France herself again

Preface

This volume has been written in English for the English-speaking public, and with constant attention to the English point of view. So many books nowadays consist of articles reprinted under a title destined to give them some sort of unity, that I may be forgiven for pointing out that this is not the case with the present work. ^ Whatever its faults may be, it has been conceived as a whole and aims at offering to the reader a body of doctrine which will help him to understand the rapid evolution of France in the past ten years, and to discriminate between what is real progress, and what ought to be regarded as an accidental relapse. This could not be done without an analysis seeking the causes of both the progress and the shortcomings in an historic development of considerable duration. There may be an appearance of austerity in such a method, but it is the only one that is repaid by clear understanding, and I feel confident that the section of the public for which I have written will not blame me for adopting it.

As may well be suspected, the greater part of this

' Four chapters were printed, it is true, in the Nineteenth Century and After, one in the Fortnightly Review, and one in the British Review; but they were intended as part of the volume I was writing. I am glad of this opportunity to thank the London editors who in the past ten years have frequently welcomed my contributions, more particularly my highly valued friend Mr. William Wray Skilbeck.

iii iv Preface

book was written before the war began, and I was uncertain at first whether I ought not to defer its publication till the peace was signed. But I found on reading the proofs that I did not feel inclined to make a single alteration of any importance. In fact, the reader will soon find out for himself that the volume could not have been written without the danger of war which awakened France in 1905, that the possibility of a war is present in every page, and in fact that this possibility and the effects it has had on French public opinion is what gives the book its innermost unity. The last pages, which were written while my ears were still full of the booming of cannon, are not by any means an epilogue, but a conclusion in the truest sense of the word.

A war regarded philosophically is only important in its beginning and in its end, in the way in which it is accepted by a country and in its consequences. The interval is the noblest repetition — and Heaven knows how we live in spirit with those who day after day prolong that heroic monotony — but it is only a repetition. One of the questions which this volume attempts to answer, viz.. What are the effects of a revived warlike spirit likely to be on the French nation? has been answered by the facts in the first weeks of the war ; but the other great problem. What is the relation between the new France and her Government? or in other terms, Will the leaders of France be as worthy of her after the war as the magnetism of the army has made them during the hostilities? will remain, when the peace is signed, exactly what it is said to be in the third part of this work. It will, no doubt, be nearer a favourable solution than it was when the Radicals wanted a reduction of the military service, but it will be what it was.

Preface v

The present volume therefore is offered to the public

as an explanation of the warHke France with which it is in such deep sympathy, but above all as an explanation of modem France as it has been since the beginning of the twentieth century, and as it is likely to appear in the coming decades. I have written it under difficulties, but with the pleasure attending the expression of what patient thought convinces us to be the truth, and with such encouragement from my publishers, especially Mr. Percy Spalding (of London) as I can never forget.

CONTENTS PREFACE

PAGE

This book written in English from the English point of view, not a collection of reprinted articles artificially put together, but an attempt at a complete analysis of the forces which have made contemporary France what it is — Relation of this analysis to the war of 19 14. . . . iii

Difficulty but possibility of an ex professo inquiry into the psychology of a nation and its historic elements — Main position: France, since 1905, has become once more a nation and is no longer a ground for experiments. ... I

PART I. THE DETERIORATION OF FRANCE Section I. Under the Second Empire CHAP

1. This Deterioration was unexpected ....

2. Danger of the Personal Ideas of Napoleon the Third

3. Even greater Danger arising from the Philosophy and Lit

erature of the Second Empire . . . . •

4. Materialism .... ...

5. Indifference to the Moral Consequences of Theories

6. Humanitarianism. Victor Hugo. The Revolution of 1848

7. Intellectual Hegemony of Germany gladly accepted

8. Unwholesomeness of Literature. Cynicism underlying the

Formula and Spirit of Realism ....

9. Anti-Christianity. Renan and La Vie de Jesus .

10. Decadence of Morals ......

11. End of the Second Empire. Universal Optimism and Deluvii

7 9

II 14 16

25 30 35 viii Contents

PAGE

12. The Future of France as prophesied by Pr^vost-Paradol as

13. The Denouement: the War of 1870, the Commune, the

Frankfort Treaty ....... 49

Section II. Deterioration of France under the Second Republic

The spirit of disorder no longer embodied in philosophies and poems, but represented by the ruling authorities 52

CH.\P.

1. Relation of this Deterioration to the Republican Institutions.

1876-1898

2. Imperfections and Dangers of the so-called Constitution of

1875. Hegemony of the Chamber and Effacement of the Government . . . . . . . .56

3. The Chamber an Element of Division, not of Union . . 63

4. The Revanche given up by the Republican Party . . 69

5. The Deterioration of France emphasized by her Colonial

Policy 75

6. Imperfections of the System of Alliances. M. Hanotaux and

M. Delcasse 78

7. The Deterioration of France exemplified in the Politicians

of the Third Republic: Great Talents keep away from Politics ......... 83

8. Anti-Clericalism the only Continuous Policy ... 90

9. The Public Spirit : Illusions and Vulgarity .... 97

ID. Deterioration of France by International Socialism . . 105

11. Dreyfusism: its Political Aspect often neglected yet All-

important .......

12. Combism: Socialist Hegemony ....

13. Combism and the Church : Religious Persecution

14. Combism and Rome: a Short-sighted Policy

16. Combism and Patriotism: M. Jaures and Germany: M

Anatole France . , , . . . . .133

105 "3 118 122 126

Contents ix

PAGE

17. Combism and National Culture: the Levelling Spirit in

Educational Methods . . . . . . -137

18. Blindness of Combism. The Possibility of War unsuspected 143

PART II. THE RETURN OF THE LIGHT Introductory

The Tangier aflfair a flash of lightning. Since 1905 French ideas in the air and no longer internationalist doctrines ......... 151

Section I. Immediate Consequences of the Tangier Incident

CHAP.

1. Lifting up of the Veil: Consciousness of the Absurdity of

Internationalism . . . . . . . -153

2. Awakening of the Instincts of Self-Preservation . . . 156

3. Revival of the Military Spirit . . . . . -159

4. The Chamber Dethroned . . . . . . .163

5. A Craving for Strong Men . . . . . .166

6. Transformation of Newspapers: their Outlook becomes Wider

and more Practical — Increased interest in Foreign Affairs . 1 70

7. Rapid Diffusion of a New Mentality, the outstanding char-

acteristics of which will be indicated in Section III, but the origins of which are traced in the following chapters . .172

Section II. Intellectual Preparation of the New Spirit by the Experience of the Best

This is the counterpart of the preparation for the intellectual and moral decadence of France traced in Part I to the philosophy and literature of the Second Empire . .174

CHAP.

1. Reaction against the Revolution. Influence of Taine.

Hostility to J. J. Rousseau ...... 175

2. Reaction against Scientism. Bankruptcy of Science . .184

3. Reaction against Materialism . . . . . .186

4. Reaction against Internationalism . . . . .187

5. Success of Provincial Literature. Its Import and the Ideas

underlying it . . . . . . . .190

Contents

PAGE

6. Reaction against Socialism, not only from Conservative but from Syndicalist Quarters. Significance of M. G. Sorel's Works . . . . . . . . .193

Section III. Evidences of the New Spirit

Division A. Instinctive Manifestations of the New Spirit

CHAP.

1. A Patriotic Attitude forced even on Internationalists . .201

2. Substitution of a European for a Party Point of View . . 205

3. Anachronism of so-called Idealist Manifestations — M. Ana-

tole France a Living Paradox . . . . .211

4. Increased Distrust of Parliamentary Action . . .213

5. Syndicalism reduced to its True Proportions . . -215

6. A Higher Moral Standard forced on the Public Spirit . .217

7. The Stage an apparent Anomaly. Explanation of the same . 220

8. The Rising Generation — its Manly Characteristics . . 244

9. The Rising Generation — it is not less French than its Pre-

decessors — Appearances to the contrary explained . . 260

ID. How far the Church is Responsible for the Transformation of

France — Nature of its Activity — its Influence Analysed . 273

Division B. More Conscious Manifestations of the

New Spirit

CHAP.

1. Return of French Literature to its traditional Spirit — Failure

of the Romanticists — Their ethos contrasted with that of Recent Writers — Taste of the latter for Clarity and Elegance — Moral Superiority of Literary Schools averse to Crude Realism ....... 298

2. The Meaning of M. Bergson's Success: it is rather the Success

of a Ivlethod and a Spirit than that of a Philosophy . . 325

3. Restoration of Classical Studies; its significance . . . 330

Conclusion of Part II

The French obviously recovering from dangerous intellectual or moral diseases — less individualistic and more attentive to the public welfare — more alive to the interests of their country — no longer afraid of going to war if it is necessary. The question is whether this convalescence will result in complete recovery or in a relapse — nations have moods — the problem mostly, in the present stage of development, a political problem ..... 334

Contents xi

Part III. The Political Problems And The Future

CHAP. PAGE

1. The Problem of the Two Spirits — viz. the partisan spirit of

the Radicals, and the patriotism represented by M. Poincar^ or by men of M. Millerand's type — Apparent failure of the latter — even their success would not mean the end of the confusion — The everlasting danger is the presence of a Chamber which represents its electors but imperfectly and does not represent France at all . . 341

2. Is a Change of Regime probable? — Many believe it with-

out sufficient grounds, yet certain facts evidently point that way — Universal expectation of and longing for a Rescuer — Its frequent transformation into sympathy with monarchical constitution — Possibility and facility of a coup d'etat, yet improbabiHty of its being accomplished by either the Duke of Orleans, or Prince Napoleon, or republican leaders — Probability of a modification or even of a complete remodelling of the Constitution . . 348

3. Inevitability of the Democratic Progress — The modern

mind almost exclusively interested in the social and moral rise of the democracy — New conditions — Insufficiency of the solution to the problem of classes propounded by Integral Nationalism — Probability of the rise of the lower classes — Its danger, viz, humanitarianism, with the consequent disappearance of patriotism . 365

4. A Moral Solution to the Political Problem— Enervating

influence of the idea of universal peace, even of the notion of the instability of political conditions — Superiority of the moral point of view: its frequent indissolubility from political issues — We know nothing of the political problems of the future, but we know that at the present moment humanitarianism is associated with inferior tendencies, whereas patriotism calls forth our best energies — It will be the same in the future whenever poHtical problems are presented in the concrete to each individual — Necessity of Christianity in its virile aspects .,,...... 370

Part IV. Conclusion

The import of this volume plain: the real weakening of France came less from the disaster of 1870 than from the literary xii Contents pac;b success of enervating ideas — Realization of this fact by intellectual leaders like Taine and Renan and their conversion to order — This change likely to transform even the masses, but slowly — Influence of the Tangier and Agadir aflfairs in 1905 and 191 1: awakened patriotism restores clear-sightedness and energy to all classes — The obstacle to this recovery : the moral inferiority of the Radicals who outweigh the influence even of President Poincar^ and stand for pacificism when war is an everyday danger. — This volume written in view of this situation: incertitude and anxiety

Light thrown over the main positions of this book by the war of 19 1 4 — The same week sees the triumph of political corruption in the acquittal of Madame Caillaux, and the triumph of pure patriotism in the response to the mobilization order — Noble characteristics of the public spirit — The background of the war wholly intellectual and moral — Patience and discipline of the nation.

Consequences in the near future: two possibilities considered — Whatever the issue of the war may be, absolute necessity of a remodelling of the Constitution of 1875 to secure for France governments worthy of her new spirit — England ought to realize this necessity, and the present volume has been written largely for this purpose.

Probability of a new era opening for France.

FRANCE HERSELF AGAIN

FRANCE HERSELF AGAIN

The object of this book is to investigate the transformation of the public spirit which has been visible in France since the beginning of the twentieth century. That there has been such a change it is impossible to deny or doubt, for everybody has felt it or heard of it, and every well-informed person who has a chance eagerly inquires concerning it.

It is true that there are changes everywhere in Europe, and that disquietude and optimism rapidly succeed each other in almost every nation. Modern peoples are, like modern towns, in a condition of perpetual mutation. Instead of the deep stillness which seemed to hold the cities of old spellbound, there prevails an everlasting activity which alarms when it bodes destruction, and excites when it means reconstruction. What a change in the atmosphere of England since the last decade of the past century, when the author of this book thought he was almost physically conscious of its tranquillity. Germany, which at a distance gives the impression of a huge body full of youthful and wonderfully directed life, is not free from multiform anxieties. The visitor who goes there under the impression that he will meet with nothing

X except prosperity and the peaceful enjoyment of opportunities is promptly undeceived. Even Italy, optimistic as her temperament makes her, and elated as she has often appeared lately, has to fight against uneasiness of mind as well as against tangible obstacles.

It is true also that if it is difficult to satisfy oneself about the condition of one little town, nay, one family, the perplexity is infinitely increased when a nation is the object of inquiry. Day after day the observer is placed in the presence of facts which do not tally with his previous inferences, or hears people whose impressions are at variance with his own, or unexpectedly sees the whole political outlook wear an appearance which disconcerts his anticipations. Sometimes he feels inclined to question the possibility of generalizing from his scanty observations about a portion of the globe of which his mental as well as his bodily vision can only embrace a depressingly narrow horizon; and he goes back to the popular notion with which every one of us has started, that where millions are unknown and even invisible, it is useless to speculate as if unity were a fact.

Yet, in spite of the fragmentary character of past history and of the kaleidoscopic nature of history in the making, experience — even the experience of a private citizen with no means of information besides the newspapers and his own curiosity — teaches us that communities have an intellectual and sentimental life like individuals, and that the phases of this life can be ascertained. We find in the long run that a collection of clippings from the press enables us to watch new facts and their consequences without much surprise. We gradually become aware that only one individual in a hundred really matters as a subject of observation; we see that even the masses are in many manners within our grasp; we can tell how quickly — I should say how slowly — literature and philosophy will filter down to them; and we see that several phenomena — war and the fears of war, taxation, the ups and downs in public morals — bear immediately upon them; we find that owing to new conditions such as territorial unity, centralization, the diffusion of the press, the diffusion of teaching through the school, and of opinion, thanks to the passage of most citizens through a regiment ; owing also to the wider distribution of riches and the influence of politics over finance — which even the rudest mind can perceive — the political intelligence of what is going on in a cotmtry is no longer the privilege of a few educated people, and consequently national reactions are more rapid. All this satisfies us that what is called the life of a nation is not a mere succession of collective moods, but a reciprocal reaction of facts over ideas which proper attention can trace.

I intend in this volume chiefly to describe the amelioration which the moral and intellectual conditions of France have shown with startling rapidity since the Tangier incident in 1905; but, as this improvement cannot be separated from its environment, I shall have to preface this investigation with an account of the previous deterioration of the country ; and as the foreign inquirer seems, very rightly, interested above all in its duration, I shall conclude by pointing out how intimately its chances are bound up with some political problems.

It will appear, on the whole, that after being for years — more than fifty years — almost exclusively a groimd for experiments, France wants to be a nation once more. She is like a man whom philosophy or science, mere intellectual pursuits, have absorbed until some great sorrow unexpectedly makes him feel that he has a heart as well as a brain, and has to live as well as think, or think in a way that will fit him for life. We shall see this noble country, distracted and gradually corrupted by false ideals and low morals, suddenly realizing that while she stayed idle at home, wasting the precious hours in mere talk, others were scouring the world and gathering power whereby her independence appeared to be threatened. The subject of this book is entirely human ; it is nothing else than the story of an error and of the awakening from it, with all the astonishments, hopes, and uncertainties which generally attend such crises.

Section I. — Under The Second Empire Section II. — Under The Third Republic Section I

THE DETERIORATION OF FRANCE UNDER THE SECOND

EMPIRE

I. It was Unexpected

Shortly after his accession in 1852, the Emperor Napoleon the Third, addressing an audience at Bordeaux, uttered these remarkable words: "France is happy, Europe may live in peace. " Perhaps no speech could be found in the whole history of France to hold so much quiet pride and consciousness of power. This was no brag. The nephew of Napoleon the First had a right to speak of France as a war or peace maker; the man who, himself a Revolutionist once, had just restored order by securing more power than anybody had commanded since Louis XIV, was in a position to appreciate the benefit to Europe of regarding France as something else than a hotbed of dangerous ideas.

France had only one rival in Europe — ^that was England. Russia was still a far-away semi-Asiatic country ; Germany did not exist, it was only a word, or at best an idea, and Prussia, exhausted by her military expenses and still ignorant of shipping and industrialism, was a byword for poverty; Italy, like Germany, was only a hope ; as to Austria, she was old and childish, and beset with so many difficulties that she hardly counted. So France and England had the whole field to themselves, and as there were no clouds, the new Emperor expressed only an actual fact when he spoke.

To-day the same sentence would sound like a chauvinist absurdity. Certainly it still belongs to France as to any other nation to let war loose and set Europe ablaze, but she has lost the privilege of imposing peace at her will. The map and statistics of Europe have changed in the last sixty years ; Germany and Italy are no longer abstractions, and Austria must blame herself if she has lost her chances. France is stronger than she herself imagines; her geographical position, her wealth, her revived military spirit, her immense diplomatic possibilities if she would only see them, the power dormant in her Catholicism, the prestige of her civilization and culture, are unique assets ; but she is only one in the European concert, and she must trust to the future, to the development of the good points in her, and of the weaknesses in her rivals to regain her former position. A great falling off! and one which is made more painful the moment we cease to view the present situation in its historic perspective to advert to the sickening details of everyday politics.

What has happened? Is it merely that the world has been moving, and that, with the growth of certain great forces such as the attraction of languages and nationalities, France has been left behind without any real fault of her own? Asking the question is answering it. Even people who know history superficially have a feeling more comprehensive than mere data that France has made havoc with her own chances; and when they are asked more definite questions about the manner in which this self-destruction was brought about, a vague admiration for intellectual daring and a vague

Political Ideas of Napoleon III 9

dread of its consequences tell them that this country lost through the unwise love of dangerous ideas.

2. Political Ideas of Napoleon III

It is surprising that at least a medallion of Napoleon the Third should not be seen on the pedestal of the numberless statues erected to Cavour in almost every Italian town. Napoleon was quite as devoted to the cause of Italy as the great Piedmontese. He had started life as a carbonaro, and the dream of his ripe years was to see the Italia Una. This kind and good man, who loved his country, and for several years could entertain the delusion that he had brought it to a degree of splendour and prosperity unknown even under his uncle, was the predecessor of the shortest-sighted Republican statesmen in his devotion to ideas and complete disregard of their political consequences. It may be to his credit that he gave the world a great example of Idealism, but monarchs are not expected to be Ideahsts ; on the contrary, their subjects look upon them as the representatives of their interests, and pray that they may never lose sight of realities. Napoleon, lost in his vision of a noble nation restored to existence through his efforts, did not see that he was preparing a rival for France if the new nation happened to be more practical than idealistic and grateful. And when, in fact, Italy had become a reality, he was imprudent enough to connect her interests with those of Prussia, and, after helping Italy into the world, he paved the way for the advent of Germany.

His was a strange reign, all brilliance to the superficial observer, full of the seeds of catastrophes in the unseen reality. And it seemed as if Fortune were labouring to hide the snares under incredible pieces of luck and dazzling appearances. The French armies would leave for the Crimea without knowing where they were to land, without even a map of the shores they were seeking, and on arriving they would discover a beautiful bay which seemed made for their purpose. They started for the struggle against Austria in Northern Italy, a country full of rivers, without bothering about a pontoon-train; but the mistake was obviated on the spot, and victories succeeded victories without any disappointment. The bravery of officers and men was unequalled, and seemed to do duty for everything else. A hundred thousand men were killed in the Crimean campaign, as many more in the everlasting skirmishes of the Mexican War, but the country hardly minded; it seemed intoxicated with daring and gallantry, and took sacrifices light-heartedly. It was the same in everything; somewhat gaudy appearances deceived in peace as in war. Three years before the catastrophe of 1870, the Exhibition of 1867, the commercial and industrial prosperity, the visits of sovereigns, the gigantic rebuilding of Paris by Haussmann, impressed the country with the semblance of grandeur, while all the time the future was being undermined by the most unscrupulous of men of genius, Bismarck, and the crisis was already within reach. The Emperor saw the danger. The last years of his reign were darkened by the daily growing Prussian cloud, and his fears alone save him from having been a dupe rather than an idealist; but this is a poor set-off against the ruin of one's own country. Napoleon will remain responsible for the great changes after which the European map showed an expanded Italy and Germany and a shrunken France.

Spread of Dangerous Notions ii

3. Spread of Dangerous Notions under the Second

Empire

Territorial losses and political degradation are as bad for peoples as failure and consequent poverty sometimes are for individuals. All weakening tends to further weakening, and it is unfortunate for a nation to know that its voice has lost influence in the councils where it used to carry great weight. The inclination which defeat leaves behind is towards vain agitation much more than towards revenge. The decadence of nations is seldom accompanied with struggles against conquerors or oppressors, but nearly always with internal dissensions, intrigues, or mere idle philosophizing. So the secondary rank to which the imprudence of Napoleon III, combined with the increasing population of several of her rivals, reduced France, has been, not merely a political falling off. From the ethical point of view, discernible in the history of nations as in that of each of us, this country ran considerable risk of being a loser, even if it had had no other germ of degradation than its diminished power. But other germs did exist which were to develop with terrible rapidity, and which will at present become the chief object of our study.

It is true that France had not waited till the time of Napoleon III to imbibe those dangerous ideas which poison the life of a community and stay in its veins long after they have ceased to be frequently expressed. The ferment of incredulity which it is not difficult to see in so much of the less-known seventeenth century literature, the theory of indefinite progress of the Encyclopaedists, the individualism of Rousseau, had been sufficiently active to result in nothing less than the great Revolution. Michelet, Quinet, Comte, Cousin, ami JoufTroy had hcx-otiu^ fanunis under the reign of Louis Philippe.

It is even true that, excepting the most attentive olx^ervcrs, people must have been inchned to look upon the Second Empire as a more rc^ligious period than any since the beginning of Die niiu^tvnth century. Had it not hccn for the Roman complication in the Italian queslit>ii which imcxpcctcdly placed the Imperial Government in the ])osition of an enemy of the Papacy, no regime would have had so many rights to tlie title of champion of tlu^ Church. The Emperor himself was not a,n anliMil C'nlliolic, hut the Empress was, and the aliuospluMc of their C\>in-t was incomparably more rclii^ious than that of the Court of Louis XVI; the pi)lit ical ordci- was bas(Hl on belief, and the clergy were so iulhuMitial that even now anti-clericalism looks to thost^ days much tnon^ than even l(> the Restoration to liml instances of exaggerated Church interference; the lycrcs were more or less overtly given up to imbelievers, but [\\c i^UMuentary schools were practically in the hands of the bishops, ami ollicial literature was respectful of dt)gma; when the sittings of Parliament became public, it appeared that the immense majority of tlu> uitMubcrs \\\MC ortlunU^x and a great many of them earnest Catholii-s, atul when Saintc-Bcuve, in his last phase, aiul tlu^ Prince jcrome-Napolcon attacked the C^luux-h in [\\c StMuitc the scaiuial was cmummuous. To all intents and purposes the authorities dm-ing the SixH'nid l<>mpire ditl not separate either perfect civism or perfcet morality fnnn the practice of Catholicism; ami anti-religious philosophy, literature, ov criticism were discouraged and, so far as possible, prevented.

It is highly probable, therefore, not only that the Emperor was in no wise responsible for the deeply spread of Dangerous Notions 13

anti-Christian intellectual conditions I shall presently describe, but was even hardly aware of them. He survived the War of 1870 by three years, and from his place of exile at Chislehurst he could follow the admirable work of political regeneration which Thiers and the National Assembly carried on. He saw Prance diminished through his fault, but he also saw that the country had never seemed more energetic, more sincerely religious, more appreciative of the moral element in its own life than it was during those first few and unfortunately very brief years. No doubt he must have thought that if France had lost something of her territory, her brain and heart were sound, and he must have died hoping that his error would soon be made good owing to the rare mental conditions which his government had done so much to create.