Moral science; or, The philosophy of obligation

Preface

In 1869 the author published his work on Moral Philosophy which has been in use until the present time in various Colleges and other Schools east and west. The author's confidence in the doctrines set forth in the book has not diminished with the lapse of time, but in the general progress of ethical thought and discussion, the appearance of new ideas or theories, and the disappearance of some of the older statements, a revision of the work has become necessary.

The principal changes introduced will be found in connection with the discussion of theories, and are intended to adjust the discussion to the present condition of ethical thought. Changes in other parts are verbal or formal rather than essential. The use of the term Science in place of Philosophy, in the title, has no special significance. It is simply a conformity to prevailing usage.

It has not seemed desirable to enlarge the book by the introduction of treatises on the Will and the Sensibility. Of course no view of obligation can be presented which does not assume some position in reference to the essential qualities of personality, and the conditions and limits of personal responsibility. Ethics must have its basis in a

PREFACE.

system of psychology ; and the study of Ethics naturally follows the study of the essential elements of human nature. Such is the ordinary arrangement in our colleges and schools of learning. This treatise is adjusted to such an order of study. The reader or student will find no difficulty in supplying the underlying philosophical principles assumed in the treatise.

The system here presented is developed from natural and rational facts and principles ; but it will be found to be in harmony with the teaching of the Scriptures, and it is essentially the system of Christian Ethics. But references to the Scriptures have not been made for the sake of establishing by the authority of Revelation the leading facts and principles of obligation. The Scriptures are a great storehouse of philosophical and ethical truth which no student or thinker can afford to overlook.

Oberlin College, December, 1892.

Chapter I

Introductory Definitions. — Divisions of the science — Topics treated of — Obligation a simple idea — Undefinable — Attempted definitions — A moral being or person — Essential attributes — Intellect — Sensibility — Free-will — A moral act — The moral element, where found — Different forms of voluntary action — More exact location of the moral element — Character and intention — Two kinds of moral action 13-19

Chapter II

Right or Virtuous Action. — The true good — Absolute and relative good — Illustrations of the two — Mere animal life valuable — The summum bonum — No comparison of the two forms of good — Happiness — Obligation, how perceived — Regard to our own good — Of virtue as good — Of benevolence as virtue — Benevolence in consciousness 20-28

Chapter III

Wrong or Sinful Action. — Its nature — Its motive — Its form, how determined — Gratification of desire not sin — Sin subordinates reason — No rational end in sin — Sin not a choice of evil — Sin not selfishness — Impossibility of making one's own good the supreme end — Sin in consciousness — Self -gratification not the intelligent end — Sin subjection to impulse, or carnal-mindedness — Desires and passions not sinful — Their uses 2 9 - 37

Chapter IV

Of the Particular Virtues. — Benevolence the root — Constitutes right character — Its relation to the particular virtues, and to right acts — Love — Gratitude — Justice not an independent

CONTENTS.

virtue — Mercy not opposed to justice — Self-denial — Veracity — » Humility — Faith — Obedience — The teaching of Scripture — Misapprehensions of benevolence — Interdependence of the virtues 38-47

Chapter V

Of Particular Vices. — Their common element — Their relation to sinful character — Their origin — Sensuality — Ambition — Avarice — Pride and vanity — Selfishness — The desire not sinful — Malevolent impulses — Natural or impulsive goodness — Two characters possible — Apparent goodness — Right moral judgments — Kindly affections — Devotional feelings — Impulsive virtues, their relation to true virtue — Imitative goodness — Deficiency exhibited — Are the impulsive virtues sinful? — Their utility 48-57

Chapter VI

Additional Remarks and Inferences. — Universality of the law of benevolence — Works of supererogation impossible — Morality personal, not transferable — Ambiguity of the term character — The seat of moral depravity — Total moral depravity — The moral change required — Relation of emotion to the moral state — Moral character in consciousness — Moral consistency 58-63

Chapter VII

Right and Wrong — Duty, Known and Unknown — Need of a Revelation. — Ambiguity of the terms right and wrong

— Absolute right and wrong — Relative right and wrong — Objective and subjective right and wrong — Right and wrong per se — The expedient and the right — Our knowledge of the right

— End and means — Doing evil that good may come — Least of two evils — Known and unknown duty — Need of revelation to furnish motive and to indicate objective duty 64-72

Chapter VIII

Conscience — Is it a Guide? — Definition and office — Impulse of conscience — Approval and condemnation — /Esthetic conscience

— Conscience as a guide — Intervention of judgment — Different views — Whately and Alexander — Sins of ignorance — Rational conscience the guide, not the emotional, nor the aesthetic — Conscientiousness — Paul — Honesty — Sincerity — Conscience educated, enlightened, perverted — Feeling of obligation 73~82

CONTENTS.

Chapter IX

Unity or Simplicity of Moral Action. — Virtue and sin contradictory — Their coexistence impossible — Different hypotheses to explain their coexistence — Imperfect powers — From the fall — From past sin — Right intention with wrong thoughts and feelings — Mixed motives — Partial regard for good — Lack of intensity — Right ultimate choice and wrong acts — The teaching of the Scriptures — Practical teaching — N. W. Taylor — Objections and answers — Prevailing consciousness — Negative testimony — No room for improvement — Degrees of goodness — Degrees of sinfulness — Temptation and guilt — Knowledge of past sinfulness — General bearing of the doctrine 83-98

Chapter X

Theories of Obligation. — The question — Different answers — Reason for the difference — Socrates and Plato — Aristotle — Doctrine of the Stoics — Of the Epicureans — Modern views — Paley — Taylor — Difficulties — Psychological error — No freedom — Misrepresents benevolence — Mistakes the motive — Makes no difference between the good and the bad — Does not accord with Scripture — Utilitarianism — Misapplication of the term — Needed discrimination — "Holy happiness" — Kind of happiness to be sought — Spencer's " Ethics " 99-H3

Chapter XI

Theories of Obligation. — Of right as ultimate — Of obligation as originating in the will of God — Difficulties — Reason not ultimate — Obligation known intuitively — ; No character in God — Relativity of morality — Unscriptural — Founded in the reason or nature of God — Of spiritual worthiness as ultimate — Hickok's view — Janet's — Seelye's — Personal perfection not the true aim The term good — Ambiguous use — Virtue as ultimate — Complacency not virtue — Virtue a quality of choice, not its object — Of abstract right as ultimate — Axiom of the theory — Does not explain the virtues — Gives no unity to virtue — Rightness not the final motive — Maxim of the theory — Acting from principle — Rightness not ultimate — Incidental advantages of the theory of benevolence 1 14-129

CONTENTS.

PART II.— PRACTICAL ETHICS. Preliminary Remarks 130-131

FIRST DIVISION.

Chapter I

Government — Its Nature and Foundation. — Definitions — Relation of sanctions to government — Object of government — Its right to exist — The right to govern — Duty to govern — Designation of the ruler — Form of government — Extent of authority — Not dependent on desire of the governed 132-135

Chapter II

The Divine Government. — Its constitution — Why God assumes the government — The divine law — How known to men — Revealed law — Authority of examples — The Saviour's example — Genuine virtue required — Personality of the law — Application to communities — Dealing with nations — National sins . . 136-143

Chapter III

Penalties under the Divine Government. — Nature of penalty — Effects of penalty — Relation of penalty to desert — True reason of penalty — Its extent — Discipline and penalty — Necessity of penalty in the divine government — Degree and duration — Guilt everlasting — Natural consequences not penalty — Physical law and penalty — Remorse and penalty — Providential consequences 144-153

Chapter IV

Civil Government. — Its foundation — Right to govern — The form of government — A legitimate government — A tyranny — Constitutions — Not a social compact — Right and duty of voting — The ruler a servant — Doctrine of instruction — Right of the majority — Principle of representation — The will of the governed a controlling element — General tendency to democracy — Relation of law to righteousness — Mistakes 154-163

CONTENTS.

Chapter V

Penalties in Civil Government. — Uses of penalties — Dangerous tendency — Capital punishment — Reasons for it — Objections , . 164-171

Chapter VI

Limits of Obedience to Civil Government. — Government subordinate — The higher law applied to a democratic state — No general formula — Laws, just, indifferent, unjust — Two possible courses — Duty of a subordinate magistrate — Right of revolution — Apprehended tendency — Errors in two directions 172-181

Chapter VII

The Relations of Nations to Each Other. — Obligation of nations limited — Laws of nations — Duty to respect each other's sovereignty — Duty in case of rebellion — In treaties — In commercial intercourse — Duty of self-preservation — The rightfulness of war — In case of resistance at home — In case of aggression from without — In defense of the weak — In suppression of outrage — In justifiable revolution — Objections — The true aim in war — Duties in war 182-192

Chapter VIII

Family Government. — Has a natural foundation — Limited in its subjects — Wide in its application to interests — Mode of constitution — Question of headship — A relation of confidence — To be entered upon with deliberation — Maintained with care — A natural sphere for each — Relations of the family to the state and to society 193-199

Chapter IX

Duties of Parent and Child — of Teacher and Pupil. — Chief work of the family — Place of parental affection — Leading duty of the parent — Duty of obedience and its natural termination — Claim of the child — Limit of obedience — Duty in maturity toward dependent parents — The teacher's authority — Its extent — Need of closer definition — The pupil's duty — Unnatural antagonism — Mutual regard — Unfavorable tendencies — Extreme individualism — Independence of opinion 200-209

IO CONTENTS.

SECOND DIVISION.

PERSONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

Chapter I

General Principles. — Basis of rights — The comprehensive right — Inalienable rights — Basis of duties — Correlation of rights and duties — Positive and negative precepts — Subjects of rights and duties — The rights of brutes — Superior right of rational beings . . . . . 210-215

Chapter II

Rights — Life. — Basis of the right — Guilt of murder — Malice and hatred — Manslaughter — Related crimes — Right of self-preservation limited — Self-defense — Protection of property — Carrying weapons — Dueling — Objections to self-defense — Euthanasia 216-222

Chapter III

Rights — Liberty. — Definition and extent — Basis of the right — Misapprehension of its origin — Application to different powers — Principle of toleration — Freedom of the press — Free discussion — Intervention of government in worship and education — Subjective limitations — Respect to the consciences of others — Use of definite rules — Violations of liberty — Its defense 223-231

Chapter IV

Rights — Reputation. — The interest involved — How a good — The precept — Temptations to its violation — Duty of exposing wrong — Slander in truth-telling 232-236

Chapter V

Rights — Property. — Origin of the right — The precept — Property, how acquired — Transferable — Right of discovery — Effect of long possession — Things not to be appropriated — Animals made property, human beings not — Limitations of the right — Law of exchange — Duty of the vender — Standard of value —

CONTENTS.

Managing the market — Cicero's example — Law of wages — Woman's wages — Work that is above wages — Violations of the right of property — Bankrupt laws — Prevalence of fraud upon the • government — Mischief of repudiation — Immorality of gambling — Conflict of labor and capital 237-248

Chapter VI

Duties — Piety. — Origin of duties — Nature of piety — Its relation to religion — Morality and religion — Morality attained by religion — Opposite of piety — Duty of worship — Possibility of prayer — Speculative objections — Social and public prayer — The Sabbath — Change of day — Obligation permanent — Proper observance — Duty of promoting religion 249-258

CHAPTER VII. Duties — Philanthropy — Patriotism. — Nature of philanthropy

— Its relation to religion — Its scope — Proper test — Misanthropy — Patriotism as a virtue — Required by benevolence — Things opposed to patriotism 259-264

Chapter VIII

Duties — Self-Culture. — Its nature and reasons — Extends to all the faculties — Spiritual culture — Its relation to virtuous character

— Intellectual culture — Things to be held subordinate — Kind of knowledge to be sought — Culture of the sensibility — Gives power

— Relation to moral character — Control indirect — Associations

— Books — Perfection of character. 265-272

Chapter IX

Duties — Self-Culture. — ^Esthetic — Its expensiveness — Elevating tendency — Increases power — False refinement — Fastidiousness — The cultivated lady — Culture, how attained — Degree of attention proper — Other demands to be considered — Physical culture a duty — Health — Manual skill — Manners and habits — Predominance of the soul. 273-283

Chapter X

Duties — Usefulness. — The true aim — The natural impulse — Proper occupation — Notoriety not usefulness — Wealth and its

12 CONTEXTS.

uses — Special obligation of the rich — Social influence — Difficulties and duties — Special duties of the young — The great want 284-293

CHAPTER XL

Duties — Fidelity. — Faithfulness in contracts — Binding force — Threats and promises — In what sense binding — When null — Conditions — Express and implied contracts — Effect of the oath — Marriage engagements 294-302

Chapter XII

Duties — Veracity. — Its nature and obligation — Significance of the oath — Its rightfulness — Profanity — Violations of veracity — Limits of the obligation — Words and gestures — Legal practice — Instinct of veracity 303-310

Chapter XIII

Duties — Chastity. — Nature of the duty — Effect and criminality of unchastity — Injustice of society — Marriage provided for — Its nature and conditions — Moral law of divorce — Civil law — Incest — Concluding remarks 31 1-3 18

MORAL SCIENCE.

PART I -THEORETICAL.

Chapter I. Introductory Definitions And Remarks

MORAL SCIENCE is the science of obligation or duty. It states and analyzes the facts connected with obligation, and determines principles of action and rules Definitions of duty. More particularly, the subjects of and topics, which it treats are moral beings, moral action, moral law, moral government, and personal rights and duties. It is often called the science of ethics, and is divided into two parts, theoretical and practical. Theoretical ethics presents the principles of the science, while practical ethics applies those principles and solves particular problems of duty. The treatment of special cases is sometimes called casuistry.

Obligation, the theme of ethical philosophy, admits of no definition, except by a synonym. The idea conveyed by the term is a simple one, incapable of analy- obligation sis. Its import is manifest to every rational notdefinable - being, given immediately in his own thought. It cannot be imparted from one to another ; and every attempt at

MORAL SCIENCE.

definition or elucidation proves abortive. Thus, Paley says, "Obligation is nothing more than an inducement of sufficient strength, and resulting in some way from the command of another;" and N. W. Taylor, "Moral obligation is the binding influence of that necessity which a moral being is under of performing that action which is decisively proved to be the best action." All such definitions tend to bewilder. The thought in every rational soul is clear and unequivocal ; and its existence is proved in the universal use and apprehension of such terms as ought, duty, right, and wrong. Not so much the nature of obligation, as the grounds and conditions of its existence and our apprehension of it, is the proper subject of inquiry.

A moral being is a being to whom obligation pertains, of whom it can be said, he ought or ought not ; who a moral being affirms of himself, I ought or ought not. Such or person. a b e j n g we ca \\ a person. He differs from all other beings, not merely in the degree of his intelligence, but in the kind of intelligence with which he is endowed. Possessing some faculties and susceptibilities in common with beings of a lower order, in others he is peculiar, and is thus separated from them by a line which they can never pass.

The attributes essential to moral agency are commonly and properly designated as intellect, sensibility, and free- Essentiai will. The intellect is the general faculty of

attributes: . . ... . - ,

intellect. perceiving and knowing, and embraces the faculties of sense, memory, imagination, judgment, and reason. The perception of the true end of life, and thence of obligation, is an intellectual act ; and thus intellect is essential to moral agency or personality.

Sensibility is the susceptibility of pleasure and pain, of

DEFINITIONS AND REMARKS.

natural good and evil. Such a susceptibility is the only conceivable channel of the idea of good and evil ; and this idea is the necessary antecedent of that sensibility of obligation, and hence of right and wrong. necessary. Thus, every moral being must be a sentient being ; only on this condition can he be a subject of obligation. It might be added that obligation terminates on sentient beings, or is due only to beings susceptible of natural good and evil. Hence, if there were no sentient life, obligation would lack both subject and object. In a world destitute of sensibility, whatever intelligence there might be, no obligation or thought of obligation could ever arise.

Free-will, or the voluntary faculty, as involved in moral action, is the power of choosing or refusing the true end of life, as presented by the intelligence. The Free-wm possession of this faculty is implied in the very necessary, idea of obligation. To affirm obligation of a being destitute of the faculty of free action is impossible in the nature of the case. Power for any act, in the sense of ability to do or not to do, is a self-evident condition of obligation to that act. Ability to do, in its proper sense, carries with it the ability not to do; and thus free-will is an essential attribute of personality. It may be spoken of as the characteristic attribute, because obligation always accompanies it.

A moral act is an act to which obligation pertains, of which we affirm that it ought or ought not to be done. The performance of such an act involves good a moral act—

• hi • , • , 1 . approved or

or ill desert, praiseworthiness or blameworthi- disapproved, ness. The doer is approved or disapproved. This judgment is wholly peculiar, incapable of analysis, not resolvable into a judgment of wisdom or unwisdom, of utility or inutility, of aesthetic propriety or impropriety. It is a moral approval or disapproval, a judgment perfectly apprehended by every moral being.

Where is found the moral element? Every moral act implies the activity of the three departments of the mind, Moral eie- involving thought, feeling, and willing, and is

ment, where ,

found? oiten attended by outward or corporeal action.

Does moral responsibility attach equally to each of these exercises, or to one alone ? Where resides the element of morality ?

Not in the outward action. The muscular movement is connected with the action of the mind by a law of neces- Not in the sity, and is inevitable when the conditions are

outward

action. supplied. We do not know the character of

an act from the outward manifestation. It is but an index of the internal state, often ambiguous ; and the moral character is the same with the same mental action, whether the outward action follows or not.

Not in the movement of the intelligence ; because that movement is governed by necessity. Our conceptions and Not in the judgments are necessarily what they are. No mteihgence. praiseworthiness or blameworthiness accrues to the agent directly from the action of the intelligence. A judgment or conception may be adequate or inadequate, correct or incorrect, and in this view right or wrong ; but it is not an object of moral approbation or disapprobation. We praise or blame the agent for the moral disposition which leads to the just or unjust conception or judgment. For the disposition, we hold him responsible directly ; for the action of the intelligence, only indirectly.

Nor is the moral element found in the movement of the sensibility. That movement is necessary. The emotions result from their exciting causes. With given conditions they must be as they are. They are pleasant or painful, de-

DEFINITIONS AND REMARKS.

sirable or undesirable ; but in themselves not praiseworthy or blameworthy. We morally approve or disapprove of the disposition or conduct which produces or Not in the fosters particular emotions, and regard the sensibility, emotion as an index, more or less sure, of moral character.

The element of morality is found in the action of the will alone. Here is free, responsible action. Whatever motive or inducement to voluntary action may Found in

. voluntary

exist, the agent himself is the responsible action, cause of the action, and hence is properly approved or disapproved, according to the nature of that action. To this, and to this only, does obligation directly attach ; when the voluntary action is wholly such as it ought to be, all present obligation is met. This is a necessary, intuitive judgment, and must be accepted as an axiom in morals. Of its truthfulness there can be no doubt in any mind, except such doubt as may result from obscurity of thought or expression. A moral agent may be held responsible indirectly for thoughts, and feelings, and external actions, because these are more or less modified or controlled by the will ; but all this responsibility attaches directly to the voluntary action. If thought, or feeling, or external action be ever spoken of as involving moral character, it is because it is regarded as voluntary. Upon this point there is practical agreement among men : the differences, if they exist, are speculative and theoretical.

But voluntary action exists in different forms. Does the element of morality attach directly to all these forms? The act of the student in attending a recita- Different

1 1 • 1 nn forms of vol-

tion is voluntary— hence is a moral act. \\ here untary action, in this process of voluntary action do we find the moral character? Nearest to our observation and most superficial is the volition, or series of volitions, which causes the i8

MORAL SCIENCE.

outward act of coming; but these volitions do not reveal character, because they do not involve it. The good and volitions and the bad alike put forth these volitions. Back

executive .

purposes. of these volitions we find a more general purpose, from which the volitions spring — the purpose to secure an education, or still further back, the purpose to gain influence and power, to which education is a means. But in these more general purposes, although voluntary states, we find no revelation of moral character. The good and the bad alike cherish the same general purposes, and pursue them by the same means — sit side by side in the same class. Inquiring still further, we find in one a voluntary choice of the proper end or object of life, that end which the intelligence approves. His other purposes and voliuitimate tions are all subordinate to this ultimate choice, choice. anc | are execu tive of it. Another does not ac-

cept this end of life, but freely declines it. Some other scheme, some impulse of desire or passion, occupies him, and with reference to this unworthy end he forms his purposes, and puts forth his volitions. Here we have the key Exact place to the character of the action and of the agent ;

of the moral . , . .

element. and in this ultimate choice of the right end, or refusal to choose it, which is still a choice, we necessarily locate the moral element. In this respect the two agents and their actions morally differ ; while in their subordinate purposes, and executive volitions, and outward actions, they may be alike. One conforms to obligation, the other does not.

The general conviction that the moral element of action is here found is indicated in the popular expression that character as tne character of an act depends upon the intention. intention. The expression is true of the ultimate intention — the voluntary attitude in reference to the rational end of life. It is not true of any subordinate pur-

DEFINITIONS AND REMARKS.

*9 pose or intention, or of any action which is executive of a more remote choice. The character does not depend, in the case supposed, upon the intention to gain an education, or to secure influence and power, but upon the choice of the end which these are to subserve. All subordinate or executive action derives its character from this choice, and is made necessary by the choice, in the sense that, the convictions of the intelligence remaining the same, the executive action must be as it is while the ultimate choice remains. The young man who proposes to obtain an education to serve God and his fellow-men, pursues his course because he believes it the proper mode of accomplishing his end. While he believes this, he cannot turn aside from his course without abandoning his ultimate end. If he enters into business while he believes that a course of study is the proper means, he abandons his end. This he Executive is always free to do, and hence executive action actlon free - is properly free action ; but its morality is wholly dependent upon the fundamental choice. Hence obligation, strictly speaking, attaches only to this ultimate choice — action in reference to that end of life which the intelligence approves, that predominant state of the will which determines all other action. When this is right, the action is right, the character is right, so far as pertains to morality.

Two kinds of moral action, and only two, are possible. The agent may accept the right end of life, and thus his action become right, virtuous; or he may reject that Two posi _ right end, and thus his action become wrong, tlon3 only> sinful. Xo neutral position is possible to a rational being, because, when the right end is proposed to his intelligence, he must accept or not accept ; and not to accept is to reject. Moral freedom lies in the ability to accept or to reject this end — an ability which is essential to moral agency.

Chapter II. Right Action Or Virtue — Good

RIGHT or virtuous action is the action which we morally approve, and for which we pronounce the agent praiseworthy. It consists in the choice of the right end of life, that end which the intelligence approves. To be virtuous is to be reasonable. It is to accept and treat as good and valuable what the intelligence presents as good. The virtuous man is the reasonable man, the man that follows his perceptions and convictions. It is in the light of these perceptions that obligation arises, and in following them obligation is met.

But what is the good which the intelligence recognizes, and in the presence of which obligation is seen — that good The true which every moral being holds himself bound goocL to respect? What does the reason present as

truly valuable ? This is a psychological question, yet every theory of morals involves an answer to it, expressed or implied.

Absolute good, that which is valuable in itself and for itself, is found only in connection with being — sentient Absolute being — that is, being endowed with sensibilgood ' ity. It consists in the satisfaction of that sen-

sibility — satisfaction in every form in which it can exist. Fullness of satisfaction in the case of any sentient being is completeness of good in his case. It is well-being, or happiness, or blessedness — all words of the same general

RIGHT ACTION OR VIRTUE — GOOD.

import. The capacity for such satisfaction or good gives to a being its absolute worth and importance ; and in the experience of such satisfaction is absolute good, or ultimate and final value. In a state of dissatisfaction, or of pain and misery, is found absolute and ultimate evil — that which is evil in itself and on its own account. Absolute good is no abstraction or mere conception ; it is an actual experience or state of sentient being. It is valuable for what it is in itself, and is necessarily regarded by every rational being as having intrinsic worth.