The uncaused being and the criterion of truth; to which is appended an examination of the views of Sir Oliver Lodge concerning the ether of space

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. Introductory 1

II. General Considerations and the

Foreword

This work was completed before the death of William James, professor of philosophy in Harvard University, and the criticisms of his Pluralistic philosophy stand exactly as then written, without additions or alterations of any kind. As a man, Prof. James was beloved by all who knew him, and his benevolent nature and open mindedness endeared him to many whose philosophical views differed radically from his own.

But esteem for the man should not disarm criticism of the writings he has laid before the world. In his last work, "A Pluralistic Universe," Prof. James, in declaring for a finite God, strikes at the very foundation of Monotheism. Polytheism, with all of its absurdities, is the logical outcome of such a philosophy. Prof. James seems to have been so weighed down by the presence of so much suffering in the world that he could not reconcile it with the existence of an Omnipotent Deity. He therefore declares in his "Pluralistic Universe": — "I believe that the only God worthy of the name must be finite. ... If the Absolute exist in addition, and the hypothesis must, in spite of its irrational features, still be left open, then the absolute is only the wider Cosmic whole of which v vi FOREWORD

our God is but the most ideal portion, and which in the more usual human sense is hardly to be termed a religious hypothesis at all. Cosmic emotion is the better name for the reaction it may awaken. Observe that all the irrationality and puzzles which the Absolute gives rise to, and from which the finite God remains free, are due to the fact that the Absolute has nothing, absolutely nothing, outside itself. The finite God whom I contrast with it may conceivably have almost nothing outside of himself ; He may have triumphed over and absorbed all but the minutest fraction of the Universe, but that fraction, however small, reduces him to the status of a relative being, and in principle the Universe is saved from all the irrationalism incidental to absolutism. . . . Because God is not the Absolute, but is himself a part when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other smaller parts, as similar to our functions, consequently. Having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves, he escapes from the foreignness of all that is human."

The -finite Being here depicted is shorn of the chief attributes of Deity — creative power and Omnipotence — and there is no good reason why there should not be a multitude of such limited beings.

FOREWORD vii

But this is not the place to enter upon a criticism of Prof. James's philosophy; this is done under the head of Polytheism.

Chapter I Introductory

It is doubtful if arguments concerning the existence of a Creator can be advanced which will be satisfactory to all minds.

To one the dictum of Descartes, "J'ai tire la preuve de V existence de Dieu de Videe que je trouve en moi d'un etre souverainement parfait," is all sufficing. Another looks abroad on nature and sees in the starry heavens and the broad expanse of ocean unanswerable arguments for the existence of a Deity. The beautiful adaptation of means to ends observable in all of nature's ways appeals to many with irresistible eloquence. The great Galen spoke of his anatomical writings as a hymn of praise to the Deity, and Sir Charles Bell regarded the mechanism of the human hand as a strong argument for the existence of a designing power overruling Nature.

The arguments drawn from these sources are hallowed by time, and will never lose weight with the mass of thinking minds. But there are those who demand more convincing proofs than these arguments can supply. To the assertion of the Pantheist that "The Universe as a whole is to be regarded as the Deity," the arguments 1 drawn from the evidence of design in nature afford no satisfactory reply. The moral chaos resulting from such doctrines, so strenuously urged by some, is not so apparent to others ; and at the present day there are journals which enjoy a high reputation for the learning and ability with which they are edited that are devoted to the propagation of Pantheistic ideas. The men so engaged are earnest seekers after truth and it is unjust to accuse them of knowingly spreading false doctrines. It is obvious that the arguments against Pantheism, drawn from the moral evil which it is supposed to entail, have not the slightest weight with such thinkers.

The present age is a veritable Babel of philosophical and scientific speculation. The Pantheist or Materialistic Monist declares that the Universe is sufficient unto itself ; and the Pluralist, on the other hand, affirms that there may be an indefinite multitude of independent beings, and that the greatest of them we may dignify by the title of God, though He, like the rest, is finite, with antecedents and a "history."

By one we are told that the ultimate atoms of matter are possessed of a certain kind of volition and self -consciousness (Voght's pyknotic theory, adopted by Haeckel in his "Riddle of the Universe") which enable them to select suitable partners for themselves, which unions resuit in the various combinations which matter assumes. 1

We are treated to learned and sympathetic criticism on the vagaries of a Nietzsche, a F'echner and a Bergson, and their writings enlist a host of ardent admirers.

We are told by Prof. William James that if there be a God he must be "finite" with a "history"; that the existence of what we call evil in the world is incompatible with an Omnipotent Beneficence. Thus the door is thrown wide open to Polytheism, for if there is one finite Deity there is no good reason why there should not be a multitude. This is nothing less than an invitation to all the Olympians, from Jupiter down, to take possession of their old abodes whence they were ejected, bag and baggage, some two thousand years ago.

By some we are informed that the Ether is a continuum (that is, without vacuities) and absolutely infinite in extension. Void space is therefore everywhere abolished, and we are invited to contemplate an absolutely infinite material corporeality — an absolutely solid mass of matter (a solid of such a nature as "old-time"

i This theory was evidently suggested by the Monads of Leibnitz, but the difference between the Pyknatom and the Monad is the difference between Materialism and Theism. The one is conceived of as self-existent, but Leibnitz made his Monads the creation of Deity, science conceived the atom to be, for in a continuum there can be no vacuities) extending in all directions without limit.

The examination of this theory, both on its scientific and philosophic sides, furnished the excuse for the appendix to this volume. One of its chief exponents, Sir Oliver Lodge, is confessedly a Theist, but his views lead logically to materialistic Pantheism.

If the Ether is an absolutely infinite continuum (space being thereby abolished) then it might be regarded, with some show of reason, as the One Great Being, and the position of the Pantheist or Materialist would be more strongly entrenched.

We have but to endow the Ether with thought, and the Pantheism of Spinoza stands revealed. There is but one substance, says Spinoza, and that substance possesses thought and extension, and is God.

That Spinoza identified God and Nature as One there can be no reasonable doubt, in view of the following quotations from the "Ethica," translated by White: —

Prop. XIV. (First part). Besides God, no substance can be nor can be conceived.

Corollary. 1st. Hence it follows with the greatest clearness that God is one, that is to say, in Nature there is but one substance.

Corollary. 2nd. It follows second, that the Thing Extended {rem extensum) } and the Thing Thinking {rem cogitantem), are either the attributes of God or affections of the attributes of God.

Prop. I. (Second part). Thought is an attribute of God. Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner. God therefore possesses an attribute, the conception of which is involved in all individual thoughts, and through which they are conceived. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of God or, in other words, God is a thinking Thing.

Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an Extended Thing. The demonstration of this proposition is of the same character as the last.

Prop. XI. The first thing which forms the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of an individual thing actually existing.

Corollary. Hence it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God, and therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that thing, we say nothing else than that God has this or that idea.

In the preface to part four of the "Ethica" we have: —

"We have shown in the appendix to the first part of this work that Nature does nothing for the sake of an end, for that eternal and infinite Being whom we call God or Nature acts by the same necessity by which He exists. . . . Since, therefore, He exists for no end; and since He has no principles or end of existence, He has no principles or end of action."

As a piece of consecutive reasoning the "Ethica" of Spinoza stands without a rival in the history of philosophy. Attempting as much as he did it is not surprising that he should have become entangled in the mazes of his own thought, and that his conclusions are often erroneous. If, however, we substitute for the word, God, the word, Nature, much of the ambiguity in his system is cleared up.

Pantheism and Atheism are philosophically identical. Both regard the universe as uncaused and eternal — the supreme existence, and the idea of creation has no place in this scheme of things. The word Atheism has been discarded in a great measure by philosophers, and this is largely due to its vicious associations, and its abandonment, therefore, is nothing more than a concession to popular opinion. The words Pantheism, Monism, Materialism, Naturalism are adopted in its stead. The "Cosmic emotion" which stirs within us as we look abroad on the face of nature and behold the beautiful adaptation of means to the accomplishment of ends, or contemplate the wonders of the heavens, is regarded by these philosophers as a fair substitute for the religious emotion experienced by those who believe in the existence of a beneficent Creator. While we must accord all sympathy to those who are deprived by their philosophical tenets of an object of worship other than the wonders of nature, we must yet demur at the inconsistency and short-sightedness of elevating the material world into an object of religious adoration. Sound judgment compels us to look upon man and his intellectual achievements as the crown of terrestrial things. Great indeed are the wonders of the phenomenal universe, but the mind of man is greater still. The stars which "sparkle on the robe of night" are, after all, nothing more than immense masses of matter, akin to the dirt we tread upon, in an incandescent state, and our world is the offspring of a star of similar nature. It must be confessed, therefore, that, from the materialistic point of view, the religion of the Positivists, founded by a celebrated Frenchman, has some ground for justification. The extremists of the French Revolution elevated on the altar of Notre Dame a beautiful woman, symbolic of human reason. With what measure of religious adoration they viewed this nude goddess we are allowed to conjecture, but surely her worship was not attended by any marked improvement in the morals of her devotees.

A distinguished American writer, Prof. James, has divided mankind into the tough minded and the tender minded. As the tough minded require but little in the way of religion for their peace of mind, the cult established by Comte may be all-sufficient for their needs, but the tender minded require something more inspiring than the worship of human nature. Even the most illustrious of the race have their faults, and their imperfections often assume alarming proportions in the glare of publicity.

To Comte's immortal honor, be it said, no crafty statesmen or bloody warriors were given place in his Calendar of the Saints. In the Pantheon which he suggested, niches were reserved only for those truly great men whose achievements in the world of mind have shed glory over the age in which they lived, or whose efforts in ameliorating suffering and want have endeared them to the whole of mankind. Thus we find such names as Homer, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates, Galen, Galileo, Harvey, Newton and Howard, but there are no Hannibals, Cassars nor Napoleons.

The celebrated German philosopher, Kant, while maintaining that the various arguments for the existence of a Creator fall short of absolute demonstrative proof was nevertheless so firmly persuaded that man's moral nature required belief in such a Being, that he declared in his "Critique of Pure Reason" : —

"If there does not exist a Supreme Being distinct from the universe — if the universe is without a beginning, consequently without a Creator — if our wills are not free, and the soul is divisible and subject to corruption just like matter — the ideas and principles of morality lose all validity, and fall with the transcendental ideas which constituted their theoretical support. . . . For in this sphere action is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral law in all points. The end is here incontrovertibly established and there is only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends and so have practical validity — namely, the existence of a God and of a future world. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is at the same time my maxim (as reason requires that it should be) I am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a future life; I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this belief, since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes."

The distinguished English biologist, George Romanes, the close friend and disciple of Darwin, was led by like considerations, to renounce an avowedly atheistical attitude, and to recognize the existence of a Creator. 1

The power of the reasoning faculty to demonstrate the existence of a God has often been denied, yet the writer is firmly persuaded that this, the greatest of our endowments, has not been so slighted by its Creator as to have withheld from it the power of proving that Creator's existence. Twenty-five years ago the writer published a work entitled "Evolution versus Involution" in which he endeavored to show that the theory of Evolution, when properly interpreted, necessitates belief in such a Being. The

i This distinguished scientist declared in his last work, published after his death, "When I wrote the preceding treatise (The Candid Examination) I did not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of human nature, as distinguished from physical nature, in my inquiry touching Theism. But since then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science of comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature as a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought to have anticipated on merely a 'priori grounds, and no doubt should have perceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research."

word "Evolution," means (using the language of Dr. Martineau) "to unfold from within, and it is taken from the history of the seed or embryo of living natures. And what is the seed but a casket of prearranged futurities with its whole contents prospective, settled to be what they are by reference to ends still in the distance?" This was written by Dr. Martineau in criticism of Mr. Spencer's general philosophical attitude, and his definition of evolution in particular. Spencer formulates several definitions of evolution. On page 360 "First Principles" he says: — "Evolution is definable as a change from incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter." On page 369 of the same work he tells us: — "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." He elsewhere formulates it thus: — "Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations.** In another place we are told: — "At the same time that evolution is a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, it is a change from the indefinite.

Along with an advance from simplicity to complexity, there is an advance from confusion to order, from undetermined arrangement to determined arrangement." The keynote of these various definitions is that evolution is a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. Mr. Spencer borrowed the idea from the celebrated Von Baer who used it merely as a morphological generalization, and had no notion of making it the foundation of an all-embracing philosophy. But in Mr. Spencer's hands it became the basis for a cosmogony. Therein he made a fundamental error which it is impossible to understand how he could have made, in view of the fact that every egg and seed in nature declare that they are not "confused" masses of "undetermined arrangements," as is clearly shown when the egg is hatched and the seed sprouts into the plant. Mr. Spencer's definition ignores the potencies, which make the egg what it is, and is therefore utterly inadequate and misleading. In replying to Dr. Martineau's criticism Mr. Spencer made the following remarkable answer (First Principles, pp. 285-6) "Now, this criticism would have been very much to the point did the word evolution truly express the process it names. If this process, as scientifically defined, really involved that conception which the word evolution was originally designed to convey, the implications would be those Mr. Martineau alleges. But the word having been in possession of the field before the process was understood, has been adopted merely because displacing it by another word seemed impracticable. And this adoption of it has been joined with a caution against misunderstandings arising from its unfitness. Here is a part of the caution: — 'Evolution has other meanings, some of which are incongruous with, and some even directly opposed to, the meaning here given it. As ordinarily understood, to evolve is to unfold, to open and expand, to throw out, to emit ; whereas, as we understand it, the act of evolving, though it implies increase of a concrete aggregate, and in so far an expansion of it, implies that its component matter has passed from a more diffused to a more concentrated state — has contracted. The antithetical word "involution/' would much more truly express the nature of the process, and would indeed describe better the secondary characters of the process which we shall have to deal with presently.' So that the meanings which the word (evolution) involves, and which Mr. Martineau regards as fatal to the hypothesis, are already repudiated as not belonging to the hypothesis."

Mr. Spencer in repudiating the true meaning of the word evolution, revealed by every seed and egg in nature, still clung to it to name his systern, offering as an excuse that being already in possession of the field, it seemed impracticable to replace it by the word involution, which he says is much better fitted to express his views. Was ever a lamer excuse offered by a philosopher in naming a system of thought ? By the light with which this word involution floods his philosophy, its inconsistencies and shortcomings are revealed. In the writer's work "Evolution versus Involution," the attempt is made to expose the errors of his system. A distinguished English writer has characterized Mr. Spencer's philosophy as "possessing the incurable defect of fundamental incoherence," and the criticism is a just one.

It was an apt saying of Berkeley that nature speaks to us in a "visual language." This was not a mere figure of speech with Berkeley, but a truth of profound significance. The lesson taught us by the germs of nature speaks to our understanding and enables us to interpret the hidden meaning of things.

It is undeniably true that the fertilized seed of the plant and the fertilized ovum of the animal embrace within their compass the potencies of the fully developed plant and animal. The significance of Dr. Martineau's definition of evolution is at once apparent — what is not involved cannot be evolved. Evolution is an unfolding of that which previously existed, and this existence may be potential or it may be material, or it may be both. No doubt we would find a great difference in the molecular structure of the essential part (the germinal spot) of a chicken's egg and that of a duck if the powers of the microscope could be increased sufficiently, but as it is they are absolutely indistinguishable by the best instruments at our command.

Nevertheless, every point of difference between the developed chicken and the developed duck must have existed potentially or in material form in their respective eggs.

We cannot call on environment to explain the wide difference of structure, for the difference exists when they issue from the shell. What is true of the seed of a plant or the egg of an animal, is true of the globe on which we dwell. All things which the earth has brought forth must have existed potentially or in material form in the molten mass as thrown from its parent, the Sun. The Sun, in its turn must have possessed in potency or in material peculiarities, the various forms which the earth presents, and must have inherited these from the nebulous mass to which it owes its origin. From this conclusion there is no escape — What is not involved cannot be evolved. Now, Pantheism asserts that the Material Universe has existed from eternity, and we are therefore compelled to regard it as the Uncaused Being, the ultimate source of all things. In the process known as evolution, Pantheism asks us to contemplate this Being in the act of unfolding itself. But man is himself a part of this Being, and we are thus called upon to accept the astounding proposition that the Uncaused can be circumscribed and subjected to analysis by that which is dependent upon it for existence, and to ignore the self-evident truth that "The whole is greater than any of its parts."

Man, being but a part, cannot in reason predicate growth or development of the whole. As well might a blood corpuscle circulating in the vessels speculate on the nature and doings of the whole man. In other words, if the Material Universe is itself the Uncaused Being, the theory of Evolution, as explaining the Cosmos, becomes a glaring absurdity, inasmuch as it implies that man has circumscribed and subjected to analysis the Ultimate Source of his being. But if we regard the Universe as a dependent being, a caused thing like ourselves, we can justly maintain that the process known as evolution is but the unfolding of the Will of the Uncaused Being to whom it owes its existence. The process becomes possible only when there are involved laws to be made manifest.

Evolution, therefore, as applied to the Cosmos necessarily implies the existence of a Being in whom the idea of the Cosmos must have been present before it assumed material form, and in the phenomena we are to recognize the Will of this Being in process of being unfolded.

But we must be careful not to confound this Being with the will power which He manifests, for by so doing we place ourselves in the exact position now held by the Materialist.

As the doctrine of Evolution, considered as a Cosmic process, may be questioned by some, we must advance other arguments for the existence of a Creator, and the following pages are devoted to this obj ect.

Now if anything exists an Uncaused Being exists, and, on a priori grounds, we are compelled to maintain that this Being is absolutely infinite. If it can be shown that we are not justified in regarding the matter of which the Universe consists as a Continuum and universal space a plenum, then we are justified in maintaining that matter is not absolutely infinite, however extended it may be throughout the Celestial Sphere.

Matter is that something which impresses us as occupying Space, or, to put it in another way, matter is the absence of space, and if it be absolutely continuous (a Contmuum), without vacuities or voids, it is obvious that all space is abolished.

On this view Matter would be absolutely infinite, and we would be obliged to accord to it an absolutely infinite magnitude, thus satisfying our a priori conception of the Uncaused. But we maintain that Matter is not a Continuum, that space (void) really does exist, and that Matter is, therefore, not of such a magnitude that we cannot conceive a greater, for in imagination we can fill up these voids.

Matter and Space (void) mutually limit one another: if all matter were abolished then Space would be absolutely infinite, if all Space were abolished then Matter would be absolutely infinite. Sir Oliver Lodge in maintaining that Matter is a Continuum has abolished Space, and from his standpoint the Universe is a solid mass of Matter, a solid of such a nature as "old-time" science regarded the atom to be. 1

In other words the Universe becomes One Great Atom, without parts, indivisible and incompressible. Now, indeed, Materialism would be triumphant if this were true. But sense perception and the verdict of reason declare that this view of things is not tenable. Weight of authority should always be respected, particularly in matters pertaining to science, but when

i The atom, whatever its ultimate nature, is properlydefined as the smallest particle of matter which is without parts, indivisible and incompressible. The elements known to chemistry, such as gold, iron, etc., are now regarded as molecules, composed of still smaller particles, perhaps etheric. The word "Electron" is now much in vogue to designate these smallest particles.

we are asked to accept the irrational we are justified in hewing a path for ourselves. We therefore maintain that motion in a material Continuum is impossible, is contradictory, and that the acceptance of the one is a denial of the other. The ability to pen these lines is a refutation of the theory of a Continuum.

The idea has been advanced that, after all, the atoms may be nothing more than centers of force. This attempt to reduce matter itself to a form of force, as suggested by Bischoff and others, is leaving the domain of physics and entering upon that of metaphysics. Science, purely as such, knows nothing of a force which is not initiated by matter in motion. In other words, the force known to science is not an entity in itself, but is imparted or transmitted motion — motion imparted by a moving mass or atom of matter to another mass or atom. This becomes very clear if we assume, as Materialism does, that matter is uncaused and has always been in motion. On the assumption that matter has been created, then, it is equally clear, that the Power that set it in motion can be defined only as a Spontaneous Will, or to use the language of theology, a Divine decree.

The great Bishop Berkeley, in abolishing the atoms, which he regarded as the stronghold of Atheism, replaced them by the direct impression made upon our consciousness by Divine Power. 1

It is needless to state that this is not the interpretation to be placed on the views of the modern scientist who talks about reducing matter to centers of force. What is gained, from the standpoint of science, by calling that which impresses us as occupying space, Force, instead of using the word Matter? It would be merely a change of name without advancing our knowledge. Instead of elucidating, it would cause confusion by designating by the same word, force, the mass, say of the sun, and the force (gravitation) induced by this mass.

To those who interpret matter in the terms of Berkeley we have nothing to say ; for matter, in last analysis, can be defined only as the expression of the will of Deity. To the mere physicist we reply, "You are merely changing the names of things, and are calling black, white. Science, then, requires us to look upon matter as composed of ultimate particles of something which occupies Space. These particles, whatever their nature may be, "Etheric" or "Electronic," or by whatever name we choose to designate them, are the true atoms of nature, without parts, indivisible and incompressible. They

i Amid the obscurity of Hegel illuminating flashes occasionally greet us, as when he tells us, that "the truth of Matter is Spirit"