Germany's isolation

Front matter

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Author's Preface

^IpHE present work was started several months -■- previous to the Serajevo murder, and completed when the first battles on the soil of Lorraine and Belgium had been fought. In the first five chapters, therefore, the danger of war is presumed as existing in the future — though not in the remote future; in the sixth chapter the outbreak of the conflict, as the result of the Servian crime, is considered imminent; the seventh chapter treats of the war. For a time I was undecided whether or not it would be advisable, after the outbreak of the struggle, to continue and conclude the work. After mature deliberation and counsel with my publisher, I finally decided in the affirmative and resolved, at the same time, to print the chapters which had been written before the war in their original form. In that way I hope to be able all the more readily to point out that the crisis which had come to a sudden and violent issue was entirely in the line of the necessary development of affairs.

The war has been forced upon us, and yet we must look upon it as a stroke of good fortune that the sacrificial death of Archduke Francis

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Ferdinand led to the premature outbreak of the great anti-German conspiracy. Two years later the war would have been far more difficult, its victims more numerous, and its outcome less certain. Today, however, it is safe to assert, in view of the results achieved at the beginning and in the more advanced stages of the war, that the victory over all our enemies, join them who may, is less a question of military than of moral significance. The trust in our success is fitly illustrated by an episode in biblical history. We read in the book of Isaiah about the plot of the king of Damascus and Samaria against the house of David in Jerusalem. King Ahaz, so the story runs, was told of the alliance of his two powerful opponents, and his heart and the heart of his people were moved as the trees of the wood are moved with the wind. Then the prophet went forth to meet him and said unto him, " Fear not, neither be fainthearted for the two tails of these smoking firebrands ; ask thee a sign of the Lord !" But Ahaz feared and said, "I will not ask, neither will I tempt the Lord." And Isaiah said, "Is it a small thing for you to weary men, but will ye weary my God also ? Therefore the Lord Himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son and shall call his name Immanuel (that is, God is with us)." Danger will indeed pass so fast that the young mother who conceives the child in time of grief.

Author's Preface xi

will call it by the name of triumph, " The Lord is with us/'

This story teaches a wonderful lesson. We may face the most severe test of strength that fate has ever imposed upon us, with the same confidence which gleams forth from the words of the prophet. The thousands of young women who at the beginning of the war had been united in wedlock with the husbands of their choice, may choose as confidently as the mother of Immanuel a name of triumph for their offspring which will be born in the fateful hour of this titanic struggle. They may do so in the firm conviction that we cannot be conquered if our moral strength holds out. If, on the other hand, we succumb to the power of our united opponents, our fall will not have been caused by the weakness and inability of our armed forces, but by the lack of moral endurance in the face of the great trial.

We do not enter into this war as we did into the war of 1870, with the recent experiences of two victorious campaigns. At the opening of the struggle we had no leaders whom the nation at home and in the field could regard in advance with the same confidence which the preceding generation, when called to arms against France, reposed in their generals. Even in point of diplomatic preparation this war differs from the one which resulted in the unification of the xii Author's Preface

German Empire. These facts make it all the more obvious that we did not want the war, but that it was handed us as a present so that we might experience the inner unification, the great rise of our national spirit, and be at last in the position to fight for our rightful place among the great powers of the world. Nothing would have been more dangerous and more calamitous for our country than that the outbreak of the war be delayed another two years, the enemies meanwhile redoubling their strength to strike at us all the harder. For a brief moment or two, when new enemies arose and our allies denied us their assistance, it seemed as if a shadow of apprehension were cast over our country. But when our army demonstrated that it could successfully resist every enemy, the cloud of anxiety passed as fast as it had appeared. As to the triumphs gained in battles, in the west no less than in the east, we may, in the spirit of unwavering confidence, even now call our sons of 1915, "Children of Victory."

But the greatest task we are facing is the duty of self-sacrifice incumbent upon our more fortunate fellow citizens. Unlike our opponents, we have the substantial internal advantage of striking from necessity, without choice and without the possibility of parrying the thrust which is aimed at our life. Our opponents, however, are striking from political principles, considerations,

Author's Preface xiii

and impulses of various kinds. For this reason every one of them is more or less firmly bound to the war and to the war-pact. The war broke out in midsummer, and not, as desired by the enemy, at a time when our provisions would have shortly been consumed. Fortunately, our crops had this year been as plentiful as seldom before, and the national larder was well stocked with meat and other provisions. With regard to our general armament, such as artillery equipment, arms, and uniforms, we had lately gained considerable advantages over the Russians and French. Equally fortunate was the fact that just in summer our naval troops had completed their training. And yet fate decreed that our opponents be unexpectedly forced to act. Unlike the Russians, we are able, without foreign assistance, to manufacture, within our own borders, all necessary material for direct or indirect military use. One and only one serious difficulty arises in the face of assured victory. Can the national food supply, which is available within the boundaries of the empire, be made accessible to all those who are in special need of it for their maintenance and health?

England joined our two enemies, France and Russia, with the supposition that by cutting off our supplies and starving us economically the war would all the faster be decided to our disadvantage, after which England's commerce xiv Author's Preface

would have undisputed sway throughout the world. With regard to food supplies proper, such action would just this year fall short of its purpose. Not so, if our industry be deprived of the necessary raw material. We have some reserve stock, perhaps more than the enemy thinks; yet within a conceivable space of time there is bound to be a shortage. We do not produce any cotton and silk, and only a fraction of our requisite supply of wool and other animal products, of most metals, of timber, oils, etc. As a result, our factories will soon have to shut down, not only on account of the withdrawal of employees able to bear arms, but also for lack of raw material. More than half of our imports consists of industrial raw material and almost two-thirds of our exports of finished products. The English, who are fully aware of these facts, will scarcely hesitate, if hard pressed, to declare all raw material which may be imported into Germany by way of neutral countries contraband of war. If there is no other way, they will be ready to reimburse the Americans, whom they cannot disregard, for the cotton withheld from shipment to Germany.

How will the account look on the other side? The largest and most important item which we should find there is the firm resolution by public and private contributions to support the hungry and needy, those that did not go into the field.

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men unable to bear arms, women, and children, until the attack of the enemy is broken down and we are in the position to conclude a peace which will heal the wounds of war and make it possible for us to maintain our rank as a world power. Germany and Austria together have a population which, in round figures, amounts to one hundred and twenty millions. These two countries are now engaged in a life and death struggle. They have a sufficient supply of food and implements of war. Even if the leadership and success of our armies were of average quality, it is obvious, beyond doubt, that, as far as the human mind is able to foretell, we cannot be crushed with such overwhelming odds that the terms of peace will be dictated by our enemies. If nothing else, the internal affairs of France and Russia renders this assurance doubly sure. Neither one of these two nations is characterized by a degree of strength and a public spirit of solidarity great enough to produce in their citizens the willingness to sacrifice their last possessions in behalf of the cause. Even if Italy should decide to join the ranks of our opponents, we have no longer any cause for alarm.

If no disturbances in nature interfere with the logical course of events, there is nothing that could force Germany into a premature peace but the starvation of the breadless, an emergency which will be brought about only by the refusal xvi Author's Preface

of the rich to share their plenty with the needy. It is not impossible that a state income tax of an extremely high rate will be imposed or raised by voluntary contributions, not for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the war, but to buy bread and meat, German-grown products, for those that are unable to provide for themselves because they have been deprived of the opportunity to earn a living by the labor of their hands. It is impossible to starve out Germany, as she depends neither for her food supply nor for her implements of war upon foreign markets. What more is there to be said regarding the outcome of a struggle which is waged for the safety of empire and nation and not for provinces, forts, and boundaries ?

The question of victory is therefore for us a question of national and moral strength and of willingness by the wealthier classes who have still to spare when the income of the humbler classes is increasingly reduced and in the end ceases altogether, to support that part of the population which depends for a livelihood on the proceeds of labor and not on the income of property. It matters little whether the required funds are raised by private organizations or are levied by state taxation; in either case, the assistance of the government bureaus will be demanded. Germany will lose this war only if the rich, the wealthy, and all those that are assured of a

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definite income from investments or steady occupation will say, " Henceforth the support of the unemployed, in other words, the maintenance of our country, is too great a sacrifice; henceforth we prefer an ignominious peace, (a peace which will exclude Germany from the ranks of world powers), to the continuous drain on our own property by contributions to the sustenance of the destitute."

The test of the moral courage of our leading classes is the only real test which we shall have to face. To doubt the military efficiency of our army is entirely superfluous. If we stand the moral test, victory is assured; then, and only then, we have truly earned it. If we fail in that test, we are not worthy of victory, and neither we nor the world at large has any reason to bewail our ruin. The public-spirited generosity which has so far been exhibited by private individuals and corporate societies is a very creditable beginning. But we must remember that it is, indeed, only the beginning. No one of us will underestimate the amount of guilt and wrongdoing which has begun to accumulate in our moral life even among us in Germany. Let us remember, above all, the stigma of the decr,easing birth-rate, the dread of raising children. Let us hope that this war will so discipline our nation that all the great and good of which the German mind is capable will flourish again as of old.

Contents

PAGE

I The Rise of England's World Power .... i

II Germany's Transformation 12

Appendix

1 Statement by Sir Edward Grey in the House of

Commons i55

2 Speech of Mr. Ramsey Macdonald in Response

to Statement of Sir Edward Grey 176

3 Letter by Baron de L'Escaille 179

Index 183

Chapter I The Rise Of England's World Power

^ I ^HE present-day political interrelation of the -*- leading powers and nations dates back to the gigantic struggles of the eighteenth century. However, the rise of Prussia, as well as the Hapsburg- Spanish and the French national policies, in so far as Europe and the continent have been affected by them, fall well within the limits of our own historical consciousness. A detailed discussion of them is, therefore, unnecessary. This, on the other hand, is not the case with the quarrel of a hundred years' standing between France and England. Its progress and eventual issue are of importance, above all other matters, because of their determining influence on the political development of the past century. Nor can it be said that our fellow citizens versed in the art of statesmanship recognize these inner connections as clearly as a thorough understanding of contemporary history seems to demand.

During the eighteenth century, Europe's relation to the colonial world across the sea gained a growing significance for the European states, a significance even greater than during the age of discoveries. On the one hand, actual colonization assumed greater proportions; on the other, colonial products were of ever-increasing importance in international economy. These facts, though incomparable to present-time conditions, were forming the very foundations for them. On the face of it, England seemed the only, or almost only, power ruling beyond the sea, and the English the great colonizers par excellence. But about the middle of the eighteenth century, the rivalry between the French colonial policy and that of England was far from being settled. In India, the two countries were equal in strength, while in America, the spacial preponderance of the Neo-Latin races over the Anglo-Saxons was considerable. By far the greater portion of the western continents belonged to the Spaniards, Portuguese, and French. On the North American continent, Mexico, at that time double its present size, and Florida were Spanish possessions ; west of the Mississippi, an immense French territory, Louisiana — the Land of Louis xiv^ — extended into the unexplored north.

True, the French were unable to settle and colonize the land, but they had and held the claim to it. The very names of settlements, such as New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi, St. Louis at the confluence of the Mississippi and the Missouri, as well as many other names, as far as the foothills of the Rocky Mountains and extending well into the Canada of today, tell the tale of French exploitative ambition in the territory between the Gulf of Mexico and the great Canadian lakes. Moreover, France owned the vast territory extending from the mouth of the St. Lawrence along the river basin, thence west and south into the interior to the borders of Louisiana, in the hinterland of the Alleghanies. Thus, not only South America but almost all of the North American continent belonged to the Neo-Latin nations. If m 1750 a prognosis regarding the future of America had been ventured, its terms could have scarcely differed from the following : Ibero-Latin-French-Catholic.

Events took a different turn. They took a different turn primarily for the reason that France, in the Seven Years' War, attempted to attain the impossible, viz., to make war on Prussia in Europe, and on England in the colonies and on the ocean. Possibly, a more efficient system of taxation might have enabled France to back up her efforts on the continent and, at the same time, satisfy the demands of her naval and colonial wars. The French people were rich, but the government lacked funds. Yet, under the pressure of existing conditions, the double-war was bound to end disastrously for France. Nothing was gained in Europe, and, beyond the sea,

England was victorious. After the Seven Years' War, France lost out in India, while Canada, at that time the cream of the French colonial possessions, came under English rule; similarly, the territory of Louisiana east of the Mississippi. The balance became Spanish, until later, under Napoleon, it was made for the second time a French domain.

Such were the events that decided the future of North America in favor of the Anglo-Saxon world. Another question remained unanswered, the question whether England or France was to obtain the determining influence on the final status of the non-European countries. Although the English navy, as early as the eighteenth century, had the ascendency over the French, that ascendency was not assured ; on the contrary, the French navy held its own on the open seas, and, under favorable conditions, had no reason to fear an engagement with its English rival. During the American war of independence, the French men-of-war were fully able to protect the transport to America of French auxiliary troops. Everything depended upon the final status of the French naval strength as it would shape itself in the midst of the unquestionable rise of the French national consciousness during the great revolution. The efiiciency of the French nation revealed itself in all its strength only after the abolishment of the worthless system of state taxes. Unfortunately, the navy did not profit by the total change of affairs, as, contrary to the army, it had remained an institution loyal to the sovereign. The republican dictators, looking upon the royalistic naval officers and crews as a danger to the continuance of the republic, deprived the navy of the essential support. They went even beyond that by allowing it to deteriorate, to degenerate. In less than a decade the ancient power of France on the high seas was ruined. When Napoleon seized the reins of authority, he recognized, no doubt, the necessity of a powerful navy, without which France would be unable to bring the war with England to a favorable conclusion. Yet all his endeavors in that direction proved futile; France lacked the state of peace indispensable to the restoration of the demoralized naval institution.

Thus it came about that the unadjustable divergence of interests of Napoleonic France on the one side and of England on the other was decided in England's favor. Napoleon's inheritance, forced upon him by the French revolution, consisted in the program of the so-called "natural boundaries" of France. The English, however, considered a France which would comprise the greater portion of the continental North-Sea coast intolerable ; for it could be plainly foreseen that the possessions of the Netherlands and Belgium, countries of great riches, industrial efficiency, and seafaring traditions, would render France, with her own industry and foreign trade, a dangerous competitor, one that would soon outstrip England's naval power.

It was Napoleon's conscious endeavor to create a French world policy exceeding by far the European limitations, a transoceanic policy in the real sense of the word. Owing to England's supremacy on the seas, the American domains which were still in France's possession could not be safely reached or even held. In lieu of them, Egypt was to be the corner-stone of a new France beyond the water. It is false to historical interpretation to look upon Napoleon's expedition to Egypt as a mere adventure without an adequate military and political foundation. Its success, however, was entirely dependent upon the possibility and method of continued communication with the mother country. The Egyptian project was bound to fail when the English in the battle of Abukir Bay, in 1798, destroyed the French fleet which had conveyed the army of occupation to Egypt.

The fate of the expedition to Egypt, though exhibiting the naval weakness of France in the most glaring light, could not act as a deterrent from renewed attempts on the other side of the water. The needs of France pointed imperatively to that course. The naval treaty with England, 1801, was followed immediately by a reorganization of the colonial possessions which had suffered greatly by the war. . . . But Napoleon's mind reached out beyond the mere restoration of the pre-revolutionary state of affairs ; he increased the French colonial possessions by (re-) gaining the land of the Mississippi basin, and cast his eye on Florida and on many another province of his weak Spanish neighbor. Thus he planned to found a great New France in Central America and the southern North America, with Louisiana and San Domingo as her principal states. The old Bourbonic kingdom had endeavored to dispute the claims of the Anglo-Saxons to the North-American continent, with the north as a point of departure — the young revolutionary power made haste to renew these efforts from the south and west.'''

If Napoleon's plans in America had succeeded, the future of the continent as an Anglo-Saxon- Protestant country over against a Neo-Latin- Catholic empire under French rule would again have been called in question. Napoleon resumed the project of Louis xiv. Spain and all of the Spanish possessions in America were to become a territory of expansion, subservient to French interests, in this case, under the rule of a Napoleonic branch line. North America, between the Mississippi and the Pacific Ocean, as a French- Spanish possession, would have been a successful check to Anglo-Saxon development in its western course. That project, like all the previous ones, could be carried out only if France were able to maintain her sea communication in the face of England's naval strength. But, when in 1805

* Roloff, History of European Colonization.

England issued victoriously from the naval battle at Trafalgar against the forcibly united French and Spanish fleets, all hopes for success had to be abandoned.

The battle of Trafalgar marks the turning point in the hundred-year struggle between England and France for the supremacy in transoceanic expansion. As a matter of fact, the battle of Trafalgar was potentially lost when the French navy was destroyed by the policy of the revolutionists. In spite of supreme efforts, it proved impossible, while at war with the far superior English, to raise the navy to its former level of efficiency. Napoleon was active, to the degree of severity, in bringing about its restoration; yet, the mere building of ships and equipping them with inadequately trained crews, fell necessarily short of the purpose, since the haphazardly raised fighting power lacked that mark of intrinsic proficiency in which the English were far in the lead.

Even after the reverses of Trafalgar, Napoleon did not consider his transoceanic and general world policy as lost. When the English blocked his way across the ocean, he returned to the Orient as his field of operation, and here his European victories seemed to open up new possibilities. That policy is plainly revealed after the removal, at Austerlitz, of the Austro-Russian resistance, and, at Jena, of the Prussian.

Having in the treaty of Tilsit (1807) made peace with Russia and entered into an alliance with the Russians, he intended to divide the Turkish empire among the three empires, France, Russia, and Austria. Egypt as well as extensive littorals of Syria and Asia Minor were to become French possessions ; besides, he planned with the help of Russia and Austria to attack India, on land by way of Persia, from the sea with Isle de France (Mauritius), at that time still a French possession, as a base. In connection with the scheme which was to make France the first power in the Near-East and the sole ruler in the Indian ocean, he thought of taking possession of Algiers. All these enterprises, for which he believed the remaining strength of the French navy adequate, were intended to serve a double purpose : to secure for France the indispensable colonial territory and to fight England. To subdue England in open battle was impossible, but after the loss of her East-Indian and Oriental trade, she would most probably sue for peace. The correctness of the Napoleonic problem has never been demonstrated, for a number of events prevented its execution. Spain withdrew from her alliance with France ; this was followed by a series of continental wars, which, in turn, brought about the dissolution of the Russian alliance. Napoleon was consequently under sentence to carry on his world policy with insufficient means ; the sins of the revolution were visited upon its heir and conqueror.*

When, in 181 5, the congress of Vienna straightened out the affairs of Europe and the rest of the world, there remained but one empire whose power reached beyond the seas — England. That position she seemed destined to maintain,

* Roloff.

or even extend, in the future. For in the beginning of the nineteenth century the control of the sea route to foreign continents served England's growing power not less exclusively than did the new era of domination over nature, the era of mechanical means of intercommunications, of railroads, of steamships and telegraphs, the era of machinery for spinning and weaving, for working iron, wood, and every type of raw material.

Whatever of European commodities, European technical methods, and European culture and civilization during the first two- thirds of the past century was carried across the ocean or back, traveled almost entirely under the English flag. England was the mart for all trading activity between Europe and the transmarine countries. Not until shortly before the middle of the nineteenth century did Germany institute something like a direct communication with North America. England's gradual rise to a world power was plainly assured, owing to her cultural and economic influence abroad. There were individual territories under other than England's rule, but these were either enclaves, perhaps remnants of some non-English colonial dominion, or, like Asiatic Russia, compact tracts of land without special significance for international trade.

"The world is rapidly turning English" — that utterance of an English statesman at the end of the nineteenth century, seemed indeed to define the inevitable fate of the non-European world. Such was the state of conditions at the founding of the new German Empire. If about the year 1870 the question had been asked, "Is there anywhere on the globe the slightest indication that a country, save England, or capital, save English capital, enjoys the prospects of a dominating influence on the economic and political development of nations?" there could have been but one answer, " There is not." The great East-Indian world was English. China scarcely knew of a European flag or a European language save the English, and China and India represent half of the human race. North America was partly English, partly a scion of English culture and civilization. In South America, English and European, with the exception of Spanish, were synonymous terms, Africa was unowned; yet every possibility in that unclaimed continent seemed England's and England's again.

CHAPTER II Germany's transformation

A SURVEY aiming to sketch the rise of ■^ ^ England's world power seems essential to a better understanding of the political problems under discussion. These problems arose at the very moment it became apparent that Germany had become the potential rival of England's activity in world politics. Recent as Germany's interests were, they gave promise of modifying the century-old and seemingly final decisions regarding the apportionment and mastery of the world — decisions forced upon Europe by the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic epoch. Not only Germany herself but the entire continent was struck with the suddenness of the change. To illustrate the point in question, let us recall a curious incident which occurred during the brief reign of Frederic iii, towards the end of the period during which Bismarck conducted the political affairs of the empire.

Alexander of Battenberg, ex-prince of Bulgaria, had sued for the hand of a Prussian princess. As the result of a clash with the ruling interests of Russia, he had been exiled from 12

Bulgaria. In a certain sense, however, he remained pretender to the throne, and a marriage with the sister of the German emperor would have vastly improved his prospects. For that very reason, demands on the Prussian-German diplomacy would not have been wanting, as the prince was eager to regain his princely position in the Balkans. Obviously, Russia would have taken offense at the proposed move. So, not to involve Germany in the imminent conflict, Bismarck opposed the Hohenzollern-Battenberg match with unchecked and characteristic recklessness. He coined the phrase, oft since quoted, " For us the Balkan is not worth the bones of a Pommeranian musketeer." That was indeed a confession of Germany's disinterestedness in world politics, a confession unparalleled in the boldness of its wording; for the Turkish Orient was the very focus of political questions which concerned themselves with matters transcending the immediate interests of the powers in central Europe. If Germany was not even interested in the European East, the question is justified, "Why take any interest in the rest of the world?" The frankness with which Germany disclaimed any interest in world politics was, a few years later, emphatically confirmed by the act of a foreign power. In 1890 England ceded to Germany the island of Helgoland. For that transaction she was well paid, as Germany gave up many and by no means unimportant claims in Africa in exchange for the island. To realize the importance of England's step, it is but necessary to ask, " What price would the English pay today in order to regain Helgoland? " If Helgoland were today an English possession, Germany would probably not have been able to strengthen her navy to such a formidable degree as to arouse England's notice and apprehension. But no matter whether or not she would have attained that end, certain it is that a successful engagement of her naval forces with an English armada would be entirely out of the question. More than that; in case of war, Germany would be at England's mercy, as Helgoland controls a number of important strategic points — the inlets of the three rivers Elbe, Weser, and Jahde, as well as the entrance to the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. Manifestly, England, when ceding Helgoland, was far from entertaining even the remotest suspicion that some time in the future Germany could grow into a world power with far-reaching interests which might seriously cross English foreign policies. Bismarck's utterance regarding the Balkan, as well as England's cession of Helgoland, impressively confirm the fact that two decades after the founding of the empire Germany was still far from displaying even a remote interest in a world policy.