The relation of sensation to other categories in contemporary psychology; a study in the psychology of thinking

Front matter

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:udy in the Psychology of Thinking

Table Of Contents

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I The problem of the psychology of thinking and the

structural and functional point of view I

Preface

These pages do not pretend to be a survey of the work done upon the problem of the psychology of thinking, such as has been given to us in Professor Titchener's admirable "Lectures". They are rather an attempt to apply the method of immanent criticism in searching out the implications of the category of Sensation as it appears in contemporary discussions of the problem. This method was wittingly adopted — in spite of limitations which it imposed and in spite of the difficulties which it offered from the point of view of formal presentation — on account of the promise it held of leading the inquirer into the heart of the problem of the psychology of thinking.

If this paper should eventually be found to contain any contribution to the problem, it will be obvious at once that the stimulus which gave rise to it lies in earlier contributors to the subject, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness not only to those whose contributions have been critically examined in these pages, but also to the many others not specifically dwelt upon, among them Marbe, Messer, Orth, Mayer, Kakise, Ach, Schwiete, and finally Binet who grappled persistently with the problem, and thought profoundly concerning it, for many years.

Personally, I am indebted to Professor Oswald Kiilpe for his many courtesies extended to me while the immediate problem of this paper was forming in my mind during my stay at the University of Bonn; to Professor C. Judson Herrick for his cheerful readiness to discuss questions of neurology that arose persistently during the course of the inquiry ; to Professor Harvey Carr and Dr. Stella B. Vincent for the helpful suggestions that grew out of our pleasant conferences. It is to Professor James R. Angell that I am beholden for constant encouragement in the pursuit of this task, and for the inspiration that lies in the ideal of scholarly independence of thought. C. R.

It is the purpose of this paper to consider an aspect of psychological inquiry as it has been developed especially by a number of workers both in America and Germany. These latter are commonly referred to as the Denkpsychologen, yet it would be misleading to suppose that their work is of significance only for the psychology of the logical processes. Nay, it would affect our whole conception of psychic process and psychic content. When we seek to correlate it with the points of view that are familiar to us in America, we note at first blush that in method it has much in common with so-called structural psychology, whilst the problems which it attacks and the questions which it seeks to answer are conceived in a spirit closely akin to the temper of the functionalist. To elucidate and qualify this statement will be part of the burden of the following pages, and it is the earnest hope of the writer that they may contribute in some measure to finding the common ground of these various "schools" in their pursuit of a common task.

Without further introduction we shall proceed to an examination of the sort of problems the movement in question proposes to itself, and its methods of attacking them. As we go along let us note bit by bit the meaning which the various writers put into the psychological terms that they employ. For by doing this it will be easier to note in how far any differences which may be found ultimately to exist between the various schools, are due to differences in point of view as to the nature of consciousness, or to differences in methods of obtaining and interpreting data. Wherever in this paper we are using quotations from the authors under discussion, we shall, when necessary, use the German or French terms of the original, otherwise we shall seek to give an adequate translation in English, sacrificing, where needful, elegance of diction to accuracy of rendering.

II

Instead of launching upon an historical account of the work on the thought processes in its specifically experimental phases, we shall consider first a treatise by Stumpf, entitled Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen, which partakes primarily of the nature of a theoretical exposition of a consistent point of view — a programme for giving context to problems, rather than a completely fulfilled and grounded system. It therefore lends itself admirably also to our purposes, for it gives a setting in the light of which the discussion of the more specific experimental efforts can be more fully appreciated.

Let us consider what Stumpf alleges he finds on turning to the study of consciousness. For him the total content, the "given" of consciousness, falls into three groups. ( i ) There are the phenomena, the Erscheinnngen, which correspond closely to the sensation, the image, and, tentatively, the simple affective elements of current structural psychology. (2) Introspection, for Stumpf, further reveals a consciousness of psychic activities, psychische Funktionen, of which we may be directly aware, and the consciousness of which cannot be reduced to sensation and affective elements. Willing, emotion, judging, conceiving, to name only a few, are processes of which we are immediately aware : they are given in the same indefinable consciousness and in the same sense in which sensations and feelings are given. (3) Then there are the relations, Verh'dltnisse, which constitute the third type of given. These relations exist, a, between the psychic elements of sensation, image and feeling, which Stumpf comprehends under the term Erscheinungen — a word which we shall render in the English as phenomena. These relations are not something that is added to phenomena by our minds through the operation of mental activities upon the sensory or affective content — no, they are conceived by Stumpf to be "given" in consciousness in the same sense in which sensations and feelings are given. They belong to the material with which psychic activities operate, but do not come under the head of psychic activities, nor are they products of these. 49 Another class of relations, b, is composed of those between phenomena and Funktionen, and between Funktionen themselves. 52 These three categories, then, the phenomena, the psychic Funktionen, and the relations, constitute for Stumpf the immediately given of consciousness. We shall have occasion, in another connection, to refer to a fourth category, the "structures" (Gebilde), which Stumpf does not, however, regard as being "immediately given" in the same sense as the other three. 63

For Stumpf the immediately given (das unmittelbar Gegebene) is that which strikes one immediately as matter-in-fact (was als Tatsache unmittelbar einleuchtet) . That which is to make this immediate appeal as matter-of-fact must be such that it can come within awareness. ( Was als Tatsache unmittelbar einrleuchten soil, muss wahrnehmbar sein). 51 It is our purpose to note the implications of this conception of the immediately given and to see in how far Stumpf adheres to it in the upbuilding of his psychological system, especially with reference to his treatment of the presence of phenomena and activities in consciousness. It is the content-character of these two factors, the "givenness" of sensation and affective elements, i. e. of phenomena (Erscheinungen), on the one hand, and of psychic activities on the other, that shall engage our attention for the present, and we will leave the discussion of the presence of relational elements in consciousness, which is not an unfamiliar doctrine, for later consideration.

It is hardly necessary to expatiate on what Stumpf may mean by saying that Erscheinungen, sensory and affective elements of the content of consciousness, are immediately given. It is simply the structuralistic doctrine that under certain conditions we may become aware of redness and blueness, of the tones that make up a clang, of sweetness, of pressure and cold sensations, — that we may become aware of these as parts of the mass of conscious experience of any moment. His classification of phenomenal elements is as follows: a, the sensation contents (Inhalte der Sinnesempfindung) , including the spatial extensity and distribution of visual and contact impressions, — tentatively also temporal duration and sequence; b, memory images (Gedachtnisbilder) , the 'merely imaged' colors, tones, etc.

Stumpf would leave out of consideration for the time being the classification of the pleasure-pain elements involved in sensory processes, on account of their still questionable status, though he is willing to see them subordinated under the head of phenomena, not as attributes of these, but as a special class. 49 It is not the classification of the phenomenal elements that shall interest us most, but rather their status with reference to the whole of consciousness and their relation to what Stumpf calls the Funktionen, that constitute for him another group of psychic givens.

Psychic activities (psychische Funktionen, Akte, Erlebnisse, Zustande) are such experiences as the awareness of phenomena, the combination of phenomena into complexes, the formation of concepts, apprehending and judging, desiring, willing and emotional states. 50 52 Funktion is here not used in the sense of a result attained through a process, as when we say that circulation is a function of the expansion and contraction of the heart, but in the sense of an activity, of a process, in the sense in which the contraction of the heart is an organic function. It is in the former sense that Stumpf believes himself to be justified in interpreting the term function as used by some American psychologists, such as Dewey. 50 Whether such an interpretation is correct is questionable; yet his own use of the term Funktion is brought out by his reference : the Funktionen are the activity phases of consciousness, of which we may become immediately aware. In this, Stumpf believes, his use of the term differs from that of Dewey. In order to differentiate the two uses of the term in these pages we shall use the German form when the term is used in Stumpf's sense, and the English form when we refer to the meaning connected with the term by the American functionalists. Limiting ourselves to a discussion of the psychological uses of the term, we note the following with reference to the different shades of meaning connected with it. Both Stumpf and the American functionalists use the term with reference to the activity aspect of consciousness.

But where such psychologists as Stumpf seek to understand this activity aspect by considering the psychic life by itself, the functionalist seeks to do justice to the process aspect by considering consciousness with reference to a biological setting. 5 Stumpf looks inward and there in consciousness is a complex of sensory elements, let us say, which together constitute the object of regard. For Stumpf it is a psychic Funktion, an activity of which we may become immediately aware, that is operative in binding together these elements into a figure, a rhythm, or a melody. Or again, given the same object, in terms of the same sensory content, we may at one time take a positive volitional attitude toward it, at another time a negative one. 63 The difference in the two states, then, is not a difference in the sensory content of consciousness, but a difference in the Funktionen involved. It is the Funktion as it is immediately given in consciousness, that, as a part of the pattern of consciousness, constitutes the difference in the pattern in the two cases. There is, to be sure a complication with other Funktionen, says Stumpf, intellectual and emotional, but it is important only to note that it is not the phenomenal content that is different in the two cases, but the Funktionen that operate upon that content. With Stumpf, therefore, the category of Funktion is a structural category insofar as it is a content among other contents, though he would restrict the use of the term content (Inhalt), to the phenomena (Erscheinungen) , whereas the Funktionen are acts, of which we may become aware, which may be perceived by directing attention in "another way".

Yet on page 15 of his monograph the Funktionen are referred to as contents. And like these others they, too, are "immediately given", though different in kind. In this sense, says Stumpf, there has been a discussion of awareness and perception of psychic Funktionen ever since Locke and Leibnitz, to say nothing of earlier thinkers. "These writers deny that the consciousness of seeing can be reduced to memory phenomena accompanying the color phenomena, memory images representing the organ of sight, etc. Still less are such interpretations possible in the case of the consciousness of judging and willing. They are convinced that they apprehend psychic activity in the very process itself, whereas colors and tones are apprehended merely as contents of an act of awareness, (Wahrnehmungsakt) , that is, of a particular class of psychic Funktionen. According to this view the phenomenal content and the act are interrelated in a manner still to be described, but are not reducible one to the other. . . . It is to be borne in mind that the assertion of the awareness of psychic Funktionen as Funktionen does not necessarily include a denial of unconscious psychic Funktionen."** 6 Thus Stumpf's conception of Funktion has its rise. We have said that he looks inward and there in consciousness he discerns sensory and feeling content on the one hand, and "acts" which operate with these, on the other. Contrasted with this mode of procedure, the so-called functional psychologist looks at consciousness with reference to the life-setting of the individual.

He tries to understand what function consciousness serves in the total life-process, as it is represented in the adaptation of the individual form to its environment. He asks : What does a given conscious experience do in the adaptive process, and how does it do it? 6 It is here that his conception of psychic function has had its rise. It considers, say a given image content, from the point of view of the function which it serves in some phase of adaptation involving consciousness. Examples of such phases are experiences like perceiving, judging, willing and emotional states. Introspectively, however, the setting in which the givgn image appears in these phases of adaptive activity, need not necessarily reveal anything at the periphery of the field of consciousness that is qualitatively different in kind from the sensory content of the image which is at the focus of attention and the affective elements associated with it. If the question of the awareness of process should become a problem for the functionalist, say in the case of judgment, he need not necessarily look for it as being given in consciousness in terms of mental texture other than that already known to him in sensation and affection. Having thus briefly sketched the essential features of the two points of view, we shall leave further comparison for the present, and return to a discussion of Stumpf's conception of the relation between two of his categories of psychical givens, the Erschcinungen and the Funktionen.

III

The difference between Erscheinungen and Funktionen, says Stumpf, is most striking. "No predicate of the one, unless it be that of duration, can be attributed to the other. Nor do the Funktionen possess intensity in the same sense as do tones and odors." They have their own peculiar attributes, "the clearness of awareness, the evidence of judgments, degrees of generality in the case of conception. If in the case of the emotional Funktionen there should be found somewhat analogous to the intensity peculiar to sensory impressions, one need not deny it, but then we have to deal merely with an analogy, and not with an intensity in the same sense of the word as in the case of sensation." 54

Two criteria for distinguishing between Erscheinungen and Funktionen are given by Stumpf. (1) Each is independently variable over against the other. 56 (2) "No predicate of the one, unless it be that of duration, can be attributed to the other." 54 And we are inclined to find implicit in his exposition a third criterion that appears to have been operative to a certain extent in bringing Stumpf to his distinction between these two types of ultimates : the mode in which they are apprehended. They are apprehended by "different directions of consciousness". The phenomena (Erscheinungen) "stand over against us as somewhat objective, that possesses its own laws, a somewhat that we have merely to describe and acknowledge". The Funktionen, however, we are told, are given us by "another direction of consciousness". 57 While Stumpf does not enlarge upon this third criterion, viz., mode of behavior under introspection, we still find it implicit in his statement that the Funktionen are apprehended by a "direction of consciousness" other than that by which the phenomena are apprehended.

IV

Stumpf believes that he can postulate on introspective grounds the possibility of independent variability of either the Erscheinungen or the Funktionen, without a variation in the one being necessarily accompanied be a concomitant change in the other. It will not be unprofitable, we believe, to follow him a little way while he is trying to make his point, for it will help us somewhat in understanding how he comes to believe that he is justified in regarding the Funktionen as being immediately given, and also to understand just what phases of consciousness he would subsume under that concept. Let us consider first his instances in which he believes a change in Funktion to occur while the Erscheinungen, the sensory content, remains unchanged. He first takes up a case in which the Funktion of awareness is involved. Awareness is apparently taken by Stumpf in the sense of "simple apprehension" the most primitive of psychic Funktionen, the process "by which parts or relations are precipitated out of the undifferentiated chaos of phenomena". 57 * It is the Funktion that precedes the judgment, whether implicit or explicit. "To be sure," he continues, "there usually goes with it an instinctive positing of the part noted, and later it is often accompanied also by a conceptual judgment concerning the existence of the part or relation." The process of being aware (Wahrnchmcn, Bemerken, N otiznehmen) , is for Stumpf to be differentiated carefully from the Funktion of judgment and the "instinctive positing" just mentioned. Awareness of phenomena of the first class, of sensory content, he calls sensing (Empfinden), awareness of phenomena of the second class, of images, he calls imagining (Vorstellcn).* 7 "Our thesis," says Stumpf, "applied to the case of sensory awareness, asserts that in the transition from being unnoticed to being noticed there need not necessarily be a change in the phenomena, in the sensory content, itself. That which changes is essentially of the nature of Funktion, of process. The transition, putting it figuratively, consists in an amassing of consciousness with reference to some part of the phenomenal content. Thus when one tone of a chord is singled out, there need not be a change in the chord as phenomenal content. What I apprehend at first as an unanalysed clang, then as an analysed one, remains what it was; so too the unified impression of some article of food, in

SENSATION IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY g

which later I note somewhat of sweetness, somewhat of sourness, perhaps also an odor and a temperature quality ; so too the dermal sensation which is later analysed into pressure, cold and pain sensations, — these remain what they were. And it is not merely the objective stimuli and the psysiological processes, but also, I believe, the subjective phenomena (Erscheinungen) that may remain the same, unchanged." 59 "To be sure," he continues, "in most cases in which we say that a sensory impression appears clearer, more distinct, and more 'transparent' with reference to the total ordering of its contents, than a moment ago, there can be shown numerous changes in associated imagery. . . ." There is a quickening of the apperceptive process. A second view of a picture allows it to be taken in with fewer and shorter stopping points. The muscular sensations are reduced at least with reference to the duration attribute. But not all cases, he believes, can be thus explained. Among them those just cited above. Likewise the following: Coming from the theatre, rapt in thought, we are aware in a vague way of the row of brilliant street lamps, or of the strokes of the bell tolling the hour. We now turn our attention directly to the lights, or to the further strokes. "We will have to say to ourselves," continues Stumpf, "that just a moment ago there also were lights and auditory impressions of the same kind and in the same spatial or temporal relations, incidentally also of the same intensity as those of which we are now aware." What has changed in all these cases is not the sensory content, according to Stumpf, but the Funktion. Since we saw that the peculiar attribute of the Funktion or process of awareness is the degree of clearness, we must infer that it is that which has changed in all these cases. We recall that by way of definition of this change, Stumpf had said that "the transition, putting it figuratively, consists in an amassing of consciousness with reference to some part of the phenomenal content". It would appear that the factor in conscious experience which is the basis for Stumpf 's judgment as to the immediate givenness of the Funktion in the case of awareness is just this amassing of attention and holding it there. This much for clinching in a concrete io CARL RAHN

case the content of his idea of one of the Funktionen. We shall revert to this anon, but for the present let us consider in what sense the phenomenal elements constituting the presentation may be said to be the same or similar in the mental state before attention is directed to the lights and in the state in which it is thus directed.

V

In support of his position Stumpf refers to a paper by A. Marty which contains a criticism of James. 58 The passage in James tQ which Marty refers has the following citation from Stumpf: "And when, after successfully analysing this total, we call it back to memory, as it was in its unanalysed state, and compare it with the elements we have found, the latter (as it seems to me) may be recognized as real parts contained in the former, and the former seen to be their sum. So, for example, when we clearly perceive that the content of our sensation of oil of peppermint is partly a sensation of taste and partly of temperature." 29 Commenting on this, James says: "I should prefer to say that we perceive that objective fact, known to us as the peppermint taste, to contain those other objective facts known as aromatic or sapid quality, and coldness, respectively. No ground to suppose that the vehicle of this last very complex perception has any identity with the earlier psychosis — least of all contained in it." Closer consideration of these two statements will bring us face to face with the parting of the ways between so-called structuralism and functionalism, and will also make clear to us how divergent are the two attempts to do justice to a completer understanding of the activity side of consciousness that are represented by such psychologists as Dewey and Angell on the one hand, and by Stumpf on the other. It is hoped that this consideration, together with its bearing upon a discussion of the experimental investigations of the thought processes, which is to

TION IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY u

a sufficient justification for broaching in this subject of the psychologist's fallacy and of the en.

VI

iccording to Stumpf the immediately given is the I Funktionen and the relations immanent in these, ndividual is momentarily conscious", i.e., the ediate. We have no reason to believe that a the temper of James could not agree to this ist in so far as the given is defined as that of dual is momentarily conscious, or the psychically difference therefore must lie in the use to which ained in the form of the subject's judgments mtent of his immediate experience are put and ion that is placed upon them. James' contention rmint experience is a totality and has nothing in e experience in which consciousness analyses oil nto a complex of stimuli mediating taste and ations. That analysis has been made under conh attention is focussed on the content as ad yields results in a rather elaborate judgment ter of the "object" presented. (We can here uestion of James' use of the term, "object" and he two experiences are quite dissimilar and the ;aid to be contained in the former. James here ilytic experience as a whole — in the terms of ily to the Erscheinungen which constitute the >o to the Funktionen which may be directly rig the immediate experience of peppermintdements.

ise by itself we may say that in the unanalysed strikes as immediate matter-of-fact (was als Ibar einleuchtet) is to be couched in terms of io CARL RAHN

case the content of his idea of one of the Funktionei revert to this anon, but for the present let us consi sense the phenomenal elements constituting the prese be said to be the same or similar in the mental state 1 tion is directed to the lights and in the state in whi directed.

In support of his position Stumpf refers to a paper which contains a criticism of James. 58 The passage which Marty refers has the following citation fr "And when, after successfully analysing this total, \\ to memory, as it was in its unanalysed state, and cor the elements we have found, the latter (as it seems be recognized as real parts contained in the forr former seen to be their sum. So, for example, wh< perceive that the content of our sensation of oil of ] partly a sensation of taste and partly of temperatu menting on this, James says: "I should prefer to perceive that objective fact, known to us as th< taste, to contain those other objective facts knowr or sapid quality, and coldness, respectively. No gi pose that the vehicle of this last very complex perce identity with the earlier psychosis — least of all con Closer consideration of these two statements will 1 to face with the parting of the ways between so-call ism and functionalism, and will also make clear to 1 gent are the two attempts to do justice to understanding of the activity side of consciousr represented by such psychologists as Dewey and i one hand, and by Stumpf on the other. It is he consideration, together with its bearing upon a disc experimental investigations of the thought processe

SENSATION IN CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY n

follow, will be a sufficient justification for broaching in this connection the subject of the psychologist's fallacy and of the immediately given.

VI

We saw that according to Stumpf the immediately given is the "phenomena and Funktionen and the relations immanent in these, of which an individual is momentarily conscious", i.e., the psychically immediate. We have no reason to believe that a psychologist of the temper of James could not agree to this definition, at least in so far as the given is defined as that of which the individual is momentarily conscious, or the psychically immediate. The difference therefore must lie in the use to which the data thus gained in the form of the subject's judgments regarding the content of his immediate experience are put and in the interpretation that is placed upon them. James' contention is that the peppermint experience is a totality and has nothing in common with the experience in which consciousness analyses oil of peppermint into a complex of stimuli mediating taste and temperature sensations. That analysis has been made under conditions in which attention is focussed on the content as Erscheinungen and yields results in a rather elaborate judgment as to the character of the "object" presented. (We can here leave aside the question of James' use of the term, "object" and "objective".) The two experiences are quite dissimilar and the latter cannot be said to be contained in the former. James here refers to the analytic experience as a whole — in the terms of Stumpf not merely to the Erscheinungen which constitute the "object", but also to the Funktionen which may be directly involved in giving the immediate experience of peppermintanalysed-into-its-elements.

Taking each case by itself we may say that in the unanalysed state that which strikes as immediate matter-of-fact (was als Tatsache unmittelbar einleuchtet) is to be couched in terms of the judgment, that within the larger setting which it had with reference to some activity, the part that was singled out and noted was a unitary somewhat ; the peppermint, with a pleasurable or painful feeling tone, mayhap also some somatic and visceral sensations. This much is the immediately given — a description of the immediate psychical content. It is that which the subject reports. So much for the first phase of the experience, in which the object is "given" as a whole, unanalysed. Then follows the analytic phase, or the one in which the object is apprehended at the focus of attention. The individual now reports that he can discriminate two sorts of sensations: taste and temperature. This statement, plus anything he may have to say concerning his awareness of concomitant process, whether sensations connected with the accommodation of the sense organ, or Funktionen if he employs that category, or other phenomena at the fringe, — these will constitute the psychological data of the immediately given of the second experience. We do not pretend that this is an exhaustive statement of all that a careful observer might report as the immediately given in the two experiences. But it is by means of such judgments only that the psychologist can in any sense be said to get at the content that is immediately given in any consciousness other than his own. It is only in this way that the immediately given in the character of "mind-stuff" can be made the starting point for a body of psychological knowledge dealing with human consciousness. 68 We now ask: What may the investigator do with the data thus gained? Stumpf claims that he is entitled to read back into the first experience the "content" of the second experience. There is nothing, to be sure, that would militate against his right to do this if he so desires. And if by doing so he obtains a system of knowledge that serves his purposes and that may serve the purposes of others, he is thereby justified by his procedure, so long as in doing so he is not introducing an element of immanent inconsistency into his system.