A discourse of the Baconian philosophy

Front matter

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Preface

Believing with Bacon, that, "It ought to be eternally resolved and settled, that the understanding cannot decide otherwise, than by Induction, and by a legitimate form of it," I have endeavoured in the following discourse, to do something towards settling the great problem. The discourse therefore* lies within the province of logic in the most comprehensive meaning of that term, as embracing the method of investigation, the grounds of human belief, and the origin of all knowledge. It is true, that in the first part of the discourse, I have endeavoured, not only to show the grand results of Induction as an organ of Investigation, but also, to vindicate the philosophy which it has built up from the grave accusations that have been preferred against it. But this is nothing more, than a vindication of Induction from objections urged against it, on account of the imputed conse-

PREFACE.

quences to which it leads. The discourse therefore, in all its parts, lies strictly within the province of logic.

The whole empire of human thought has been traversed in the discourse, revelation as well as nature has been searched, and Induction has been found every where, the true method of Investigation. And so far from its being the Organon of Infidelity and Atheism, as has often been asserted, it is found, that all the lines of investigation which it lays open, whether in physics or psychology, ultimately converge and point upwards, to an inquiry that results by the strictest logical necessity in the belief of a God. And when the province of revelation is entered, it is found, that the very truths which Induetion has discovered in the province of nature, are assumed as true, in its teachings : and that nothing is told in revelation which does not consist with the inferences which Induction has established in the province of nature. And on the other hand, whenever man has cast aside Induction, and let go the thread of experience as an inadequate clue to the lab-

PREFACE.

arynths of knowledge, and attempted by an a priori method of investigation and its corresponding doctrine of fore-knowledge, to ascertain the truths whether of nature or revelation, we find that nothing but ever-varying and ever-increasing error has been the result. It would seem therefore, to be a legitimate conclusion ; " that the understanding cannot decide otherwise than by Induction. " In undertaking a task so foreign to my habitual pursuits, I have been influenced by a love of truth, and a strong desire to vindicate a Method of Investigation, which by its great doctrine, that experience is the only light to our path, and lamp to our feet in the pursuit of knowledge, is pushing forward the frontiers of science in every possible direction, with such triumphant success. And when I reflect, how far the task was beyond my abilities, I rejoice to know, that all the errors which I may have committed in the execution of it, will be corrected in the progress of truth. Num fingo? num mentior? cupio refelli: quid enim laboro, nisi ut Veritas in omni quaestione explicetur ?

Table Of Contents

ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION.

Part The First

The Influence of the Baconian Philosophy. — Some one nation always at the head of the rest. England at the head of modern civilization. In modern civilization there have been three great revolutions : the religious, the philosophical and the political. The philosophical revolution originated in England. Lord Bacon stands at the head of this movement. The object of this revolution. Bacon's writings — their publication and their circulation. Royal Society of London. The leading discoveries of the physical sciences made in England. These discoveries enumerated, and the method oi their discovery pointed out. These discoveries objects of the most delightful contemplation. Contrast between the physical dis-

10 TAfiLE OP CONTENTS

coveries of the ancients and the moderns as objects of intellectual contemplation. Baconian philosophy practical. The application of its discoveries to the mechanic arts. The benefits conferred on England by the Baconian Philosophy. This philosophy not confined to physical nature ; but embraces intellectual and moral science. The opinion that this philosophy leads to a mean standard of beauty, refuted ; and the question examined at large both by philosophical analysis and historical fact. English literature examined, and its distinguishing features pointed out. The opinion that the Baconian philosophy leads to materialism and atheism refuted. The Baconian philosophy likely to form the type of universal civilization.

Part The Second.— Chapter -i

The Baconian Method of Investigation. — The Aristotelian logic. The reasoning process in its form, is the syllogism. All reasoning proceeds by comparison. The fundamental principle of the syllogism. Bacon did not design .to teach a new mode of

TABLE OF CONTENTS. II

reasoning, but a new mode of investigation. The a priori method of investigation nothing more than a misapplication of the Aristotelian logic. The influence of the a priori method of investigation upon philosophy. Bacon appears. His installation of the sciences. The Novum Organon, its object, the spirit of its philosophy, and the nature of its method of investigation. This method called Induction. It is the reverse of the syllogism. Analysis and synthesis considered, and both shown to be inductive processes. The application of mathematics to the inductive sciences considered. Induction carried on by principles of evidence and not by principles of logic. The nature of analogy considered* The inductive process founded on analogy. The great fundamental principle of philosophical evidence developed ; and it is shown to bear the same relation to induction that the fundamental principle of logic does to the syllogism. Whether Bacon discovered the inductive process considered.

PART THE SECOND.— CHAPTER II. The Theory of Mind assumed in the

12 TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Baconian method of Investigation : — Only two theories of mind, the theory of innate ideas, and the theory, that all our knowledge is founded ultimately upon experience. The theory of innate ideas, is the theory of mind assumed in the a priori method of investigation ; and the theory, that all our knowledge is founded upon experience, is that assumed in the Baconian method of investigation. Plato the leading Philosopher amongst the ancients, and Des Cartes amongst the moderns, who maintained the theory of innate ideas. Both these Philosophers maintained the a priori method of investigation. Bacon's theory of mind, the same with that of Locke and Reid. They all maintained the theory that all our knowledge is founded upon experience. Locke solved the fundamental problem of psychology ; and Reid developed the fundamental laws of thought. The Baconian method of investigation the psychological correlative of the theory of mind that all our knowledge is founded ultimately upon experience. The theory of mind taught in the sacred scriptures. The

TABLE OF CONTENTS. 13

philosophy of Kant examined. The Baconian method of investigation traced up to the first impressions made upon the senses.

Part The Third

Natural Theology: its place amongst the Sciences^ and the nature of its evidence : — Natural Theology a branch of the inductive or Baconian philosophy. The errors of Lord Brougham's discourse of Natural Theology pointed out. The place of Natural Theology amongst the sciences and the nature of its evidence pointed out by Bacon.

Hume's essay on a special Providence and a future state considered. The error of the essay shown to consist in confounding a mere physical cause with an intelligent creator. This error shown to lie at the foundation of all atheistical arguments. The evidences of Natural Theology traced up to the idea of causation developed in consciousness.

Part The Fourth

The connection between Philosophy and Revelation : In the interpretation of

14 TABLE OF CONTENTS

scripture, revelation must not be subordinated to philosophy. The subordinating revelation to philosophy is now, and has always been the chief source of theological error. The influence of various systems of philosophy on Christianity examined. The Baconian Philosophy the only one consistent with Christianity.

ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION.

The Baconian Philosophy is emphatically the philosophy of protestantism. Luther denounced the Aristotelian logic, because it was the foundation of the scholastic theology, the frame-work which supported its superstructure, and the cement which held together all Its parts. And Bacon denounced it, because it was the foundation, and frame-work and cement of the a priori philosophy. Protestant Christianity and the Baconian philosophy originate in the same fountain, and flow together in the same channels. And it is very remarkable that just now, so much attention is directed to the two great revolutions of modern times — the religious revolution effected by Luther, and the philosophical revolution effected by Bacon. Two more elaborate histories of the reformation than any ever submitted to the world, are now being written, and are nearly completed, — the one, by D'Aubigne in Switzerland, and the other, by Ranke in Germany. The first, as far as completed, has been translated into English, and published and read with the deepest interest over all Great Britain, and has been republished and read more extensively, in this country, than almost any other book. And from the high reputation of Ranke, and the absorbing interest of the subject, his history will doubtless soon be translated into english and circulated through all the multiplied channels of publication. And the most animating interest in the great theme, will be kept alive. And within a few years, Montagu's edition of Bacon's complete works, with translations of those written in latin, which had engaged the attention of the editor more than twenty years, has been published in England, and is now republished in this country; and the popular publications of England, and the great periodicals of both that and this country, have been for a long time teeming with commentaries and expositions of the Baconian philosophy. The

KNAXTTICAL introductiox. 1?

mighty spirit of modern civilization appears to be stirring' up society anew, by rehearsing the history of its triumphs, and proclaiming again to the world, its great doctrines. It seems to be gathering up its strength, for a new onward movement.

Impelled, by the same influence which is operating upon so many minds in the different nations of Christendom, we have endeavored in this discourse, to exhibit a popular and succint, but yet a more thoroughly developed exposition of the Baconian philosophy than any which has appeared.

In the first part of this discourse, we have set forth, as the leading truth, that the Baconian philosophy has for its primary object, the investigation of the laws of the material world, and the application of these laws, through the instrumentality of the useful arts, to the physical well-being of man. That this philosophy does not think it beneath its dignity, to solve the homely problems : "What shall we eat, and what shall we drink, and and wherewithall shall we be clothed ?" But admitting, that philosophers like other peopie, must feed their hunger and clothe their nakedness, it teaches how to make with more facility and in greater abundance, the food and raiment necessary for our bodies, and proclaims not in whispers, but in its very loudest accents., that Franklin did not more fully exemplify the true spirit of philosophy when he brought down fire from heaven, than Fulton did, when he yoked it to the car of commerce..

And as England originated the great philosophical movement of which we are speaking, and stands at the head of modern civilization, we have cited the chief discoveries in the sciences made by the Anglo-Saxon race, and then showed how these discoveries, by their application to the useful arts, have extended the dominion of man over the empire of nature, and in this way conferred on England so much wealth and power.

After thus showing the connection of the Baconian philosophy with the useful arts, and how much it has through them, contributed to the physical comforts of man, we next show that this philosophy does not Lead v to a selfish morality, as some have alleged; but that in all its principles, and in all its aims, it tends to produce a noble and disinterested morality. The next question discussed, is the bearing of this philosophy upon the arts of beauty ; and it is shown by an analysis of its fundamental principles, that it maintains a .most exalted ideal. And this fact is further •proved and illustrated, by spreading out in microscopic view, the literature of England with all its rich and various and masculine beauties, which has grown up under the influence of the spirit of this philosophy.

We next defend this philosophy from the charge of materialism and atheism with which it is so often assailed, and show that this charge has no foundation either in its principles or the influence which it has actually exerted upon the opinions of men ; for that the nation which has most assiduously cultivated it, has also done more to advance the doctrines of natural theology, than any nation known to history.

We conclude this part of the discourse, by showing that the Baconian philosophy is not

20 ANALYTICAL INTHODUCTION,

like the ancient philosophies, adapted to the culture of one .epoch .and one people only ; but that like Christianity it is catholic in its spirit and equally suited to all times and to every people, and that it is likely to extend its blessings to all nations, and gather them under its wings as a hen doth gather her chickens.

In the second part of the discourse, we enter upon the consideration of the Baconian method of investigation. This part is divided into two chapters. The first chapter treats in the first place, of the Aristotelian Logic, and shows that it analyzes the reasoning process, and developes the form in which every argument passes through the mind, and that this form is the syllogism. It then shows, that the truth of the conclusion of an argument is always assumed in the premises, and is not in reality a new truth : but merely a particular instance of a general truth already known, and stated in the premises. It is then shown that the a priori method of investigation is nothing more than a misapplication of the Aristotelian logic as a method of investigation. The effect of this misapplication upon ancient philosophy, is then shown, and the peculiar errors produced by it, pointed out. This effect is then traced down through the middle ages of European history, and the futility of the philosophy of that period is signalized.

We next enter upon the consideration of the method of investigation taught by Bacon in the Novum Organon, and show that it is just the reverse of the syllogistic method of Aristotle, which had been previously used. It is shown that the Baconian method of investigation proceeds from particulars to universal, and that the syllogistic or a priori method proceeds from universals to particulars. And it is shown that the Baconian method of investigation is not a process of reasoning at all — is not carried on by rules of logic : but is carried on by rules of evidence. And that though the mathematics are applied to the verification of the inferences of induction in the physical sciences, that still this does not take those sciences out of the pale of induction and put them within the precincts of reasoning: the reasoning process being in such application of the mathematics, a mere touch-stone to test the truth of the inductive conclusions, and not to elicit any new conclusion not already reached by induction. Analysis and synthesis are also considered ; and are shown to be in the sciences o( contingent truth, inductive processes and not processes of reasoning, and that they are what Bacon called the ascending and descending processes of induction. And as we show that induction is carried on by means of principles of evidence and not by principles of logic, we enter upon the consideration of the nature of philosophical evidence \ and show that all evidence may be divided into analogy and identity ; and that the whole inductive process, as long as that process is founded on mere probability, no matter how great is the probability, proceeds on analogical evidence. And we show that all the great discoveries in physical science have been made by the evidence of analogy. We then distinguish between philosophical analogy, and rhetorical analogy ; and show that the distinction is an important one, and that for want of this distinction men have continually fallen into error. And finally we evolve out of our analysis of the inductive process-, the great fundamental principle of philosophical evidence, which hears the same relation to induction, that the Dictum de omni et nullo of Aristotle, does to the syllogism. And thus we have rendered induction just as systematic as Aristotle did the syllogism. And surely it is much more difficult to develop a principle which shall embrace in its application the innumerable particular instances which occur in every science or department of nature, and show the connection between them and the inductive inference properly inferrible from them, than it is to develop a principle which shall show the connection between the premises and conclusion of an argument : and therefore such a principle is so much the more important.

Mr. Macaulay in his celebrated review of Bacon's writings seemed to think that no such principle as the one just mentioned could be developed — that no precise rule can ho given, marking the difference between instances from which a sound inductive inference can be drawn, and instances from which such an inference cannot be drawn. And with a levity characterized more by the spirit of a coquette, than of a philosopher — with strong words and weak arguments — he has attempted to ridicule by the reductio ad absurdum, the value of Bacon's delineation of the inductive process in the second book of the Novum Organon. He amuses himself, and as he supposed, his readers too, with a ludicrous caricature of the inductive process, in showing that it is by it, that a man finds out that he has been made sick by the mince pies which he had eaten. It would have been quite as philosophical, to have attempted to depreciate the inductive process^ by showing that it was by that process, that Hudibras arrived at the conclusion that it was not necessary to have more than one spur ; because he had ascertained by actual experiment, that one side of his horse could not move without the other, and that therefore, if one spur could make one side go, it would make the other go too. Mr. Macaulay well knows that ridicule is not argument. And doubtless he would readily perceive, that the fact, that Hudibras

••* by geometric scale,

Could take the size of pots of ale ; Resolve by signs and tangents, straight, If bread or butter wanted weight,"

does not detract from the dignity of Newton's Principia or prove that the rules of geometry are useless. And yet he does not perceive the folly of attacking by ridicule, the development of induction which Bacon has given in the second book of the Novum Organon. But smitten with the ambition of critical display, he sacrifices truth to rhetoric. And in his attempts to reduce to absurdity, the reasonings of others, he plunges into that predicament himself. Flying upon the wings of antithesis, and in his onward course showing first one wing of the antithesis and then the other, in order that his readers may admire their brilliancy and their contrast, and more intent upon the grandeur of his flight than the point to which he is moving, he i& 3 sometimes carried to the most preposterous conclusions. And on the point which we are now examining he goes the whole length of declaring that grammar and logic and rhetoric are useless studies. When it is a knowledge of these very studies, which has strengthened and plumed his own wings, and enabled him to soar aloft so boldly and gracefully, that we cannot but admire his flight, even when it is beyond the regions of truth and common sense.

But not content with ridiculing induction by general remarks, Mr. Macaulay, as if to signalize its absurdity, ridicules it in all its details, until his criticism rivals m the minuteness of its anatomy, the celebrated curse which Dr. Slop, at the request of Mr. Shandy, read aloud, to the so great horror of my uncle Toby. " We have heard (says he) that an eminent judge of the last generation was in the habit of jocosely propounding, after dinner a theory, that the cause of the prevalence of Jacobinism was the practice of bearing three names. He quoted on the one side Charles James Fox, Richard Brinsley

Sheridan, John Home Tooke, John Philpot Curran, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Theobald Wolfe Tone : These were instantiae convenientes. He then proceeded to cite instances absentiae in proxime : — William Pitt, John Scott, William Wyndham, Samuel Horsely, Henry Dundas, Edmund Burke He might have gone on to instances secundum magis et minus. The practice of giving children three names, is more common in America than England. In England we have a King and a House of Lords, but the Americans are republicans. The rejectiones are obvious. Burke and Theobald Wolfe Tone were both Irishmen; therefore the being an Irishman, is not the cause of Jacobinism. Horsely and Home Tooke were both Clergymen; therefore the being a Clergyman, is not the cause of Jacobinism. Fox and Wyndham were both educated at Oxford; and therefore the being educated at Oxford, is not the cause of Jacobinism. In this way our inductive philosopher arrives at what Bacon calls the vintage, and pronounces that the having three names is the cause of Jacobinism."

ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION.

" Here is an induction corresponding with Bacon's analysis, and ending in a monstrous absurdity. In what, then does this induction differ from the induction which leads us to the conclusion that the presence of the sun is the cause of our having more light by day than night ! The difference evidently is not in the kind of instances, but in the number of instances; that is to say, the difference is not in that part of the process for which Bacon has given precise rules, but in a circumstance, for which no precise rule can possibly be given." Now we join issue with Mr. Macaulay and say that it is the kind of instances as well as the number of instances which constitute the difference between the two cases which he puts. For if the instances of the three names had been as numerous as the whole Jacobin party, though it would have been a marvellous coincidence, yet no man in his senses w T ould have believed that the bearing three names was the cause of the prevalence of Jacobinism ; and simply because, the instances are not of the kind from which an inductive inference can be drawn : they being:

the mere coincidence of chance, and not kindred facts conjoined by a law of nature. It is true that if every Jacobin had borne three names, it might have been inferred that there was some cause for such a conjunction of facts ; that their parents, perhaps, from some common motive gave their children three names, just as'the old Puritans from a common motive, gave their children whole verses of scripture for names. But under no circumstances whatever could it be inferred that the bearing three names was the cause of the prevalence of Jacobinism. The fact that the presence of the sun is the cause of more light by day than night is a fact in nature, and is supported as every fact in nature always is, by innumerable analogies. But is the naming children a fact in nature — a work of the Creator? Is the bearing three names and the being a Jacobin, a relation established by the Creator of the universe ? Is there any analogy in nature from which it can be inferred that the one is the cause of the other? Certainly none. It might as well be supposed that the

wearing pantaloons is the cause of one per- 3* son's being a man, and the wearing petticoats, the cause of another person's being a woman, as that the bearing three names is the cause of one's being a Jacobin.

This then is the difference between the two kinds of instances, and "the circumstance for which a precise rule can be given :" the one is the constant connection between ttvo facts in nature, the other, the casual coincidence of two facts totally irrelevant, and dependent on the acts of man. Their difference is perceived intuitively, and therefore cannot be made plainer by illustration. Our remarks in the discourse, on analogy, appear to us, to throw light upon the subject.

Mr. Macaulay after exhausting his weapons of ridicule, becomes very serious, and says "that the difference between a sound and unsound, or to use the Baconian phraseology, between the interpretation of nature and the anticipation of nature, does not lie in this — that the interpreter of nature goes through the process analzyed in the second book of the Novum Organon and the anticipator through a different process. They both per-

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form the same process. But the anticipator performs it foolishly or carelessly ; the interpreter performs it with patience, attention and sagacity, and judgment. Now precepts can do little towards making men patient and attentive, and still less towards making them sagacious and judicious." JN T ow these sober remarks of Mr. Macau] ay are not entitled to one tittle more respect as exhibitions of truth than those which we have been examining. Precepts of no use! Why ; are not precept and example the only guide of man ? and is not the whole force of example in its being the expression of a precept? The mere general precept which lies at the foundation of the Baconian philosophy, that we should scrutinize with caution the phenomena of na^ ture, before we draw our inferences, has revolutionized philosophy ; and yet it is gravely asserted, by one of the most brilliant writers, and adroit critics of the age, that precepts are useless in philosophical investigations, and in every thing else. We readily admit, that as long as induction is confined, to ascertaining what article of diet has made a man sick, or whether one side of a horse can move without the other, precepts are of very little use. But then, it must be remembered, that induction " resembles the tent which the fairy Paribanou gave to Prince Ahmed. Fold it, and it seemed a toy for the hand of a lady. Spread it, and the armies of powerful Sultans might repose beneath its shade." When it is the toy for the hand of a lady, we may use it without the aid of precepts, but when it is spread out so that the armies of powerful sultans may repose beneath its shade, we cannot manage it by our unaided strength.

Having thus, in the first chapter of the second part of the discourse, considered the Baconian method of investigation, in the second chapter, we consider the theory of mind assumed in that method. We show, there never has been, and that there never can be, more than two theories of mind : and these two theories are the theory of innate ideas, and the theory that all our knowledge is founded ultimately in experience. We show that the theory of innate ideas is the theory assumed in the a priori method of investigation ; and that the theory that all our knowledge is founded ultimately in experience, is that assumed in the Baconian method of investigation. It is shown that Plato was the leading philosopher amongst the ancients and Des Cartes amongst the moderns, who maintained the theory of innate ideas ; and that both these philosophers maintained the a priori method of investigation. It is next shown that Bacon had a distinct view of the theory of mind that all our knowledge is founded ultimately in experience ; and that this is the theory of mind which has been developed by Locke and Reid. We show that Locke solved the great fundamental problem of this theory of mind, and showed that all our knowledge originates in sensation and consciousness. And that Reid established this theory still more firmly by developing the great psychological laws which lie at the foundation of this theory, and which govern human belief in the knowledge derived through these original sources of information. He developed the law which governs our belief in the testimony of sensation, and the law which governs our belief in the testimony of conciousness. He also developed the law which governs our belief in the testimony of memory, and the law which governs our belief, that the future will be like the past, and that like causes will produce like effects. This last is the fundamental law of induction. And thus we trace up the Baconian method of investigation through the theory of mind which it assumes in every step of knowledge until we trace the process up to the very first impressions made upon the senses, and we show the psychological law for every act of the mind in the process. We next examine the philosophy of Kant, and show that his doctrine of a priori conceptions of the reason, has the same logical characteristics as the doctrine of innate ideas; and that it assumes the a priori method of investigation. We have therefore in the two chapters of this part of the discourse, exhibited an outline of a complete system of logic in the largest sense of the term ; and furnished in it a touchstone of philosophical criticism by which the reasonings of all philosophies may be tested.

In the third part of the discourse, we apply the second part by way of philosophical criticism, to Lord Brougham's Discourse of Natural Theology, and Hume's Essay on a special Providence and a future State. We show that Lord Brougham in the very outset commits a logical blunder, which vitiates much, of his subsequent reasonings. And that he does not solve the problem which he has proposed to himself; but that he always dodges it, or passes it over, by a mere assertion. We show that this results from his overlooking some of the logical and psychological principles which we have developed in the second part of our discourse. We then show how by an application of these principles, the problem which Lord Brougham has proposed to himself can be solved. We next show that the great doctrine of Lord Brougham's discourse, that Natural Theology is a branch of the inductive or Baconian philosophy, and is founded on the same sort of evidence as that philosophy, had been distinctly advanced by Bacon, and set forth with the most accurate discrimination ;, and from the fact that