Studies in diplomacy

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Preface vii

The Triple Aliance 70

Preface

When a person has been caught, in the front row, in an immense and painful national catastrophe, when he has issued from it injured by the iniquity of party feeling and the bad faith of the enemies of his country, he has lost peace of mind, and to regain it resorts to the study of the events that made him a victim. That fate has been mine. I venture to put together, in this volume, the writings I have been occupied with in silence and retirement ; they are purely diplomatic essays, and have appeared in the Revtie des Deux Mondes.

It seems to me, however, fit and opportune that they should be preceded by a few rapid remarks which cannot be without interest to the reader, whilst they will have particular value for the author of these pages.

Those who lived through the woeful year have certainly not forgotten the explosions of anger that resounded all over France at the time when the question of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern's viii PREFACE

candidature to the Spanish crown sprung up, and which became still more acute after the invasion of our territory. Public opinion, or rather the press, did not confine itself to Prussia's direful underhand dealings, it denounced with equal violence the want of forethought on the part of the Imperial Government, and what it termed the incapacity of its agents. I was personally held up to the indignation of the country. Strange to say, it was a semi-official newspaper, the ConstihUionnel, that first put me on the rack. At that time I had only just reached Ems, entrusted with a mission fraught with difficulties apparent to every one, and to bring it to a happy issue it was essential I should enjoy, above all that I should appear to enjoy, the entire confidence of my Government. I thought it right to call the Due de Gramont's attention to this unfortunate incident, begging him to dispel the unjustifiable accusations of which I was personally the object, either at the tribune or in the Joitrnal Officiel. He paid no attention to my entreaties.

They bitterly reproached me with having neither foreseen, nor even had a presentiment of, the agreement come to between Berlin and Madrid to the advantage of Prince Leopold, and made the same charges in regard to the cordial understanding arrived at between Prussia and Russia. But, as a matter of fact, I had fathomed Count Bismarck's

PREFACE ix

design in the course of the preceding year, as soon as it had been conceived, and without having been incited to do so otherwise than by a sense of duty, and I had called the attention of my Government to the matter, whilst requesting to be authorised to have an explanation on the subject with King William's Prime Minister. My first despatch in regard to this bears the date of March 27th, 1869, Acting in accordance with the instructions I had thus invited, I had a long interview with Count Bismarck. I gave an account of it on May nth, and was able to affirm, after having received my interlocutor's avowal, that I had been quite right in my conjectures, namely, that Prince Leopold's candidature had been brought forward and discussed at Berlin. I shall have occasion to return to this subject later on ; but it Is of importance to me to establish here, that by having my correspondence of the preceding year placed before him again, M. de Gramont could have safely shielded me, and put an end to the erroneous rumours, reproduced and commented on by the press to the prejudice of the consideration enjoyed by the agent representing him at Ems. He wrote afterwards, but too late, in a book published in 1872 : ^ " Count Benedettl's complaint was justifiable; but, to have defended him, at that moment, against the newspapers that were attack-

^ La France et la Prusse avant la guerre^ p. 382.

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ing him, it would have been necessary to divulge the whole exchange of views that took place in 1869, a-nd this narration could not have failed to have considerably increased the irritation of the public mind, as it would have shown that Prussia acted with full knowledge of the circumstances, and that the Prussian Government was aware to what point it was wounding French interests and feelings, by raising the question of the Hohenzollern candidature again. The Government therefore considered it right to keep silent, at least for the moment, and thought Count Benedetti would continue for some time longer to make a sacrifice of his personal feelings, which were justly wounded by the undeserved attacks of a few newspapers."

This sacrifice was imposed on me, and I submitted to it although it was prejudicial to the task I was performing at Ems. But was I relieved at the proper time ? By no means ; I continued under the weight of those accusations, which should have been refuted at once so as to show the country that the Imperial Government was right in repelling the audacious combination prepared at Berlin, and that its agents had served it well ; to show Europe to what degree of perfidy the policy of the Prussian Government had attained in this affair ; finally, to thoroughly establish that it had conducted

PREFACE xi

the matter in such a way as to place France in this dilemma : to go to war or accept the accession of a German prince in Spain. Count Bismarck would certainly not have failed to have done so.

As a matter of fact, what happened ? Finding authority in the blame the Constitutionnel inflicted on me, its contemporaries of all shades hastened to multiply the reproaches it had been the first to pronounce. According to some, the Government I had kept so ill-informed should recall me from Ems and revoke me by a minute, setting forth the motives for doing so, inserted in the Journal Officiel ; in the opinion of others its duty ordained that it should bring me before a committee of inquiry. These amenities so ill-adapted to uphold me in the negotiations, at once so arduous and so delicate, that I was engaged in with the King of Prussia, reached me each morning with the Paris mail. They continued more ardent and bitter, without being any more justifiable, after my return. "If Count Bismarck," wrote M. About in the XIXe Siecle, "imagines we are thirty-six million Benedettis in France, he is making a great mistake."

No one troubled about the justice of these invectives, however cruel they were. As no part of my correspondence had been published.

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it was impossible for any one to determine how I had acquitted myself of my functions, and public opinion remained convinced that I had neglected to give the Imperial Government information, that I had failed in all my duties, and that they were therefore authorised to load me with a good share of the responsibility of our disasters. As our defeats became more serious, public feeling was exasperated, and the conviction that I was devoid of all diplomatic understanding, that during my mission to Prussia I had been constantly inferior to my task, gained consistency as it spread, like a fact henceforth beyond discussion. I then noticed persons who, on all occasions, had shown themselves anxious to give me proof of their esteem, slip away so as to avoid my presence. Sharing the general uneasiness, and anxious for news from the seat of war, I often visited the Corps Legislatif, persuaded that the Government might at any moment give some information to the Chamber. A friend came and found me in the gallery to which I had access, to advise me not to show myself there, as my presence so aroused the anger of certain members of the Assembly. " There is the culprit," they exclaimed forgetting that the real guilty parties were, in the first place, the deputies who had refused the Government, notwithstanding the patriotic efforts

PREFACE xiii

and eloquent demonstration of Marshal Niel, the means to carry on a war which had been foreseen and had become inevitable since Sadowa. "You want to make France an immense barracks," they said to this brave soldier. "You will make it a huge cemetery," was the rejoinder. One knows, at the present day, on which side was foresight and reason.

Party spirit leads the best minds so thoroughly astray that, on the occasion of Count Bismarck's last avowals an important journal placed me in presence of this singular dilemma : " Either our Ambassador," it said, " had seen at Ems the despatch addressed, in accordance with the King's commands, by H err von Abeken, to the President of the Prussian Cabinet, a despatch which was so fraudulently altered at Berlin, and he communicated its terms to the Imperial Government; or else he was unable to get the information and was ignorant of the contents of that document. In the first of these two suppositions, M. de Gramont and his colleagfues should alone assume the responsibility of ulterior events ; in the second, on the contrary, the Ambassador failed in the most essential of his duties, that of keeping his Government correctly informed. He is the chief culprit."

How could I know the contents of the despatch sent from Ems to Berlin ? Could I have my eye xiv PREFACE

and hand in the King's private room, and thus be immediately informed as to the instructions the sovereign sent his Ministers ? The argument is really not worthy of the newspaper, generally more serious and circumspect, that appropriated it, and the tenour of which it found in publications without consistence. Would the writer in the same journal admit, indeed, that it is impossible to pen either a telegram or despatch at the Quai d'Orsay without the diplomatic agents accredited to Paris being in a position to send a copy to their Governments ? But, besides, what did Herr von Abeken say in his despatch to Count Bismarck ? We now possess the exact text of it brought to the tribune of the Reichstag by General Caprivi. Herr von Abeken gave a summary of the incidents that had occurred at Ems during the day of July 13th, and of which I had, having taken part in them, given an account on my side. Now the versions forwarded to Paris and Berlin were absolutely identical. If I had had the despatch I am reproached with having been ignorant of before me, I could not have given the Imperial Government more correct information. It pleased Count Bismarck to alter the communication of his sovereign so as to inform Europe and particularly Germany, contrary to all truth, that an Ambassador at Ems had been humiliated by the King. Can I be in any way responsible ? And is it not

PREFACE XV

singular that, when Count Bismarck boldly lays claim to the initiative of this misdeed, a French newspaper should find a pretext, in this incident, for reverting to the accusations that were disavowed even by the man who was the cause of them !

I have pointed out before with what unanimity and bitterness they reproached me — apart from the ignorance in which I was accused of having left my Government in regard to the candidature of Prince Leopold — with the little care I had taken, as they said, to control the relations between Russia and Prussia, to call attention to the close intimacy established between those two powers to our prejudice. This is what ^ht. Journal des Ddbats observed on this subject, adding nothing, for that matter, to what was related, in still more disobliging terms, by other organs of the Parisian press : " Light will be thrown on all these mysteries at the proper time. In the meanwhile, let us remember, that our Ambassadors at Berlin and St. Petersburg were ignorant of all, and that this understanding between the two sovereigns, which was to be so disastrous to us, was concluded before their eyes without them noticing anything. M. Benedetti did not have the least suspicion. . . ."

On what basis do such positive statements repose ? We shall see how utterly unfounded xvi PREFACE

they were. When my correspondence has been gone into it will be established as a matter of fact that, at every moment since 1866, I noted the incidents that revealed to me the harmony, becoming closer and more cordial, that was being established between the Courts of Prussia and Russia, that from these circumstances I obtained the proof of the existence between them of an understanding in regard to approaching contingencies. I shall be pardoned if I do not resist the desire to supply here an irrefutable demonstration of it. This is what I wrote on January 5th, 1868 : " What distinguishes Count Bismarck, is not merely the rapidity of his resolutions ; it is also his foresight and activity. He has understood that it would not suffice, to put his new plans into execution, to appease all internal dissensions, he has shown himself convinced that it is necessary also (after Sadowa) to protect himself against the discontent of France. For that purpose, and without losing a day, he has set about seeking security and an alliance at St. Petersburg.

"General von Manteuffel was suddenly recalled from the army and sent on a mission to the Emperor Alexander. What did the King's confidant do at St. Petersburg? . . . Nothing has placed Prussia under the necessity of divulging the arrangements she may have concerted with

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Russia ; but it is certain that General von Manteuffel resided for several weeks at the Imperial Court, and that since that time, the Russian Government has not ceased to observe an attitude that has been manifestly friendly in its relations with Prussia. Its representative at Berlin, who was so much alarmed by the success of the Prussian arms, and who did not conceal his anxiety, was, in his turn, summoned to St. Petersburg ; he returned, a few weeks later, entirely reassured and affecting an attitude of satisfaction which was no more departed from. . . , All these events are recorded in my correspondence ; I nevertheless recall them because coupled with ulterior incidents, they show there exists an understanding between St. Petersburg and Berlin. . , . The English Ambassador here for a long time refused to admit that the agreement between Prussia and Russia should be regarded with uneasiness. For some time past, his views have become considerably modified, and at present he is not less persuaded than other members of the diplomatic body, that contingent arrangements have been made between the Governments of King William and the Emperor Alexander. For my part, I have discovered the pe^nnanent demonstration, if I may so express myself, in the firm resolution of the Berlin Cabinet to prepare German unity without allowing itself to be turned

b xviii PREFACE

aside for an instant by the possibility of a conflict with France. . . ."

Apart from producing the written proof of the bonds uniting Russia and Prussia, it seems to me that it would have been difficult to explain myself on this subject with greater care and emphasis.

The Journal des Debats therefore was as ill-informed as its contemporaries, and its good faith was strangely led astray when it affirmed that I had seen nothing, and learnt nothing of what was passing before my eyes.

At what moment — it is necessary to note and retain this — did I make it such a constant practice to call attention to the relations springing up between the Cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg ? The page you have just read was written by me in January 1868, thirty months before the war, and it will be observed that I refer to previous despatches written in the same sense and in the same line of thought.

No one will ever know what I have suffered, the bitterness in which my mind has been so long and so pitilessly steeped, the anguish in which I have lived for several years. My grief was all the more keen as I had the conviction of having shown myself worthy of the confidence that had been placed in me when I was appointed to the Embassy at Berlin, and my hands are full of proofs bearing witness to it.

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Unable to endure the torments that encompassed me, and taking my inspiration from my patriotism as much as from feelings of self-esteem, I decided, in the year 1871, to appeal from an opinion deceived by organs that had an interest to lead it astray to an opinion better informed, and I resolved to put together, in a volume,^ the important despatches I had penned from Berlin, and to add to them the whole of the correspondence I had exchanged with M. de Gramont during my mission to Ems. I nursed the illusion, which, however, was very natural, that by placing all the documents in the case before my readers, I should set public opinion right again and obtain the reparation due to me.

These documents, in fact, established beyond doubt, not only that I had not been surprised at the candidature of the Prussian Prince, but further that I had not been mistaken, at any time during my long residence at Berlin, as to the real intentions of the Government to which I was accredited, any more than I had been as to the intrigues of Count Bismarck ; that I had on the contrary, observed them with the greatest care ; that, finally, I had given almost a daily account of them. To prove this, it will suffice for me to reproduce here the conclusion of the despatch from which I recently quoted a first

^ Ma Mission en Prusse.

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extract. After having grouped together all the elements of information authorising me to believe that they aimed, in Berlin, at the restoration of the German Empire, whilst acknowledging to themselves that they could only attain that end after having placed France, by a successful war, in the impossibility to raise an obstacle to it, I added in concluding : ". . . We must not dissemble : public feeling in Germany, generally, has urged the Prussian Government to enter on the path along which it is now advancing. Union first of all, then liberty, such has been the programme of the National Party, comprising all shades of moderate Liberals, since it has been able to form an idea of the importance attendant on the success obtained by the Prussian armies ; and it is with transports of enthusiasm and hatred that it would second the King's Government in a war against France. There are Particularists ^ in Germany. . . . There exists, in some secondary States, an invincible feeling of aversion for everything connected with the Prussian Government. . . . But at the outset of a national war, the most stubborn of those who share this feeling would be obliged to abstain from indulging in it ; they would have to give way before the masses who would applaud

1 Adherents to a political party in Germany who wish the different States forming the German Empire to maintain their independence and their own institutions. — Translator.

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at the conflict whilst passionately imposing on themselves the sacrifices that would be imposed on them. The German populations, in general, would regard the struggle, whatever the circumstances under which it broke out, as a French war of aggression against their country ; and if the fate of arms were favourable to them, their exactions would know no limits ; they would equal those of Prussia, which have always been so difficult to satisfy each time she has been victorious. We should therefore have to keep up a formidable war in which a whole people at the outset would take part against us. I here close this explanatory summary, which I recommend rather to your indulgence than to your attention."

I resumed in these few words : " German union will soon be accomplished ; ought we to accept it ? If so, do not let us conceal the fact that we shall give it a kindly welcome. ... In the contrary event, let us prepare for war without respite, and let us form a clear idea as to what assistance Austria is likely to be to us. . . . We shall need all our forces to ensure victory on the Rhine ; the campaign of 1866 has more than amply shown, by the defeat of the Austrian armies, the dangers of a struggle engaged in on either side of the Alps."

Does not this despatch show that I had long xxii PREFACE

since had a presentiment of the conflict, of Prussia's well-determined intention to provoke it, and had pointed out the obligations this contingency imposed on us ? Could I have shown greater attention, greater forethought, have pointed out the dangers threatening us at a more seasonable time ?

To prove that my convictions did not vary, that I persisted up to the last moment in the judgment I had expressed on the policy and calculations of the Prussian Cabinet, I will quote an extract from the last despatch I wrote from Berlin. The Emperor Alexander II. had just reached Ems ; King William, followed by Count Bismarck, had hastened to join his guest. I had on more than one occasion, and notably in my report of January 5th, 1868, noted the efforts made with unswerving steadfastness by the German Chancellor to cause a feeling to prevail at the Russian Court in accordance with his designs. On the occasion of the meeting of the two sovereigns, at which I was not present, this is how I thought I could sum up the views the King and his Prime Minister would give expression to :

" If I must confide to you," I wrote on June 30th, 1870, two weeks before the opening of hostilities, "my personal impressions, I will say that it suffices to remember what was the

PREFACE xxiii

thought of the Bedin Cabinet in constantly exerting itself to strengthen its intimate relations with that of St. Petersburg, to form an idea of the object the King had in view in proceeding to Ems, accompanied by the Chancellor, and of the interviews they have had with the Emperor Alexander. Count Bismarck, being of one frame of mind in this respect with his Sovereign, has invariably sought to ensure the eventual concurrence of Russia in their views. With that aim he has shown himself, on the one hand, favourable to the policy of the St. Petersburg Cabinet in the East ; on the other hand he has not ceased to awaken susceptibilities in regard to questions that agitate national feeling in Russia. I have no fear of being in error in presuming that he has been careful to give his views on the state of affairs in the Principalities, and in all the Levant, so as to please the Emperor ; and he cannot have failed to point out the tendency of the Vienna Cabinet to re-establish autonomy in Polish Galicia. Whilst the Minister will have assumed the task of setting the Emperor at ease on the first of these two points, and of alarming him on the other, the King will have displayed that good grace which he has always known how^ to turn to such wonderful account, to captivate the kindly feelings of his august nephew ; and I have no doubt, for my part, that, together.

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they have produced on his mind the impressions they desired. . . .

"It must not, however, be supposed that Count Bismarck considers it advisable to bind his poHcy closely to that of the Russian Cabinet. My views are that he has not contracted and is not disposed to make any engagement likely to cause him difficulties or to weaken him on the Rhine. The Chancellor's complacency towards Russia will never be of such a nature as to limit his liberty of action ; he promises, as a matter of fact more than he intends to perform, or in other words he seeks the alliance of the St. Petersburo- Cabinet in order to have the benefit of it in the event of a conflict in the West. . . . And so I have always felt persuaded that no official engagement has ever been made between the two Courts. ..."

Ulterior events, and particularly the resolutions that the Chancellor caused to prevail at the Berlin Congress, when Russia was pitilessly sacrificed, have entirely justified my conjectures, however premature they may have been at the time I put them in writing. In regard to this matter, again, was I wanting in foresight, and was I mistaken as to Count Bismarck's real intentions ? But what my readers will retain above all, is that, from 1866 until the last moment of my stay at Berlin, I have never, at any time, omitted to set forth in my correspondence not merely the calculations I

PREFACE XXV

felt justified in considering the Prussian Government was making, but its ceaseless efforts to ensure the neutrality of Russia and eventually its armed co-operation, if Austria determined to give assistance to France in the ensuing war.

Since Austria had been expelled from Germany, they had had but one object at Berlin, that of uniting the Southern States to the Confederation of the North and of re-establishing the Imperial Crown for the benefit of the House of Hohenzollern. They would not hesitate at war if recourse to arms became necessary. In the meanwhile they were preparing to attain their end in a military sense, by making the armies as powerful as possible ; diplomatically, by displaying dazzling perspectives at St. Petersburg, which, although fallacious, were sufficient to convince the Sovereign he could rely on a kindly attitude, and if occasion offered on active support, particularly in view of keeping a check on Austria. That is just what I was constantly pointing out, and my volume, Ma Mission en PrtLsse, is swarming with indications bearing testimony to my vigilance and to my eagerness to collect every kind of information in regard to the frame of mind and aims of the Prussian Government.

Did I err at Ems ? Did I mistake the King's real intentions and the nature of my instructions ?

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Did I imprudently create the incidents that permitted Count Bismarck to hurl the two countries in arms against one another ? What interest had we in this affair, what could we, what ought we to exact ? First of all, the desistance of Prince Leopold. It was granted us. Was it necessary and advisable to obtain that the King should impose it on him and enter into an engagenient with us ? M. de Gramont thought so, and I was not of his opinion. It is not the place here to enumerate the reasons of this disagreement : they are, however, easy to guess. What it is of importance for me to add, is that the King consented to give his personal and sovereign assent to the Prince's determination, and communicate it to us, thus sharing the responsibility of his nephew's declaration. I thought, for my part, that this solution gave us most entire satisfaction, without any prejudice to the dignity of either party, and consequently that it was acceptable on both sides.

During the whole course of these negotiations nothing occurred to disturb the courtesy with which they were carried on. It is necessary I should repeat here, that at Ems there was neither an insulter nor a person insulted. Questioned at Baden, on this subject, some years later, the King replied : " M. Benedetti performed his duty correctly ; nothing more."

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There was a change in the aspect of things on July 13th, due to the communication which I received orders to make to the King at the last moment, and also to a despatch from his Ambassador at Paris. I was instructed on the night of July 1 2th, to solicit the King's verbal assurance that he would not authorise Prince Leopold to accept the offer he had just declined in case it were made to him again. Baron Werther, on his side, became the intermediary of another desire, which was not com'municated to me : it was a question of deciding the King to write the Emperor a letter conceived in such terms as would appease the irritation the incident had provoked in France. The King rejected my last overture, and gave orders to inform Count Bismarck of these final phases of our conferences. The despatch prepared with that view bears the same date, day and hour, as that in which I announced to M. de Gramont that the King gave his approbation to Prince Hohenzollern's desistance, whilst authorising me to notify the same to the Emperor's Government. Had it not been for the last wish that I was requested to express to the King and the desire that the Prussian Ambassador at Paris consented to transmit to his sovereign, ]the despatch destined for Count Bismarck would merely have announced the closure of this discussion, and the text, in that case, would not xxviii PREFACE

have undergone the criminal aUerations of which the Chancellor has boldly assumed the responsibility. My mission would therefore have been happily fulfilled, and war averted.

Consequently no more at Ems than at Berlin had I in any way betrayed the confidence of my Government. I therefore had reason ,to think, that my volume would throw a brilliant light on the way in which I had acquitted myself of my professional duties, and cause the most prejudiced to modify their opinions in my favour. Nothing of the kind occurred, I had not made allowance for passions, particularly for legend, that occult power which exercises such baleful influence on the credulity of the masses. A few earnest men, desirous of gaining information, were struck with the authority of my revelations and so expressed themselves to me. But the •general public, who read little or not at all, who have formed their opinion and abide by it, showed me no consideration. A new trouble was added to the others, that of seeing writers worthy of all esteem abstain, with the exception of Jules Favre,-^ from relieving me of the accusations brought against me.