The philosophy of language; containing practical rules for acquiring a knowledge of English grammar, with remarks on the principles of syntax and composition

Preface

Knowledge is the birthright of man; but the means and opportunities of acquiring it are available only to a very limited extent by the subordinate classes of society. These privations might be lamented, if the happiness of those who toil depended on a participation of that mental and refined pleasure which scientific pursuits afford. The lowly, however, are often bappy in their ignorance, because, in their rude and uncultivated state, their desires are circumscribed, and they feel less acutely the miseries of want and dependence. But there are many whose avocations are less constant and less laborious — many who have raised themselves by industry to comparative ease and affluence, and on the correctness of whose opinions the stability and good order of civilized society chiefly depend. These have sufficient leisure to cultivate their minds ; and it is a duty they owe to themselves— to their dependents — and to their country — to claim their right to a share of that stock of knowledge which the industry of past ages has accumulated for the common benefit of posterity. ^

But there is a preliminary and indispensable acquirement to be secured, before the treasures of science and learning can be opened to their view. Written Language must be understood; and it is not only necessary to become acquainted with those mute signs by which

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IV PREFACE.

thought is arrested in its fleeting progress, but every reader should also obtain a competent knowledge of the fundamental principles which regulate and determine the propriety of artificial language.

Hence Grammar is a subject of more importance than most persons are willing to admit; and though it has not the attractions which many other studies possess, still it would perhaps be difficult to name a science more extensive in its application, or more generally useful in directing the conduct of the understanding. Even those who appear to pay least attention to the arbitrary rules by which language is often controlled, are nevertheless compelled to observe the fundamental laws of speech; and though they may affect to despise a knowledge of the use of words, they too often betray their solicitude for grammatical accuracy j by their hesitation and confusion — for they feel, though they do not perhaps know, that Speech is the Index of the Mind.

It concerns every one, therefore, who is called upon to judge and act for himself, to possess the means by which alleged improprieties of diction may be corrected. This art grammarians profess to teach ; but do the works of those writers always afford the means by which the learner may be enabled to decide for himself, on subjects which, perhaps, no individual has a right to determine for another? In answering this important question, we shall, hereafter, have occasion to claim the indulgence of the candid reader.

The primary object of this treatise on language is to render the principles of grammar easy, and the rules of syntax practically useful, to those who have in early life neglected the theory of speech. There are many, we feel convinced, who would willingly devote some portion of their leisure to the study of grammar, if the knowledge to be derived from works on that subject proved commensurate with the attention the science necessrilya demands;

PREFACE. V

but there are few grown persons who will not rather depend on their own judgment, than voluntarily submit to learn the lessons of grammarians.

To blend the philosophy of language with the best instructions of the best teachers is perhaps the surest means of attracting the attention of the self-educated reader. Such students do not wish to be taught, they desire only to be informed; and it may be presumed that one who has experienced similar difficulties knows better the kind of information they require than more learned writers on the subject. Whether we have supplied such information must be left to the decision of that class of our readers.

The liberty we have taken with the writings of the learned, will probably subject us to still severer criticism; but we ask no favour for the errors we have committed. The works of writers on language are the fittest for the selection of grammatical inaccuracies, for grammarians at least ought to attend to the rules they inculcate. It was not, however, from any invidious motive, but from a principle of justice, that we in general gave their blunders the preference to those of less reputable writers.

But there is one class of readers whose disapprobation we may expect, and whose commendation would be no proof of the practical utility of this volume. — We mean those persons who learn the principles of a science, as many learn the words of an Italian song, merely that they may be able to repeat a given number of sounds, without caring to understand the meaning of the writer. Such readers are impatient to became learned at an easy rate, and esteem that instruction the best which is soonest committed to memory. They are unwilling to bestow the thought and attention which an abstruse subject demands, and without which scientific practical knowledge can never be acquired. It matters not, therefore, what system of grammar such persons adopt; for as they are too indolent

VI PREFACE.

or too incapable, to think for themselves, they must after all be contented to imitate the phraseology of others.

But if the hitherto superficial reasoner should be inclined to apply himself seriously to the study of this indispensable science, he may still ask, "Must we be constantly thinking of our grammar whenever we speak or write?" It may be answered, certainly not. This mistaken notion has perhaps made more bad speakers and bad writers than a total want of a knowledge of grammar. The subject, and what he intends to say concerning it, ought solely to occupy the attention of the speaker or writer during the time he is employed in forming his sentences. Those who write best are probably those who think least about the choice of words or the structure of sentences while they are composing. The mind will in general suggest the preferable words and phrases; and the writer, having previously acquired a competent knowledge of the principles of language, will be prevented from committing gross improprieties. The practice of grammar is chiefly useful in enabling any one to ^correct errors that have been committed in speaking or in writing. Those, therefore, who understand the theory of language, have acquired the means of applying the rules by which grammatical accuracy is regulated. But it is not essential that those rules should be "learnt by heart;" the anomalies only require to be committed to memory.

In the arrangement of the Etymological Chapters of this volume, the syntax and construction of each part of speech have been connected with the etymology of the word. Whatever was considered useful to the uninformed student, has also been included ; and an illustration or two containing words classed under each particular part of speech have been added, in order that those who wish to acquire the science may have the means at hand of ascertaining the progress they make in the knowledge of words. These lessons (if they must be so called,) are progressive,

PREFACE. Vll

and may be repeated as the learner proceeds with the subsequent chapters. The selections are such as will not, it is hoped, displease even our better informed readers.

As regards the philosophy of this volume, we cannot reasonably expect a uniformly favourable opinion. Some may think that the remarks contain too much of the theory of language, and that the author has too often indulged in controversial disquisitions; but before his readers form their decided opinion upon these points, they are requested to examine whether the philosophy of the language has not been made subservient to the practical utility of the rules of grammar, and whether the controverted questions do not merit the calm consideration of all who desire to be informed on this subject.

It would have been easy for the writer to have given a greater appearance of originality to this treatise, by adopting as his own the valuable extracts which he has selected from the works of his predecessors, but he feels well assured that such remarks will have more weight in their original language. Whenever it has been possible to trace the author, the benefit of his assistance has been acknowledged. This could not be always attended to in selecting the rules of syntax. These have long been considered the property of every writer on language, therefore whenever they have been clearly expressed, they have frequently been taken verbatim from grammarians.

As the principal design of this work is to instruct the English scholar, it would justly be considered inconsistent to refer for proofs and examples to the learned languages, or to aim at a display of deep research. That the latter might have been accomplished by one with very little pretensions to learning our classical readers will admit, for the author has found some difficulty in avoiding any appearance of this parade of learning. His constant endeavour has been to simplify and render intelligible an abstruse science, and if possible to shew that a knowledge

Vlll PREFACE.

of English Grammar is not necessarily dependent on a previous knowledge of the structure or the grammar of any other language.

We here feel it necessary to offer some excuse to our scientific readers for controverting opinions that have been universally received, and that are by grammarians considered indisputably established.

It is the general opinion that " the province of the grammarian is not to dictate what usages ought to be, but simply to discover what they are."

This apology for not investigating the propriety of established usages may serve the compiler of Greek and Latin grammars. The dead languages must be learned with all their imperfections, since the anomalies are now a legitimate portion of those languages. But the circumstances are very different with a living language like our own — a language that has been progressively improving since its infancy, in spite of the restrictions of the learned. Here the grammarian has a higher duty to perform. He is regarded as the arbiter of taste in deciding doubtful and discordant idioms — as the dictator of propriety, and as the promulgator of the established laws of language. It is true he cannot enforce obedience, but it is his duty to resist useless innovations; and such resistance, seconded by sound argument and philosophical research, will seldom fail to overcome the prejudice of custom, and, though slow in its operation, must ultimately prevail.

The rules of grammar owe their origin to written language. It was not till mankind began to use signs for sounds that the necessity of a strict conformity between the signs and the ideas intended to be expressed by them became obvious. In oral language the tone or the gesture of the speaker often supplied the deficiences and inaccuracies of speech, but in written discourse it became essential to attend to the grammatical structure of sentences. Hence originated among our first writers the

PREFACE. IX

office of the critic and grammarian. Those idioms which from their purity and general use were best understood were taken as a standard of propriety, and considered as forming a legitimate portion of the national dialect, in contradistinction to the anomalies of the ignorant, and the dialects of the remote and less cultivated provinces, and thus the language of the learned at first superseded that of the uneducated and vulgar. The established phraseology of our best writers, therefore, must ever be regarded with respect, even by those who may be disposed to question their unlimited authority, for it cannot be denied that our authors are the guardians of our language, and are amenable to ordinary criticism only when by their example they give currency and permanent existence to grammatical improprieties. The anomalies of speech may be tolerated, but they cannot be, or at least they ought not to be, recommended; for when the union of right and wrong is attempted every effort to explain the consistency of the contradiction adds only to the difficulty of comprehending the commentator.

The elements of artificial speech are arbitrary, and so are the forms or idioms of a language. Every one is at liberty to use what particular signs he may think proper in recording his own thoughts, and to accept or reject any form of words which may be suggested by another. Even the Roman tyrant admitted his inability to force a new word upon the people, though in other respects he was master of their wills, and their lives and liberties were at his disposal. But there is a more powerful inducement than the mandate of a sovereign, which will always ensure a cheerful submission to improvements in speech, and which among the rudest people at first gave currency to the elements of their language — it is the common interest of those who have occasion constantly to communicate their wants and their opinions, to establish by tacit consent a uniform manner of expression, and to

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avoid as far as possible the use of ambiguous words or phrases.

Custom or use is said to give law to language, and has long been considered by the learned as the only standard of propriety. He, therefore, who opposes the errors of popular usage, or questions the correctness of fashionable phraseology, will perhaps be treated little better than as an outlaw in the republic of letters — still as a disinterested inquirer, having no theory of his own to establish, and willing to admit the theories of others as far as they are comprehensible, the author may claim indulgence if he question the wisdom and justness of a decree which the law-makers themselves do not seem to understand.

What (we have often asked) is " Reputable Usage?" Not, says an eminent critic, the usage of the multitude, nor the usage of the learned, much less the usage of the court, but a sort of compound ratio of all three. And this " compound ratio" as yet undefined, is nevertheless to be taken as the standard of propriety. Another writer declares that " Language is a species of fashion, and that every anomaly stands upon the same basis — custom having prescribed for it a particular rule." In addition to these authorities we are compelled to admit that writers on language invariably coincide in their opinions on this point; and grammarians, in particular, strongly inculcate implicit obedience to usage, unless in cases which custom has left dubious.

It is not the desire to be thought capable of controverting the opinions of great men, deservedly esteemed for their talents and learning, nor any vainer motive, which induces the writer of this volume to oppose the universal assent of grammarians to a long established maxim. It is the firm conviction that the dictum is unphilosophical and dangerous — that it is the chief cause of the many difficulties which the study of language presents, and affords an un-

PREFACE. XI

answerable excuse for the little attention that is often paid to the more valuable instructions of grammarians. For who will spend much time in acquiring the rudiments of a science, the principles and rules of which are ever varying, since the knowledge of what is right must depend upon the capricious decisions of those who pretend to understand the precise limits of " Reputable Usage.''

But it may be asked, what then is the legitimate standard of propriety in language? Or rather, what is grammar? We shall answer without hesitation, because we can appeal to the experience of every intelligent writer, and to the practice of every grammarian, whenever he has been able to see clearly, and to correct with certainty, any impropriety of long established usage.

Grammar is the strict agreement between the signs and the ideas which such signs are intended to express. It was this concordance that first gave law to language, and currency to original forms of speech ; and it is to maintain this conformity between words and ideas that the rules of grammar are so useful. It is to the mind, and not to the vox populi, which the grammarian appeals when he is able to prove any grammatical inaccuracy; it is only when a difficulty occurs, that custom is allowed to have the supremacy.

The authority of reputable usage is perhaps less restricted in determining the propriety of single terms, than it is in regulating the laws of construction. An increase of knowledge necessarily demands an increase of means for the communication of that knowledge. In the progress of civilization new words are constantly required to express new ideas; and when ingenuity fails to invent suitable expressions a modification of some established term frequently supplies the deficiency; but even in establishing the arbitrary elements of language, the fundamental principle of grammar is attended to by the learned, the fitness of the new term is ascertained by referring to

Xll PREFACE.

its etymon or derivation, and its propriety is estimated by the conformity which exists, or is supposed to exist, between the sign and the object it is intended to represent. If there be no real nor any imaginary resemblance discernable, nor any circumstance to fix the meaning of the expression, it is generally left to the use of those who are contented to adopt the vague phraseology of the illiterate.

Sometimes, however, from frequent application and general use, an indefinite word acquires at length a precise signification, and, when sanctioned by authority, is, after a time, incorporated in the language. So far does reputable usage ennoble that which was at one time justly condemned as belonging to the jargon of the vulgar.

The authority which gives currency to single terms is also sufficient to sanction any improvement in the idioms of a language, but the laws of construction must ever be subservient to the principles of Universal Grammar. Nothing therefore, in our humble opinion, can justify an illogical departure from established grammatical usage. Why grammarians should wish to substitute custom for the unerring laws of the human mind, in determining the propriety of contradictory idioms, will perhaps be sufficiently shown in the subsequent pages of this work.

It would not become the author to speak in extenuation of the defects of this volume, yet it will be readily admitted, by those best acquainted with works of this kind, that considerable difficulty must be experienced by him who endeavours to condense into one volume the Theory and Practice of an art so extensive in its details as that of Grammar. This difficulty suggested the plan of combining a technical Dictionary with the Index ; and it is hoped that the form in which the notes are there given will be more acceptable to the reader than that usually adopted.

Among those who have assisted to render this volume deserving the notice of the public, the author may be allowed to distinguish James Henry Hurdis, Esq.,

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of Newtek , a gentleman ever willing to devote his highly cultivated talents, either to the service of the public, or to promote the welfare of a private individual. The engravings are intended to illustrate parts of the subject that appeared to require attraction, but if they fail to instruct, they cannot fail (as specimens of art,) to be admired, and will give a value to this volume which its intrinsic merit may not perhaps entitle it to receive.

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THE

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

Introduction

" Language is an art, whose influence extends over all the others, and in which, finally, all science whatever must centre." — Horne Tooke.

When we consider how inseparably Language is connected with man's happiness, and how much the successful development and improvement of his intellectual faculties depend on its resources, we may, without impropriety, inquire why the study of so important a science as grammar should be so generally neglected. Few acquire a competent knowledge of its rules, — a slight acquaintance being all that is usually considered essential by those who wish to speak correctly, and when this object has been attained, the study of language is too often abandoned in disgust.

What, then, is the nature of this science, so repulsive to many, so imperfectly understood even by its professors? What are the advantages any one may expect to derive from the study of grammar? — and can the subject be rendered agreeable to the student by more efficient means than those hitherto adopted? These are questions to which we shall direct our attention; and should we fail in our purpose to render the subject more intelligible, our efforts may still be attended with advantage, for the hints of the unlearned sometimes supply materials for the learned to work upon.

Z PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

A modern writer asserts, "The success with which the principles of any art or science are investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those whose labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement." This observation may be very true, if it be limited to those who really investigate the principles of a science ; but if we include all who write upon any particular subject, the proportion of success may indeed be questioned. Grammar is one proof of the inverse proportion of labour to the success of its application. The writers on language are many; their discoveries few. The subject has been often handled, but seldom investigated, unless the repetition of rules, enforced by new authorities, can be called investigation. But what has authority to do with the rules of grammar? Usage may sanction inaccurate language, but the most reputable usage cannot alter the nature of the science. Its fundamental principles are unchangeable. Grammar should teach the correct use of words. Its rules should not be annulled by exceptions, nor should errors be palliated by quoting precedents from classical writers. This servile compliance with usage is the cause of the many difficulties which occur in acquiring a knowledge of grammar. Its principles are rendered obscure and uncertain, when the grammarian, instead of exposing erroneous phraseology, employs his pen in its defence; and until this method of treating the subject be exploded, there can be little hope of much permanent improvement in our language. For when authority is permitted to supersede the principles of science, the most effectual barrier is fixed against the progress of improvement. Authority in language ought to extend no further than to the choice of words and phrases, in reference to their just application; and when this point has been established, the construction and modification of terms should conform to the principles of grammar.

It is, however, confessed, that the structure of language,

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. o

ike the materials of which it is composed, is, in a great degree, arbitrary, and depends upon the order in which different nations are accustomed to think; as long, therefore, as the peculiar idioms and established phraseology of a particular people are perspicuous, they cannot be deviated from with propriety. But the decisions of grammarians, determined by the dictation of usage, should not be like the laws of the Medes and Persians, which altered not. The rules of grammar should be subject to revision, whenever they are found inconsistent with the principles of right thinking ; and the science should be made subservient to the mind, whence alone it takes its origin.

A writer on grammar has, nevertheless, to contend against many difficulties. He is called upon to give proofs of his ability in the frequent exercise of the rules he inculcates. The prejudice of habit, the caprice of fashion, and the authority of the best writers, conspire against his precepts. Axioms, founded on rational principles, are sometimes contemned, because they are not understood; while the idle and halfeducated prefer imitation to originality, and adopt, without questioning, the errors of their instructors.

"It is not," says Mr. Locke, "worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another." Every attempt to exercise the judgment of such a learner is considered as a tax upon his exertion, and he resents the imposed condition as if it were an insult to his understanding. It is not for such that we have undertaken the task before us. Knowledge can never be acquired by rote ; — the reasoning faculties must be employed, if men desire to profit by and remember what they learn.

The practice of grammarians has been to conceal those difficulties which they could not explain. They have dwelt, with tedious prolixity, upon the elementary principles of the science, while they have left the most useful branch of it

b 2 comparatively unexplored. They content themselves with repeating, that language is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts; they confine themselves to general definitions, but they are cautious how they descend to critical investigation. " Sensible and learned men," says Mr. Brenan," conceal the truth, through a fear that too much knowledge may divert the pupil from a proper steadiness to the observance of rules." What is this but a tacit acknowledgment that the rules are founded in error, and will not bear the investigation which science, properly so called, should at all times be ready to undergo? Will such an apology satisfy the reader? Let him mark the consequences of this injudicious forbearance: "These scrupulous teachers," says the same spirited writer, "give directions that positively mislead, fill the mind with wrong notions, and throw a most prejudicial taint of doubt and error upon the future reasonings of the learner."