The self: what is it?

Contents

PAGE

Part I. Sensibility. Chapter

I. Causality — A Predicate of Sensibility. . 23 II. The Same Continued 34

III. The Implications of End of Existence —

Predicates of Sensibility 42^

IV. Responsibility — A Predicate of Sensi-

bility 46

V. Intelligence — A Predicate of Sensibility 49

VI. The Self — An Impersonation of Sensibility 72

VII. Inferences and Objections Suggested

by Part i 78

Introduction

The first and most vital trait of materialism is, that it primarily springs from sensibility, and not from intelligence; from tendency, and not from theory. It is not possible to become a materialist by starting out with the question: Is mind or is matter the prime factor of the universe? To decide such question, mind and mind only, must be the sole judge, jury and law. As the sole active and interested party in the case, mind could not decide against itself; or even if it should, what would signify a decision coming from a self-repudiated source?

Instead, materialism originates from tendency, and from vicious tendency withal. True enough, being once born from tendency, it makes haste to clothe itself with theory, as a shield of defense. So also, every vicious act has a ready-made argument for its excuse or justification. This means that the why and how vice can justify itself, are identical with the why and how of materialism. Both alike disclose a serious flaw, either in intelligence or in sensibility; either in the head or in the heart. Which of the two is to blame? Rather, which of the two is the causal and responsiblt element of mind?

This is not a trite question; but the first and most momentous one underlying human character. It is well to answer it on the spot: Which of the two is held responsible by a civil tribunal when trying a man for his life — which, his intelligence or his prompting sense motive? Of course, the question is too plain to be put to a sane man. But the strange fact is, though seeing and acting out the truth in practical life, on turning away, we instantly deny it in theory. That is to say, according to universal instinct and usage, the sense motive is the mainspring and responsible agent in the practical issues of life; while theoretically, intelligence is the supreme authority: Am not I and all other discreet people governed by calm and sober reflection? is an expression of it in theory.

This contradiction — the admission of sense causality in practice and its denial in theory, is the beginning point of all philosophical strife. The contradiction not only implies an error, but an all-inclusive error, respecting the root principle of human character. The question comes: Is sense or is intelligence the supreme authority of mind? Answer: Practically, sense is; theoretically, intelligence is. The latter will be seen to be a pure illusion; and as such, is the first and chief instrument of materialism — vicious tendency, for converting intelligence into a shield of defense.

Materialism lurks in every path of experience, whether practical or theoretical, impeding the one and mystifying the other, much as darkness does the traveler. Every inquiry of moderate scope, no matter when, where, or by whom begun, sooner or later leads into the wilderness of materialism. No wonder then, that in one or other of its phases, it has been the main trouble of philosophy from the first. Through all the ages, thoughtful men, seeing its harmful influence, have made a life long struggle against it.

To get fully rid of it — to make a clean sweep of the infamous plague once and for all, wise men, even before the days of Plato, resorted to idealism: denied the positive reality of matter, holding it to be an illusory appearance only. In modern times, the devout and far-seeing Berkley is found fore most in this line of thought. Next and most notable, are seen the four great German thinkers, led on by Kant, the aim of each seeming to be the philosophical annihilation of matter so as thereby and therewith, to chase the spectre materialism wholly out of existence. Their high and full blown zeal regarded it as a life and death question: either materialism is false and must be driven out of the present world, else all hope of a world to come is vain.

Nevertheless, though matter be annihilated; though materialism be left without any logical crutch; yet, like another old man of the sea, it still holds its iron grip on the neck of philosophy. This is wholly inexplicable, except on the assumption, that it originates in and is backed by vicious tendency, which, springing perennially from depraved sensibility, will continue to assert itself in spite of all logical opposition.

But the point is, that the struggle of philosophy must ever continue vain and fruitless, so long as it stands on two such primary errors: (i) That materialism is a creature of intelligence; and (2) that intelligence is the supreme authority of mind. To glimpse the question in a nut shell, let it be answered thoughtfully: How can a vicious man employ intelligence for devising vicious deeds, and subsequently for justifying said deeds, except on the assumption, that sense is the controlling authority, with intelligence as its passive instrument?

That sensibility — including not only the five, but all the senses, is the causal and responsible agent, must be assumed as the first, most momentous, and self evident of philosophical truths. All our moral, religous, social, civil, political, and other institutions of practical import, are grounded on this great primary truth. Thus, to find the mainspring of any given action, we go straight to the sense motive, and award praise or blame, life or death, according to the moral quality of said motive; thus instinctively recognizing sense as the responsible head, without one thought of intelligence, except as a passive instrument.

Again, no one practical fact is plainer or more universal, than that every man's life is governed by some one or more senses — by the moral sense or otherwise, which dominating authority unceasingly employs intelligence as a passive instrument for serving its special purposes. Thus, the intelligence of the miser is always serving the demands of avarice, in money getting; that of the thief, in stealing; that of the ambitious man, in preferment; that of the philanthrophist, in doing good; that of the parent, in the well being of his family, and so on to the end; insomuch, that to know a man's ruling sense or senses, is to know, in advance, how his intelligence will be employed.

And again, we are necessitated to assume the veracity of intelligence in all cases; otherwise, our debates and inquiries which tacitly assume it, are the sheerest folly. But if intelligence be both truthful and self-controlling, then it could not — neither from choice nor from exterior force — be induced to take part in falsehood; indeed, on the assumption of its veracity and self-control, falsehood would be simply impossible. But as a matter of universal practical fact, intelligence is just as ready and just as willing to lie as to tell the truth ; just as efficient a tool for the thief, as for the phiio the self: what is it?

lanthropist. This shows beyond dispute, that while intelligence per se is truthful, it is meanwhile passive and like all other passive instruments, may be indifferently employed, either for right or wrong purposes.

But this self-evident, practical fact, is denied in all speculative theory. It is the usage in mental philosophy for instance, to begin, continue and end the inquiry, with intelligence; indeed, such inquiries, explicitly or implicitly, usually regard intelligence — divine reason, not only as the climax, but as the all-in-all of human character. This is often done too, without one allusion to sense, unless of an incidental kind. From a practical cbmmon sense standpoint, tnis is to play Hamlet with Hamlet left out; it is to attempt an analysis of mind, with its basic element left out.

This however, is the point to be emphasized : Here on the one hand, a world full of practical facts point to sensibility as the supreme authority of mind; while on the other, a world full of theories assume intelligence to be supreme. As direct opposites, one of the two must be false; and being false, all deductions from it must be equally false. Whch is true, and which false?

What is the highest tribunal for such an issue? What can be higher than universal instinct and usage, backed by a common sense interpretation of

INTRODUCTION II

the practical facts relevant to the issue? According to this highest tribunal, intelligence, so far from being the autocrat of mind, is but a passive instrument — a mere cat's paw, for subserving the demands of sensibility. To assume otherwise, is not only an error, but an all-inclusive error, respecting the foundation principle of human character. Such a frightful error, at such a vital point, is certainly an ample answer to the ever-recurring question: Why has philosophy made no decisive forward step since the days of Plato?

The illusion leading to this contradiction between practice and theory, is so subtle as to be quite difficult of realization. It will be fully noticed at the proper place; and with it, will be disclosed an endless number of other consequent and kindred illusions, which perplex the world of theory. Just here and now, two questions demand notice: Why and how is such a fundamental contradiction possible?

As respects the why, man would only be a machine, and not a man, without his crowning trait of responsibility. But responsibility cannot exist without moral free agency; nor free agency, with out a power to do either right or wrong at option; nor the latter, without depravity. That is, the same provision made in the mental economy for the full play of depravity, free agency, etc., also

I2 THE self: what is it?

allows the misuse of intelligence for purposes of contradiction, sophistry, falsehood, etc.; for, to preclude the latter, would balk free agency.

The other question — as to the how or mode of contradiction, may be called the central problem of mental philosophy, especially if we judge from the magnitude of the contradiction just pointed out. Besides, it will be found that a full solution of contradiction, must sooner or later involve every distinctive trait of mind.

Thus, the attempt to explain the contradictions of intelligence, by means of intelligence itself, implies two vital facts: (i) That intelligence —the instrument employed for the inquiry, is truthful per se, else it is extreme folly to employ it in this, or any other inquiry. But (2) the very point to be inquired about — the contradictions of intelligence, tacitly imply it to be false.

But it cannot be both true and false. Besides, since to employ it at all, is to assume its integrity ; and since, according to practical fact, its misuse is referable to an over-ruling sense — hereby involving sense and its relationships; and since again on the other hand, to discriminate between the true and false phenomena of intelligence, must amount to an analysis of intelligence itself, it follows, that to properly explain contradiction, must involve an analysis of the entire mind — both sense and intelligence. It is at least not extravagant to call it the central question of mental philosophy.

Hence, and in other words, this treatise is presented as an analysis of mind or self-hood — not in detail, but to the extent of fundamental traits only. Part I. is devoted to an analysis of Sensibility, as the basic element of mind, and whence is deduced sense causality as the most significant upshot. This upshot, as personating the basic principle of mind, is assumed to be the primary fact of mental philosophy ; and being such, is thenceforth employed as the axiom or dominating principle of inquiry.

Part II. is devoted to an analysis of intelligence, the central problem of which is a solution of its apparent contradictions; and which, as just said, involves sooner or later a reference to every distinct ive trait of mind.

The first named — sense causality with its implications — being pretty generally self-evident, will need no theorizing arguments for proof ; but only to be fairly presented by a common sense interpretation of practical facts. But the second — a solution of contradiction, which among other things requires an exposure of the illusions leading to contradiction — will prove the most difficult part of the inquiry. This is much as to say, there is no trouble about the doctrine of Copernicus: it needs no additional proof. The trouble rather is, to expose the illusion, whereby, on turning away from Copernicus, we still imagine the sun to rise and set.

By the way, one or another illusion has obscured every step of our way so far. We cannot stop to discuss them at this place. But in order to mitigate honest perplexity somewhat, as also the premature disgust of those who may be inordinate zealots of intellect, a hint must be given just here upon the chief one of these stumbling blocks. It is this: How can sense be called supreme, or how can it operate at all, without the aid of intelligence?

Unity of mind, it is replied, will not allow sense and intelligence to be two independent individuals; they may be regarded in logical, but not in real antithesis. All human activity manifests the two as distinct, yet in perfect unity or concert of action; one meanwhile always being dominant, and the other subservient, hereby necessitating the inference, that one is subject and the other a predicate. But since intelligence is always manifested in a subservient relation, it must be assumed as a predicate or endowment of sense, somewhat as a flame: is of a burning body.

Otherwise than this, no phase of human activity is intelligible. Responsibility for instance, always implies the presence of intelligence; yet, though always implied, intelligence is never explicitly recognized as being responsible. Instead, sense and.

sense only is responsible. Hence, intelligence being always implied, yet sense only being responsible, sense must be self-endowed with intelligence. Otherwise, sense would be dependent on something other than itself; and in which case, this other something would be responsible instead of sense.

The smart question, how can brilliant intelligence issue from blind sense, is quite away from the mark. We know nothing of essences ; and can only judge from phenomena. According to the latter, intelligence can only act after and in obedience to sense prompting ; and as a literal and undeniable fact, does sustain the relation of predicate or endowment to sense, in all its practical manifestations. There is no alternative: unless, may be, a theorizing analysis of essences may yet prove all practical facts to be utterly false. More of this, however, at the proper time and place. Only remember, that though sense and itelligence are of necessity distinct and opposite logically, they are in reality but two phases of one and the same thing; sense being the thing or subject, with intelligence as its predicate. Or thus, sense is cause, and intelligence is its instrument.

Returning, all contradiction is brought about by illusion; and the prime illusion indicated above — the mistaking of intelligence for the supreme authority or Self, may be called the first and chief of all. This first and chief is followed by an endless number and variety of others, to explain each of which, would be an endless work. Hence it may be added, that the culminating problem of this book, is to find one principle, whereby all contradiction, sophistry, falsehood — the whole brood of make-believes, may be explained in one and the same process.

An attempt at the same thing in the first edition, was not sufficiently clear. This was doubtless owing to the fact, that the exposition was given to the reader, precisely as it was wrought out by the author : in other words, it was too abstract. The chief care in this edition has been to employ all the concreteness possible with such a problem.

To this end, a series of illustrations are employed, the first being the solar contradiction just alluded to. In this instance, one witness asserts that the sun rises and sets; while the other asserts precisely the reverse. Both assertions are true, according to their respective standpoints, though possitively contradictory. What is the fault, and how can it be consistently reconciled with the integrity of intelligence?

The object is not to explain this one for its own sake ; but to deduce a general principle, which will explain all contradiction. The phenomena to be explained, are so vast and varied, that a principle applicable to all, will at first seem vague, because of its generality. The solar will hence be followed by a number and variety of other illustrations, sufficient to give all the clearness desired by thoughtful readers.

Without said principle — without understanding the contradictions of intelligence, no proper analysis of intelligence is possible. Nor is it extravagant to say on the other hand, that to understand contradiction, is to see intelligence simplified an hundred-fold; insomuch, every one of normal common sense, will feel himself at home in the study. And why not? Plainly, intelligence itself must be intelligible to common sense, else it can be no fit instrument of truth about other things.

The scope of inquiry hinted at in the foregoing, does not lead to a remote or fruitless theorizing ; but rather to the A, B, C, of all philosophical inquiry; to those great primar} 7 principles underlying both practice and thought.

For instance, it will be seen as we proceed, that precisely the same class of illusions, which deny the Copernican philosophy, may be and constantly are urged against the existence of God, the immortality of mind, moral free agency, and indeed against all immaterial things.

Nay, by like illusive means, the entire realm of intelligence itself, may be and constantly is virtually turned wrong end foremost. Thus, instead of one simple, universal and unchanging method of inquiry —suited to the infant and philosopher alike, we are deluded with a so-called induction, synthesis, or other like counterfeit, which results not only in mystification, but in practically reversing the one true method.

With the battle thus half won, and by the same illusive means, the principle of cause and effect is also presently reversed. To reverse these two — the method of inquiry and the principle of cause and effect, virtually amounts to reversing the whole world of thought; so that, instead of nature's own order of proceeding from causes to effects and from wholes to parts, we now see like Leucippus that the total universe is a mere effect, produced by a combination of atoms as its cause.

Then again, this combination of atoms, whereby parts produce wholes, and effects produce causes — what is it, or how can it end, except in the doctrine of growth? This growth in turn, becomes so expansive and exuberant, as presently to cancel all just conceptions of Identity and Permanence; but without these two principles, we cannot conceive,, either of intelligence or rational existence.

These for example, with an endless number of other illusive sophistries, are in the same category and may be exposed by one and the same process*

INTRODUCTION IO.

To realize such result will shield us from the din of much logical debauchery; will give a firm grasp upon the little we may happen to know — sufficiently at least to feel sure that there are such things as truth and reality; and hereby, bridge over the abyss of universal skepticism.

Whether or not true, the evils of materialism are assumed to be worse now than ever before, Worse in this, that besides being as bad practically as ever before, they claim more loudly than hitherto, a high rational justification. More than ever before, the grossest phases of materialism are boisterous in claiming scientific origin and sanction ; so boisterous indeed, as to be overheard by the popular ear.

Hence, now perhaps more than ever before, the good of society requires a philosophy adapted to the popular ear. But here precisely has ever been a great trouble: though the popular ear is quick to hear any sophistry in proof of a favorite and vicious tendency, it yet becomes instantly deaf to any sober thought in opposition to said tendency.

It is possible, however, that materialism has overshot its mark in the present case. It has managed, mainly by its scientific pretenses, to excite much popular interest in certain great problems; which latter however, can find no ample solution, except in the sphere of philosophy. Thus, without so intending, materialism has perhaps opened up a way between philosophy and the popular ear. At any rate, the vital interests at stake, justify an attempt at its realization.

In reference to the situation here indicated, this treatise was written. In addition, and in view of the great odds to be met in the undertaking, it is assumed as a serious possibility with regard to philosophy — as indeed with regard to many other things, that its chief enemy may perchance be one of its own household: viz., metaphysical rig-ma-role, tedious definitions, learned nomenclature, with other like cheap ritual. Fearing as much, such hindrances will be avoided as fully as can be. And though such precaution will have drawbacks peculiar to itself, it is yet hoped, that the popular reader and young student, may hereby be brought more directly face to face with that august something called Mind or Self.

Full details in such an inquiry, would require several volumes, and thus again balk the end in view. To avoid this, the great labor has been to condense; to give the most concise outline possible, without sacrificing intelligibility.

Part I will be easy enough; but Part II cannot be got without some interest and thought. The first assumption of every inquiry is, the veracity of the inquiring intelligence; but this veracity is directly impeached by endless contradictions. These latter occur not only in the least questions, but perplex and even deny the most momentous truths — implicitly deny ail truth. To explain the ground of contradiction, so as to vindicate the integrity of intelligence, to intelligence itself, and therewith get a valid standard for all intelligible truth, must be the first and most vital problem of intelligence. It is to prove that, which is the ground of proof; to measure that, which is the measure of all knowledge.

Can such problems be mastered in a hasty and careless way, as one might read a novel or newspaper? Certainly not. Neither does this mean to say, that great sagacity is required for the task. Every normal mind has sagacity enough for all problems of interest to itself. Without such interest — without a desire to know, sagacity is vain and useless; with the desire, the way is open to any human knowledge ; in fact, the desire is the guarantee of the sagacity. Those having an interest in the inquiries of Part II have nothing to fear; those having none, had better lay the book aside at once.

The two editions are the same in essential respects; but superficially, this second is wholly new. The first edition was too abstract. This one may perhaps go to the other extreme. The only help for these and other short-comings, is the patience and charity of the reader. As for the rest, it is fully believed that this edition will be far more intelligible and readable than the first.

THE SELF: WHAT IS IT?

PART I.

SENSIBILITY.

Chapter 1. Causality — A Predicate Of Sensibility

We naturally enough regard the human mind as consisting of two distinct spheres: viz., Thinking and Feeling. The thinking sphere is variously called intelligence, intellect, thought, brain, and so forth, according to the occasion. The feeling sphere is called sensibility, heart, will, desire, and so forth.

The antithesis between thinking and feeling is logical, more than real, as will be seen later on. For present purposes, it is hard to find two antithetical terms, which will distinguish properly between thinking and feeling. To avoid needless debate, let us adopt the one word intelligence to represent the thinking, and the one word sensibility to represent the feeling trait of the mind.

Henceforth these two words will be used generically; intelligence, to represent all the thinking or cognitive powers; and sensiblity, to represent all appetites, desires, emotions, affections, or other feeling powers of mind. The latter especially must be sharply noted; for in most writings of the kind, the word sensibility is restricted to the. five senses, while as here used, it personates the entire realm of feeling or sense.

It is also well to note, that with few exceptions, which will be specified, the word mind will also be used in its full import, including God, spirit,, soul — everything not included in the word matter.

Thus we set out on the two general assumptions : First, that total existence presents two phases — mind and matter; and secondly, that mind, the special topic of this treatise, also presents two phases — sensibility and intelligence.

The emphasis here put upon the two words sensibility and intelligence, is to pave the way to the following propositions: The conceptions (i) Cause, (2) End, (3) Responsibility,^) Intelligence, and (5) Selfhood are each and all grounded in sensibility. All together, the five propositions virtually affirm that sensibility is the very essence of mind; for being subtracted, nothing of any worth remains to the latter.

We can properly call that essence only, which seems to be the permanent ground or subject of certain predicates. It is common to say, that we know nothing of essence per se; can know nothing but the facts of phenomena. So that, in saying that sensibility is the essence of mind, is only meant, that the traits ju'st named as being predicable of sensibility, pretty well exhaust our conception of mind.

It is moreover well to note here in the outset, that one great trouble will burden us all the way through this Part I. No one argument in the usual sense will occur in the entire book; instead, only enough exposition to get the given proposition fairly in view, and then demonstration by self-evident facts. But despite such facts, illusions will stand ready to contradict at every crook or turn. What is to be done? We must ignore contradictions until Part II, when their exposure will be the special work. But why not expose them first? Because contradiction — materialism, is simply inexplicable without a previous analysis of sensibility as its source.

It is much easier for instance, to prove the Copernican doctrine than to disprove the illusions which contradict it; indeed, the latter is simply impossible, without the former; although, in the former, as in the present case, illusions act as a contrarywind and tide from first to last.

Now to the first proposition, viz: Causality is grounded in sensibility. Human causality— which is the kind more especially in question, is of course assumed to be of a secondary or derived kind, though none the less valid on that account for hu man purposes. That man is endowed with causality, is clearly implied in moral responsibility. Responsibility implies that the agent so endowed has the power to act or not act at discretion, but a power to act or not act at discretion presupposes causality in the agent who can so act.

Causality is thus a necessary implication of responsibility. But does not responsibility itself need proof? Certainly not. It is assumed in all our possible theories and conventionalities; in so much, it cannot even be debated without meanwhile assuming it, just as would be the case in debating the reality of existence.

But the causality implied in responsibility, is of a moral kind: is there no other phase of causality, than the moral? Plainly enough. The moral phase ought to control all human conduct ; instead, it is often opposed and even wholly overthrown. Now, this rebellious element must also be endowed at least with causality, else it could not thus baulk the moral authority.

Tn short, the human mind is liberally endowed with causality. This brings us to the immediate in-

CAUSALITY — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 2J

quiry of the chapter: Where is this causality grounded — in sensibility or in intelligence?

As usually conceived of, simple energy, power, force, or whatever else you choose to call it, must be positively passive, as contrasted with causality. Literal energy can be nothing but itself — simple energy, and no more. It cannot be both itself and meanwhile something else exterior to itself; which prompts itself to activity. Indeed, in itself it is nothing; it does not exist nor can it be conceived of, except as a predicate of causality. Causality of necessity precedes and includes it, just as cause precedes and includes effect.

So then, besides simple energy in its common import, causality also implies a self-motive energy — an originating and secondary energy both in one. Its activity is self-prompting, and its self-prompting is an activity in one identical and spontaneous act.

Whether or not possible to define it more sharply; or whether it imply anything more, this at least suffices as a test for present purposes. With this test it hazards nothing to say, that nowhere in the realm of human thought can we find any concrete illustration of causality, except in the sphere of sensibility.

But the word sensibility is too generic and vague, for the precise point in question; and since the word desire, more fitly perhaps than any other one,, characterizes all sensibility and is meanwhile peculiarly suited for the precise point in hand, let it be used just here instead of sensibility, to personate the feeling sphere of mind.