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The virtues and their reasons

Austin Bierbower · 1888 · Scanned text · Free in the US

61,466 words · about 4 h 18 min to read

Period artwork: Interior of the Bodleian Library, 1845
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About this book

Author
Austin Bierbower
Language
English
Published
1888
Length
61,466 words · about 4 h 18 min
Sections
26 reader sections
Text
Scanned text, read from page scans by OCR; may contain errors
Rights
Public domain in the United States

 

Contents (26)

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Preface

This treatise, while intended for the general reader, and emphasizing those virtues which have a particular interest at this time, is especially adapted for moral training in the public schools and higher institutions of learning. Moral instruction is often excluded from public schools on account of the different religions represented, and the want of text books acceptable to them all. This exclusion has led to serious attacks on our public -school system, threatening its existence. In presenting systematically that morality which is common to all civilized peoples, the Author has had no occasion to take notice of religious differences. Catholics, Protestants, Jews and unbelievers may use this book with equal approval.

Chicago, June 1, 1888.

Contents

INTEODUOTOKT.

Page.

1.— The Ground and Rule of Right... 17

CHAPTER THIRD. Page

HONESTY 115

III.— Cheating 118

IY. — Employee, and Employe 121

V.— Promises 123

VI.— Gambling _. 126

3. Parlor Games 128

4. Betting 130

5. Speculation 131

VII.— Blackmail 132

VIIL— Reparation 133

Chapter Fifth. Public Duties 137

I.— Principles 137

2. Equality __ 138

3. Liberty. 140

(2). Tolerance 143

(3). Persecution _ _. 145

(5). Anarchism 147

(6). Socialism 149

II. —Patriotism _ _ 151

Page.

III.— Special Duties _ . 153

1. Taxes 153

2. Jury Duty 154

3. Military Duty 155

4. Public Education 157

(3). Election Frauds 162

(4). Intimidation... 164

6. Submission to Authority 165

7. Rioting 166

IV. — Cosmopolitanism _ 167

V.— Care foe Posterity _ 169

PAET SECOND.

DUTIES REGARDING SELF CHIEFLY.

CHAPTEE SIXTH.

Page.

SELF DEVELOPMENT 173

I.— Education 173

2. Physical Training 177

3. Health Keeping 179

II. — Courage ._ _ 181

III. — Independence 185

IV. — Large-Mindedness ___ 186

V.— Ideality . 188

CHAPTEE SEVENTH.

INDUSTRY 190

II. — Perseverance _ ___ 195

III.— Decision 200

IV.— Earnestness _ 204

CHAPTEE EIGHTH.

SELF SUPPORT _ 206

CHAPTEE NINTH.

Page.

SELF CONTROL 209

I.— Will Tower .. 209

II. — Prudence 212

III. — Self Restraint.. _ 215

1. Moderation _ _ 215

(2). Gluttony 217

(3). Amusements 220

(4). Cupidity 222

(5). Self Sacrifice 224

2. Patience _ _ 226

3. Modesty 228

4. Demeanor _ 229

IV. — Selecting Thoughts 232

2. Reading _ 235

V.— Habit Making 237

CHAPTEK TENTH.

TEMPERANCE _ 240

II.— Moderate Drinking 243

III. — Teaching to Drink 246

IV. — Prohibition _ 248

V. — Opium, Cocaine, Etc 250

VI. —Tobacco 251

CHAPTEE ELEVENTH.

SEfcF RESPECT 253

II.— CnrvALRY 255

CONTENTS. 15

Page.

III.— Dignity 257

IV.— Pride 258

Y. — Neatness 259

VI. — Cleanliness _ 260

VII. — Vices Antagonistic 262

2. Cowardice 266

3. Jealousy 269

4. Vulgarity , 272

(1). Coarseness _._ 272

(2). Profanity _ 273

5. Morbidness _• 276

CHAPTEE TWELFTH.

PURITY.. 278

CHAPTEE THIETEENTH.

CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 283

II.— Integrity 286

III.— Scrupulousness 288

IV. — Artificial Duties 290

V.— Conflicting Duties 292

INTRODUCTORY.

l.—THE GEOUND AND EULE OF EIGHT.

Ethics, Moral Philosophy, or the Science of Duty, contemplates that course which we call right and deem best. It reaches to all conduct; since there is a best way of doing everything, and it is wrong to act differently. Some cases of right and wrong, however, are so generally recognized as to be specially known as virtues and vices, and with these the science of Morals has chiefly to do.

"We recognize right by our judgment of what is best, and by a feeling — -conscience — which indicates, as the result of many impressions, what we ought to do, and impels us thereto.

As to what constitutes right, thinkers differ; some maintaining it to be a course in harmony with the necessary order of things; others, the will of God, as revealed in Eevelation or Nature; others, utility, happiness, or the general good of mankind. This question leads into Speculative Philosophy, which we shall not here enter. It is enough now to observe that, whatever men's opinions touching the ground of right, 2 17 they all deem those things right which are thought best for men, and consider that course morality which will bring them most happiness.

Accordingly, when people are asked to do right, they are asked simply to do what is best for themselves. Duty never conflicts with interest, if rightly understood; but it must be the interest of all, and not of self only, and one's whole interest, and not a part only. One man's welfare rarely conflicts with another's, if his entire welfare is taken into account, and not a present advantage only, or narrow view of advantage. All our interests, when taken together, harmonize with the like interests of our fellows, and the conduct which conduces to this general advantage is the subject of Ethics.

It will appear from these discussions that every special virtue secures some good to the individual practicing it, as well as to others; so that morality is simply good living, or conduct in harmony with the laws which conduce to the advantage of society. Each man's conduct, to be moral, must be for the good of all, of which he himself is one. As most of one's advantages come from society, his interest, like that of others, requires society to be well conducted, so that his duties to others reflect back in advantages to self.

Though we often fail to see the advantage of virtue to self, or even to others, a wider view, or deeper

INTRODUCTORY. 19

insight, discloses the fact that no virtue is without its advantage, and no vice without its punishment;,^ and, though we can not ordinarily have in mind the reason of morality, but must act from the general rules of virtue, or from conscience, the reason is always to be had when sought. As every virtue stands on a foundation of reason, as well as of advantage, the impulses of Conscience have all a ground in our intelligence. At least the virtues here discussed (which are universally recognized as duties) will be seen to have a sufficient reason in some advantage to the parties concerned.

2.— CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES.

We will here divide duties into two general classes : I. Duties Eegarding Others Chiefly. II. Duties Eegarding Self Chiefly.

As the duties to others, however, have, as just intimated, an advantage also to self, and those to self have an advantage also to others, the classes here made are for convenience of discussion, and are not strictly exclusive.

The same is true of the smaller subdivisions. The virtues so overlap, and run into one another, as to make up one morality, instead of separate and independent virtues. Any one of them, if followed to its remotest connections, will be found to involve all the rest, and, if fully set forth, to exhibit the whole; for the laws by which they are regulated are universal. The dissection of morality into its members would destroy its life, did we not recognize the division to be only mental, and so preserve its unity.

In the first class, however, are placed those duties which more immediately contemplate others, and in the second those which chiefly affect self.

I. In Geneeal

l.-PRELIMINARY.

There are some general conditions of thought and feeling which lie at the foundation of all morals, and constitute what may be called moral states, as kindness, love and sympathy — terms nearly synonymous, which express the feeling with which we should regard our fellow men. We shall treat, in the first chapter, of this general state of good feeling under the head of Kindness, which embraces, in its widest sense, all the rest. It has, however, like the other terms, its special meaning, distinguishing it from them, which we shall also note.

First, then, of kindness, or heart-tenderness, as a general state.

Kindness, or love, which is the sum of all the virtues, is the feeling of benevolence which the good man has toward all men, desiring their welfare and sorrowing for their misfortune. Underlying virtue generally, and itself the chief special virtue, it tends, in its wide results, toward all moral ends. Dominated by it, one can do no wrong, since every wrong can be resolved into some unkindness, and will tend to all good, since every good is kind. As good-will to men it would end war, oppression, dishonesty, deceit and impurity, and, instead, would make men feel like brothers, with a common interest and mutual preference. Revolting from every wrong as repulsive, it tends to every virtue as inclination ; so that it would suffice, as already said, to exhaust the whole subject of this treatise, if adequately presented.

The kind man, being good at heart, does good spontaneously, impelled thereto by his nature, with little need of consideration or effort. Good by impulse, he has but to see pain to want to relieve it, to know wrong to want to right it, and, in general, to see an opportunity for good to want to embrace it. Instead of waiting to be convinced in order to have a benevolent purpose, he unerringly flies to the right on feeling, which is quicker than thought.

The chief characteristic of kindness is a participation in others' pleasures and pains — rejoicing in their happiness and suffering in their sorrows. As if feeling with others' hearts, the kind man has a life in common with many, being actuated by the sentiment which makes mankind one. Appreciating all life as

KINDNESS. 25

his own, he is in unity with nature, and, feeling what is remote, he enlarges himself by bringing the world within his grasp; so that the kind man is deemed one of "great soul" — big-hearted and liberal-minded — incapable of anything mean on which vice can take hold.

This being so, it becomes the object of Ethics to engender this kindly feeling as the most general guarantee of morality, and so to pursue our good intentions with the force of good feeling. This may be done by [concentrating the will unswervingly upon it, and keeping the resolution to be continually kind.

Kindness greatly multiplies our enjoyments, as one thereby not only enjoys his own pleasures, but those of others, and so is practically rich, since what belongs to all is also his ; for in the only sense that one can f really have anything — in enjoying it — he has air things ; whereas, one who can enjoy only what is his own is poor, as no man's possessions are alone enough for happiness.

Kindness in itself is also a pleasurable feeling. We can not love others without being ourselves happy, it being the nature of love to be happy. For, though love is of others, the feeling is in us, so that while we think of them we enjoy the feeling ourselves ; as the flame in the lantern, which lights the outside, also, at the same time, heats the lantern.

2— LOVE.

Kindness is nearly synonymous with love, so that love, in its widest sense, has already been discussed. But kindness takes many forms, like water, which may be snow, or dew, or clouds. Under love we speak specially of warmth of feeling for others. Kindness may be cold or hot ; it may take on the form of tenderness or concern; it may show itself as sweetness, politeness or charity ; but when it is on fire we call it love.

Love, being thus of many varieties and degrees, can appear as an enthusiastic sympathy for any class — for parents, brothers, sisters, children, friends, lovers, or for the world. The loving nature has a warm feeling for whoever is thought about, and good will may be as extensive as thought. For love is the most perfect sympathy with man, and though we may love special ones when we think of them, we should love all when all are contemplated. As the sun warms whatever it shines on, we should send out our warmth of feeling to all of whom we think, making compassion ever accompany attention.

For, we need no more be indifferent to any than hate them, and we would not, if we understood their thoughts and feelings, which would, instead, call for sympathy. The demands for self are not sufficient to exclude thought for the race. Men have always

LOVE. 27

time to love, which is the only duty that goes to all, and which Christ characterized as all duty. The spirit of love is to be always in a condition to feel warmly toward others, so that when they are brought to our attention our affections will embrace them. Action, moreover, should flow from love as its most general source, and be the expression of a desire to do good to somebody — family, friends, country or the world — which embraces nearly all the virtues.

Everybody, then, should love, and in that love should not confine himself to one person or one kind of love. One can, without much virtue, love a lover, or attractive person of the opposite sex, but if love go no farther, it is only passion. He should love with warmth his relatives, friends, country and, if he has a soul great enough, the world. The true lover is a lover of many. One can not love one well who loves one only, his affections not having exercise enough to be strong or pure. We should love especially those who need our love, and not merely those who can command it.

If one has no great love for men, or concern for their welfare, he should cultivate it by thinking of them more, and understanding them better. For one can not know another well without loving him. The word " acquaintance " is nearly synonymous with " friend." All we know we are interested in, and the more intimate we become the more friendly we are. Cynics and Pessimists, who love least, are mostly recluses, who see men through reports, instead of face to face. Nobcdy can be unkind to one whom he well knows, most vices being, as Plato says, the result of ignorance.

It is our duty, therefore, to know men well enough to love them. After we thoroughly love a few, we find ourselves gradually loving all, or enlarging our interest in mankind ; for nothing grows faster than love, or spreads wider, its exercise driving out hate and breaking down barriers of separation. Love will generally keep pace with knowledge, being a harmony with nature as much as is truth.

Love, moreover, has its own enjoyment, like kindness generally. While it does most for others, it self -enjoys. Its feeling is the pleasantest in our nature, and the greatest good known. It goes farthest to make happiness, and is itself the most unmixed happiness ; for love can not coexist with misery, but expels pain as it does hate. It is synonymous with "feeling good," and is the most lasting and least wearing of pleasures. Enjoyment in eating can be had but three times a day, and then but a little while. The pleasures of drunkenness are only occasional, and are followed by pain, like the pleasures contained in all the vices. Love's pleasures, however, are intense

SYMPATHY. 29

without being exhausting, and reach from childhood to age. Endless in variety, too, they can coexist without jealousy or mutual limitation. For love of wife, child, brother, friend, countryman, race and animals can all be felt at once.

To build up a loving nature, therefore, is a sure way to happiness, as well as to virtue, as one then carries most of the conditions of happiness with him. Others are worth more to him if he loves, and he is worth more to himself. He is also more apt to be loved, since a loving nature, expressing itself in the face and conduct, is pleasing to others, so that love is reflected back as love.

3.— SYMPATHY.

Sympathy is another synonym for kindness, covering nearly the same ground. We use it here specially to emphasize that feature of kindness which enters into others' feelings and enjoys or suffers their states, rejoicing with the happy and suffering with the sad, as if one's feelings were not all in himself, but his nerves ran outside of him to report back to his heart the pains and pleasures of others.

Sympathy is sensitiveness to the consciousness that is in the world, or a flowing of our souls into all life, by which a oneness of feeling is realized. It takes on others' moods, feels the pleasures and pains in others'

bodies, makes us larger than ourselves — a part of humanity — and, reminding us that we are not, as individuals, entirely separate, renders us sensitive, as well as conscious, of the oneness of the race.

A sympathetic man can not see another smile without smiling, the expressions of the face being catching. One's readiness to follow 'others' feelings, and be at one with them, is the great reconciler of the race. There is a natural tendency in men to feel together, as well to co-operate together, feeling uniting them as much as opinion divides them; so that the charities make men brothers when their differences would make them enemies. Forijt is easier to make one of your feeling than of your mind, more being persuaded by sentiment than by argument. A leader has but to show feeling to have followers, a heart disclosed causing other hearts to cluster about it.

It is of the first importance, then, to have a lively sense for others, and to enter strongly into their feelings. Did we thoroughly feel with men we should rarely be displeased with them, as contact with feelings begets approval, instead of antagonism. Two minds coming together as naturally love as two electric currents make light, and to enter into close relations with other minds is the greatest guarantee of morality, as of love.

Learn, then, to live in others, feeling as they do,

SYMPATHY. 31

and so to possess their means of happiness as well as your own. One who carries others' burdens carries also their pleasures, and gets strength enough from their joys not to feel grievously their misfortunes. The sympathetic man takes to others something to make pleasure for himself, for, in rejoicing with them, and for them, the joy, which is in himself, is pleasure to him, notwithstanding the object of it is without. To enjoy others enlarges the sphere of one's enjoyment, carrying him out over more life, and making more of the world sensitive to him. ^A great man has thus great pleasures, as well as great thoughts, sympathy being the principal source of the enlargement of \ pleasure.

He who feels most takes most of nature up into himself, and thus enlarges himself by additions from the outside world. One is as large as the space which his sympathy covers, appropriating as much as he loves.^ Where indifference or hate commences his limitations begin, and beyond that he is not.

Sympathy, moreover, begets sympathy, starting its kind wherever it goes. We naturally return love for love, as the mirror reflects light, so that the sympathetic ones are the loved ones. To awaken an interest you must show an interest. Love, like a telegraphic current, flows two ways. Sympathy, going in circles, alights wherever there is something sympathetic to conduct it; so that it is important for morals, as for happiness, to be in the current of others' feelings, and feel along with the race.

4. -UNSELFISHNESS.

Sympathy runs naturally into unselfishness, which is but another synonym for kindness. It is the nature of all love to be self -forgetful, and under this negative form we shall consider it.

Unselfishness does not consist in neglecting self, but in thinking much of others, and, though to give attention to others is, to that extent, to withdraw it from self, this alone is not the virtue meant, but may be simply inconsiderateness. The spirit of unselfishness is to be ever ready to consider others and benefit them without thought of self.

Unselfishness is not necessarily self-sacrifice, but, as it is to our advantage to be unselfish, the unselfish man enjoys his own life more than does fhe selfish one. For, to be quick to think of others, and to seek their relief before we have time to think of self, is not only a great virtue, but great delight.

With this self-unconsciousness one finds it easier to relieve another than to see him suffer. Instead of shutting himself up to appetite or avarice, and deeming it enjoyment, he wants to get out of himself to do for others. He who lives in and for himself is like

UNSELFISHNESS. 33

one dwelling in a tomb, who had better, for that purpose, be dead. All life seeks something external, and the greatest lives extend farthest from self, and take in most of the world. ^

In society, especially, should one not think of self, thus appropriating feelings due to others for his own advantage. Some can hardly think of self without thinking of others, just as some can hardly think of others without thinking of self. A generous man is more unselfish in his own business than a selfish one is in helping others. When doing our duty to others we should not regret it as wasted time, but do it as eagerly as when working for self. We owe love to our disinterested deeds, and should perform our duties to others as pleasures.

To grudge what is not for self is to suffer others' pleasures, instead of enjoy them, and so to reverse the order of virtue. For, as the unselfish man is the happiest of men, because he enjoys others' joys, the selfish man is the unhappiest, because he suffers from so many things that are not his own. Envying others for what they have is one form of suffering their enjoyments, instead of enjoying them. The envious man suffers from a disease which he has not. He -not only takes on the ills of life, but makes torments out of the pleasures. Since few of the many things in the world are ours, it is important to learn to enjoy what is others', and not to suffer from all else but our own.

While our feeling is all in us, so that we alone enjoy it, the selfishness consists in thinking of our own enjoyment at such times, and not of the person calling out the feeling. "While all love is a feeling in us, it is accompanied by thoughts of another (the one loved). And while this feeling is enjoyable in the person having it, Jhe who loves for this pleasurable sensation in himself, and not for the object thought of, is selfish in his love, which is then but lust. He loves himself, instead of the other, enjoying the tickling sensation felt in his body when thinking of an admired object, which is about as meritorious as the pleasure of being drunk.

In all forms of benevolence we may do good to others unselfishly or selfishly. We may relieve the poor and at the same time think lovingly of them, or relieve them and think of some return in reputation, gratitude, or relief from importunity. The unselfish man wants no compensation for his beneficence, finding satisfaction enough for his deeds in the happiness of the ones benefited.

SPECIAL LOVES. 35

II. Special Loyes

1.— FAMILY LOVE.

We have thus far spoken of love in general. There are also special loves, or love for particular persons, according to their relation to us. While we can love all men with that general feeling of kindness or sympathy which should go out to the race, and which we may call humanity, we must love those more* with whom we come more in contact, whose merits, wants? and sufferings we specially know. We thus love parents, brothers, sisters, and other relatives; also neighbors, friends, and countrymen. We have a different kind of love for different classes and characters — for the good, the congenial, the benefactors, the suffering, the poor, and the absent.

This is not necessarily selfish love. Though the loved ones are nearer us in some respects, the love may be just as generous as the love for the remote. We can love only what is brought to our attention, and those mentioned are simply better known to us, or more in our minds. Members of our family are with us daily, and for most of our lives ; our intercourse with them is intimate ; we know their feelings and wants, and we have seen many of their acts of love. We love them more, therefore, because we see in them more to love, and we love them oftener because we oftener think of them. "We also return their love, or love them out of gratitude ; for among the many causes of love is goodness, and no goodness is better known than goodness to us.

Thus we have special reasons and opportunities to love parents. Our life is due to them; they have cared for us through the years when we could not care for ourselves — usually a third of life ; they are the first known to us, and the first whose love we know; our interests are united, and, being of one flesh, we consider ourselves in great part one. Hence parents and children specially love each other, which love becomes the strength of family and the source of further enjoyments.

The noblest persons think most highly of parents, deeming their fathers the noblest of men and their mothers the tenderest of women — a judgment not necessarily prejudiced, since children know their parents better than they know others, and better than others know them, so that they see more good in them. If others are nobler, these are yet noble enough for all their appreciation, so that more nobility could hardly call out more.

One seldom has occasion to consider whether his parents have faults, because he is never done appreciating their virtues, so that the time does not come

FAMILY LOVE. 37

for criticism. If one does not think highly of his parents, it is not because they are unworthy, but because he is, few characters being so defective as an ungrateful or undutiful child. One who does not love his parents can not well take on any virtue, there being a disorder in his faculties themselves; whereas one who, with constancy, is true to his parents, always inspires hope for the other virtues.

The love of brothers and sisters is much the same as the love of parent and child. Growing up around the family hearth, it is the offspring of intimate association and oneness of blood and interest. This family-loving is the training-school for world- loving in after years, the family being the world in general for people in early life, where all the virtues are started in embryo.

Commencing with love of parents, brothers and sisters, one naturally extends his love to relatives more remote, from the same cause. They are similarly connected by blood, and similarly associated with him in early life, though in varying degrees of intimacy. We love all near relatives, and especially those who are much with us — uncles, aunts, cousins, grand-children, etc. — love being naturally the result of association as of thought.

Our family, however, soon shades off into Strangers; blood becomes thin, and after a few degrees are passed we drop them as relatives, to love them as neighbors, friends, or simply as part of mankind. We are all in some degree related, but the ties are too numerous to follow, with either our feeling or thought, except for a few degrees.

2.— FRIENDSHIP.

Among those not related to us, or only remotely so, we select congenial characters for friends; although friendship is often the result of accidental association. We have said that two persons can hardly know each other intimately without loving; and, since every person must know some, everybody has some friends. Persons thrown much together, besides knowing each other well, and mutually sympathizing, have much in common. They engage, like brothers and sisters, in the same sports, have the same acquaintances, know one another's secrets, take one another's advice, and in many other ways identify their life. Friendship is an artificial relationship, where circumstances make brothers of people. We like to be with those who appreciate us, and understand us, to whom we can confide and apply for help, and who are interested in what we are interested. And these we often find outside of our relatives. Our associates in business, our neigh-

SEXUAL LOVE. 39

bors, and those having like tastes usually make up this class, so that a special love springs up between them and us.

This is not in derogation of any other love; for, as we have said, love does not diminish by being divided, but strengthens with its exercise toward many ; so that we can love our family more by having others to love. Nor is friendship necessarily selfish, since it is a love simply for those who are most known, and shuts out the love of no others. For he who loves special ones most, loves the world most.

3.— SEXUAL LOVE.

The most intense of the special loves is the love between the sexes, which, beginning in courtship, ripens in conjugal love.

So prominent is this affection that it is preeminently known as love ; so that to many the word love suggests no other meaning. All-absorbing, it is the greatest motive in life, feeding the ambition of youth and moulding its ideals. Starting most fancies, it is the subject of nearly all romances, plays and poems. It does most to sweeten life, and, if perverted, does most to embitter it.

In this affection one most completely lives in another's life, losing himself in her welfare and making common cause with her. It is the intensest of all feelings, and the most lasting, giving the greatest happi-, ness and the most continuous happiness. Strengthening men for the virtues to which it exalts them, it is the affection which every one should feel at least once in life, if only to know the full range of virtue. In idealizing its object one sees how great human worth may be, and tends toward it.

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