safety. Of course, they knew that Great Britain was acting with duplicity in pretending to hold to the correct attitude of non-interference for herself and at the same time encouraging Servia to resist and Russia to interfere. And of course, they felt that their German ally should not yield to either Great Britain or Russia or both in giving any countenance to such a departure from correct and usual diplomacy.