An examination of the philosophy of the unknowable as expounded by Herbert Spencer

CHAPTER I. The Issue

Introductory Remarks.

§. 1. Citations to be hereafter made will show that Mr. Spencer holds, and has endeavored to prove, that we can know nothing of the External World, save its bare existence; nothing of Mental Substance, save its bare existence; and noTEing of the Intrinsic Nature of mental modes, except that something of the kind exists. Otherwise stated, I conceive the theory to be, that, of reality external to consciousness, nothing but the existence can be known. As stated in still a third form, the doctrine seems to consist in the belief that all* without the sphere of consciousness Is, in respect of its nature, — that is, the sum of its attributes minus its existence, — absolutely unknowable. Some realization of the equivalence of these three modes of expression is essential to an appreciation of the discussions which are to follow.

To the scheme of nescience, substantially as above set forth, I oppose the doctrine that we are capable of realizing something of the nature of things occupying the region outside of consciousness. It is not meant by this that immediate knowledge of anything ooi present in consciousness is possible. X.> <me i> more firmly convinced than myself that there can I"' no consciousness, strictly so-called, of what fa beyond consciousness.

2 THE ISSUE.

But that there can be genuine thought of something not within consciousness, is an independent proposition, and the one here urged as true.

It will be perceived, by those who have read thus far, that, as regards the question in dispute, Mr. Spencer is at great disadvantage of position. To the disadvantage necessarily accruing to one who undertakes to establish a contested proposition, there is added, in Mr. Spencer's case, the greater disadvantage inherent in the effort to establish a rule as absolutely without exception. His task is far less arduous whose success is attainable by breaking a single link in a chain of reasoning, or forcing recognition of a single exception to a rule. While, however, it is obligatory upon any one to avail himself, in discussion, of every advantage which he can, in moderate self-gratulation, attribute to the greater justness of the views he has adopted, he should scorn to avail himself of any mere controversial formality. Ours is not the age of quibblings over the "the affirmative" and "the negative;" and no such quibblings shall the reader find. Wherever he finds denial, he shall find affirmation; wherever he finds attempted refutation of an important doctrine, he shall find an endeavor to establish another doctrine in its stead. In this connection it is also well to mention that the dry and rigid epitome, above presented, gives no adequate idea of the entertaining variety of important topics which Mr. Spencer subordinated to his main design. All these are to be drawn into the discussion. To the reader may be promised, therefore, something more substantial than mere logical statement of the issue would lead him to anticipate.

§ 2. The issue is not between Mr. Spencer, on the one hand, and a single opponent, on the other; nor is it of recent advent. "The question of an external world," said Mr. Mill, "is the great battle-ground of metaphysics." Says an eminent contemporary metaphysician: "In this border country there has been a war for ages in the past, and there is likely to be a war for ages in the future." Over all external to consciousness, let us add, the conflict extends, engaging about as many factions as

THE ISSUE. 3

there are philosophers. Whoever enlists in it will find that the greatest are his allies and the greatest his opponents.

This is, therefore, no attack upon Mr. Spencer personally. He is the most dangerous of adversaries, and one of the most worthy of men. But, as the latest authoritative exponent of a certain philosophic tendency, there is no proper alternative between attacking his reasonings or refraining from the attack. Again, the sentiments here upheld are not peculiar to myself. They are those of a numerous class of enquirers, and are even entertained by mankind at large. It can scarcely be presumptuous to side with so many, although to do so is to decide against the rest. One thing that may seem presumptuous is to risk the defeat which has been repeatedly visited upon the strong. But if the contest is to be continued, and its antiquity and present unsettled state imply that it is, there must be a continual coming of recruits. He who thinks he has novel tactics to try should come forward and give them trial.

§ 3. To the issue, the Doctrine of Evolution is not a party. There is, it is true, a connection between what I have called the "Philosophy of the Unknowable " and the Philosophy of Evolution ; but it is' not that of foundation and superstructure.

Mr. Spencer has, indeed, prefaced the exposition of his System of Philosophy by a systematic treatise on "The Unknowable;" and he does, moreover, return to the subject again and again throughout his writings, to give his views 1 hereon further expression, elucidation, and confirmation. His theory of knowledge he considers, not a doctrine of metaphysics only, but a biological, psychological, and even a sociological doctrine as well. Under the title of "Transfigured Realism," too, he gives it consideration not otherwise bestowed.

Yet it is not indispensable to the Philosophy of Evolution, I >i 1 1 is rather a complication from which thai philosophy should be glad to extricate itself. Thai evolution is only a law of appearances, not a law of things, ifl a thought fraught with disheartenment and burdened by a weight of complex subtilties. No evolutionist should harbor Bentimenl repugnant to the t<'n< t

4 THE ISSUE.

that realities are the subject-matter of the process of evolution and of the Evolution Philosophy. But if he must entertain a prejudice, let it not lead him into suspicion that he hears a voice from the hostile camp. In my own case, at least, I find the fullest acceptance of criticisms to be propounded not incompatible with estimation of the "Synthetic Philosophy " as perhaps the noblest speculative product of a single mind.

A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY.

CHAPTER II. A Fundamental Fallacy

The Impossibility of Establishing Unknowableness.

§ 4. On slightest acquaintance with Mr. Spencer's agnostic conclusions, there is enough to raise the question, How is it possible to establish the proposition that something is unknowable? Accordingly with this question the examination shall begin. Incidentally to the search for an answer, the reader shall be introduced to the whole line of argument which it is my intention to investigate.

The following is an epitome of the treatise on "The Unknowable:" " Common Sense asserts the existence of a reality; Objective Science proves that this reality cannot be what we think it; Subjective Science shows why we cannot think of it as it K and yet are compelled to think of it as exMng; and in this assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature, Religion finds an assertion essentially coinciding with her own." (First Prin., § 27.)

I 5. (J ran ting that "Common Sense asserts the existence of a reality," which -hull be provisionally called "The Unknowable," we will first enquire in what manner Objective Science i- supposed to aid in proving that this reality i- bo far from being what we think it, that it is "utterly inscrutable in nature."

To deduce unknowableness from knowledge of "The Unknowable," would have been absurd, so what doubtless appeared t<> be an alternative method was adopted. It seemed t<» Mi-. Spencer that if successful in showing that every idea, vulgarly supposed to be representative of the nature of "The Unknowable," conflicts witli itself, lie would have the testimony of Objective Science in Buppoii of his position. Pursuant bo such view, he makes an attack upon all possible conceptions of the Origin of the Universe. These, if he commits no error, are demonstrated self-conflicting. Next, he grapples with the mental representation of Causation, and brings it before us, denuded of obscurity, that Mansel may point out its self-opposing tendencies. This disposition of " Ultimate Religious Ideas" being made, " Ultimate Scientific Ideas " are treated in a similar manner. The notions expressed by the terms, " Space, " " Time," "Matter," " Motion," "Force," "Extent of Consciousness," and "Mental Substance," are severally examined for the purpose of showing that each, when expanded, combats itself.

We can aiford to be very generous with Mr. Spencer. Let it, for experiment, be conceded that he has been entirely successful in showing, that what we have heretofore deemed knowledge of " The Unknowable," the knowledge that it exists excepted, "proves on examination to be utterly irreconcilable with itself." (First Prin., § 22.) Nevertheless a gap effectually separates the premise from the conclusion. A certain portion of the universe was to be proved unknowable. Our ideas of it are, with one exception, shown to be utterly incongruous. The conclusion is, that there is a total non-resemblance between these ideas and the part of the universe in question. But what shall be said to the polemic who will argue that this, the so-called "Unknowable," may, in exact correspondence with what have been esteemed its representatives in the world of mind, sustain necessary conflicts among its parts? Worse than hopeless would it be to rely upon the declaration that it is impossible to pronounce this assertion true or false ; for, if its falsity is not known, none can deny its truth; and if true, "The Unknowable" is known. Of one defence, and one only, can Mr. Spencer avail himself. He must maintain that "The Unknowable" is free from the conflicts which overwhelm the ideas commonly thought to represent it — that the notion of its self-consistency is as legitimate as the notion of its existence. The defence, that existence involves self-consistency, is not open to him; because he denies this in the case of the contested ideas. Such an inconsistency as the ideas have, may realities be supposed to have, unless the contrary be shown. Understand that if the proposition missing from Mr. Spencer's argument is implied, he has not only affirmed of "The Unknowable" a general and abstract consistency, but also denied that it possesses any of a multitude of special and concrete inconsistencies. Every time he showed, or tried to show, us an imperfection in the ideas which he impugned, he said, by implication, "The Unknowable is not subject to an imperfection answering to this one." Justice will be done if he be permitted to speak his own accusation. " In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us the truth, that we are not permitted to know — nay are not even permitted to conceive — that Reality which is behind the veil of Appearance; and yet it is said to be our duty to believe (and in so far to conceive) that this Reality exists in a certain defined manner." (First Prin., § 31.) The "certain defined manner," in the case before us, is the possession of congruity and the freedom from certain incongruities.

Thus it appears that the first proof that something is unknowable, rests on the supposition that more of it than its existence is known. Of course all would more willingly hear "The Unknowable" called congruous than incongruous. It is not this description, but the name and something said to justify its application, to which objection is made. That the objection lias been sustained by criticism, that there has been discovered, in the reasoning of Mr. Spencer, a difficulty from which he cannot extricate himself, they who still doubt may satisfy themselves by considering what answers he can offer to the question, Is the unknowable portion of the universe a chaos corresponding to that mental chaos which you tell US OUT thoughts of something beyond the knowable compose? Refusing to answer, he would abandon his argument. Should he say "yes," he would deny his conclusion. Should he say "no," he would

be thereby debarred it- affirmation, lie musl answer t<» avoid

a surrender; yet any answer will defeat his cause.

§ ('). Although Objective Science has jusi taught us, by its example, to think of the inscrutable reality as congruous, we are now to learn how " Subjective Science shows why we cannot think of it as it is." Reduced to syllogistic form, the argument to be next investigated seems, a minor premise being supplied, to stand thus:

There can be no knowledge of what is unconditioned; "The Unknowable" is unconditioned; .'.There can be no knowledge of "The Unknowable."

To which, one objection is that the minor premise destroys the conclusion. Asserting that "The Unknowable" is unconditioned, carries the implication that it is known to be unconditioned. Lest it be thought unfair to present so briefly an elaborate argument, and particularly unfair to summarily supply a minor premise, it will be well to go further into detail. First, however, it must be premised that the author has, because of supposed appropriateness, given to "The Unknowable" several titles, not yet mentioned, each of which is significant of a part of what is imported by "unconditioned," — significant of the absence of certain particular conditions.

Assisted by Hamilton and Mansel, Mr. Spencer, in the chapter entitled " The Relativity of All Knowledge," puts forth considerable effort to convince us that "a thought involves relation, difference, likeness." (First Prin., § 24.) By this is meant that every thought involves a relation of subject and object; also a difference and a likeness between the object and something else. So much being granted, it would follow that whatever cannot exist in relation to the thinking mind, and be known as different from something else, and as like something else, cannot be thought of at all. Because seeming not to fulfill the specified conditions of the thinkable, "the Real, as distinguished from the Phenomenal;" "the First Cause;" "the Infinite;" "the Absolute," or non-relative; "the creating;" "the uncaused;" "the Actual," as opposed to the "Apparent" — in short, "the Unconditioned" — is pronounced unthinkable, and the conclusion that "The Unknowable" can never be an object of thought is treated as too obvious to need definite expression.

From his own words we may best learn how Mr. Spencer passes to the ultimate conclusion from the law of relativity. After quoting largely to show that "the Unconditioned" has been put to the first and second tests and found unthinkable, he proceeds ( First Prin., § 24 ) to apply the third axiom — what can be known can be classed. "A cognition of the Real, as distinguished from the Phenomenal, must, if it exists, conform to this law of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought of, it must be thought of as such or such — as of this or that kind. Can it be like in kind to anything of which we have sensible experience? Obviously not. Between the creating and the created, there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions existing between different divisions of the created. That which is uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is caused: the two being, in the very naming antithetically opposed. The Infinite cannot be grouped along with something that is finite; since, in being so grouped, it in ust be regarded as not-infinite. It is impossible to put the Absolute in the same category with anything relative, so long as the Absolute is defined as that of which no necessary relation can be predicated. Is it then that the Actual, though unthinkable by classification with the Apparent, is thinkable by classification with itself? This supposition is equally absurd with the other. It implies the plurality of the First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute; and this implication is self-contradictory. There cannot be more than one First Cause; seeing that the existence of more than one would involve the existence <>f something necessitating more than one, which something would he the true First ( ause. How self-destructive is the assumption of two or more infinities, i> manifest <>n remembering that such Infinities, by limiting each other, would become finite. And similarly, an Absolute which existed imt alone but along with

other absolutes, would do Longer be an absolute hut a relative.

The Unconditioned therefore, a- claSSlble neither with any form of the conditioned nor with any other Unconditioned, cannot

he classed at all. And to admit that it cannot he known ;i- of such or such kind, is to admit that it IS unkuowahli/' A few words more, and the entire argument is thus summarized and ended: "a thought involves relation, difference, likeness. Whatever does not present each of these does not admit of cognition. And hence we may say that the Unconditioned, as presenting none of them is trebly unthinkable."

What, if we assent to all this, does it establish in regard to " The Unknowable?" A multiplicity of names, signifying the possession of certain characteristics, has been given to it; and these characteristics have, it is thought, been proved incognizable. Does "The Unknowable" possess these characteristics? is now the all-important question. To profess ignorance, is to yield the argument. To deny, is to leave a gap in the argument and violate the conclusion. To affirm, is to complete the argument by violating the conclusion. Mr. Spencer has indicated a willingness to seize the last horn of the trilemma. By indulging in reasoning which postulates such knowledge, he has asserted that " The Unknowable " is real ( not phenomenal ), a first cause, infinite, absolute (non-relative), creating, uncaused, actual (not apparent): in brief, unconditioned. Surely this is an amount of information which we do not possess concerning many things that are called knowable. ISTot yet, however, have the limits been reached. All that has been affirmed of that possessing its alleged attributes, has been affirmed of "The Unknowable." It is, we are to understand, of such a nature that it cannot exist in relation to the knowing mind. In other words, we know "The Unknowable" as so conditioned that it is incapable of that relative existence without which any knowledge of it is impossible. Add to the intelligence already accumulated the knowledge that "The Unknowable" is neither like nor unlike anything else existing ; and consider the numberless implications which might be developed and added to the sum. Should not "The Unknowable" be called by another name? Mr. Spencer must answer affirmatively or disavow many beliefs essentially implied in his mode of proof; but in the latter case he has proved nothing in regard to " The Unknowable." What matters it, as far as the question before us is concerned, whether a long list of attributes is conceivable or inconceivable, if they are not known to belong to a The Unknowable?" Admit that "The Unknowable" is not known to be unconditioned, and we care not if "the Unconditioned" is unthinkable. Concede it impossible to say knowingly that "The Unknowable" has peculiarities which must forever prevent its existing relative to something knowing it, and in relations of likeness and unlikeness, and it will be necessary to consider all that has been so far said about the relativity of knowledge utterly irrelevant. Ineffective from end to end is the argument, unless the thought that "The Unknowable" is unconditioned, is as legitimate as the thought that it exists.

§ 7. Notwithstanding the premise, above implied, and elsewhere repeatedly expressed, that "The Unknowable" transcends all relation, we are now to be shown how it is related to the mind; and the purpose is to farther convince us that "we cannot think of it as it is." From a point of view widely separated from that which he lately occupied, Mr. Spencer, in additional support of his theory of the unknowableness of something which exists, directs our attention (First Prin., § 25) to what purports to be the relativity of knowledge presenting another aspect. " Life," he says, " is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." "If then," he argues, "Life, in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations, the necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes obvious." 11 If every act of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in the environment, then the relativity of knowledge is self-evident — becomes indeed a truism." Judging from what ha- been cited, one mighl be led to suppose that the relat ivity spoken of consists of relation- between phenomena, relations between noumena, relations between phenomena and noumena, and relation- between phenomenal and noumena] relation-. Taking, however, all that is said into consideration, the meaning seems to be, that only phenomenal relation-, or relation- in consciousness, can ever come "withini the reach of intelligence;" and that the impossiblity of transcending these relations proves noumena and their relations unknowable.

Witness the following: "The knowledge within our reach, is the only knowledge that can be of service to us. This maintenance of a correspondence between internal actions and external actions, which both constitutes our life at each moment and is the means whereby life is continued through subsequent moments, merely requires that the agencies acting upon us shall be known in their co-existences and sequences, and not that they shall be known in themselves." Remarks immediately following show this to mean that the necessities of life require a knowledge, not of noumena, but merely of the co-existences and sequences of the effects which noumena produce in consciousness. " If x and y are two uniformly connected proj:>erties in some outer object, while a and b are the effects they produce in our consciousness; and if while the property x produces in us the indifferent mental state a, the property y produces in us the painful mental state b (answering to a physical injury); then, all that is requisite for our guidance, is, that x being the uniform accompaniment of y externally, a shall be the uniform accompaniment of b internally; so that when, by the presence of x, a is produced in consciousness, b, or rather the idea of 6, shall follow it, and excite the motions by which the effect of y may be escaped. The sole need is that a and b and the relation between them, shall always answer to x and y and the relation between them. It matters nothing to us if a and b are like x and y or not. Could they be exactly identical with them, we should not be one whit the better off; and their total dissimilarity is no disadvantage to us." Immediately after comes ^he conclusion of the argument. "Deep down then in the very nature of Life, the relativity of our knowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital actions in general, leads not only to the conclusion that things in themselves cannot be known to us ; but also to the conclusion that knowledge of them, were it possible, would be useless."

What has all this to do with " The Unknowable ? " Are we to understand that it is believed to comprise "things in themselves " which are known to be so constituted and connected with consciousness that a knowledge of their nature would not enable us to better procure the desirable and avoid the undesirable effects which they may produce upon us ? Silence on Mr. Spencer's part means death to the argument ; negation, abortion ; affirmation, self-destruction. Implicitly he affirms. "In the very definition of Life," he tells us, "when reduced to its most abstract shape," the "ultimate implication becomes visible." According to this definition, Life is "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." Because in this view of life is involved the belief that "every act of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in the environment," it is deemed beyond dispute that the mind can and need contemplate relations in consciousness only, and that therefore the environment is unknowable. But stop: it is impossible to realize that life is "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," or that "every act of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in the environment," without forming a relation in consciousness that is not parallel to a relation in the environment, but representative of a relation between the environment and the environed mind. Now, as in the author's words, "tin- consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both the related members" (First Prin., § 26), the knowledge of a relation between them proclaims the mind and its environment knowable and known. " In the very definition of life," then, as in everything which we have found Mr, Spencer employing for the same purpose, "this ultimate implication becomes visible" — the nature of "The Unknowable" is partly known. Besides being known as one of the terms of a certain kind of relation, it is, according to implication- of remarks concerning the necessities of life, minutely understood. Knowing that promotion of life "merely requires thai the agencies : i « - 1 1 1 1 ir upon n- shall he known in their co-existences and sequences, and imt that they shall l>c knowD in themselves" — thai the record of past manifestations of "The Unknowable" will just as well enable us to regulate the character of future manifestations, as would a perfect understanding of "The Unknowable" and all the relations which it may possibly bear to us — is impossible unless "The Unknowable" is exceedingly well known. Repeatedly we discover the one unlawful implication. Again Mr. Spencer has thwarted his own design.

§ 8. With the assertion that we cannot think of "The Unknowable " as it is, fresh in our memory, we are called upon to listen to an argument, supplementary of those preceding, yet based on the supposition that we may rightly think of it as a cause.

An entire chapter ( First Prin., Part I., Chap. I.) is devoted principally to establishment of the doctrine that "there must be a fundamental harmony" between Science and Religion; and another (First Prin., Part I., Chap. V.) to showing that this fundamental harmony is to be found in the conclusion that u the reality underlying appearances is totally and for ever inconceivable by us." The former chapter is almost unobjectionable; the latter is open to destructive criticism. In it we are told that in the " assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature, Religion finds an assertion essentially coinciding with her own ; " and this is what we question. How Science, represented by Mr. Spencer, proves the conclusion which is to end the Avar between Scientists and Religionists, by contradicting it, — how she uncovers something, to show it to be totally and eternally hidden from our view, has been observed. Forgetting this, as best we may, let us suppose that Science supports the conclusion that promises to harmonize her and her great antagonist. Will religious thought tend to the acceptance of the same belief?

Religion is represented as having been forced to abandon position after position, retreating before advancing Science, until the impregnable point, the ultimate conclusion, was reached. "Leaving out the accompanying moral code, which is in all cases a supplementary growth, a religious creed is definable as a theory of original causation." (First Prin., § 14.) As religions developed, existing theories of causation gave way to others. " Each higher religious creed, rejecting those delinite and simple interpretations of nature previously given, has become more religious by doing this. As the quite concrete and conceivable agencies alleged as the causes of things, have been replaced by agencies less concrete and conceivable, the element of mystery has of necessity become more predominant." (First Prim, § 28.) "And now observe that all along, the agent which has effected the purification has been Science." (First Prin., § 29.) Here we must pause to consider of what the alleged development consists. It is asserted that Religion, d by Science, has, from time to time, abandoned causes relatively conceivable and assumed causes less conceivable. Note that Religion is not shown to have ever given up the hypothesis of causation. That the contrary is true, we are frequently reminded. Defining religious creeds as theories of original causation, is the same as affirming that they Avill be something else than religious creeds when they exclude belief in a cause. What says the author? " Be it in the primitive Ghost-theory which assumes a human personality behind each unusual phenomenon; be it in Polytheism, in which these personalities are partially generalized; be it in Monotheism, in which they are wholly generalized; or be it in Pantheism, in which the generalized personality becomes one with the phenomena; we equally find an hypothesis which is supposed to render the universe comprehensible. Nay, even that which is commonly regarded as the negation of all Religion — even positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for it, too, in asserting the Self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion, which

irdfl as adequate causo of every appearance, propounds an

a priori theory from which it holds the facts to be deducihle."

(Firsl Prin., § 14.) Elsewhere, as well as here, the assertion is withheld, that Religion has consented, or will consent, to dispense with all causes. No more is said than thai "instead of die specific comprehensible agency before assigned, (here is substituted a less specific and Less comprehensible agency." (First Prin., ^ 29.) Could any doubl in regard to Mi-. Spencer's meaning remain, it would l>e dispelled by the words of the alleged ultimate religious conclusion. To this we now pass.

"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon ; though Omnipresence is unthinkable, yet, as experience discloses no bounds to the diffusion of phenomena, we are unable to think of limits to the presence of this Power; while the criticisms of Science teach us that this Power is Incomprehensible. And this consciousness of an Incomprehensible Power, called Omnipresent from inability to assign its limits, is just that consciousness on which Religion dwells." (First Prin., § 27.)