The heart of man: an attempt in mental anatomy

CHAPTER VI. Moral Sentiments 68

THE HEART OF MAK.

CHAPTEE I.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. THE ANATOMICAL METHOD.

I TAKE the word " heart " in the highest of its popular acceptations, and employ it to denote that part of the mental organism in which emotions are experienced, desires and aflfections exert their force, and volitions take place.

Already in my first sentence, there is an expression which would excite the contempt of many philosophers if they should happen to see it. They warn us against thinking of the Mind as made up of parts. They tell us that it is " unextended " — that it inhabits no space ; and they would have us carefully guard against viewing it in the light of an organism. I must decline to acknowledge the authority of such teachers. However it may be to others, to myself, most certainly, an unextended entity is altogether unthinkable. I am compelled to employ the concept of space whenever I think of anything as having a substantive existence. To me, whatever exists in no space is nowhere, and what is nowhere is nothing. I do not aver, however, that Mind occupies space to the exclusion of Matter. Whether impenetrability is, or is not, a property of the mental substance.

is a point on which I have no knowledge.^ But ignorant as I must remain concerning the nature of this substance, beyond the point at which its self-manifestations cease, I am under a necessity to postulate a "Something" in which the powers of the Mind inhere, and which affords a field for their movements and interactions. As names of an entity, such expressions as " A thread of consciousness " and " A series of ' feelings,' " convey no meaning. To talk of " consciousness " apart from a conscious subject, or of "feelings" without a subject that feels, is to talk nonsense.

I submit with perfect cheerfulness to .the necessities of which I have spoken, since all experience teaches that man is constituted for the discovery of truth. Hence, that an effort to cast off a necessary conception is a stride in the direction of foolishness, can be proved by an induction as broad as the whole range of human history.

Accepting the laws of my nature without reserve, I see no middle ground between the position that Mind is an extended and organized entity, and the position that all mental phenomena are products of our corporeal organism. Materialism may justly assert the prior claim to attention, for there is reason in the law which requires us, in all cases of this kind, to satisfy ourselves of the inadequacy of the causes which are known to exist, before assuming the existence of an additional cause. I have endeavored to obey this law. I have tried honestly to take in all the light which such men as Spencer, Bain and Maudsley are able to dispense. I am delighted and instructed by their disclosures concerning the structure of the brain and of the whole nervous system. While they linger in the domain of Anatomy, or in that

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 7

of Physiology proper, I feel that I am following guides who know their way. I am deeply interested by their striking illustrations of the well known influence of corporeal changes upon the mental state, and of mental changes upon the corporeal state. But, so soon as they begin to deal with the simplest phenomena purely mental^ I find an idea of inadequate causation growing upon me. When I place all the forces, which they point out, by the side of a complicated train of thought, with manifold emotions flashing out here and there upon it and interlacing themselves with it, my conviction that the former cannot have caused the latter becomes so overmastering that I lose all patience with the assertion of such origination. I am constrained to suspect that such able thinkers as I have named have busied themselves so exclusively with matter that they have become incapacitated for observations in which the bodily senses can render no aid. Be this as it may, their writings make it manifest that they have scarcely pushed their investigations across the threshold of mental life, and that they are profoundly ignorant as to the wonderful things which take place in the inner recesses of the human soul.

Of the countless undisputed products of material organisms, every one can be proved to consist of matter. Every one of therri can be weighed, or measured, or discovered, by the microscope ; or its presence can be detected by some other physical test. This being true, is the generalization unwarranted when we say "All products of material organisms are themselves material"? If any scientist has gone over a wider range in accomplishing his induction, I should like to hear his story. Assuredly some centuries will elapse

THE HEART OF MAN.

before Evolutionists will gather a greater number of particulars to prove that all physical organisms are evolved from protoplasm. Perhaps it vrill be said that mental phenomena are not " products," properly so called, but effects akin to the corporeal feelings produced by an internal excitation of our nerves of sensation. I deny the validity of the distinction. I understand Physiology to teach that transformation of matter is a concomitant of all physical organic activity. Obviously, then, the new forms of matter, resulting from such activity, are immediate material products, and the consequent feelings are physically evidential of the presence of those products. Besides, a discriminating consciousness discloses so vast a difference between corporeal feelings and mental phenomena as almost to compel a recognition of different origins. The very least that it seems possible to say honestly is, that the differences between these two classes of phenomena are sufficient to establish an immense probability of difference in originating forces.

The materialistic theory can be antagonized legitimately with all the arguments which tend to sustain the authority of Christ as a Teacher, and with all other arguments going to prove the possibility of mental existence apart from a corporeal organism. It is very probable that the bringing in of such considerations will be called unscientific. I am venturesome enough to say, however, that if Science is what its name imports, the laying of all departments of knowledge under contribution, for the sake of getting at the truth, seems to me to characterize the only truly scientific method. At all events I shall never board up the windows on any side

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 9

while endeavoring to adjust my conceptions to the realities of the universe.

For myself, I feel no need of support from the classes of arguments to which I have just made allusion. I hold that the human Mind is a living Being, because I can picture it to myself as existing apart from the human body, and can see it, in that state of isolation, exhibiting all those " changes, simultaneous and successive," which constitute a life complete in itself. The following chapters are largely taken up with the pointing out of such vital movements, and may be seen, from one point of view, to contain a continuous assignment of reasons for the rejection of Materialism.

The m^ethod of investigation, which I have employed in working my way to the conclusions set forth in this discussion, I call " The Anatomical Method," because it is based on the conception of Mind as an organized being, and aims to disclose the structure of that being. At the risk of appearing egotistical, I think it best, at this point, to relate an experience. About eighteen years ago I got tired of the vagueness of my ideas concerning conscience, and supposed I could soon clear them up with the help of the few authors accessible to me, I found myself instructed, of course ; but the result, on the whole, was exceedingly disappointing. I came across no theory that was really useful in dispelling the mists in which my moral nature seemed to be enveloped. I then put aside my books and attempted, on my own account, to analyze the moral sentiments. I soon became convinced that " conscience," as the word stands in our literature, is the name of an ever-varying assemblage of wholly diverse elements, intellectual, emotional,- etc., and ought never to be employed where scientific exactness is sought. As to the sources of those elements I was still in the dark, and found it necessary to go further back for a starting point. After several futile efforts I finally propounded to myself the question, What are the primary, undecomposable powers of the human soul ? Here I felt that I was making some headway, but had not proceeded far before it flashed upon me that I was treating the Mind as an organism, and ascribing different functions to its respective parts. I remembered, of course, that Sir William Hamilton says, "Man is not an organism." Nevertheless I persevered, and the farther I proceeded the firmer seemed the ground I was treading. From that time to this I have found great delight in conceiving the human Mind as an organized being, inhabiting a corporeal organism for the present, and affected immensely by that immediate environment, yet capable of living a life altogether its own. I have been conscious of no wavering in the opinion that the human Mind has a structure as definitive as that of the human body, and equally open to examination by one who is sufliciently resolute and able to hold his .faculties to their work with suflicient steadiness. Hence I anticipate very sanguinely that the Mental Anatomists of the future will make good for Psychology a permanent footing among exact sciences.

Most of the contents of the following chapters were written out during the period of which I have spoken; and, after all these years, I see little to change except in the matter of terminology and in the way of cond^sation. It is possible that I am far astray in all my conclusions; but I cannot divest myself of the conviction that the lack of progress and of pop-

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 11

ular interest in psychological studies is largely due to the treatment of the mind as an unextended and unorganized "principle," or whatever else it is called, of which no conception can be formed. I believe, too, that a mere intellectual craving for a substantial and conceivable ground of mental phenomena has caused thousands of intelligent men to acquiesce in Materialism.

I distinguish in the mental structure five distinct systems, in each of which I see a distinct elementary power inhering. They are as follows:

1. The Sensory System; a system of mental senses.

2. The Intellective System; a system of faculties.

3. The Emotive System; a system of susceptibilities.

4. The Acquisitive System; a system of desires.

5. The Reactive System; a system of affections.

The elementary powers inhering in these systems, respectively, I call: Mental Sense, Intellect, Emotivity, Acquisitivity and Reactivity.

THE SENSORY SYSTEM.

Mental sense is the mind's power to take impressions from matter. It is that by which mind, as a recipient, is placed in correspondence with the material universe. In our present stage of being, the Sensory System is reached through our nerves of sensation and four special corporeal organs. If matter has classes of properties which cannot make themselves known through these avenues, the mind must remain ignorant of such properties so long as its inclusion in a material organism shall last. It is plain that we are not in a position to say that the entire Sensory System can now be brought under examination.

THE INTELLECTIVE SYSTEM.

The primary office of intellect is the ascertainment of truth. This involves the retention or permanent possession of truth, because continued ascertainment depends on the utilization of truth already ascertained. As I profess to treat only of the three systems which constitute the heart, I might, without impropriety, pass at once from this topic. I prefer, however, to say frankly that I have never attempted a thoroug-h exploration of the Intellective System. My belief is that mental anatomists will hereafter make in the intellective part of our nature some important discoveries to which the ablest psychologists have never been able to attain in conceiving the mind as unorganized. If I were prosecuting researches in this field I should hold myself rigidly to the conception of the Intellective System as a system of Faculties, having Truth for their central object, and I should seek an exhaustive answer to this question: What are the structural provisions for the ascertainment, permanent possession, application, embodiment and expression of truth? I am satisfied that very insufficient study has been bestowed on what may be called " the executive processes " of intellect — the processes through which expedients are chosen, plans are constructed, machinery is invented and truth is made ready for expression in art and language.

There are three faculties, the workings of which are observed by everyone. I name them : the Intuitive Faculty, the Associative Faculty and the Introspective Faculty.

The existence of the Intuitive Faculty, as well as the fact of intuition, is, of course, denied by those philosophers who maintain that all our knowledge is derived from experience.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. 13

My patience with such men is hardly commensurate with the patience which would be elicited by a persistent endeavor to convince me that I lack a right arm. Some of them are blessed with wonderful endowments, but they are victims of a voluntary mania, which keeps them struggling to convince themselves and the world of the worthlessness of all our knowledge ; and their work is uniformly pernicious. The Intuitive Faculty manifests its presence and power at the lirst dawning of infantile intelligence ; it accompanies every attentive exercise of the organs addressed by the external world, and it is operative when the dying man bestows his last look on the faces of loved ones at his bedside. The instant a sensory impression is received, the Intuitive Faculty asserts the reality of that from which the impression proceeds. I venture here to throw out the remark that this last sentence seems to me to comprise a full statement of what takes place in sense perception. The ultimate facts are a sensory impression, and an intuition of reality. The interpretation of sensory impressions, by ascription of properties to objects perceived, is the work of other faculties, and is sometimes erroneous, while the Intuitive Faculty is infallible. I find myself in full sympathy with Sir William Hamilton when he indignantly protests against certain doctrines because they imply that "the root of our nature is a lie." And yet the absolute and invariable trueness of our necessary beliefs is abundantly substantiated in another way. It is enough to know that, while false beliefs are plunging thousands in distress every hour, no man, in all the ages, was ever misled to his own harm by a necessary belief ; that the Intuitive Faculty has so commended itself to all men that even those who deny its existence are ready, at any moment, to risk their lives on its veracity, and that the constant assumption of such veracity is an indispensable condition of safety. Let any man consider what would happen to him if he should contradict in practice the affirmations of the Intuitive Faculty as to Reality and Causation.

CHAPTEK II.

THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM.

Emotivity is the Heart's power to experience pleasure and pain from operations of Intellect. For each elementary form of pleasure, caused by a simple intellective action, the Emotive System presents an original Susceptibility. Otherwise, that form of pleasure could not be experienced. As pain is the opposite of pleasure, so each original Susceptibility of pleasure is, at the same time, a Susceptibility of pain from the opposite of that intellective action which causes the specific form of pleasure. Hence, in making a survey of the Emotive System, we have only to ascertain

THE PRIMARY INTELLECTIVE CAUSES OF PLEASURE.

These may be divided into two classes, according as the quality, relation, or state, which Intellect employs as a medium in the production of pleasure, is within the Mind, or external to it. In the former case, I call the Intellective Cause a Consciousness ; in the latter, a Perception.

Before entering upon a demonstration of the original Susceptibilities, I think it proper to remark that I believe an exclusive reliance on the Introspective Faculty, in psychological investigations, to be an immense mistake. As mental development progresses, the intellective processes, the emotions, desires and affections become more and more complex, and it becomes increasingly difficult for the Introspective

Faculty to reveal an elementary mental action. For this reason, I have relied largely, as will be perceived, on the observation of manifestations of mental life in childhood. At that period, there is no secretiveness to thwart us ; lively emotions and strong impulses display their well known signs, and the general simplicity of mental action enables us to dispense with laborious analyses. I now proceed to what I regard as a complete list of the primary Intellective causes of pleasure.

1. Consciousness of Knowing.

I first used the word "Knowledge," instead of "Knowing "; but I saw that the emotion for which I was aiming to account, might be confounded with the self-complacency which a man experiences when he says to himself, " I possess a great store of information," whereas it is totally different. On the other hand, I have been, at times, inclined to name this cause simply "Knowing," and to treat the pleasure produced by it as merely the emotive reflex of intellective apprehension. It is certain that unmistakable signs of this special form of pleasure are observable before any keen introspection becomes possible. Still, I believe that, in the earliest stages of mental life, a certain dim thought of selfhood accompanies the emotion under consideration, and very soon a clear consciousness is manifested by such exclamations as "I see! I see!"

That Consciousness of Knowing is a primary cause of pleasure, will not, I think, be questioned. As the first inquisitive gaze of the infant evinces a spontaneous reaching of Intellect after truth, so the smile, with which its apprehensions are greeted, can be accounted for only on the hypothesis of an original susceptibility to that cause. As Intellect expands and its various faculties awaken to activity, if the tendency to reach after truth is judiciously stimulated and guided, the ebullient joy in learning names, apprehending distinctions and discovering uses, testifies still more strongly to the benign power of Consciousness of Knowing. Who has not observed the glee with which the little one points out the letters of the alphabet that have been learned, or attempts to name the articles of furniture in the room? Every intelligent mother understands the beguiling of infantile grief by asking "What is this?" and taxing her ingenuity to bring about new apprehensions. In later years Consciousness of Knowing goes into combination with other Intellective causes of pleasure, and, perhaps, is not often found apart from them. But the susceptibility to it continues to be a wellspring of joy, which needs only to be kept open in order to yield a copious stream to the end of life.

There are two circumstances by which the form of the pleasure thus produced is greatly affected. One of them is the order of apprehensions. When this is such that ideas akin to each other are raised successively, the emotion is like the tranquil flowing of a stream, more or less rapid, and continually deepening. But when apprehensions follow each other in such order, that strongly contrasted ideas are brought into being almost simultaneously, we have that titillation of spirit which is called the Sense of the Ludicrous, and finds expression in laughter. I would not be understood to say that this emotional state is occasioned in no other way. Laughter is often excited through peculiar operations of other Intellective Causes. But there are numerous cases in 2 which the emotions under consideration can be ascribed onply to the order of apprehensions. We here discover a law evidently designed to give variety to our joys, and to refit Intellect for effective labor. Renewed elasticity and vigor are acquired in the fantastic mental actions occasioned by the combination of incongruous ideas, and by the presence of odd, grotesque and comical conceptions.

In the second place, the pleasure, caused by Consciousness of Knowing, is affected by the character of that which is known. This is a momentous fact. The comparatively unimportant truths, apprehended in early childhood, yield only a childish delight. The apprehensions, occasioned by gossip, cause only a petty pleasure. But the consciousness of knowing a sublime truth, a far-reaching relation, or a comprehensive law, raises, dilates and fills the soul with a joy beyond expression.

2. Consciousness of Power.

The first idea of power arises from physical action ; and the earliest consciousness of it is the reflex of physical exertion. Very soon it begins to be measured by the distance passed over, the weight raised, or the resistance otherwise overcome. The memory of every one, who has seen children at play, will furnish abundg-nt evidence of the title of this Consciousness to be ranked among primary causes of pleasure. As Intellect grows the Consciousness of Power attaches itself to intellectual exertion. Then it becomes intimately, though not inseparably, associated with Consciousness of Knowing, and doubles the pleasure produced by that Cause. When the period of planning and contriving arrives, a new field is opened. When, for example, a child first places a chair and climbs upon it, to take something from a table, a look of triumph evinces the delight which springs from consciousness of power to devise and execute that plan. The consciousness of knowing how to perform the feat may afterward present itself ; but I am convinced that, in most cases, Power is the sole medium of the first joy.

Again, we find Consciousness of Power uniting itself with the active impulses of the mind. When the impulse is pleasant i n itself, the pleasure is heightened by a sense of its strength ; and when it is painful the pain is greatly modified by the same cause. Our capacity to maintain fixed purposes affords a conspicuous field for this form of pleasure. One has but to search one's own internal history in order to be convinced that power of determination is, in itself, and without reference to its object, an important source of enjoyment.

Under this head, also, we may say that the amount and quality of the pleasure produced are affected by several circumstances. In the first place, other things being equal, the value of the emotion is governed by the order of the faculties from the exertion of which the consciousness proceeds. The lowest form is that which results from the exercise of physical power. IsText comes the pleasure which is added to the product of Consciousness of Knowing in the mere acquisition of information. Far richer than this is the fruit of power in reasoning, in moving step by step, from deduction to deduction, toward a triumphant conclusion. Still more intensely delightful is Consciousness of Powder to devise and combine expedients for the accomplishment of a great end. And yet higher than this is the pleasure yielded by that power w^hich moves men to great achievements through the instrumentality of truth.

Again, the pleasure due to this cause is measured by the resistance overcome. This is merely saying that the resultant enjoyment is proportionate to the power necessarily employed. The law applies to every exercise of power, whether in the overcoming of physical resistance in the solving of difficult problems, in the influencing of men, in the regulation of one's own habits, or in the ruling of one's own spirit.

Finally, the other conditions being fulfilled, the value of .the pleasure depends on the number of faculties brought into co-operative activity. Let the physical energies, Perception, Memory, Imagination, Reason and the faculties of expression be all aroused, each every instant throwing in its force to accelerate the one sweeping movement, and Consciousness of Power will then di-splay the fullness of its worth. The emotions experienced on such an occasion are affected, of course, by the nature of the object aimed at; but, so far as this is the case, the result is traceable to other intellective causes. It should be noted that pleasure thus originated is not confined to the hours in which powdr achieves its triumphs. It is renewed when Memory recalls those hours, and is often anticipated while the triumphant moments are still in the future.

3. Consciousjiess of Oionership.

The term "Ownership" is chosen in preference to "Property," because it is broader and less liable to be misapprehended. I mean by it that relation to an object which enables me to speak of it as mine. That the consciousness of that relation is pleasurable, needs no proof. That it manifests itself in early childhood is equally unquestionable. The only point open to dispute concerns the possibility of its being included in Consciousness of Power. And I think all doubt on that point will disappear when it is considered that the right of exclusive control does not enter into the essence of Ownership. For reasons which could easily be explained, the idea of such a right is often associated with Consciousness of Ownership; and, in such cases, much of the resultant pleasure can be traced to Consciousness of Power. But we frequently use the possessive pronouns without the faintest notion of right or ability to exercise control. We say "Jiy father," "J/y mother," "My party," "My church," "My country," and the delightful consciousness which finds expression in that emphatic "My^'' is plainly irreducible. There is certainly nothing in it which bears a near resemblance to anything in Consciousness of Power. I shall hereafter have occasion to show that the office of this intellective cause of pleasure is immensely important.

4. Perception of Sympathy.

I shall be understood, of course, to mean that we experience pleasure in perceiving Sympathy with ourselves. It is hard to explain how this cause of pleasure has escaped the notice of so many philosophers. They have much to say concerning Sympathy* itself ; and some of them unduly magnify its influence in originating mental phenomena. But concerning the pleasure that rises within us at the manifestation of Sympathy with ourselves, they say, little, if anything. No list of original impulses with which I am acquainted includes Desire of Sympathy. Yet one of the first things evinced by the infant soul is susceptibility of pleasure in finding its joys and sorrows shared by others. A little hurt is instantly changed to a benefit by that cause. All joys are multiplied by it. Much of the earliest prattle consists in calling attention to this and that, in order that apprehensions and emotions may be shared. In later years the susceptibility is continually manifesting its power. Our enjoyment of a landscape, a picture, a poem, a pleasing event, or a successful achievement, is incomplete till we are assured of Sympathy. The conception of this pleasure gives society its chief attraction, and is a principal stimulus to conversation, as well as to the advocacy of cherished opinions. The skillful management of the susceptibility has made the fortunes of many poets and other artists. After vainly endeavoring to trace these effects to some other Intellective cause, I deem it unquestionable that, if anything in man is original and ultimate. Susceptibility of Pleasure in Perception of Sympathy has that character.

5. Perception of Favorable Regard.

My reason for using the expression " Favorable Regard," instead of "Esteem," is obvious. The latter term is far too narrow, while the former includes affection, admiration and all other sentiments complimentary to their object. There can be no doubt that affection is the form of regard in the perception of which pleasure is first exhibited. The child is delighted by a loving embrace before a favorable opinion can be comprehended. Were it not for this, and one or two other facts, I should be strongly inclined to deny the originality of a Susceptibility to this Intellective Cause, and to ascribe the pleasure derived from Favorable Regard to a Perception of Sympathy with the perceiver's self-complacency, in connection with the strength added to the latter feeling by commendation. It is evident that commendatory manifestations often owe much of their pleasureableness to these influences. Yet, as I have intimated, there are some phenomena for which I cannot account without classing Favorable Regard among Primary Media of Pleasure. The matter would seem to be set at rest by the fact, that some persons are willing to exchange self-complacency for praise. Such is their conception of the value of Favorable Regard that, for the sake of it, they are willing to forfeit their own esteem.

6. Consciousness of Goodness.

A certain degree of mental growth necessarily precedes the manifestation of the Susceptibility corresponding with this cause of pleasure. The idea of personal quality must come into being, and a Mind must become able to reflect on its own character. But, so soon as this stage of development is reached, the Susceptibility is apparent to every thoughtful observer. The earliest qualitative discrimination is the act of distinguishing between Goodness and Badness. In the first instance it is objective ; external things are classed as good, or bad. This classification results inevitably from the reaction of Emotivity on Intellect. A perception is either pleasurable or painful, and, according as it is the one or the other, a favorable, or an unfavorable, judgment is immediately and spontaneously passed upon that which is perceived. The object then continues to be regarded as good, or bad, unless the judgment is reversed through subsequent operations of Intellect on Emotivity and the inevitable reactions of the latter on the former. When the child begins to reflect on its own qualities, a similar classification is made in these, and is corrected in a similar manner. All its qualities, physical, intellectual and moral, are regarded with pleasure or pain, and classed, accordingly, ^s good or bad.