Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, bart

Front matter

Class. E) I4&1 ns%

PHILOSOPHY

OT y

Preface

In this publication we give to the readers and students of philosophy in America all, except part of an unfinished Dissertation, that Sir ¥m. Hamilton has published directly on the subject of metaphysics. The completed supplementary Dissertations on Reid, 1 the foot-notes to Eeid that have an enduring interest, and the philosophical portion of the 'Discussions, 2 etc.,' have been used to make up this work. The article on Logic and the Appendix Logical, in the Discussions, might have been added, but these do not properly belong to the metaphysical system of Hamilton, and, moreover, have been reserved for another purpose. The place where each part of this volume may be found in the work from which it is taken, has been designated by a foot-note.

In our collection and arrangement of Hamilton's Philosophy, we have followed a systematic plan. Any explanation or vindication of this plan would be, to those who are unacquainted with Sir "Wm.'s system, unintel-

1 The works of Thomas Reid, D. D., now fully collected, with selections from his unpublished letters. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations, by Sir Win. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh : Third Edition, 1852 : pp. 914 (not completed).

2 Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform. By Sir Wm. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh, 1852 : pp. 15%.

6 PEEFACE.

ligible ; to those who have mastered its principles, superfluous. Our foot-notes are not very numerous, and consist mostly in references to other parts of the work, where some point indicated is more fully treated ; and in explanations of a few, more than usually difficult, passages. In a single instance we have expressed our dissent from a position taken by Hamilton, the grounds of which we have briefly designated, without entering upon a systematic discussion. A severer study may convince us that Sir Wm. is right and that we are wrong.

Hamilton has promised a General Preface to his Reid, and a Sequel of the Dissertations. When these appear, they will be added to this work in a separate volume, in which the Indices will be given to the whole.

New York, June, 1853.

Introduction

We do not propose to give here a resume of Sir Wm. Hamilton's philosophy. A correct list, in technical language, of the principles of his system, would not be a clear exposition of his metaphysical doctrines. To attempt to put in a brief introduction the substance of several hundred pages of Hamilton's Philosophical Discussions and Dissertations would be presumptuous and preposterous. A philosopher, who thinks like Aristotle ; whose logic is as stern as that of St. Thomas, ' the lawgiver of the Church ;' who rivals Muretus as a critic ; whose erudition finds a parallel only in that of the younger Scaliger ; whose subtlety of thought and polemical power remind us of the dauntless prince 1 of Verona ; whose penetrating analysis reaches deeper than that of Kant, — such a one, it it our pleasure to introduce to the students of philosophy in America ; who, in a style severely elegant, with accuracy of statement, with precision of definition, in sequence and admirable order, will explain a system in many respects new, — a system that will provoke thought, that, consequently, carries in itself the germs of beneficial revolutions in literature and education, in all those things that are produced and regulated by mind in action. True to our plan of making the work as completely Hamilton's as possible, we shall offer, mostly in the language of our author, a few considerations on the utility of the study of philosophy.

Philosophy is a necessity. Every man philosophizes as he thinks. The worth of his philosophy will depend upon the value of his thinking. ' If to philosophize be right,' says Aristotle, in his Exhortative, : we must philosophize to realize the right ; if to philosophize be

' The elder Scaliger.

8 INTKODUOTION.

wrong, we must philosophize to manifest the wrong : on any alternative, therefore, philosophize we must.' 1

No philosopher can explore the whole realm of truth. No single mind can compass the aggregate of what is possessed by all. Every system must, then, be incomplete ; it cannot be taken as an equivalent for all that can be thought. The most that any system can do for us is to aid us, to stimulate our minds, to infuse higher intellectual energy. ' If the accomplishment of philosophy,' says Hamilton (Dis. p. 39, et seq.), ' imply a cessation of discu&sion — if the result of speculation be a paralysis of itself, the consummation of knowledge is the condition of intellectual barbarism. Plato has profoundly defined man " the hunter of truth ;" for in this chase as in others, the pursuit is all in all, the success comparatively nothing. " Did the Almighty," says Lessing, " holding in his right hand Truth, and in his left, Search after Truth, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer, in all humility, but without hesitation, I should request — Search after Truth" "We exist only as we energize ; pleasure 1 is the reflex of unimpeded energy ; energy is the mean by which our faculties are developed ; and a higher energy the end which their development proposes. In action is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement, and perfection of our being ; and knowledge is only previous, as it may afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers, and the condition of their more complete activity. Speculative truth is, therefore, subordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by the quantity of energy which it occasions — immediately in its discovery — mediately through its consequences. Life to Endymion was not preferable to death ; aloof from practice, a waking error is better than a sleeping truth. — Neither, in point of fact, is there found any proportion between the possession of truths, and the development of the mind in which they are deposited. Every learner in science is now familiar with more truths than Aristotle or Plato ever dreamt of knowing ; yet, compared with the Stagirite or the Athenian, how few among our masters of modern science rank higher than intellectual barbarians ! Ancient Greece and modern Europe prove, indeed, that the " march of intellect" is no inseparable concomitant of

1 Ei fiiv <pi\oco<p7iT£ov., <pi\oao(pr]Ttov' Kal cl pr) <pi\oao<pr)Tiov, ^iXocro^tlTtov' 7t&VT<x>% Spa <f>l\o<TO<priTCOV.

2 Aristotle defined happiness, Energizing according to virtue. It results from the healthy, unimpeded activity of every element of our nature. — W.

INTEODUCTION. 9

" the march of science ;•" that the cultivation of the individual ia not to be rashly confounded with the progress of the species.

' But if the possession of theoretical facts he not convertible with mental improvement, and if the former be important only as subservient to the latter, it follows that the comparative utility of a study is not to be principally estimated by the complement of truths which it may communicate, but by the degree in which it determines our higher capacities to action. But though this be the standard by which the different methods, the different branches, and the different masters of philosophy ought to be principally (and it is the only criterion by which they can all be satisfactorily) tried, it is nevertheless a standard by which neither methods, nor sciences, nor philosophers, have ever yet been even inadequately appreciated. The critical history of philosophy, in this spirit, has still to be written ; and when written, how opposite will be the rank which, on the higher and more certain standard, it will frequently adjudge to the various branches of knowledge, and the various modes of their cultivation — to the different ages, and countries, and individuals, from that which has been hitherto partially awarded, on the vacillating authority of the lower !

' On this ground (which we have not been able fully to state, far less adequately to illustrate), we rest the pre-eminent utility of metaphysical speculations. That they comprehend all the sublimest objects of our theoretical and moral interest ; that every (natural) conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and future destiny of man, is exclusively metaphysical, will be at once admitted. But we do not found the importance on the paramount dignity of the pursuit. It is as the best gymnastic of the mind — as a mean principally and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that we would vindicate to these speculations the necessity, which has too frequently been denied them. By no other intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentrated in such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy ; by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved. " Where there is most life, there is the victory."

'Let it not be believed that the mighty minds who have cultivated these studies, have toiled in vain. If they have not always realized truth, they have always determined exertion ; and in the genial elo-

' The practical dauger which has sometimes been apprehended from metaphysical pursuits, has in reality only been found to follow from their stunted and partial cultivation. The poisor aas grown up ; the antidote has been repressed. In Britain and in Germany, where speculation has remained comparatively free, the dominant result has been highly favorable to religion 2 and morals ; whilst the evils which arose in France, arose from the benumbing influence of a one effete philosophy ; 3 and have, in point of fact, mainly been corrected by the awakened spirit of metaphysical inquiry itself.'

Hamilton again says (' Discussions,' p. 696, et seq.) : ' Yet is Philosophy (the science of science — the theory of what we can know and think and do, in a word, the knowledge of ourselves), the object of liberal education, at once of paramount importance in itself, and the requisite condition of every other liberal science. If men are really

1 Bacon, himself, the great champion of physical pursuits, says : — ' Those sciences are not to he regarded as useless, which, considered in themselves, are valueless, if they sharpen the mind and reduce it to order. Hume, Burke, Kant, Stewart, &c, might he quoted to the same effect. — Compare Aristotle, Metaph. i. 2, Eth. Nic. v. 7.

2 The philosophers of Germany, not as it is generally supposed in this country, and even by those who ought to know, have been more orthodox than the divines. Fichte, who was, for his country and his times, a singularly pious Christian, was persecuted by the theologians, on account of his orthodoxy. — W.

3 'Since the metaphysic of Locke,' says M. Cousin, in 1S19, 'crossed the channel on the light and brilliant wings of Voltaire's imagination, sensualism has reigned in France without contradiction, and with an authority of which there is no parallel in the whole history of philosophy. It is a fact, marvellous but incontestable, that from the time of Condillac, there has not appeared among us any philosophical work, at variance with his doctrine, which has produced the smallest impression on the public mind. Condillac thus reigned in peace ; and his domination, prolonged even to our own days, through changes of every kind, pursued its tranquil course, apparently above the reach of danger. Discussion had closed : his disciples had only to develop the words of their master : philosophy seemed accomplished.' — (Journal des Savans.) During the reign of sensualism in France, religion, languished, for she was deprived cf the aid of her most efficient servant — philosophy. — W.

to know aught else, the human faculties, by which alone this knowledge may be realized, must be studied for themselves, in then* extent and in their limitations. To know, — we must understand our instrument of knowing. " Know thyself" is, in fact, a heavenly precept, in Christianity as in heathenism. And this knowledge can be compassed only by reflection, — only from within: "Ne te queesieris extra." It tells us at once of our weakness and our worth; it is the discipline both of humility and hope. On the other hand, a knowledge, drawn too exclusively from without, is not only imperfect in itself, but makes its votaries fatalists, materialists, pantheists — if they dare to think ; it is the dogmatism of despair. " Laudabilior," says Augustin, "laudabilior est animus, cui nota est infirmitas propria, quam qui, ea non respecta, moenia mundi, vias siderum, ftmdamenta terrarum et fastigia coelorum, etiam cogniturus, scrutatur." "We can know God only as we know ourselves. " Noverim me, noverim Te," is St. Austin's prayer ; St. Bernard : — " Principale, ad videndum Deum, est animus rationalis intuens seipsum ;" and even Averroes : — " Nosce teipsum, et cognosces creatorem tuum."

' Nor is the omission of philosophy from an academical curriculum equivalent to an arrest on the philosophizing activity of the student. This stupor, however deplorable in itself, might still be a minor evil • for it is better, assuredly, to be without opinions, than to have them, not only superlatively untrue, but practically corruptive. Yet, even this paralysis, I say, is not accomplished. Eight or wrong, a man must philosophize, for he philosophizes as he thinks ; and the only effect, in the present day especially, of a University denying to its alumni the invigorating exercise of a right philosophy, is their abandonment, not only without precaution, but even prepared by debilitation, to the pernicious influence of a wrong : — " Sine vindice preeda." And in what country has a philosophy ever gravitating, as theoretical towards materialism, as practical towards fatalism, been most peculiar and pervasive ?

' Again : — Philosophy, the thinking of thought, the recoil of mind upon itself, is the most improving of mental exercises, conducing, above all others, to evolve the highest and rarest of the intellectual powers. By this, the mind is not only trained to philosophy proper, but prepared, in general, for powerful, easy, and successful energy, in whatever department of knowledge it may more peculiarly apply itself. But the want of this superior discipline is but too apparent in

English [American] literature, and especially in those very fields of erudition hy preference cultivated in England [America].

' Of English [American] scholars as a class, both now and for generations past, the observation of Godfrey Hermann holds good : — " They read but do not think ; they would be philologers, and have not learned to philosophize." The philosophy of a philology is shown primarily in its grammars, and its grammars for the use of schools. But in this respect, England [America] remained, till lately, nearly two centuries behind the rest of Christendom. If there were any principle in her pedagogical practice, "Gaudent sudoribus artes," must have been the rule ; and applied it was with a vengeance. The English [American] schoolboy was treated like the Eussian packhorse ; the load in one pannier was balanced by a counter- weight of stones in the other. . . . The unhappy tyro was initiated in Latin, through a Latin book ; while the ten declensions, the thirteen conjugations, which had been reduced to three and two by Weller and Lancelot, still continued, among a mass of other abominations, to complicate, in this country, the elementary instruction of Greek. . . . But all has now been changed — except the cause : for the same inertion of original and independent thought is equally apparent. As formerly, from want of thinking, the old sufficed; so now, from want of thinking, the new is borrowed. In fact, openly or occultly, honorably or dishonorably, the far greater part of the higher and lower philology published in this country is an importation, especially from Germany : but so passive is the ignorance of our compilers, that they are often (though affecting, of course, opinions), unaware even of what is best worthy of plagiarism or transplantation.

' Theology — Christian theology is, as a human science, a philology and history applied by philosophy ; and the comparatively ineffectual character of our British [American] theology has, for generations, mainly resulted from the deficiency of its philosophical element. The want of a philosophical training in the Anglican [American] clergy, to be regretted at all times, may soon, indeed, become lamentably apparent, were they called on to resist an invasion, now so likely, of certain foreign philosophico-theological opinions. 1 In fact, this is the

1 This invasion has already come with us. Dr. Hickok and a few others, who alone see the real danger, have faced it manfully and well armed. The spirit of the Absolute, which has found its way hither through various channels, from the country of Scholling invasion, and -this the want of national preparation, for which even at the present juncture, I should be most alarmed. On the Universities, 1 which have illegally dropped philosophy and its training from their course of discipline, will lie the responsibility of this singular and dangerous disarmature.'

We commend Hamilton's philosophy to educators, not only for its great excellence as a metaphysical system, for its profound thought and affluent erudition, for its spirit of free inquiry, and, consequently, its power to quicken the mind ; but, above all, we commend it for its accordance with the principles of revealed religion. Sir Win., though metaphysically the ' most formidable man in Europe,' is an humble Christian ; though the most learned of men, he is ready to bow before the spirit that ' informed' the mind of Paul. Hamilton says that he is confident that his philosophy is founded upon truth. ' To this confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of my own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above all, however, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony between the doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. " Credo equidem, nee von fides." The philosophy of the Conditioned is indeed pre-eminently a discipline of humility ; a " learned ignorance," directly opposed to the false " knowledge which puffeth up." I may say with St. Chrysostom : — " The foundation of our philosophy is humility." — (Homil. de Perf. Evang.) For it is professedly a scientific demonstration of the impossibility of that " wisdom in high matters" which the apostle prohibits us even to attempt ; and it proposes, from the limitations of the human powers, from our impotence to comprehend what, however, we must admit, to show articulately why the " secret things of God" cannot but be to man "past finding out." Humility thus becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation, but of reason. This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in theology, which had not previously emerged in philosophy ; that in fact, if the divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity to reveal, and wilfully indentify the doctrine of God's word with some arrogant exand Hegel, will not be exorcised by a solemn reading of creeds, and by repeating some stereotyped theological phrases ; it must be brought into the clear white light of thought ; like every other spectre of the night, it will vanish at the real dawn.— W.

1 Our American colleges, instead of having ' dropped philosophy and its training from their course of discipline,' have never seriously taten it up.— W.

treme of human speculation, philosophy will be found the most useful auxiliary of theology. For a world of false, and pestilent, and presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy and theology are now equally discredited, would be at once abolished, in the recognition of this rule of prudent nescience ; nor could it longer be too justly said of the code of consciousness, as by reformed divines it has been acknowledged of the Bible : —

" This is the book, where each his dogma seeks ; And this the book, where each his dogma finds." '

CONTENTS.-

Part First

THE PHILOSOPHY OP COMMON SENSE ; OE, OUlt PEIMAEY BE- LIEFS CONSIDEEED AS THE ULTIMATE CEITEBION OF TEETH.

Section I. The Meaning of the Doctrine, and Purport of the Argument, of Common Sense 19

II. The Conditions of the Legitimacy, and legitimate application, of the argument 86

III. That it is one strictly Philosophical and scientific 41

IV. The Essential Characters by which our primary beliefs, or

the principles of Common Sense, are discriminated 47

V. The Nomenclature, that is, the various appellations by

which these have been designated 50

VI. The Universality of the philosophy of Common Sense; or its general recognition, in reality and in name, shown by a chronological series of Testimonies from the dawn of speculation to the present day. 85

Part Second. Philosophy Of Peeception

CHAPTEE I. — Elucidation of Seed's Doctrine of Perception, and ns Defence against Sm Thomas Bkown 165

CHAPTEE II. — Presentative and Eepeesentative Knowledge.

Section I. The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive, or Immediate, and of Eepresentative or Mediate cognition ; with the various significations of the term Object, its conjugates and correlatives 238

II. Errors of Beid and other Philosophers, in reference to the

preceding distinctions 256

16 CONTENTS.

CHAPTEE III. — Various Theories of External Perception.

Section I. Systematic Schemes, from different points of view, of the various theories of the relation of External Perception to its Object; and of the various systems of Philosophy

founded thereon 265

II. What is the character, in this respect, of Eeid's doctrine of

Perception ? 272

CHAPTEE IV. — Doctrine of Perception maintained by the Absolute Idealists. — Discussion on the Scheme of Arthur Collier. . 285

CHAPTEE V. — Distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of

Body.

Section I. Historically considered 306

II. Critically considered. Three classes (Primary, Secundo-

Primary, and Secondary Qualities) established 352

CHAPTEE VI. — Perception Proper and Sensation Proper.

Section I. Principal momenta of the Editor's doctrine of Perception, (A) in itself, and (B) in contrast to that of Eeid, Stewart, Eoyer-Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish

School 412

II. Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Perception

proper and Sensation proper 432