An essay shewing the intimate connexion between our notions of moral good and evil, and our conceptions of the freedom of the divine and human wills

Preface

It is not without a considerable degree of timidity that I have ventured to publish the following- Essay. It would betray something like insincerity were I to say that I did not think it contained something worthy attention, either in matter or in arrangement ; but at the same time the dryness and intricacy of the subject are calculated to confine my expectations of praise within very moderate bounds indeed. In these times, abstract questions, and refined speculations, are held but in comparatively little repute. There has not been perhaps, in any period in the literary history of this country, a greater degree of lukewarmness and indifference, among the reading part of the community, than exists, at the present moment, towards such topics and speculations as will be found in the following pages. The tide of public taste and opinion has set strongly in for amusement, and for what is aptly enough termed light reading ; and,

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in many cases, even philosophy herself has had to adorn her person in more light and airy habiliments, and to assume a more condescending and accessible demeanour, in order that she may maintain her influence, or extend her popularity.

Discussions on human nature are much more intricate than those on mathematics, or those on the sciences, which are generally classified under the head of natural philosophy. Here the mind goes smoothly forward from one step of reasoning to another, without doubt or apprehension of error ; but in metaphysics, moral philosophy, and politics, the path of inquiry becomes more uneven and rugged, and the mind is frequently fatigued and bewildered by the consideration of opposite views and conflicting principles. This difference in the two departments of physical and mental inquiry, arises from the very constitution of things. In mathematics, for example, the terms employed in any process of reasoning are always of a fixed and definite nature, and are invariably used in one sense ; thus, a hundred stands always for a hundred, a square for a square, and a circle for a circle. But in subjects relating to the mind of man, to his moral constitution, and his political relations, this is not the case. What is the precise nature of

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mind itself, what is morally good or bad, and what is politically expedient or inexpedient, give rise to inquiries in which a considerable diversity of opinion will generally be found to exist. These topics are not susceptible of the same strict logical demonstration on which the pure sciences rest, But we are not, on this account, to conclude, as the language of many who have a dislike to studies connected with human nature would seem to imply, that there is no real stability or truth in these disquisitions ; or at least that what little truth can be extracted from the cumbersome load of controversial matter, which ages of dispute have accumulated, possesses no great claim to be considered as really interesting to man. On the contrary, the truth of mental and moral philosophy is founded upon the same firm and immutable basis as the other branches of knowledge, commonly supposed to possess more solidity, because they are generally more attractive. And with respect to the value of speculations on ethical subjects, when properly conducted, there can, I think, be only one opinion, and that a favourable one ; seeing that they are closely and indissolubly connected with doctrines and principles of great moment, and manifest importance to every human being.

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I was once an ardent admirer of the doctrine of philosophical necessity, but in the course of time doubts arose in my mind as to its solidity, and more particularly as to its moral and religious influence on the character, when it becomes firmly established in the mind. I uniformly found, that those writers who were the most zealous and successful in saping the foundations of religion and morality, were precisely those who brought the doctrine of necessary connexion most frequently and prominently under the consideration of their readers ; and in conjunction with this circumstance, I almost invariably found that the effects of the doctrine of necessity upon the moral conduct of its advocates were of a very pernicious description, — their principles becoming perverted, and their conduct dissolute and profligate. From these considerations, I was led to look a little more narrowly into my own views on this point ; and the following pages are the result of my reflections, which, though they do not by any means embrace an abstract logical refutation of philosophical necessity, yet they have, I think, an evident indirect influence to this end, by bringing our common notions of the freedom of the will, on ^a variety of subjects, more completely under one general view

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I am aware, it will be said, in reference to the pernicious influence which necessity is found to exercise, that the evil does not arise from the right construction and application of the doctrine, but from its perversion ; the best doctrines, it may be remarked, may be applied to the worst purposes. But this is at best but a miserable apology for the infliction of positive evil. I have looked with some degree of care into those statements and arguments brought forward by eminent necessarians on this branch of their system, that of rebutting the charge of immorality ; and I have always thought these statements and arguments vastly more specious than solid. There are some systems of human nature, which, though not susceptible of a logical refutation, being of such an equivocal character as to appear suspended, as it were, between truth and falsehood, yet do, notwithstanding, exercise as unfriendly an influence over our moral feelings and habits, as if they were positively and decidedly erroneous, and their error capable of a complete demonstration ; and this I conceive, is exactly the case with the doctrine of philosophical necessity. It is a doctrine liable from its very nature to be misconstrued and abused. I do not know a more destructive instrument that can be put into a young

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man's hand, on his setting* out on the journey of life, than one of those epitomes of the necessarian hypothesis, which are generally drawn up and circulated by the disciples of this system.

With respect to the language of this Essay, I must throw myself on the charitable indulgence of the reader ; and particularly for those few typographical errors which have crept into the work, from my living at a considerable distance from the place of publication. I advance no pretensions to fine classical writing ; but I may be allowed to observe, that I have endeavoured to be as perspicuous as I could, or as the nature of the subject would alloy/ ; being firmly convinced, that the most important qualification which either writing or speaking can possess, is that of being readily understood.

Morpeth, 3d January 1831.

General Remarks upon the Principles contained in the

foregoing chapters . . 183