Instinct and reason

Chapter I. Of Knowledge In General

1. Locke has said, " Since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them." i

2. If this sentence be understood in its obvious meaning, it certainly gives a very inadequate view of human knowledge ; for it seems to embrace nothing but the knowledge of ideas, or the science of mind, 2 which, though the most important, is by no means the only department of knowledge with which we are conversant.

1 Essay concerning Human Understanding. Book IV. chap. 1.

2 I here suppose that by Ideas Locke meant simply mental phenomena in general, not ideas in that peculiar sense, which has been attributed to him, (especially by Sir William Hamilton), as something immaterial, yet distinct from the mind, and existing even out of consciousness. That Locke did not hold that opinion, I have, I think, proved. See Principles of Psychology, supplement to chapter " Of Perception.*'

3. This much is certain, that nothing is immediately present to the mind but its own Feelings or its own Thoughts, 1 and consequently; that all our knowledge must be either of them or through them. How it comes to pass that by means of mental phenomena we become acquainted with things totally different, is, no doubt, a a great mystery ; but, unless we deny the existence of matter, the fact is indisputable.

4. All our knowledge, then, is either immediate or mediate ; either the knowledge of our own feelings and thoughts, or of other things through the medium of these. The importance of Psychology is hence apparent ; for mental phenomena are not only interesting in themselves, but they are the channel of communication with every thing else.

5. Since the knowledge of our own feelings and thoughts is alone immediate, we ought to be much better acquainted with them than with other things. And, no doubt, we are in one sense, though, possibly, not in another. "We know the particular feelings and thoughts perfectly, as they arise successively in our minds ; but we may be very ignorant of their composition, connection, and origin ; in other words, we know them practically, but not scientifically. Here, as elsewhere, it is true that what is nearest to us is often least comprehended as a whole. The very interest we take in the particulars, their engrossing nature, clouds our general view. Moreover, it is difficult for the mind, even with intention, to turn round and examine its own phenomena ; and the very act of examination may modify them. Lastly, the

1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part I., chap. 2.

OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 3

phenomena are fleeting, and liable to change, and therefore cannot long be examined at one time. For these reasons, Psychology is one of the most difficult of sciences ; though, from our immediate knowledge of the subject thereof, it seems susceptible of a great advance towards perfection.

6. From the above it follows that all men are more or less Psychologists ; they must know something of their own minds, their own feelings, and thoughts, they cannot prevent themselves from so knowing ; for those feelings and thoughts press upon them at every turn. Consequently, the opinions of untutored men in reference to Psychology are entitled to more respect then their opinions on any other subject. In Natural Philosophy, for instance, the views of untaught men are of no value whatever, they are often the very reverse of the truth ; for they judge mostly by appearances, and these are deceitful. Judging by appearances, men long thought that the earth was the centre of the universe, round which the sun, planets, and fixed stars performed a daily revolution. And how could they think otherwise? To assert the contrary must have seemed at first a violent paradox, in opposition, it might be said, to our very senses. Do we not see the sun rise and set as well as the stars ? It required no little Philosophy to prove that* we see no such thing ; that we only see phenomena, changing phenomena, from which we infer motion of the sun and stars, while we ought to infer from the same phenomena motion of the earth. This one thing is certain, the phenomena admit of two explanations ; and why should untaught men necessarily stumble upon the right ? The senses give us directly no information with respect to external objects ; they furnish us only with sensations. Of these we cannot doubt, but our inferences therefrom may or may not be correct. It is not then our senses that deceive us, but the thoughts which we build thereupon.

7. Another corollary from the above is, that startling paradoxical opinions on the subject of Psychology ought to be looked upon with peculiar suspicion ; as opposed to the common opinions of mankind on a matter strictly within their competence. Psychological paradoxes are prima facie self-condemned ; and though they may obtain a hearing, they must expect to be silenced at last by the indignant clamour of unlearned metaphysicians. Thus the daring opinions of an ingenious writer of the present day, confounding subject with object, self with non-self, mind with matter, are scouted universally, as opposed to our intimate conviction, which nothing can overthrow or even weaken, that the things thus confounded are really distinct.

8. From what precedes it further appears that all our knowledge begins with that of Self, obtained through consciousness. This is the fons et origo of all our acquirements, how various soever they may be ; and this must exist with the knowledge of every thing which is not self, for through self alone can the non-self be reached. Moreover, though the information about other things obtained through consciousness may be very defective or utterly wrong ; yet the immediate knowledge which consciousness effects is free from all doubt. To doubt that we think is a contradiction, for the very doubt is itself a thought, and by the very nature of feeling, we

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must know whether we feel or not. It is satisfactory to be thus assured that the source and the condition of all our knowledge is itself free from cavil.

9. Before preceeding further it may be well to inquire whether the word knowledge admit of any ambiguity, and consequently any explanation. By Locke the term knowledge is limited to certainty, and other knowledge commonly so called is designated probability. This it must be allowed is an unusual meaning of the word, unwarranted either by popular usage or by philosophical authority, which generally treats of knowledge as either certain or probable. By far the greater part of what we commonly call knowledge is of the latter sort. A man of great knowledge means one whose mind is stored with facts, most of which are not of undoubted certainty. At the same time, mere suggestion, mere supposition, are not called knowledge. Unless the probability be in favour of any fact, that term is never applied. When we say, I do not merely think so, / know it, we mean that we have, if not a certain, at least a very strong assurance of the truth of the fact, founded on evidence powerful if not demonstrative. Thus, unless we limit with Locke the meaning of the word to certainty, it is impossible to say where knowledge begins or ends ; because the degrees of probability are infinite ; and what seems probable to one, and is therefore esteemed knowledge, may seem improbable to another, and consequently no knowledge at all. Even Locke, who restricts knowledge to certainty, is somewhat doubtful whether sensitive knowledge, as he calls it, be properly entitled to the name, and he begs it to be admitted under the category, as if by courtesy. We must not then attempt to fix the boundaries of knowledge very strictly ; just as we cannot always say whether a certain shade of colour be light or dark ; but we must bear in mind that by its very nature knowledge is somewhat indefinite. Strong belief in any event past or present is often called knowledge, though the event may not be true. To knowledge of the future we more seldom pretend, because our belief is less firm ; though Job does say, "I know that my Kedeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth/' 1

1 Chap. xix. ver. 25.

Chapter II. Of Different Kinds Of Knowledge

1. Haying ascertained the nature of Knowledge in general, as well as the case admits, for we have seen that it cannot be strictly defined ; and having seen not only that Knowledge begins with the feelings and thoughts of our minds, but that these, the latter at least, are an indispensable condition of all knowledge, at all times ; we have next to enquire whether there be not different kinds thereof. That there are different degrees we have already seen, varying from absolute certainty to a small excess of probability. Certainty admits not of degrees, but the degrees of probability are infinite.

2. Knowledge may be divided into kinds in different ways, upon different principles. First, we may divide it, according to the evidence upon which it rests, into the certain and the probable, including under the latter a degree of probability which commonly passes for certainty. That the sun will rise to-morrow we cannot doubt; but according to this division it is an event highly probable only. We must allow it to be possible that the sun shall not rise again ; and therefore possibly not to-morrow.

3. Again, knowledge may be divided into the original and the derivative, words which sufficiently explain themselves. If we possess any knowledge at all, some portion of it at least must be original, for whatever is derived, is derived from something, and that something, if not itself derived, must be original. If itself derived, it must proceed from something earlier, which is either original or built upon what was original. Therefore, that some portion of our knowledge is original, is a necessary consequence of the admission that we possess any knowledge at all. It is possible that all our knowledge is original ; but impossible that all is derivative. To ascertain what knowledge is original and what not, may be a difficult task; but this difficulty does not effect the reality of this distinction. As there can be no reasoning without premises granted, so without primitive knowledge none could be acquired.

4. Lastly, knowledge may be divided into the instinctive and the rational; according to the source whence it springs, from Instinct or from Keason. As this seems to be the distinction which cuts most deeply into the human mind, we shall adopt it as the ground of our future observations.

CHAPTEK III.

OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION FIKST.

OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.

1. Accurately to distinguish the boundaries of Instinct and Eeason is no easy task. Popular language, however, and popular opinion, acknowledge the distinction ; and these, as we have seen, are not to be despised in questions of mental philosophy. We cannot, indeed, expect any great accuracy in the notions and discourses of daily life ; but philosophy without precision is unworthy of the name. Let us then endeavour clearly to distinguish between instinct and reason.

2. Eeason is commonly supposed to be that faculty whereby Man is especially distinguished from the lower animals, which are said to be mere creatures of Instinct. Whether this be or be not true, we shall see presently; but were it granted, it still would not tell us what reason and what instinct is, and how they differ. If man alone have reason, he has instinct also ; so that instinct, at least, is common to him and the rest of the animal creation. Those who consider man as the only rational animal, at the same time allow that he is not all rational, that he has instinct also. This question, then, concerns man as well as the other families of animated nature.

3. The word instinct is often applied to the emotions as well as to the intellectual part of our nature. All the primary desires are instincts, that is, they arise without any effort, whether we will or not, by the original constitution of our minds, without meditation, without any view to consequences, without any thought beyond that of the wished-for object. Such are desire of life, of power, of glory, of affection. Such desires may be encouraged or discouraged, they may grow into passions or decline into indolent longings ; but they must exist before they can be cultivated or depressed, before they can rise into dignity or sink into insignificance. They are a part of the original furniture of the mind, furniture that may or may not be polished and adorned, that may get very old, but which never can quite wear out. To these primary desires the term instinct is constantly applied ; as when we talk of the instinct of self-preservation.

4. This use of the word in the case of the emotions may help us to fix the sense of instinct when applied to the intellect. Instinctive knowledge, like an instinctive emotion, must, in the first place, be original, not derived from previous knowledge; it must be got without effort, whether we will or not ; without meditation ; without any wish for it ; it must rush into our minds, we know not how ; and must be held to, we cannot tell

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why ; it must be firmly relied on, but not discerned to be true. Where all these characteristics meet, there is instinctive knowledge.

5. The characteristics of instinctive knowledge may more methodically be summed up thus : —

First, — It must be original, not derived from previous knowledge. From this it follows, as a corollary, that it is got without effort, whether we will or not ; without seeking, without meditation ; that it neither demands nor admits of logical proof.

Secondly, — It must be universal, held by all men without exception ; even by those who profess to doubt it.

Thirdly, — It must be irresistible, proof against all sceptical arguments, though unanswerable.

Fourthly, — It must not be self-evident, like the axioms of mathematics; in other words it must not be discerned to be true. The corollary from this is, that the denial of instinctive truth, however perverse, is still admissible ; for such denial is, strictly speaking, not absurd, that is, not directly opposed to reason.

These four characteristics, with their corollaries, sufficiently determine what is instinctive knowledge.

Section Second. Of Personal Identity And Of Memory

1. Let us now take specimens of such knowledge, and let us see how the above characteristics apply.

2. All our knowledge begins with Consciousness, consciousness of some feeling or thought actually present ; and of which, therefore, as we have seen, we cannot doubt. This is the foundation of all knowledge, but taken alone, it is not knowledge ; for, had our mental life been merely a succession of feelings and thoughts without any conscious connection between them, we should have remained for ever ignorant of all things. Such a supposition is possible ; and it is enough to show that the knowledge of self is not necessarily involved in consciousness, that we might have had feelings and thoughts innumerable in constant succession, without any acquaintance with self. The supposition is tenable because it is not inconsistent, one part does not contradict another ; and consequently the knowledge of our Identity is not self-evident or necessary.

3. This, however, must be allowed, that knowledge, properly so called, does necessarily suppose some knowledge of self; for, how could I be said to know anything beyond the feeling or thought of the present moment, unless I myself were somehow known. This knowledge is clearly implied in every other. In this sense, and in this sense alone, we may admit the first proposition of an ingenious writer of the present day, as

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contained in bis " Theory of Knowing and Being," that " Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself J 3 Yes, along with whatever any intelligence knows; but this does not prove that selfknowledge is a necessary article of belief, but only, like memory, necessary to all other knowledge. We might have had a succession of feelings and thoughts, without memory, without a knowledge of self ; but such a succession would not be knowledge.

4. The above Proposition, as thus understood, seems to be true, and consequently harmless at least, if not fruitful ; but Proposition Second, which the author deduces from the First, is paradoxical in the extreme, being opposed to the universal intuitive reason of mankind. This Proposition contains the whole of his system ; and if it be upset, the whole must fall. It is as follows : — " The object of all knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of oneself, — object plus subject — thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition.

" Demonstration.

u It has been already established as the condition of all knowledge, that a thing can be known only provided the intelligence which apprehends It knows itself at the same time. But if a thing can be known only provided oneself be known along with it, it follows that the thing (or thought) and oneself together, must, in every case, be the object, the true and complete object of knowledge, in other words, it follows that that which we know always is, and must be, object plus subject, object cum alio — thing or thought with an addition to it, — which addition is the me; Self, therefore, is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." 1

5. Now, let us observe, in the first instance, that the author allows in the enunciation of the Proposition that the object of knowledge, as understood by Mm, differs from what is naturally and usually regarded as the object, differs by containing something not commonly comprehended under it. Why, then, it may be asked, do you call it an object ? why attach a new meaning to an old and well-understood word ? Your object, it is allowed, is not the object of other men. Accordingly, in the demonstration we are told that " if a thing can be known only provided oneself be known along with it, it follows that the thing (or thought) and oneself together must, in every case, be the object, the true and complete object, of knowledge." Now this is the very inference which we deny. Self is not, and cannot be, a part of the object, so long as these two are distinguished by all men under heaven. No one can confound the two. The attempt to confound them is an insult to the universal intuitive reason of mankind. The author himself allows that they are " naturally and usually" distinguished. It is, in fact, only by giving a new meaning to the word object, by enlarging it, that the inference can be maintained. Because a thing can be known only provided oneself be

1 " Theory of Knowing and Being," by Professor Ferrier. Proposition II.

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known along with it, it does not follow that self is an object of knowledge, as that word is usually understood. The condition of all knowledge is not necessarily an object of knowledge. It may and must co-exist along with the object, but only the slightest reflection, or rather none at all, is required to distinguish them. To say that " Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition/' is a monstrous paradox, a contradiction in terms, a contradiction to the meaning of the word object Sometimes, indeed, self may be an object to self, as when we reflect on the operations of our own minds ; but this very case, by its difference from other cases, proves that self is not always, not necessarily, an object, or a part of an object. In this particular case, and in this alone, self is both subject and object. This Second Proposition, the first inference from the Primary Proposition, contains, as we have said, all that is peculiar to the " Theory of Knowing and Being ;" and that inference being shown to be fallacious, the whole system must perish.

6. It thus appears that the startling and paradoxical air which pervades the whole of the " Theory of Knowing and Being/' arises from giving a new and enlarged sense to the word object, a sense different from the natural or usual, as the author himself allows. But, as the writer cannot get rid of the old sense of the word, he immediately applies to it what holds good of the term in its new signification only ; and, so applied, the system becomes paradox and nonsense. If, on the other hand, the new sense be constantly held to, the " Theory" is frivolous, a mere change of nomenclature. Paradox or insignificance, absurdity or nothing, u choose your horn." I have elsewhere said, " No error is more common in Philosophy than by changing the meaning of a word to arrive at conclusions which wear the air of novelty, while nothing may be really new but the altered signification of a term."

In knowing any thing I cannot but know myself also. True. But that thing is either self or non-self. Let it be non-self, then the knowledge of the non-self is not the same as the knowledge of self; or the object differs from the subject. It is impossible to evade this argument but by denying that there is any thing in the word but self. If a non-self be allowed, the reasoning is irresistible.

7. An acquaintance with the past which we obtain by memory, and an acquaintance with self, are two instinctive and fundamental articles of knowledge, which arise together, and are for ever inseparable. We cannot remember any thing past, that is, in the first instance, some past state of consciousness, and through it some outward event, without knowing, in other words, believing without doubt, that the subject who then was conscious, and he who now remembers, is the same, the same, not merely similar, really One and Indivisible. So, we cannot believe in self without the remembrance of something before the present moment, some prior state of consciousness, belonging to that self. " I am the same man as I was yesterday," predicates sameness and supposes memory ; u and I remember the events of yesterday," precludes memory and supposes sameness of the subject. Thus knowledge of Personal Identity and knowledge of

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the Past are inseparably and necessarily bound up together.

8. These two articles of knowledge, Personal Identity, and some acquaintance with the Past, are fundamental, because they are the ground- work of all other knowledge. It is clearly impossible to know any thing beyond the present moment unless we know that we who now learn and we who formerly learnt are the same ; and it is also impossible to know what we formerly learnt without memory. Consequently, these two articles of knowledge are strictly fundamental.

9. If there be any exception to the above truth it is in the case of intuitive knowledge, to be afterwards dwelt upon. When we assent to any self-evident maxim, such as " if equals be added to equals the wholes are equal/' or " two straight lines cannot enclose a space ;" it may be doubted whether any exercise of memory, any knowledge of self, be necessary. The mind appears to embrace the maxim at once without any reference to the past. This being allowed, it would follow that, strictly speaking, knowledge of self is not indispensable to all knowledge, that it does not always even co-exist with the knowledge of an object, much less form a part of that object, as Professor Ferrier maintains.

10. These two co-existent and contemporaneous articles of knowledge are not only fundamental but instinctive ; as will readily appear by reference to our Criteria (Section I. 5).

(1.) Knowledge of Self, and its concomitant Memory, are certainly original, not derived from any previous knowledge. They are got without effort, whether we will or not, without seeking, without meditation ; they neither demand nor admit of logical proof.

(2.) They are universal, held by all men without exception, even by those who profess to doubt them.

(3.) They are irresistible , proof against all sceptical arguments, though unanswerable ; for such arguments, however puzzling, are not demonstrative. We must yield to demonstration.

(4.) They are not strictly self-evident like the axioms of mathematics, in other words, they are not discerned to be true. The contrary supposition involves no contradiction, and is therefore admissible ; it is no outrage to reason. Our sameness may be a delusion ; memory may deceive us ; though we cannot so believe. Eeason must allow the supposition to be just possible, but Instinct forbids us to doubt.

Section Third. Knowledge Of Matter

1. Next in order to the knowledge of Self, and of past states of Consciousness, may be ranked the knowledge of Matter. Hitherto we have been acquainted only with our own minds, with the present and the past states thereof, and with that something which remains permanent amidst all modifications. So far, all is of a similar nature, all is immaterial, and though at the bottom every

KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 19

thing is mysterious, and imperfectly comprehensible, yet there appears no peculiar mystery in passing from one state of Consciousness to another. My own Being, the only one which I intimately know, is spiritual ; there may therefore be other spiritual Beings similar to myself in all respects ; there may be other spiritual Beings superior to myself; there may be One Great spiritual Being above all. These inferences are natural, nay, unavoidable. The world of Spirits, then, is the one first open to us, through our own Consciousness, and by inferences therefrom, so far as we are able to make them. It is the first world revealed to us by Instinct, and the last which Beason should give up ; for we cannot abandon it without denying ourselves. If we be not spiritual, we are nothing. The world of Spirits, then, is the one of which we have the greatest certainty.

2. But the world of spirits is not all. We are next introduced to a world of a very different sort, not only different, but opposed, the qualities of the one being a negation of the other. The one is material, the other immaterial ; that is, the one is extended, solid or impenetrable, or occupying space, moveable, and infinitely divisible ; the other unextended, penetrable, or occupying no space, consequently incapable of movement in space, and indivisible.

3. Now, the great question is, how came we to know a thing so different from ourselves ? This does seem the mystery of mysteries ; and so it has appeared to thoughtful men ; for, while by some, theories have been formed to lessen the difficulty ; by others, the existence of matter has been called in question or even flatly denied. Ke~ ferring to another work 1 for an account of the various theories framed to meet the difficulty, by softening down the distinction between Mind and Matter, by materializing mind, or by immaterializing matter, or by interposing Deity, theories which complicate the mystery without removing it, we shall be content here to refer to those who profess to doubt or to disbelieve the existence of the material world.

4. Considering the wide and deep distinction between Mind and Matter, the awful gulph which lies between them, and hence the impossibility of an immediate knowledge of the latter ; these doubts seem at first not unreasonable. As soon as we begin to think upon the subject at all, we must see that all we know immediately is some state of our own Minds ; and how, from such a state, we get at something else utterly opposed in nature, does seem peculiarly incomprehensible. In vain do we attempt to throw a bridge over the chasm by means of sensible species or Ideas, whether those ideas pass directly from the object to us, or through the medium of the divine Mind ; we must at last leap the gulph which we had laboured to cross with ease. A very ingenious author of the present day, already alluded to, has endeavoured to get over the abyss by filling it up, by effacing the distinction between Mind and Matter, but the ravine was too broad and too deep.

5. But why must we leap the chasm which we cannot otherwise cross ? Why not remain on this side and refuse to trust ourselves to an unknown land, beset with

1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part III., chap. III., Sect. 3, Of Perception.

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clouds and thick darkness ? Here, all is comparatively clear, there, all is mysterious, unlike to any thing which we intimately know. Myself I know, my thoughts and feelings I know ; but what is that which neither thinks nor feels ? Why believe in something without, which contradicts all within ? Surely this is too great a call on my credulity. A Spirit I am, and, without some powerful reason to the contrary, I will believe only in the world of spirits.