Napoleon at bay 1814

Front matter

A o ct- ^ o

A yo^

0'

Author's Preface

THIS volume will appear almost precisely one hundred years after the commencement of the campaign which it describes.

As in the case of the author's four previous histories of Napoleon's campaigns, it deals only with the purely military side of the war, politics being referred to only in so far as they actually influenced directly the course of military operations. Further, it is confined to the operations in which Napoleon was personally and directly engaged. Therefore, no attempt is made to deal with the campaigns of Soult and Suchet against Wellington, with the blockade of Davout in Hamburg or of the other fortresses in Germany, with Maison's campaign in the Netherlands, with Eugene's in Italy, or even with Augereau's movements about Lyons. The latter, feeble though they were, certainly did exercise a considerable influence on the allied movements, especially in the end of February ; but it was mainly unfounded alarm which influenced Schwarzenberg, and the details of Augereau's advance and retreat are of little interest.

There appears to be, at present, no modern work in English giving anything like a full history vi Author's Preface

of this campaign, except the lectures of Captain Jones pubHshed in 1868. Being addressed to Sandhurst cadets they necessarily do not go into much detail. When they were delivered, even Napoleon's correspondence was scarcely published in full, and none of the many documents which have since been disinterred from the various record offices of Europe were available.

In French there are several excellent histories, notably the " 18 14 " of the late M. Henry Houssaye, and the admirable volumes of Commandant Weil, which represent the result of years of assiduous search in the archives of Paris, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. Captain Hulot, of the 45th Infantry, has also published a useful volume, '* La Manoeuvre de Laon." In German there are contemporary accounts by Muffling and Clausewitz, and a translation of Danilewski's Russian work, which has also been translated into English. Two volumes (by General Janson) of the great " Geschichte der Befreiungskriege, 1813-1815 " deal with 18 14. That author naturally had freer access to German records than Colonel Weil, but, save in this respect, little has been added to the French work.

The author has been over the greater part of the theatre of war, and, in the case of the country between Soissons, Laon, and Berry-au- Bac, had the advantage of seeing 10,000 French troops of the present day manoeuvring with general ideas very similar to those of Napoleon of March 7th-9th, 18 14. The whole thing was a vivid object-lesson in the difference between the simple training of a few weeks which enabled Napoleon to pit his recruits with success against

Author's Preface vii

the veterans of the allied armies, and the far lengthier and stricter training which alone can qualify men to meet the more exacting conditions of warfare in the twentieth century.

The author hopes the maps in the present volume will be found sufficient. The general map shows all but a very few of the names mentioned in the text. These will be found in the maps used for battles and the manoeuvres at and south of Laon. These latter are reproductions of the French staff map on a scale of goooo* The country in most of these places has changed little in general character, and it is only necessary to eliminate the railways, and to remember that many of the roads now metalled were not so in 1 8 14. Their general line is unaltered.

The author takes this opportunity of gratefully acknowledging the courtesy of the Geographical Department of the French General Staff in permitting him to reproduce extracts from their map.

The numerous small plans showing troop positions on various dates do not pretend to accuracy or uniformity of scale, but it is hoped that, in conjunction with the general and local maps, they will afford a clear view of the general situation on almost every important day of this short campaign. On them place names are shown, as on the general map, in italics, whilst names of commanders, or numbers of corps, appear in Roman capitals and figures. The use of commanders' names generally has been preferred ; for, in Napoleon's army of 18 14, the units were often so small as to be likely to give rise to misapprehension if described as corps, divisions, etc.

viii Author's Preface

In all maps the top and bottom are respectively north and south, and French troops are shown by solid, whilst the allies are represented by open rectangles.

F. L. P.

^isi October, 1913.

Contents

PAGE

I. From Hanau to Chalons i

II. Brienne and La Rothiere 17

Chapter I

NAPOLEON'S campaigns of 1813 and 1 8 14 were in reality a continuation of that of 181 2 ; but the well-marked pauses in the end of 181 2 and beginning of 18 1 3, and again in the end of 181 3, naturally lead to their treatment as three separate parts. When Napoleon re-crossed the Rhine, in the beginning of November, 181 3, with the 60,000 or 70,000 soldiers whom alone he had saved from the disaster of Leipzig, the allies lost touch of him for a considerable period.

It will be well to describe briefly the general military situation of Europe at this time. Napoleon, with his field army, had been finally driven from Germany ; but he had still in that country large garrisons occupying the important fortresses which had not been re-taken from him, and which were now isolated in the midst of hostile forces and a hostile population ; for the Emperor had no longer any German ally, and the auxiliary forces of Bavaria, Saxony, and the other states of the late Rhenish Confederation were now being led against him, and recruited by fresh levies. Though some of the garrisons left behind in Germany had to surrender before the

B end of the campaign, they accounted for a very large force lost to Napoleon. Nearly 100,000 men were in Dresden, Magdeburg, Glogau, Hamburg, Kustrin and Wittenberg alone. He had, moreover, to provide garrisons for the fortresses on the Rhine and in Eastern and Northern France which would soon be surrounded by the rising tide of invasion. Mayence alone had a garrison of about 1 5,000 men. There were more fortresses in Belgium and Holland with only a small field army which never exceeded about 15,000 men.

On the Pyreneean frontier Soult, with about 60,000 men, faced Wellington, already over the frontier, and Suchet, with 37,000, was opposed to the Anglo-Spanish forces in the north-east corner of Spain. In Italy, the Viceroy had some 50,000 men against about equal numbers of Austrians under Bellegarde. Murat was for the moment on the French side with the Neapolitan army, but he was already wavering and soon changed sides.

In the campaign which we are about to describe, diplomacy and politics played an unusually important part. With all powers, both military and political, united in his own hands, there was, in Napoleon's case, a constant harmony of operations, though he found himself hampered in his military movements by the necessity of always covering Paris, and of avoiding situations which might give rise to alarm in the capital, and thereby offer opportunities to the many enemies of his government there. Paris was the heart and centre of his power, the storehouse of his military supplies, and the headquarters of his army organizations. It represented France in a way that Moscow did not represent Russia in 181 2, or Berlin Prussia in 1813. At the same time, it was the cauldron in which seethed all the forces of revolution and discontent, and all the intrigues of the parties opposed to the Napoleonic regime. All France, and Paris especially, was weary of the Empire and of the years of war which it had represented. Napoleon knew well that the fall of Paris entailed that of the Empire, and Paris was then not a fortress capable of making a serious resistance whilst the Emperor organized fresh armies south of the Loire.

On the side of the allies, political interests were far more complicated, as is always the case with allied armies. The interests of the several powers were very divergent, and we shall constantly see their military operations very largely ruled by the selfish interests of one or the other.

The Tsar personally cherished the idea of an occupation of Paris to avenge Napoleon's occupation of Moscow in 181 2; but he found himself restrained in this by the strong feeling, dating from before Kutuzow's death in 1813, that Russia had played her part in driving back the French from her own territory with the awful losses of the retreat. Many of his statesmen and commanders saw no sufficient reason, after that, for fighting other people's battles in Central and Western Europe.

Austria, as represented by Metternich and the Emperor, was in a different position. After the successes gained in Germany in 18 13, it was practically certain that any peace that could be concluded with Napoleon would end in the restoration to her of practically all she had lost in recent wars. A continuation of the war, and the overthrow of Napoleon, would tend to the increase of the power and influence of her old rivals Russia and Prussia, which she could not regard with satisfaction, especially as Russia was understood to have views as to the disposition of Poland which suited neither Austria nor Prussia. Some weight, not too much, may also be given to the Austrian Emperor's unwillingness to assist in the complete overthrow of his daughter's husband Napoleon.

The King of Prussia, a devoted adherent of the Tsar, was generally ready to follow his lead. On the other hand, the feeling of his subjects, and of many of his statesmen and generals, was one of intense bitterness against the man who had oppressed them for seven years, and of burning desire for revenge against him and his army.

England, weary of protracted war, and of playing paymaster to the Powers of the various coalitions, was ready to welcome peace, provided there were reasonable guarantees for its permanence. The ever-intriguing Bernadotte was another source of trouble ; for he had wild visions of himself as the successor of Napoleon, by election of the French people. It is supposed to have been at his instigation that the allies proclaimed that Napoleon, not the French people, was the enemy.

With such divergent views prevailing at headquarters of the allies it was obvious that compromise must be the order of the day, unless there was to be a break-up of the coalition.

When we come to the military leaders, we find on the one side Napoleon served as subordinates by marshals who, however excellent as corps commanders, were none of them fit for semiindependent command, and moreover, were as tired of war, for the most part, as was the rest of France. They had been liberally endowed by their master, and were now only anxious to enjoy their wealth and honours in peace.

On the side of the allies, the commander-in-chief. Prince Schwarzenberg, by nature a statesman and diplomatist rather than a general, was terribly lacking in enterprise, tormented by a constant fear of attacks on his lines of communication, and intolerably slow in moving. On the other hand, some excuse may be found for him in the difficulties of his position as the servant of many masters. He owed allegiance primarily to his own sovereign the Austrian Emperor and his adviser Metternich, neither of whom favoured bold measures or a vigorous attempt finally to overthrow Napoleon. The Tsar, who had arrogated to himself the principal position among the three sovereigns, and was fond of interfering in military matters, constantly urged Schwarzenberg forward, and even at times passed orders on his own account. The King of Prussia generally followed Alexander.

The commander-in-chief of the army of Silesia, the veteran Blucher, was the very reverse of Schwarzenberg. He hated Napoleon with a bitter hatred ; nothing would satisfy him but the Emperor's early and complete downfall. He was all for an immediate advance on Paris, which was not at all what Schwarzenberg or Metternich or the Emperor Francis desired. Yet Blucher was never insubordinate, though it must be admitted that he advocated and rejoiced in separation of the armies as giving him a freer hand. No one has ever accused Bliicher of being a heaven-born genius, but he was full of common sense and did not hesitate to rely for brainwork on his more talented subordinate Gneisenau. If Gneisenau supplied the brains, it was Bliicher who supplied the relentless energy, the fierce patriotism, and the strong will which pushed his army forward and kept peace between Russians and Prussians, and even between Prussians and Prussians in the campaign about Laon. When Bliicher, broken down by fever and ophthalmia at Laon, was compelled to delegate his command temporarily to Gneisenau, the results were immediately apparent in Gneisenau's cancellation of the orders for an immediate pursuit of the defeated French, and in the inactivity of the Silesian army during the days on which Bliicher was incapacitated. Bliicher undoubtedly was the hero of the campaign on the allied side. But for his energy, it might well have had a different end.

Arrived at Frankfort-on-the-Main, the allies settled down to lengthy deliberations and councils of war. Bliicher was all for an immediate continuation of the pursuit of the defeated French army of Leipzig, right up to the gates of Paris. On the 3rd November he wrote through Gneisenau to Knesebeck : * ** We can now take stock

* Knesebeck was the principal military adviser of the King of Prussia. He was thoroughly imbued with the antiquated principles of 1 8th century war, was all for manoeuvring, and seemed to consider a great battle the last resort of a desperate leader, rather than as the primary objective to be aimed at.

of the position of Napoleon. If we move rapidly on Holland and cross the Rhine, the conquest of Holland will be an accomplished fact in less than two months, and we shall sign a durable peace. If, on the contrary, we remain on the right bank, if we allow ourselves to be delayed by negotiations, we shall have to engage, in 18 14, in a severe and bloody campaign." The writer saw as clearly as did Napoleon himself that the one thing absolutely necessary to the latter was time to reorganize and recruit his army. A fortnight later Napoleon himself expressed the same idea in a letter to Marmont. " We are not, at present, ready for anything. In the first fortnight of January we shall be already prepared for much."^^" Had Bluchers general idea been followed, the Empire of Napoleon would probably have fallen before the end of December.

Clausewitz, in his critical essay on the campaign, has shown that the allies might well have advanced, after a week's rest on the Rhine, with 245,000 men, even after detaching 40,000 men with Bernadotte against Davout in Hamburg. Clausewitz calculates that of the 245,000 a force of 65,000 would have sufficed to mask the eastern fortresses. Deducting another 30,000 for losses in action, by disease, etc., at least 1 50,000 allies could have arrived before Paris. Napoleon's 60,000 or 70,000 would have dwindled by a number at least as great as the reinforcements he could have gathered in the meanwhile, and, moreover, they would have reached Paris thoroughly demoralized by a continuous retreat of nearly 500 miles after the great defeat of Leipzig. The result of a decisive battle east of Paris, under such circumstances, could hardly be doubtful.

But an immediate advance was not to be expected under the political conditions prevailing at the allied headquarters. On the 9th November commenced a series of councils of war, of plans of campaign, and of tentative negotiations with Napoleon. The allies still offered terms of peace which would have left France with her " natural " frontiers, the Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine, though there was to be no longer any French suzerainty or predominating influence beyond them. This offer, conveyed through St. Aignan, a French diplomat held as a prisoner of war, gave Napoleon what he so urgently needed, an opportunity of gaining time. He probably had no intention, at this stage of the war, of accepting any such terms, though later there came a time when the allies' offers were much less favourable, and Napoleon claimed in vain the offer of the Frankfort terms. For the present, he delayed answering till the ist December, and then made impossible proposals for the surrender of the fortresses on the Vistula and the Oder, on condition that their garrisons were sent back to him so that he could add them to his field army. He did promise to appoint Caulaincourt as his plenipotentiary to meet the agents of the allies, a promise which led to the assembling of the Congress of Chatillon in February 1814.

As regards the plan of campaign of the allies, there was never any chance of their adopting Bluchers energetic ideas. Various schemes, submitted by Knesebeck, Radetzky, and the Tsar himself, were discussed and rejected.

The scheme finally accepted laid down the following general movements :

(i) The main army (Army of Bohemia) to cross the Upper Rhine about Basle and even higher up, sending 12,000 men under Bubna to secure Switzerland, thereby giving the Austrians a more direct communication with their own country. The centre would move on the plateau of Langres, to which great importance was attached as turning by their sources the Meuse, the Marne, and the Seine ; a truly i8th century view.

(2) Bliicher with the Army of Silesia would, at the same time, cross the Middle Rhine between Mayence and Coblence. His function was to manoeuvre so as to hold the enemy until Schwarzenberg could reach his communications.

(3) Of the North Army the corps of Billow and Winzingerode were to subdue Holland, whilst Bernadotte with the rest, reinforced by part of the Russian-Polish army of Bennigsen, dealt with Davout at Hamburg, and with the Danes.

The general principles of action of the divided armies were laid down in a memorandum of the 13th November by Schwarzenberg. It is understood to represent the scheme arrived at during the armistice of 18 13. They were briefly :

(i) Fortresses encountered to be masked, not besieged.

(2) The main army to operate on the enemy's flank and communications.

(3) The enemy to be forced, by attacks on his communications, either to detach, or to hurry the bulk of his forces on the threatened points.

lo Napoleon at Bay, 1814

(4) He was only to be attacked when divided and very inferior in numbers.

(5) If the enemy advanced in mass against one of the aUied armies, it would retire whilst the other advanced.

(6) The point of union of all allied forces to be the enemy's headquarters.

The Bohemian army crossed the Rhine on the 20th December, 1813, Blucher on the ist January, 18 14, Winzingerode five days later.

Into the details of invasion we do not propose to enter until the end of January, when Napoleon again appears upon the scene. He had disposed his feeble forces in an immense " cordon " facing the Rhine. This very disposition clearly indicated that he had no intention of making a serious defence. All that this show of defence could do was to prevent the enemy occupying with light troops an area abandoned by the French. The allied advance to the Marne was therefore only a promenade militaire, though probably the marshals, in Napoleon's absence, might well have done more than they did to delay the enemy. They fell back as the allies advanced without any serious attempt at resistance, or even at delaying them by manoeuvring.

When he got back to Paris early in November, 18 13, Napoleon was busy trying to raise a new army. Between the 9th October, 18 13, and the 6th January, 18 14, no less than 936,000 new levies of regular troops and National Guards were ordered, including drafts on all the years back to 1802, and forward to 18 15. But, for various reasons, some of these levies were postponed ; for some there were no arms available, and some were resisted or evaded. Houssaye calculates that not more than one-third were actually called up, and not more than oneeighth ever fought.

The Emperor might draw trained soldiers from the armies of Italy and of Spain, but he never could make up his mind, as his soldier's instinct bade him, to abandon the secondary objective in Italy. As for Spain, he endeavoured, too late, by restoring Ferdinand VII. to his throne, to conclude a peace which should result in the withdrawal from the war of the English and Spanish armies, and the return to him of his veterans under Soult and Suchet. The bottom was knocked out of his scheme by the refusal of the Spanish Cortes to ratify the treaty of Valen^ay, signed by Ferdinand whilst still a prisoner. Napoleon had to be satisfied with the withdrawal of part of Soult's and Suchet s veterans,* and their replacement by new levies. These troops were, with the exception of the Old Guard, the best he had.

From Italy he withdrew nothing, and presently the Viceroy was opposed, not only by Bellegarde's Austrians, but also by the Neapolitan army when Murat abandoned his brother-in-law. In the Netherlands, Maison's 15,000 men were handicapped by a general uprising induced by Bulow's advance. The Emperor had nothing left but the resources of France. There, unpopular though he now was outside the army, he was

* He withdrew altogether from Soult, to his own army, 11,015 infantry, 3420 cavalry and 40 guns. From Suchet were taken, for Augereau's army of the Rhine, 8051 infantr)', 2132 cavalry, and 18 guns.

able to do much in raising a general insurrection in the provinces occupied by the allies. They played into his hands here ; for undoubtedly many atrocities (not perhaps worse than those of the French in Germany) were committed by the Cossacks and others. Though peasant risings caused much annoyance to the allies, and necessitated the strong guarding of convoys, it hardly seems that they had any serious influence on the result. They certainly added greatly to the savagery of the campaign on both sides. Into details of Napoleon's efforts to raise a new army we do not propose to enter at length.*

As for the allies, owing to the addition to their forces of those of the Rhenish Confederation, reinforcements were constantly coming in, and were sometimes sent to the front, sometimes employed in the task of blockading the fortresses, thus setting free the better trained troops at first so employed. Plotho calculates that the allies put into the field in 18 14, one way or another, 652,000 men in first line and 235,000 in reserve ; 887,000 in all. Of these 230,000 were Austrians ; 278,000 Russians; 162,000 Prussians; 197,000 other Germans ; and 20,000 Swedes, f

The " cordon " which the Emperor left facing the Rhine in November was generally disposed thus :

Victor, with about 10,000 men, watched the Upper Rhine from Hunningen to Landau.

* For a most graphic account of the difficulties in raising men and arms, and of the details of guerilla warfare, see Houssaye, "1814", Chap. I.

t The Austrians in Italy are included, but not the forces of

Wellington.

Marmont had about 13,000 between Landau and Coblence.

Sebastian!, with 4500, watched from Coblence to the Lippe.

Macdonald, on his left, had 11,500 for the space from the Lippe to Nimeguen.

On the extreme left were Maison's 15,000 in the Netherlands, on the extreme right were 1600 men at Lyons, the nucleus of a corps entrusted to Augereau.

Morand was blockaded with 15,000 in Mayence.

The only reserves behind the centre of this immense line were, at first, the Old Guard under Michel ; two divisions of Young Guard forming under Ney at Metz, under the high-sounding title of the " Army of the Vosges " ; and a few battalions under Mortier.

On the 1 2th January Napoleon dictated a long note * on the actual situation of France. With the usual optimism of these latter days, he proceeds to estimate that Schwarzenberg with 50,000 men, and Blucher with 30,000, were all that could arrive before Paris by the middle of February, when he would have 120,000 men in the field to oppose them, besides a garrison of 30,000 in the capital. At this time, he seems to have contemplated awaiting the arrival of the enemy before Paris. He was determined ** never to make any preparation for abandoning Paris, and to bury himself, if necessary, in its ruins." He had previously said that he intended to make of Paris a strong place which he would never quit.f He did not believe in the enemy's marching * Corr. 21,089. t Corn 21,084 of nth January.

on Paris. He would certainly have been justified in the belief if his gross under-estimate of the allied forces available had been nearly correct. Sometime during the next few days he was disillusioned, and resolved on a very different plan : an attempt to prevent the junction of Blucher and Schwarzenberg towards Chalons, and to defeat them separately.

The theatre of war with which we are mainly concerned is enclosed by a line running north-east from Paris to Laon, thence through Reims, Chalons-sur-Marne, St. Dizier, Chaumont, Chatillon-sur-Seine, Sens, and Fontainebleau back to Paris. It may be described generally as a plain except in the portion north of the river Aisne, where there are hills rising some 400 feet above the river levels. This area will be more fully described later on. The country between the Marne on the north and east and a line running roughly through Villenauxe, Sezanne, and Etoges is almost a dead level, scantily populated and with a heavy, clayey, marshy soil. The tract west of this line lies on a higher level and is much superior in fertility and population. It is also much more undulating with quite deep valleys in places.

The Seine and the Marne are the two principal rivers in the theatre. Always serious military obstacles, rarely fordable in winter even in their upper reaches, they flow more or less parallel to one another on the arc of a circle convex towards the south-west until they begin to converge to unite just outside Paris.

The Aube is the most important tributary joining the Seine on its right bank. It is generally unfordable within the theatre, except in very dry weather. The Seine receives a considerable tributary, the Yonne, on its left bank, and a smaller one, the Loing. The most important tributaries of the Marne from our point of view are the Grand and Petit Morin on the left bank, and the Ourcq on the right. The two former are petty streams, but their marshy beds give them some importance as military obstacles, a remark which applies with still greater force to the larger Ourcq.

The Aisne, flowing from east to west through Berry-au-Bac and Soissons, is a much more important stream, generally unfordable. Its tributary the Vesle, flowing through Reims and thence to its left bank above Soissons, is a small stream of secondary importance. The Lette, or Ailette, which flows parallel to and north of the Aisne, will be referred to later. Both it and the Aisne are tributaries of the Oise.

Three great roads led across the theatre to Paris.

(i) From Chdlons-sur-Marne along the left bank of the Marne to Chateau-Thierry where it crossed to the right. At La Ferte-sous-Jouarre it re-crossed to the left bank, and finally again went to the right bank at Trilport.

The chord of the arc made by this road between Chalons and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre was formed by an inferior road, though still a good one as roads then went, from Chalons by Champaubert and Montmirail direct to La Ferte, where it joined the chaussde.

(2) From Chaumont across the Aube at Bar-sur-Aube, then across the Seine at Troyes At

Nogent-sur-Seine it again crossed to the right bank of the Seine, finally crossing the Marne close to Paris.

(3) From Auxerre by the right bank of the Yonne to Sens, where it crossed to the left bank, passing again to the right bank of the Seine at Montereau, and joining (2) at the crossing of the Marne outside Paris.

There were many other roads of fair quality for the times, running both east and west, and north and south.

The " chaussees " and other roads had to pass many times across the Seine, Marne, and other streams, and we shall find the bridges frequently destroyed and repaired, often in the course of a few days, by each side alternately. The facility or difficulty of restoration often exercised an important influence on the course of operations.

Chapter II Brienne And La Rothiere

NAPOLEON, leaving Joseph In charge of Paris, of the Empress, and of the King of Rome, reached Chalons early on the 26th January, 18 14. He had been preceded there by Lefebvre-Desnoettes at the head of 1700 Guard cavalry. The troops available for immediate operations were :

Victor with the II corps and Milhaud with the ' 5th cavalry corps between Vitry and St. Dizier from 14,747* which their advanced guard had been driven on the 25th.

Marmont with the VI corps and Doumerc's ist ^ cavalry corps. He had only Lagrange's infantry at I 12,051 Vitry le Bruld and the cavalry. Ricard's division [ was on the march from St, Menehould to Vitry. J

Ney with three divisions of Young Guard | (Meunier's, Decouz's, and Rottembourg's) and | 14,505 Lefebvre-Desnoettes' cavalry at Chalons and Vitry. I