A critical history of philosophical theories

Preface

Philosophy is the result obtained by the employment of reason in the discovery of those fundamental principles that give unity and harmony to knowledge. It seeks to reduce complexity to simplicity, and multiplicity to unity, and to find the ultimate reality. Facts acquired by observation are explained by reason.

The history of philosophy is the record of these speculations and their results. A critical history of philosophy is a discriminating examination of the theories of the philosophers of the various schools, in order to test and confirm their truth, to expose their errors, to trace the relations of the different systems, the conflict of their principles, the occasions of their appearance, and the order of their development.

To understand the principles maintained by the philosophers of the various schools, the conflict of their principles, the reasons for their theories, and the connection of the various systems, is to understand philosophy itself. The phenomenal world is the product of two factors — the external world and the human mind; philosophy deals with both.

Uncritical thought accepts appearance as the sole reality. Science classifies phenomena and determines their laws, while philosophy attempts to find a rational explanation of phenomena as facts of experience. That is. Science treats of phenomena and their laws, while philosophy seeks for causes and the rational explanation of phenomena. Nothing can be more interesting or more stimulating to thought than the study of the relations of philosophy and science.

It will be found that no system of philosophy is without some merit, though it may be only a crude beginning, or a one-sided attempt to give an account of the mystery of existence. Broad views are requisite, if we wish to avoid the errors of all partial or incomplete systems.

As the mission of philosophy is to give a rational explanation of the phenomenal, it cannot, therefore, disregard the facts of experience, and still be true to its calling. On the other hand, to deal exclusively with phenomena, discarding the necessary principles which afford their rational explanation, is to abandon the guide of reason, or to resolve it into transformed sensation.

Herein is revealed the chief conflict in philosophy, as it exists between the empirical and rational schools. To

PREFACE

neglect facts is to lose sight of that which is to be explained; to discard necessary principles is to miss their true explanation. Either course is one-sided and doomed to failure. True philosophy is a combination of the two methods — ^the observation of phenomena, and their explanation by the aid of rational principles.

No study is more interesting than that of the theories and speculations of philosophers. These theories will pass in review in the course of this treatise, and their truth or falsity will be critically and candidly examined. If the reader will study these investigations, neither in a partisan spirit, nor in the temper of controversy, he will not fail of his reward. The distinction between things and ideas accords with the unbiased good sense of mankind.

The proper attitude of a philosopher is not that of a disciple of a great master, nor that of an advocate of a certain school of philosophy, but that of an independent thinker, and as such he will confer a benefit on other thinkers, not because of agreement, but rather because of divergence, and on that account his investigations will receive a more hearty welcome. Philosophy is the love of wisdom.

Contents

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I. The Milesian School 9

CHAPTER I The Milesian School

The Milesian School of Philosophy received its name from Miletus, the city of its chief philosophers — Thales, Anaximander and Anaximines. The term Ionic Philosophy is often applied to the Milesian School; but this term is too generic as it would include the philosophy of Heraclitus, which is distinct from that of the Milesian School, though the two are species of the same genus. Tlie^term Milesian School is, therefore, specifically what is needed.

1. Thales (640-548 B. C.)— Thales of Miletus was the first of the Milesian Philosophers, and, in fact, he was the first Greek philosopher. Standing by common consent, at the head of the seven wise men of Greece, the leader in philosophic speculation, noted for his mathematical, astronomical and scientific attainments, and for his practical sagacity and political influence, he is to be regarded as no ordinary man.

It is said that Thales predicted the solar ecUpse which occurred, according to the Julian calendar. May 28, 585 B. C. The probability, however, is that he only explained the cause of the eclipse after its occurrence. As a civil engineer, he superintended the changing of the course of the river Halys, by order of Croesus. His political influence is seen in that he dissuaded the Milesians from allying themselves with Croesus against Cyrus.

In opposition to the poets who explained the phenomena of the world by the intervention of mythical divinities, Thales sought for the principle of things in nature itself. He was, therefore, a natural philosopher. He found the ultimately real, the principle of the universe, in water, which he supposed to be endowed with life and motion. The important part which water evidently plays in the economy of nature, no doubt, confirmed him in this opinion. The first principle V ^PXVf is that from which all things are generated.

It is not probable, as Aristotle conjectured, that Thales was led to this view by the old mythological notion of the poets. Homer and Hesiod, who had ascribed the origin of all things to Oceanus and Tithys, or because the gods swear by water, for his whole proceeding is in opposition to mythology. His theory was based on the observation of facts; but that water is the principle of things, that it is the living and life-giving principle, affording by its motions, its modifications, its thickening and thinning, a satisfactory explanation of the countless phenomena of nature, cannot, for a moment, be entertained, though it plays no unimportant part.

How then can the theory of Thales be regarded as philosophical? Not because it gave a true explanation of the phenomena of nature, but because of its right methods, in discarding the mythical, and in seeking a natural explanation of things, and because of its aim in attempting to reduce multiplicity to unity and complexity to simplicity. The spirit of the theory of Thales is truly philosophical; for philosophy is the employment of reason in the discovery of those fundamental principles which give unity and harmony to thought. It goes back of phenomena to their conditions and cause. Science classifies phenomena, names and defines the classes, and discovers and verifies the laws according to which the phenomena occur.

2. Anaximander (610-547.) — ^Anaximander lived at Miletus, and was contemporary with Thales, though younger. He was a profound and influential thinker, pre-eminent for his geographical, mathematical, and astronomical knowledge.

Believing that water, the principle of Thales, is too determinate, since any definite form requires explanation, Anaximander conceiving that the ground of all things must itself be without form, yet boundless, and thus permitting the separation from itself of any form, or even opposite forms, assumed ri dpxy, the origin, first principle, or essence of things to be TO aTreipav, the infinite, unlimited, unbounded, or indeterminate. The r6 aweipov cannot, however, be pure unbounded space, which cannot be the origin of any thing; it must, therefore, be unbounded substance, analogous to ether, from which opposite elements, as hot and cold, moist and dry, are separated in the work of creation.

The apxVy or original essence, Anaximander probably held to be formless matter, as distinct from particular

THE MILESIAN SCHOOL 11

kinds of matter. It must be indeterminate, unbounded substance, TO a7r€ipov, original, uncreated and eternal, not exhausted in the production of the universe. To assume it produced by something back of itself, would be to assume the first principle not the first, which is a contradiction.

It is evident that if we assume this first principle to be spirit, instead of matter, and endowed with intelligence and will, we have the God of Theism.

Anaximander held that after the universe has run its course, it will collapse and return to its former nebular condition, which will develop, as in the past, and so on, over and over again, an eternal repetend.

The apxVf or t6 airtipov, of Anaximander, is the equivalent of the one substance of Spinoza, which he called Deus vel Natura. The evolution of the apxv anticipated, by two thousand years, the nebular hypothesis of Kant and La Place.

As a thinker, Anaximander was the most profound of the Milesian Philosophers. He sought for the foundation of things, which was itself without foundation, and therefore original and eternal. It is evident that something, other than space and time, must be original and eternal, otherwise there never would have been any other reality, save space and time themselves.

3. Anaximines (588-524.) — Anaximines rejected water, the principle of Thales, as too determinate, also to aTrupav, the principle of Anaximander as too indeterminate, and assumed air as the first principle. His system may, therefore, be regarded as a compromise between the philosophy of Thales and that of Anaximander.

Anaximines held that by rarification air became fire, and by condensation wind, clouds, water, rocks, metals. He considered air to be the substance of mind or spirit, as indicated by such words as ^vxv^ irvevfrn. The earth he believed to be a great circle, having thickness or depth, floating on the air. The thesis of Thales and the antitheses of Anaximander were thus combined in the synthesis of Anaximines. If water is too definite, air is so too, only perhaps, in a less degree.

4. Diogenes of Apollonia (478-428.) — Though not a Milesian, as to residence, Diogenes accepted Air, the principle of Anaximines, as the first principle, and held it to be intelligent; but this is implicit in the view of Anaximines, that air is the substance of mind or spirit. The assignment of intelligence to air, a material substance, conflicts with the later theory of Anaxagoras, that Novs, or spirit, is the first principle or originator of all other things. Here we see the beginning of a conflict continued to the present day, between Spiritualism and Materialism.

5. Remarks on the Milesian School, 1. The Milesian philosophy discarded the mythical explanation of phenomena in favor of the natural. Its point of departure was physical, and its philosophers were natural philosophers. 2. Neither water, the principle of Thales, nor air, that of Anaximines,' can be regarded as the first principle; for they are too determinate, and need to be accounted for. The principle, to airupav, of Anaximander, rests on higher ground, though it was not necessary to assume it material, which Anaximander did. He might as well have assumed it NoOs, that is Mind or Spirit, as Anaxagoras afterwards did, or left the alternative between matter and spirit to be decided later, according to which one would best explain the phenomena. 8. The Milesian philosophy is truly philosophical in aim, though there is no reason to suppose that it found the real first principle. 4. It has great interest as the beginning of philosophy.

CHAPTER II The Eleatic School

The philosophers of this school were Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno. Melissus of Samos was an adherent and supporter of this school, though not an original philosopher.

1. Xenophanes (circ. 5721-480.) — Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic philosophy, was a native of Colophon, a city of Ionia, in Asia Minor. In consequence of the Persian conquest of Ionia, Xenophanes left Colophon, and traveled as a poet and a rhapsodist through the cities of Greece, and finally settled in Elea, a city in Southern Italy. From Elea this school of philosophy derived its name.

Xenophanes held that "there is one God supreme among gods and men, resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind." Accordingly he sharply criticised the prevailing anthropomorphic conception of the gods, who in popular mythology, as in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, were represented in the likeness of men, and characterized by human faults, and were guilty of base immoralities. He said, in ridicule of this view: "If oxen and lions could paint, they would make the pictures of their gods in their likeness — ^horses would make them like horses, oxen like oxen." He said, in fact: "Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; Thracians give them blue eyes and red hair. "

Xenophanes was not an Atheist, for he speaks of the one supreme God; he was not a Polytheist, for he considered the other so-called gods, mythical. He was a Pantheist, since he denied the plurality of gods, and affirmed that the universe, not the phenomenal universe but the unchangeable, essential universe, is itself the Divine Being. He condemned the custom of exalting the physical qualities of men, as strength and agility, above their intellectual and moral attainments, as is done, when in public assemblies, the victor in athletic games, the boxer, the wrestler, the runner,is assigned the seat of honor above the philosopher or public benefactor.

Xenophanes held that philosophy is reasonable opinion, only probability, rather than certain knowledge. In common with all the Eleatic philosophers, his thoughts were concerned with the antitheses, being and not-being, the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable, the universal and the particular, assigning reality to being, the one, the permanent, the universal, and denying it to not-being, the many, the changeable, the particular.

Greater importance was assigned to the principles of reason than to the deliverances of the senses; hence the Eleatic philosophy is dialectical, logical, metaphysical, rather than sensational and empirical.

Xenophanes held to the truth of the axiom: Ex nihil nihil Jit, regarding it as self-evident that nonentity has no power of generation, which is an incontrovertible truth. He maintained that being, in the sense of unchangeable substance, is the principle of the universe, the ultimately real, and that change is not-being, the unreal. As being is unchanging substance, void space is not being, is in fact, inconceivable and impossible.

Xenophanes also held that whatever be the apparent changes in the phenomenal world, the one, the permanent, the unchangeable unity, is the only real, the essential universe, the principle of all things, the ultimate and the absolute being, the same from everlasting to everlasting. This view, changed from the pantheistic to the theistic conception, expresses the highest Christian thought of the present day. Theism holds that God is the ground of the universe, though distinguishable from it, while pantheism maintains that the universe itself is God in the unity of its essential being.

The ultimate reality is, without doubt, unchangeable in its essence, though it is not inactive, since it is the eternal First Cause whose energy produced the universe. The phenomenal though changeable, cannot be regarded as non-existent; for if non-existent it could not change. The Eleatic philosophy failed to explain change, and, therefore, denied its reality, but the fact of change is not disproved by its denial.

2. Parmenides (cir. 520-440.) — Parmenides, the most renowned of the philosophers of the Eleatic school, was held in high esteem by Plato, and greatly venerated by the thinkers of antiquity. He may be regarded as the metaphysician of

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL 15

the Eleatic School. Unchangeable being, the one only reality which to the mind of Xenophanes, was a poetic conception, became to the mind of Parmenides, a necessary truth apprehended by reason.

Parmenides, therefore, dwelt on the distinction between being and not-being, regarding it as self-evident that being is the true, the permanent, the unchangeable, the immutable, the principle, not simply pictured by the imagination, but apprehended, at once, by the reason as the necessary reality, while not-being is apprehended as the false, the transitory, the changeable, the mutable, the unreal. The phenomenal, however, is not refuted by its denial. It is the business of philosophy to account for the phenomenal, not to deny its reality.

The philosophy of Parmenides is known from his poem "Concerning Nature," a fragment of which has been preserved. The poem consists of two parts, the first " Concerning Truth/' the second ''Relating to Opinion.''

Parmenides represents himself as going in pursuit of truth in a chariot drawn by impetuous horses, symbols of the passions, escorted by the nymphs of the sun, symbols of the senses. At length he reaches two gates where the goddess of justice and truth stood with keys and opened the gates, the one the entrance to the path of light, the other to that of darkness. The first path is the way of reason leading to truth, to being, the constant, the real; the second path is the way of the senses leading to falsehood, to not-being, the variable, the unreal, the non-existent.

It is right here that the philosophy of Parmenides fails. The real is not necessarily the unchangeable; it may be either constant or variable. The sum of the three angles of a plane triangle is the constant two right angles, while the sum of the sides is a variable that may have any length between the limits zero and infinity; but the sum of the sides, though variable, is no less real than the sum of the angles though constant.

According to Parmenides, the changeable, the phenomenal universe of the senses does not exist; but if it has no existence, how can it change? It is not being, if being is the unchangeable. The truth is, the phenomenal, the appearance through the senses, though not permanent, is real as appearance; it finds its ground and explanation in the truth of being^ the unchangeable, which is apprehended by reason. An event has its explanation in cause, the energy of substantial being.

Viewing the unchangeable as true being, and the changeable as not-being, Parmenides could not reconcile the two, and therefore denied existence to the changeable. Accordingly we have the world of unity, the essential real world, apprehended by reason, and the phenomenal, the unreal world of the senses. Parmenides, however, did not save the phenomenal world by calling it the world of appearances, but annihilated it by calling it not-being in the sense of the non-existent; it exists, if changeable, but is explained by the essentially unchangeable. Being, not the inactive dead-head, but substance, energetic reality, involving power or capability of casual activity, is really the true eternal first principle.

3. Zeno (circ. 500-440.) — Zeno was not only a philosopher, but a patriot, and died a martyr in the defense of the liberty of Elea, his native city. He is to be distinguished from Zeno, the founder of the Stoic philosophy.

Zeno may be called the logician of the Eleatic school, as Parmenides was its metaphysician. Parmenides aflBrmed that reason apprehended the unchangeable as the real, and, therefore, since two contradictories cannot both be true, the changeable must be unreal. Zeno undertook to prove, by the reductio ad absurdum method of reasoning, that the changeable is impossible.

To prove the impossibility of motion, he said that Achilles, the swift-footed, could never overtake the slow-going tortoise. To use modern measurements, let us assume that, on a straight road, the tortoise is ahead of Achilles one furlong, or 40 rods, the length of one side of a square field containing 10 acres, and that both are running in the direction from Achilles to the tortoise, Achilles running 10 times as fast as the tortoise. When Achilles has reached the first position of the tortoise it is not there, but is 1/10 of a furlong ahead, and when Achilles has reached that second position of the tortoise, it is 1/100 fur. ahead, and when Achilles has reached that third position, the tortoise is 1/1000 fur. ahead and so on ad infinitum; therefore, in finite time, Achilles never could overtake the tortoise; but as he does overtake it, and could actually pass it, we have here a contradiction, on the supposition that motion is real; hence motion is not real. Let us see:

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL 17

Let t denote the time required, and that Achilles can reach the first position of the tortoise in 1 minute, then he can reach the second position in 1/10 of a minute, after reaching the first, and the third in 1/100 of a minute after reaching the second, and so on; hence,

(1) t =1 +1/10 +1/100 +1/1000 + . . . , ad infinitum. Multiplying both members of (1) by 1/10, we have

(2) 1/10 / =1/10+1/100+1/1000+ ... ad infinitum. Substracting equation (2) from (1), member by member,

we have

(3) 9/10 / =1; .' .t =10/9 minutes =1 1/9 minutes. Observe that excepting the term (1) the second members

are alike, and will cancel in the subtraction.

To show that the sum of an infinite number of decreasing terms may not exceed a finite limit, take 1/2 of anything, the half of the remainder, or 1/4 of the thing, then 1/2 of the remaining 1/4, or 1/8 of the thing, and so on ad infinitum, and we shall have 1/2 +1/4 +1/8 +1/16 + . . . , ad infinitum, which can never exceed 1, or the thing itself, since we never take the whole of what is left, but only 1/2 of it.

Zeno said a finite body is impossible; for let it be divided into an infinite number of parts, the sum of the parts should equal the whole. The parts either have magnitude or no magnitude. If the parts have magnitude, the sum would have infinite magnitude, since there are an infinite number of parts; but if the parts have no magnitude, the whole would have no magnitude, since the sum of any number of zeros is zero. To refute this reasoning let the body h be divided into n parts,each part is 1/n 6,and the sum of the parts nxl/nb ==b whatever be the value of n, since the ns cancel.

Remarks: 1. The Eleatic philosophy, though claiming to be based on reason, was one-sided and therefore imperfect, and doomed to failure.

2. A reaction was inevitable, and this appeared in the philosophy of Heraclitus.

CHAPTER III Heraclitus and Pythagoras

These philosophers can be conveniently treated in the same chapter. They are not directly related, though each stands as the founder and embodiment of a system.

1. Heraclitus (circ. 535-475.) — Heraclitus, the son of Blyson, was born at Ephesus, and was of noble family. He was a descendant of Androclus, the founder of Ephesus. His hereditary right to the chief magistracy he resigned in favor of his younger brother that he might devote himself to the study of philosophy, despairing also of accomplishing anything for the state on account of the corruptions of the people.

Heraclitus stands for the opposition to the Eleatic School, and therefore denied the permanent, which the Eleatics affirmed, and affirmed the changeable, which the Eleatics denied.

The Eleatics could not reconcile the permanent and changeable, and therefore denied the changeable. They took for their principle Being, that is the permanent, the unchangeable. They called the changeable not-heing, the non-existent.

Neither did Heraclitus attempt to reconcile the permanent and the changeable. He therefore denied the permanent, and took for his principle Becoming, unceasing change, such as we see in nature, in the vicissitudes of summer and winter, day and night, growth and decay. Unceasing change is going on in everything, though at different rates. Things apparently permanent, as rocks, have internal activities which never cease.

Becoming, the principle of Heraclitus, seems therefore more perfectly to represent the universe, as it appears to us, than Being, the principle of the Eleatics. Becoming, however, is known to us empirically, through the senses, and by consciousness, and is not therefore a principle of reason. Back of all change there must be something permanent, the First Cause, the origin of the changing. The First Cause, though essentially immutable, in its essence, is not therefore dormant, but

HERACLITUS AND PYTHAGORAS 19

by ceaseless energy is carrying forward the universe to its final consummation. Change, however, cannot be the first principle. Every change requires a cause. Motion may be as natural to a body as rest, and therefore needs no explanation; but every change in motion, whether in velocity or direction, requires a cause. The explanation of every change is found in cause, the essential energy of substantial being. Change, therefore, being phenomenal and known by experience, needs to be accounted for, and cannot be the first principle, the true universal. As an evient, any change needs explanation. The first principle is, therefore, not change, but cause, which is apprehended by reason as energy or efficiency, and manifests itself in every movement as energetic being. The principle of change, and even of being itself, is the energy which maintains its own existence and the stability, the order, and the harmony of the universe. Cause is, therefore, a deeper first principle than the material sensibles of the Milesians, or the being of the Eleatics, or the becoming of Heraclitus. In cause we reach the true explanation of change.

His principle of incessant change and his love of paradox led Heraclitus to affirm contraries of the same object, as that a thing is and at the same instant, is not. Thus, to test this hypothesis, let water at the freezing point be subjected to heat and call the states of temperature. A, B, C, etc., then Heraclitus would say: A is not- A, and not- A is B; B is not-B, and not-B is (7, and so on.

Let us subject this process of thought to a little vigorous logic: If A is not- A and not- A is jB, then A is B; if B is not-B and not-B is C, then B is C, and since A is 5, then A is C, and so on till the water boils. Then the water is freezing and boiling, and at the same instant, has all intermediate temperatures !

The law of thought that conflictives cannot exist in the same object, at the same time, forbids the affirmation that A is not- A, but no law of thought forbids us saying that not- A is B, Diverse attributes may exist in the same object at the same time, but not conflictive attributes, since they would destroy each other. A body may be both spherical and red at the same time, but can not be at the same instant, both spherical and cubical.

Heraclitus uttered many profound truths, as: "A man's character is his fate." "Wisdom is the foremost virtue." " Lovers of wisdom should know many things. "

2. Pythagoras (circ. 580-500.) — Many mythical stories cling about the life of Pythagoras, but from the most reliable accounts, those given by Philolaus, a Pythagorean and a contemporary of Socrates, and by Aristotle, and later by Sextus Empiricus, we learn that he was the son of Mnesarchus, an engraver. He was born in Samos, one of the principal and most fertile of the islands of the Aegean Sea. At the age of twenty he traveled for twelve years, visiting Ionia, Phoenicia, and probably Egypt, and finally settled at Crotona, in Magna Graecia, or Southern Italy, where he founded a school of philosophy. He taught mathematics, physics, astronomy, and morals.

According to Heraclitus, Pythagoras was the most learned man of his time. Thales introduced geometry into Ionia, but Pythagoras raised it to the rank of a science. He made many mathematical discoveries among which is the celebrated theorem, still known as the Pythagorean: The square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other sides. In honor of this discovery, it is said, he offered a hecatomb of oxen as a sacrifice to the immortal Gods. In astronomy, Pythagoras, or more probably his successors, taught the theory of a central fire around which revolved the heavenly bodies including the sun and the earth.

In his school at Crotona, Pythagoras not only taught mathematics and astronomy and philosophy, but inculcated the importance of seeking for physical and mental perfection, and of cultivating the art of self-control, good manners, and upright moral character.

Silence for one year was required of the novitiate in the meetings of the society and a rigid discipline was imposed on all the members. Women were admitted to his school on terms of equality with men, a remarkably advanced step for that early age.

Pythagoras was, therefore, a social, moral and political reformer, but the aristocratic character of his society, its secret methods and wide-spread influence, excited suspicion, and aroused the hostility of the common people. The society was broken up by a mob, and its members dispersed. Pythagoras went to Metapontum where he spent the rest of his life in comparative quiet.

HERACLITUS AND PYTHAGORAS 21

The doctrines of Pythagoras have been obscured by legends; disregarding the myths, we may still derive, from the most reliable sources, a fairly correct knowledge of his doctrines. To account for the order of the universe, Pythagoras assumed number as the first principle. Mathematical relations are found everywhere, and seem to afford explanation of the order of the universe, which is, therefore, a cosmos abounding in harmony and proportion. Even morals were represented by geometric symbols. Thus a square stood for justice which may throw light on the modern expression, '' 'I will do it on the square, " and his mathematical principles stood for moral truths. His first principles were, however, arithmetical rather than geometrical, perhaps because the properties, even of geometric forms, were expressed by ratio, which is essentially number. Pythagoras thus conceived number, which is present in all things, to be a truer first principle than water, or indeterminate matter, or air, the principles of the Milesians. A principle of reason, instead of a material principle, was assumed as the explanation of the phenomena of the universe.

It is evident, however, that number does not constitute the essence of things. Thus take ten horses and ten trees. The number is the same. If the number is the essence the two groups ought to be essentially alike, which is not the case. Number, therefore, does not account for the difference, nor for the peculiarity of anything whatever; it affords no explanation of essence.