The nature of mind and human automatism

Front matter

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Chapter I. The Modern" Doctrine Of The Relation Oe The Mind To

THE BODY.

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Introductory — Spiritualism and Materialism — Purpose of this Work— The Physical Basis of Mind— The Theory of Functions — The Theory of Aspects — The Inadequacy of both Theories — The Usual Explanation no Explanation — The Real Questions to be answered — The Logical Deductions from these Theories inconsistent with the known Pacts — The Inadequacy of the Usual Explanation generally recognized ; by Spencer ; by Tyndall — Fiske — Logical Conditions of the Problem — Bain — One Cause of Hostility to Materialism — The Notion of Double Properties entertained by Tyndall ; by Bain — Mind does act upon Body — Views of Lewes 3-27

Chapter II. The Trite Nature Of The Problem To Be Solyed

Statement of the Theorem to be proved — Meaning of Subjective and Objective — What is meant by Matter and Motion- — Pour Different Conceptions of Matter — Carelessness in the Use of the Term Matter — What is meant by Cerebral Activities — Their True Nature — Sources of Error in investigating the Problem — Parallelism between Physical and Mental Processes — Fiske on this Parallelism — Fallacy of the Theory of Parallelism— Spencer . . 28-43

vii viii CONTENTS,

Chapter III. The Solution

PAQE

The Argument — The Brain as the Organ of the Mind — Grounds for helieving Consciousness to be Dependent upon Molecular Motions in the Brain — Nature of the Dependence — Four Possible Explanations — The Second only probable — Consciousness the Reality of Physical Processes — Apparent Paradox — The Eeal Question not how Physical Processes are transformed into Consciousness — Lewes — Explanation of the Paradox — Nature of the Association between Consciousness and the " accompanying Physical Changes'' 44-60

CHAPTERIY.

THE NATURE OF THE MIND.

The Ultimate Nature of Mind — Consciousness an Ultimate — Difficulty of understanding the Transition between Mind and Body avoided — Carpenter — Ferrier — There are not Two Processes, but One — Feeling is not accompanied by Molecular Changes — It is not inconceivable that Mind should have been produced from Matter ; Reply to Fiske — Spencer and the Substance of *Mind — The Insufficiency of the Notion of Mind being a Symbol of something else ; also of the Theory of Aspects — Matter and Mind as Different Modes of apprehending something else — Deductions from the foregoing Principle . . . . . 61-82

CHAPTER Y.

THE CORRELATION OF FORCES.

The Applicability of the Law to Mental Action— Meaning of the Law — Objections to its Application as offered by Fiske — Objections answered — Materialism not inconsistent with this Law 83-90

CONTENTS. ix

HUMAN AUTOMATISM.

Chapter I. The Reflex Character Of Ideas

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Logical Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine — Law of Inertia — Consciousness is Passive, not Active — All Muscular and Mental Action Reflex — Apparent Objection to this Conclusion — Use of the Term Reflex to describe Psychical Facts 93-98

CHAPTER I L

CONSCIOUSNESS AS AN AGENT IN THE DETERMINATION OF BODILY ACTION.

Automatism the Logical Consequence of the Reflex Theory — Automatism modified by the Discovery of the I^ature of Mind — Objections to Automatism avoided — Consciousness an Agent in Determining Action — Lewes and Automatism — Huxley — Objections to Consciousness being a Collateral Product — Experiments on Animals — Interpretation of these Experiments — Case of the Fren?h Sergeant 99-130

CHAPTER IIL

SELF-DETERMINATION. <- '

Meaning of Self-Determination — Agency by which it is accomplished — Nature of the Ego — Self-Determination compatible with the Reflex Theory and Automatism — All Action determined by the Strongest Motive — Revery and Deliberation — Coleridge — Mozart — General Conclusions 131-148

X CONTENTS.

CHAPTEE lY.

WHAT IS MATERIALISM?

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Vagueness in the Term — Materialism Misunderstood — Palse Meanings attributed to the Term — Only Two Positions upon which we can stand — Showing that Mind is the Keality of Matter does not transfer it to Spiritualism — Any Doctrine which in Substance accepts this is Materialism — Evolution shows that External Eorces are allied in Nature to Consciousness — Materialism does not impair the Dignity or Attributes of anything in the Universe — The Discovery of the Causation and Origin of Phenomena does not alter the Phenomena themselves — Materialism in one Kespect more elevating than any other Doctrine — The Morality of Materialism — Evolution of Moral Principles — Highly-developed Brain necessary for High Standard of Morals among Eaces — High Standard impossible among the Lower Eaces — Illustrations of this — Absence of the Moral Codes of Civilized Nations not Evidence of the Absence of all such Codes in Lower Eaces — Theological Codes best suited to Man in his Present State 149-173

PART I. THE IvTATUEE OF MIE^D

'' The very idea of so noble, so refined, so immaterial, and so exalted a being as the anima, or even the animus, taking up her residence, and sitting dabbling, like a tadpole, all day long, both summer and winter, in a puddle, or in a liquid of any kind, how thick or thin soever, he would say, shocked his imagination : he would scarce give the doctrine a hearing." — Tristram Shandy^ B. ii. eh. 19.

CHAPTER I.

THE MODEEN DOCTKINE OF THE EELATION OF THE MIND TO THE BODY.

" When men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions/^ remarks Hobbes, " and registered them as authenticated records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such persons than to write legibly on a piece of paper already scribbled over/^ Hence it is that any inquiry like that which is the subject of this work is fraught with difficulties, which are due as much to the fact that most men have already acquiesced, without question, in opinions of transmitted authority as to the inherent obscurity of the matter. And although those, who have given especial thought to such questions, and from the stand-point of modern science have studied anew the problem of the relationship of the mind to the body, have arrived at conclusions differing largely from the orthodox beliefs held by the majority of even educated people, still, for a long time to come, it cannot be expected that these conclusions will be very widely accepted, until at least radical changes are made in modern methods of education. And yet, if all men could and would wipe out from their minds, as with a sponge, all existing opinions on such matters, and would begin anew to build up a doctrine of the nature of mind which should be in harmony with existing knowledge, there can be no doubt that a very different opinion would be arrived at than that which obtains to-day. It is very difficult for any one, brought up with certain ideas and beliefs, to sufficiently set aside these preconceived notions to give due weight to evidence offered by those of an opposed way of thinking. This is one of the reasons, aside at least from the inherent difficulty of the subject and the lack of exact knowledge of the mechanism of the nervous system, why there has been so much difference of opinion regarding the relation of the mind to the body, and why the opinion maintained by the gen-r erality of people differs so widely from that held by the leaders in advanced thought. But though there is a wide chasm between the notions of the unlearned and the scientific writers of the day, there is an equally wide one between the latter and another class of men, who, though learned in such matters, still, from the force of conservatism, adhere to ancient scholastic creeds. The philosophical world to-day is divided, as it alw^ays has been, into two schools of philosophy, — the spiritual and the material, though the latter may be said to be the exponent of modern science.

Spiritualism endeavors to explain all mental phenomena by presupposing the existence of a spiritual something acting through the brain as its instrument : materialism looks to the properties of matter alone for a solution. But while spiritualism simplifies the problem by postulating what in one sense may be considered a definite, if incomprehensible, factor, materialism on the other hand, protean in its forms, embraces many doctrines and appears under many guises. Spiritualism simply avoids the difficulty by going around it ; materialism boldly enters the labyrinth, but often becomes lost in its mazes. Materialism, like spiritualism, was originally the creation of metaphysical speculation, and contained very little that was founded upon established fact. As long as this was the case, as long as materialism was but the product of abstract speculation without positive scientific data upon which to rest, it was nothing more than a mere collection of fanciful hypotheses, without solidity and without substantial support. In this respect it was like unto its opponent spiritualism, and only merited the neglect it formerly received. It is only within the last few decades that sufficient evidence has been collected, as the result of patient and laborious investigation into the phenomena of nature, to justify the offering of materialism as a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of the universe and to warrant its acceptance. With every addition to our knowledge, with every fresh discovery in the domains of science, the deeper we penetrate into the mysteries of nature, the stronger becomes the doctrine of modern materialism ; until to-day it offers the most acceptable explanation of the vital problems with which science has to deal. It is difficult to understand how any one, who has taken pains to thoroughly inform himself on the great scientific questions of the day and is conversant with the discoveries made of late years in the natural sciences, especially in the department of biology, can fail to find in materialism^ the most satisfactory explanation that has yet been

^ It is only fair to say that by materialism I do not mean any of those crude notions which are commonly attached to the term. By materialism I mean a much higher form of doctrine, which I believe to be the legitimate expression of the scientific thought

1^ g THE NATURE OF MIND.

offered of vital phenomena. It is true that what has been accomplished is insignificant compared with what remains to be done, but with every step forward the way becomes clearer and the path surer. In these pages we shall be interested only with that aspect of materialism which deals with the relation between mind and body ; an old question, but one which so far from becoming hackneyed with time, receives increasing interest from every additional discovery made in the physiology of the nervous system. We are to-day, for the first time, just beginning to be in a position to investigate the problem which nervous physiology alone has properly opened to us and which before has remained as a sealed book. All metaphysical speculation, not founded on physiological data, as to its contents must be looked upon as a series of more or less shrewd guesses, and even with our present knowledge of the functions of the nervous system, we cannot consider that we have more than arrived at the threshold of the inquiry. The time has not yet arrived when we can hope to thoroughly understand the relations of the mental to the physical world. Nevertheless, as the merchant from time to time stops in the midst of his transactions to '' take account of stock," so in the progress of science, it is well to occasionally pause, and cast

of the day, though perhaps it is necessary to admit that some of the exponents of this thought reject, for what appears to me insufficient reasons, the term materialism. This may he because this expression has often been invested with a meaning, crude and unphilosophical, with which this higher form has nothing in common. What is understood by materialism will be explained in the final chapter, to which the reader is referred.

our eyes over what has been done, to sum up the evidence that has been accumulated^ and see whither we are drifting. Accordingly, the writer has ventured in these pages to call attention to that explanation of the problem which seems most in accordance with the present condition of science. The subject has been approached entirely from a materialistic stand-point, and therefore the spiritualist will probably find little herein to disconcert him. In a subject so prolific in literature as that of the relation of mind and matter, no one can hope to invent a theory that has not at some time or other been previously suggested. At most one can only hope, as fresh additions are made to our knowledge, to bring new and more potent evidence in support of this or that theory, and to read more intelligently by the light of improved science problems that before have been involved in obscurity and veiled in mysticism. In the following pages the WTiter has simply endeavored to bring forward evidence in support of a theory which has seemed to him most in accordance with known facts, and to explain by natural means phenomena which otherwise border on the mysterious. The doctrines Avhich are maintained have seemed to him to be the only logical sequences of the generally accepted views held to-day in regard to the basis of mental processes, and if the latter are accepted the other should be also. How far the view^s here advocated are in harmony with those of other writers will be noticed later.

If we look a little more closely into the history of philosophy, it will be found that it has always been a tendency of mankind to explain the unknown by a resort to mysterious and supernatural agents. This has been true both of animate and inanimate nature. It is a tendency which has prevailed in inverse proportion to the existing knowledge of the causation of natural phenomena. The wind^ the thunder, the lightning, the properties of matter, all have at different times been explained by means of supernatural or immaterial agents! Mind has been no exception to this law ; but as the cloud which has hung over our knowledge of biological processes has remained longer unlifted than in other departments of science, the spiritual influence has been longer felt, and mental phenomena have remained for a longer time enshrouded in mysticism.

To-day the weight of authority is in favor of a material basis for all mental phenomena. It is generally conceded that mind depends upon the development of a peculiar matter, the brain, for its existence.

The brain is a complex organ made up of what are called nerve-cells and nerve-fibres, the latter serving as conductors, like ordinary telegraph-wires, for the cells, which are the batteries which run the nervous mechanism. Of the nerve fibres, some connect together the neighboring cells, others cells situated in distant parts of the brain. Other systems of fibres connect the brain with the various parts of the body. Of these latter there are two kinds: one ingoing, called the sensory or centripetal nerves, which convey impressions to the cells of the brain; and the other, outgoing, called motor, or centrifugal, which convey excitations from the cells of the brain to the muscles, viscera, and other parts. This, in a rough way, is the anatomical mechanism of the nervous system. The more minute structure with still other systems of nerves it is not necessary for our purpose to consider. We have here what is called a nervous loop. An impression is conveyed from the skin^ for example, by way of the ingoing nerves to the brain. Here an agitation^ is set up among the molecules of the cells. -This agitation is conveyed from cell to cell, a greater or less number being implicated as the case may be ; and finally this molecular motion is retransmitted as a nervous current along the outgoing nerves to the muscles to end in muscular action. Now the important point is this : at the moment w^hen the ingoing current reaches the cerebral molecules, a feeling of some sort arises in the individual, and continues as long as these molecules continue in agitation, and ceases when the molecular motion ceases. Whenever the molecules of the brain are set into activity, a sensation or thought of some kind occurs; and, vice versa, whenever a thought or sensation arises^ a corresponding molecular agitation occurs. Let us take a concrete example. A man is sitting in his library quietly reading. The rays of light from his book fall upon his retina and excite the terminal filaments of the optic nerve; from here the impression is carried as a neural current to the brain, and excites the molecules of the cells. Along with this excitement of the cerebral molecules there arises the image called the book, and all the various thoughts corresponding to the printed words of the page. These thoughts are said

^ Often called undulations, tremors, vibrations, etc.

to occur side by side with the molecular agitation. Suddenly the cry of " fire'^ is raised. The man throws down his book, jumps from his chair, and runs down stairs in answer to the alarm. Now what has occurred in his nervous apparatus ? The pulsations of the atmosphere corresponding to the sound '' fire'^ have struck upon his auditory apparatus ; from there they have been conveyed as a neural undulation or current along the auditory nerve to his brain and there aroused a new set of molecular motions ; and with them a new set of thoughts has arisen, embracing perhaps a mental picture of the house in flames and of danger to the inmates. But not stopping here, the cerebral motion has been transmitted along the outgoing nerves to the muscles, and resulted in the actions just described ; we have here, from a physical point of view, what is called a nervous circuit. On the one hand we have a series of molecular motions beginning with irritations of sensory nerves, and passing as cerebral motions through the brain, ending in muscular action ; and on the other hand we have states of consciousness correlated with a portion of that circuit, the cerebral portion. In this or in some modified form of this consists all nervous and mental action. On this fact is based the doctrine of the physical basis of mind, which recognizes the association and interdependence of molecular motions and consciousness. Underneath, then, every mental act there flows a physical current. With every thought, sensation, or emotion is associated a physical change in a material substance, — the brain. No mental act can take place without a corresponding physical change; no physical change without a corresponding mental

THE NATURE OF MIND, H

act. Such is the usually accepted doctrine of the present day.

According to this view we have two sets of phenomena, two classes of facts, a mental act and a physical change, invariably associated together. But this is very far from explaining the nature of mental processes. The further question is here presented to us, What is the nature of this association ? Is it to be looked upon, as many think, as a mere coexistenoe of dissimilar phenomena, rather than as one in which any dependency of the one upon the other can be traced ? And are we here to place a limit to our inquiries, and consider that the problem has been reduced to its lowest terms ? If we are content to do so, very little progress can be said to have been made towards understanding the relationship between mind and matter. Unless some causal or interdependent relation between the two can be established, we shall be very little better off than we were before physiological science undertook to solve the problem.

But, in truth, physiological science does pretend to go further, though a careful study of the teachings of the exponents of the modern school will reveal two different interpretations of the facts, however unanimous they may appear at first sight. These two interpretations may be termed the Theory of Functions and the Theory of Aspects. Both theories I hope to be able to show are neither a sufficient nor correct explanation of the facts.

The basis of both doctrines is a physical substance underlying both series of facts, — the physical disturbances, and consciousness, — but the relation which the two series bear to this substance differs in the two theories. First^ as to the Theory of Functions.

After a careful study of the reasoning by which this conclusion has been reached, as well as of the general nreaning which seems to underlie the writings of the principal authorities on the subject, I am convinced that there is only one intelligible meaning with which this doctrine can be invested, and that is this : there is one underlying matter or substance ; this substance has two properties, — one of these properties is known as those disturbances w^e call nerve-motions, the other is consciousness ; that is, our ideas, sensations, and emotions. When nerve-motions, the one "property'^ of this matter, is present, consciousness, the other '^ property,^' appears simultaneously. Both come and both go side by side together; but why when one appears the other should do so also we do not know. They may be likened to the following ideal case. Let us invest a piece of iron with the properties of magnetism and heat under ideal conditions. Let us suppose (which is not the case) that whenever the temperature of the iron is raised above that of the surrounding air it becomes magnetized, and, conversely, whenever it becomes magnetized the temperature becomes raised. In this case the magnetism could be said to correspond with consciousness and heat with nerve-motions.

This simile must not be pushed farther than is intended. In this case of the iron the heat will probably be inferred to be the cause of the magnetism, and vice versa. But this has scarcely been asserted to be the case with mind and the accompanying neural undulations. The analogy is applicable only so far as concerns the parallelism of the phenomena. Consciousness and nerve-motions are said only to run in parallel circuits. When one is present, the other is also present. They resemble two clocks, which, wound up at the same moment, record the time and strike the hours in perfect harmony. '^ We can trace,'^ says Tyndall, '^ the development of a nervous system, and correlate with it the parallel phenomena of sensation and thought. We see with undoubting certainty that they go hand in hand. But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the connection between them/^^ and yet '^ though t,^^ says Huxley, " is as much a function of matter as motion is.^^ ^

Although the theory has not often, if at all, been stated as distinctly or boldly as has just been done, still I think I am justified in this interpretation of it. This is the general idea underlying this form of the materialistic doctrine, and is the only meaning which can be deduced from the writings of such men as have accepted it, although it may be suspected that the very vagueness with which it is often stated is not indicative of a clear conception of the defined conditions. Furthermore, this interpretation is the only one which is logically compatible vnth the deductions which have been drawn from the doctrine itself. This I hope to be able to show later. Till then I shall have to ask the reader to provisionally accept it. According to this doctrine we may be said to have to do with a unity of substance and a duality of properties.

The Theory of Aspects differs considerably from this,

* Belfast Address, p. 62. 2 Qn Descartes.

though the two are sometimes confused and regarded as identical. There is certainly often lacking that precision of language which is essential to a clear understanding of the problem.

According to the Theory of Aspects^ consciousness and nerve motions (vibrations) are only different aspects of one and the same underlying substance, which is unknown. This view has perhaps been as clearly expressed by Bain, as by any one else, when he says, " the one substance with two sets of properties, two sides (the physical and the mental), a double-faced unity, would seem to comply with all the exigencies of the case.^^ ^

The same notion has thus been described by Lewes : '' There may be every ground for concluding that a logical process has its correlative physical process, and that the two processes are merely two aspects of one event." ^ And again : ^' The two processes are equivalent, and the difference arises from the difference in the mode of apprehension." ^

The inadequacy of these theories of Functions and Aspects to explain much of the diflSculty is admitted by most writers almost in the same breath in which they advanced them. That which has received the most general acceptance is the Theory of Aspects, but as an explanation it is incomplete. To say that consciousness is the subjective aspect of matter is equivalent to saying that consciousness is the conscious side of matter, which is no explanation. It is simply stating over again in different terms the fact we wish

1 Mind and Body, p. 196.

« Physical Basis of Mind, p. 395. ^ ibj^.

to explain ; and similarly^ to say that nerve-motion is the objective aspect of the same matter is simply to say that nerve- motions are objective phenomena, which is what we knew before. These are only restatements of the facts, not explanations of them. Nor does it help matters to say that the same matter underlies both, or the difference between them is due to different modes of apprehending the same thing. I shall have more to say on this point in chapter iv., to which the reader is referred. What we wish to know is this : Sow do we come to have two aspects instead of one f Why, when we have one aspect, should we also have at the same time the other? How is the one set of changes, the physical, related to the other set, the mental ? What is that connection between them that insures the presence of a feeling when physical disturbances are produced, or when a feeling is present, induces physical disturbances? What difference is there between the essential nature of an objective fact, like a neural tremor, and a subjective state or feeling, and have they anything in common f These are important questions which call for answers, and any doctrine which fails to explain them falls far short of the requirements of the case. But these questions, there need be no hesitation in saying, neither the theory of functions nor aspects explains. On the contrary, the former has led to deductions which, though logically drawn from the premises, are inconsistent with the facts established by each one's own consciousness. Consequently the premises must be false. The deductions I refer to I propose to consider in a later chapter, and therefore that discussion will not be anticipated here, farther than to say that, accepting this explanatiODj it has been held by some, that states of consciousness are merely by-products^ and in nowise essential to the working of the body ; or, in other words^ that our feelings have no causative influence in the production of our actions. So that when I eat because (as I suppose) I am hungry, or work out an intricate mathematical problem, or strike some one who made me angry, I am not prompted to these acts, and do not carry them into execution under the direction of my thoughts and feelings, but these acts are done by the mechanism of the brain, and the chemical and physical changes which work the mechanism are simply accompanied by my feelings and thoughts, but not influenced in any way by them. Our feelings become simply indicators, like those of a steam-engine, which tell the number of revolutions, and height of pressure, without in any way affecting the revolutions themselves.

Such a conclusion is sufficient to reduce the whole theory to an absurdity.

The inadequacy of the above explanations, however simple and satisfactory they may appear at first sight, is recognized on all sides, and is the same whether it be approached on the physical or on the subjective side. They simply avoid the difficulty, they do not remove it. This difficulty is, as I have said, in explaining how we come to have two aspects, and how these two ^^ aspects'^ are related; how physical changes become translated into the subjective feeling. That the two are correlated in time, that is, that the two occur simultaneously, side by side, is plain enough and easily understood, but it is confessedly not so easy to understand how the one becomes ^' transformed^^ (?) into the other ; how, in fact, a feeling insures the presence of a physical motion, and a physical motion, of a feeling. Thus Mr. Spencer, who, as a psychologist, has treated the matter in a masterly manner, maintains this view of different aspects. " For what,^^ he says, '^ is objectively a change in a superior nerve-centre is subjectively a feeling, and the duration under the one aspect measures the duration of it under the other.^^ ^ And the same thing is repeated in other passages. But this is no explanation, as Mr. Spencer himself tacitly recognizes when he later adds, '^ though accumulated observations and experiments have led us by a very indirect series of inferences to the belief that mind and nervous action are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing, we remain utterly incapable of seeing and even of imagining how the two are related. Mind still continues to us a something without any kinship to other things; and from the science which discovers by introspection the laws of this something, there is no passage by transitional steps to the sciences which discover the laws of these other things.^^^ Here is a mystery which he recognizes in common even with his spiritualistic opponents.