Ethics

Preface

The following work, now respectfully offered to the Public, is an elementary treatise on ethics or moral philosophy. It contains only those essential and salient principles concerned in man's moral action, a clear knowledge of which was .believed to be important for students of philosophy. When executing this design it was judged best to omit many things that would be appropriate in a treatise whose aim was more comprehensive; and, for the sake of brevity, even to condense the matter actually introduced.

It is the end of philosophy to show truth as coming from its first, most absolute, and most universal principles ; and it is for ethics to explain the intrinsic and essential constituents of moral action in man, as naturally known to human reason. Among the subjects pertaining to ethics herein discussed, it was deemed expedient, in a work primarily intended for use where all citizens have some voice in political affairs, to examine the nature, properties, and scope of civil law and authority, at as great length as the limits of such a book could becomingly allow.

Practical instruction on particular matters of positive duty is the special office of the many excellent didactic and doctrinal writings that are composed for general use among the

IV PREFACE.

people ; ethics has for its proper aim to furnish demonstrative reasons to prove the truth and justice of the chief, fundamental principles from which all the more special rules of natural rectitude or morality are deduced. By not sufficiently or correctly discriminating between the wholly distinct ends of the ethical treatise, and the Christian catechism, one might produce a book, and name it philosophy, which, in reality, would justly merit the censure of being, "not philosophy, but theology not proved." Truth supernaturally taught, and all laws and duties based on it, have Divine revelation for the foundation of their certainty ; but the arguments of philosophy are discovered by the natural light of reason. Yet, truth that is divinely revealed, and truth proved by natural reason, can never be really opposed to each other, both having God for their author. Nor, on the other hand, is it anything inconsistent that philosophy should be guided and perfected by revealed doctrine, at least indirectly, and in matter that is of itself obscure to man's unaided natural reason. When the human mind is truly logical, it will aways derive the same conclusions from the same premises ; still there is not a little diversity of opinion concerning some subjects of moral philosophy, which is apparent especially in questions that regard the application of ethical principl _s to certain social and civil matters. It can scarcely be doubted that the predilections of education, and the peculiar influence of national customs on the mind, have some share in causing this difference of thought which exists even among the well meaning.

The criterion of scientific and philosophical truth is not authority, but evidence ; namely, the evidence of propositions as following necessarily and demonstratively from their certain principles ; but, even in scientific and philosophical mat-

PREFACE. V

ter, recognized authority is required for some minds, as a guaranty of correctness. The well thought sayings of great authors, especially of St. Thomas, the master of the schools, are often cited on the margin, both as confirmatory of the reasoning advanced in the text, and as suggestive of other arguments. The fact should not be unknown to the ingenuous student of philosophy, however, that, especially in more recent times, the words of St. Thomas, like those of the sacred Scriptures, are sometimes quoted in proof of the most contradictory assertions, and for sustaining the most opposite systems : a circumstance which serves, at least, to show the weight that his authority still has among the learned. Nevertheless, it is a peculiar excellency of the scholastic language that it is neither equivocal nor indefinite. It is, perhaps, not saying too much to affirm that the old scholastic metaphysicians are never at fault in their reasoning, when it is a question of what must be true in the nature of things, or of what can be determined by the canons of strict argumentation. Truths that spring necessarily from the very nature of man and of human society, never change, though things that are extrinsic and accidental to them may change. Those venerable philosophers of the olden times reached their conclusions by rigorous logic; and their conclusions were right and true, because derived by necessary sequence from matter not subject to mutation. St. Thomas and the illustrious authors in succeeding centuries that studied his writings and developed their meaning, had no opposite opinions concerning the natural origin and constitution of civil society. Indeed, there is little doubt that nothing is gained by theorists who reject the teachings, and the axioms received as certain among those sagacious thinkers ; at least, in the truths of social ethics 1*

VI PREFACE.

which are mainly dependent for their proof on speculative or abstract reasoning.

The writer's thanks are hereby tendered to the Public, and to the periodical press, for the favor shown his Elements of Philosophy, which has met with unlooked-for success. It is hoped that this little volume on Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, though not a complete and comprehensive work on that branch of philosophy, and, doubtless, not free from errors and imperfections that were unobserved in the matter actually contained, may, despite those defects, still be found of some use as a help for the student of philosophy.

Walter H. Hill, S. J.

•S*/. Louis University, May 27, 1878.

Introduction

A purely speculative science has for its object only the contemplation of truth; its subjects belong exclusively to the intellect, having no direct or immediate reference at all to practical things ; yet, such science may be remotely useful, in a greater or less degree, to the practical. Ethics is not a speculative science, except under some particular respect ; its object pertains to the will, and its aim is to perfect the will with the good that is true. Though ethics, viewed under a certain respect, or as to the mode in which it demonstrates a priori some truth, may be called speculative science ; yet, that truth is referred by it more or less immediately and directly to the practical, or to the objects of the will's deliberate action. Moreover, the fundamental principle of this science is man's ultimate destination, his sum?num bonum or chief good, as an object to which he can freely tend, by using proportionate means. Hence, ethics is properly styled a practical science, since it is concerned about an end to be gained, and the. means of attaining to it.

Ethics, from the Greek word ^°C (Latin, mores, morals, whence the name moral philosophy,) is so called, because it aims at what ultimately perfects man as a moral being. What ultimately perfects man as a moral being, is the acquiring of his summum bonum, or of that object, the possession of which constitutes for him the state of perfect beatitude or happiness. What ultimately perfects man in the present order of his existence, is intellectual and moral virtue ; or, from the stand-

YIII INTRODUCTION

point of ethics, it is chiefly moral goodness, since in ethics the intellectual virtues are regarded as having for their end to subserve and perfect the moral virtues. On this account ethics is often said to be the fruit of all the sciences, since it ultimately perfects man, by ordering those sciences, and all things else in respect to an ultimate end that is absolutely supreme.

Since the various objects about which man's knowledge and action can be exercised, are related to each other in many different manners, we may distinguish several kinds of order and connection among things which human science regards and proposes; for example, there are many kinds of order and real connection in things which reason does not devise or found, but which it discovers as facts. The physical sciences, whose objects are real things," have for their proper matter relations of this kind ; as, that the tides follow the moon's movement around the earth; that hydrogen burns ; the earth's orbit around the sun is an ellipse, etc. There is also an order of connections and relations among things which reason devises, and establishes for itself artificially, founding it, however, on real things. Of this kind are grammar, logic, etc., which are man's work; they propose artificial relations among things ; but yet they are not " baseless fabrics," though those systems are contrived, and built by man's ingenuity. To make " Socrates the nominative case," " Europe the minor term," etc., is to conceive Socrates and Europe, not as real beings in their real relations ; but as placed in an order of artificial relations with which human reason invests them, for the purposes intended by the arts of grammar and logic.

There is also an order and relationship among objects of the will, and in its acts, which reason makes for itself;* but

* " Est ordo etiam quam scientia facit in actibus voluntatis, uncle oritur nostra ethice. Incle patet ethicam esse de rationabilibus scientiis, non ex realibus ; id est earn esse ex iis, quorum objectum pendit a ratione, etsi aliter, imo minus, quam Logicae, et Grammaticae objectum ; ideoque magis est realis, quam Logica vel Grammatical' Irenseus Carmelit. Eth., cap.

INTRODUCTION". IX

which it truly founds, however, on the true and positive relations of those things. Nature does not infuse into man's reason the science of ethics, with its principles and conclusions ; or, it is not innate to man ; and, the moral character that is in the objects which surround him, is not in those objects as a real physical quality. Wherefore, human reason, by its natural power, puts an order of relations and connections into the will's objects, analogously to the manner in which it founds the system of relations and connections among concepts and judgments that constitutes logic; or the manner in which it founds a system ot relations and connections among words and phrases in a sentence that makes grammar ; and thus ethics has some likeness of nature both with real or physical science, and with rational science.

Finally, there is an order which reason puts into outward works and operations ; and this is art, which takes its name according to the objects that the work or operation concerns ; as, ait of music, art of grammar, art of agriculture, etc.

It may be said, then, that ethics is a rational science, which is conversant about moral good ; and its principles are deduced by man's reason from the objects that concern the free will ; it has for its ulterior end the art by which man may live uprightly or conformably to right reason.

The plan pursued by Aristotle in his Ethics, and Politics, was adopted in many subsequent schools ; and in substance it is the one followed by most writers on moral philosophy at the present time. Aristotle made ethics preliminary to his politics. He argued that the end is first and principal among causes ; that there is an ultimate objective end, or " summum bonum," at which man is ordained by nature to aim; and the possession of this chief good constitutes man's last perfection,

I, § 2. There is also an order which science makes in the acts of the will, and from that our ethics arises. It is plain, then, that ethics is a rational science, rnd not a real or physical science ; that is, it is of those sciences the object of which depends on reason, though in another manner, and even less so, than does the object of logic and grammar ; and it is, therefore, more a real science than is logic or grammar.

X INTKODU CTION.

and his complete beatitude. He explains the nature and the principles of morality ; and also of the virtues, which are means of fitting man for beatitude ; beatitude itself being produced by the contemplation of what is highest and best. Man, as alone or solitary, is not sufficient for himself ; he is, therefore, a social being, or is intended by nature to live in society ; and he must exist in civil society. After considering man as a member of the family, he then discusses, at some length, the different forms of civil government, contrasting their various advantages and disadvantages.

The following treatise is similar in its plan and scope to numerous modern works of the kind which are modeled on the writings of this illustrious Grecian philosopher. Accordingly, the first part regards what ultimately perfects man ; or, it treats of final beatitude, and the nature and principles of that moral goodness necessarily required to be in the means by which man attains to ultimate bliss. In the second part human action and moral goodness are considered as applied to more specific matter; as, man's relation to God, to his fellow man, to the family, and to civil society.

Contents

ETHICS, OR MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Chapter I. Ultimate End Or Destiny Of Man

PAGE.

Article I : All the Voluntary Action of Man, as well as the Natural Action of Irrational Things, has an Appointed Ultimate End that is duly Proportioned to it 15

Article 2 : What Constitutes Perfect Human Bliss ; or in what Good,

Complete Beatitude consists 19

Article 3 : Whether any Goods of this Present Life can be the Object that is Adequate or Proportioned to a State of Perfect Bliss for Man 26

Article 4: Whether the Attainment of Final Beatitude Depends on Man's Free Action ; and whether Beatitude is the same for all Persons ; whether an Imperfect Bliss is Attainable in this Life, as a Proximate End of Man 34

Chapter II. Action Of Man As A Rational Being

Article I : Human Action ; or of those Actions which Fall Under the

Empire of Man's Reason 41

Article 2 : Of Voluntary and Involuntary Actions 45

Article 3 : Whether Concupiscence Renders Man's Actions Involuntary; whether Fear or Anger takes away Liberty of the Will 50

Chapter III. Principles Of Moral Goodness

Article I : Morality of Human Actions 54

Article 2: The Principles which Proximately Cause Morality 61

XII CONTENTS.

PAGE.

Article 3 : Merit and Demerit of Human Actions 65

Article 4: Whether any Human Actions are neither Morally Good

nor Morally Bad 69

Chapter VII. Civil Law

Article I : Necessity of Civil Laws 133

Article 2 : Human Law does not Extend to all Good nor all Evil ; it is

not the Natural Law Applied 139

Article 3 : Law Essentially Just ; it Binds in Conscience 145

Article 4 : Sanction of Law 154

Chapter II. Special Duties

Article I : Man's Duty to God 195

Article 2 : Duty of Man towards Himself 200

Article 3: Of Self-Defence 206

Article 4 : Man's Duties towards his Fellow Man 212

Article 5 : Veracity or truthfulness; the Lie is Intrinsically Evil 215

Article 6: Origin of Dominion or Ownership of Property; Communism False 222

Chapter III. Max As A Social Being

Article I : Man's First Social Relation is to the Family 240

Article 2 : Unity of the Family 243

Article 3: Respective Duties of Parents and Children 252

Article 4: Servile State or Slavery ; Rights and Duties of Masters and

Slaves 255

Chapter IV. Civil Society

Article I : Necessity of Civil Society 261

Article 2 : Necessity of Supreme Authority and Government; Unit of

Civil Society 268

Article 3 : Origin of Authority to Govern Civil Society 275

Article 4: Different Forms of Civil Government ; Right of Suffrage. . 292 Article 5 : Faculties of Supreme Authority ; its Right Use ; Necessary Qualities of the Good Ruler 298

Article 6 : Privation of Law and Government ; or Concerning Anarchy and Tyranny in the Body Politic 305

Article 7 : Common Law of Nations ; or, the Jus Gentium ; International Law - : 319

Conclusion 333

ETHICS, OK MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PAET L-GENEEAL ETHICS.

Chapter I. Ultimate End, Or Destiny Of Man

ARTICLE I.

ALL THE DELIBERATE ACTION OF MAN, AS WELL AS THE NATURAL ACTION OF IRRATIONAL THINGS, IS ON ACCOUNT OF AN ULTIMATE END.

The end, according to a general meaning of the term, is that for the sake of which an act or an operation is performed;* and the ultimate end, in the intention of an intelligent agent, is that to which all other ends intended by it are subordinate, and to which they all tend, as means.

The end thus understood is one of the four causes,t as explained in works on general metaphysics : it is the first and the highest among causes; for, though it influences only morally towards the production of the effect wrought by the efficient cause, yet it is directive of the other causes, and they are subordinate to it. The ultimate end, or the final purpose for the accomplishment of which all the means are cobrdi-

* " Finis est id cujus gratia aliquid fit, in quo quiescit, et satiatur agens ; ergo est aptus appeti." The end is that for whose sake any thing is done, and in which the agent rests satisfied; it is, therefore, fitted to be desired by appetite."

t " Bonum habet rationem causae finalis." I p., qu, 5, a. 2, ad 1. Good has the nature of final cause. "Verum est in anima, sed bonum est in rebus." 1 p., qu. 16, a. I, ad 4. The true is in the mind, but the

good is in things.

ds)

nated, rules all the intermediate actions and intentions:* like the first mover that controls the action of many dependent agents, which it causes to move in obedience to an impulse given by it to the proximate or nearest one, and which is then communicated from one to another till the last. Hence it is that the ultimate end is often styled " die principle of intention;" for all other intentions in the rational agent are subject to the supreme influence of the object ultimately aimed at, and all other action of such agent is related to this ultimate end as means; or it reduces to unity all action of the agent, causing all movements to tend towards i: as their last term. All things in the world exist and act on account of an end. The special end for which some things exist is easily discernible by us; and one important advantage furnished by physical science is the aid which it gives us in discovering and interpreting the plan and order that are in the works of nature. We cannot conceive a being created to endure perpetually in the condition of tendency to an end, without ever reaching a final state, or, at least, without ever fulfilling the purpose of its existence. But though all things have some ultimate end, which is proportioned to their nature, yet they tend to it in different manners, for their action is according to their specific nature — " modus agendi sequitur modum essendi." Irrational things move towards their ultimate end in obedience to a law implanted in them by the author of their being. The brute animal can apprehend an end,t as materially such, and tend to it by the impulse of sensible appetite; but it cannot know an end, formally as an end, which is a rational act. An intelligent being can apprehend an end, as an end; and it can select and arrange the means for its fulfillment.

*" Primum principium in operatives, quorum est ratio practica, e*t finis ultimus." P. 1.2, qu. 90 a. 2, in C. In practical things, which are the object of practical reason, the first principle is the ultimate end. The end is always first in the intention, and it directs the agent's action; but that end is last in the execution of the work.

t " Finem aoprehendunt, sed non rationem finis." They apprehend an end, but not its nature as an end.

GENERAL ETHIGS. 17

Not all man's action is performed by him for an end. Here we may distinguish four kinds of action in man, answering to four grades of essential perfection that are combined in him : i. that which he has in common with inanimate natures — v. g , minerals ; 2. that which he has in common with vegetable natures; 3. the action which he has in common with irrational animals — beings whose action is wholly limited to these three kinds can tend to an end, as an end, only when directed by an intelligent agent that is extrinsic to them and superior to them; 4. man can act as a rational being; he can apprehend an end precisely and formally as an end, and select and use appropriate means for its attainment. He has some actions of the first three kinds, and they are really actions of man, inasmuch as he is their principle; but they are not styled human actions, since by them he does not tend to an end differently from inanimate things, nor from the vegetable, and the irrational animals, which move towards an end without knowing its nature as an end. Man's action is specifically and completely human only when it is on account of an end intended by him, or when it is rational and deliberate.*

Man naturally tends to happiness; or, man ultimately aims at happiness, in all he does, whether his will acts with deliberate choice, or naturally, spontaneously, and without deliberar tion. The will cannot love evil, as evil ; but, by the physical and necessary law of its nature, it embraces what is apprehended and offered to it precisely and purely as good. When good is understood in this general sense as the undetermined object towards which the will necessarily tends in all its particular acts, it is sometimes called by authors, man's chief good, man's beatitude, or the ultimate end of man's actions, etc. ; and there is a respect under which all these forms of expression are

* "Homo est dominus actuum suorum per rationem et voluntatem; unde et liberum ai-bitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis." 1. 2 p., qu. I, a. I. Man is the master of his actions through his reason and will ; on this account, freedom to choose is called a faculty of the will and the reason.

"In omni malo est aliquid boni." I p., qu. 49, a. 3. In every evil there is something of good.

2*

18 ETHICS, OB MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

true and proper. But further on, we shall see more precisely what object and what action of rational nature are required in order to constitute perfect human bliss.*

Reflection on the operations of our own faculties manifests the fact to us that in all our voluntary action, we tend to one dominant and supreme end ; and that we always either explicitly or implicitly intend that end, in whatever we do as rational agents. This end, which is always thus intended by us, is our own happiness, our own good; and at this we ever aim, whether the means selected by us to accomplish our purpose be, in themselves, good or bad. From that end, understood in this general sense, we cannot, by any physical possibility, avert our wills; for this simple good is the proper object of the will, just as color is the connatural and proper object of the eye, or sound is that of the hearing; and no faculty can turn away from its own specific object to one which is totally separated from its whole sphere of action.t It is in accordance with this truth that the philosophical axiom is to be understood, "finis non cadit sub electione ;" the end does not fall under our choice, or it is not subject to choice : the end here meant is that happiness or good for self which we ultimately intend by all that we do. All the other ends which man wishes, regard particular things; they are subject to choice and they are only means in respect to what is ultimately intended by him; to these particular and special ends, which may be freely intended by way of means, is applied the axiom, •' media cadunt sub electione:" the means fall under election, or the means are subject to free choice.

This ruling principle in man, by which he is irresistibly

* Observe, then, that the expressions, "man's ultimate end," "man's beatitude," "man's chief good," are applied, under different respects, to that simple but indeterminate good towards which the will is naturally and necessarily inclined, and to which it is conceived to be always tending in its acts. But when we conceive God as the real object of happiness, and the real chief good, then those expressions are applied accordingly.

t " Nulla potentia potest ferri extra suam objectum adaequatum." Suarez' Metaph. Disp. 30, sec. 1 1, no. 2. No power or faculty can be carried beyond its own adequate, commensurate object.

impelled towards a supreme end or chief good for him, must, in the very nature of things, have its ultimate term or object; for this natural tendency in man to a term which he never reaches in this life, is conclusive proof that he is destined for a future state of existence, and that, in respect to it, his present one is preparatory and transitional.

ARTICLE II.

WHAT CONSTITUTES PERFECT HUMAN BLISS; OR IN WHAT GOOD COMPLETE BEATITUDE CONSISTS.

In order the more clearly to understand the operation of man's rational nature, and the object of his action, in a state of perfect bliss or complete beatitude, we should distinguish between objective beatitude andforma/ beatitude. Objective beatitude, is that thing, or object, the possession of which will render man perfectly happy; formal beatitude, is that action or operation of man's own powers, by which he will really and truly possess that thing or object that is to make him happy.

Since perfect bliss or beatitude should be the ultimate complement of the rational or intellectual nature's perfection, it must include, as esseritial to it, the highest and most noble action of that intelligent being. What is the highest and the noblest act of an intelligent being ? It cannot be that of reasoning; for all reasoning is progress toward an end, or to what is more perfect; or it is a means of attaining to an end, and not the act of possessing it. The highest and noblest act of an intelligent being, is the vision or contemplation of truth; and from this act of the intellect, there result love and fruition in the will, which are greater or less, according to the degree of beauty and goodness in the object contemplated. Man's highest faculty is that one which rules over all his other powers, which is first to act; which gives light and offers objects of action to all his superior faculties, and which gives him his nearest likeness to the divine nature : all this is true only of

20 ethics, on moral philosophy.

his intellect; and, by consequence, the intellect is principal among the powers of man's rational nature.

When we consider the objects which the action of the intellect may concern, its operation in knowing may be distinguished into two kinds; the practical and the speculative. The intellect itself as capable of acquiring both practical and speculative knowledge, or of knowing both practical and speculative things, is also distinguished into the practical intellect, and the speculative intellect.

Practical -knowledge regards the feasible, what can be done physically, or what ought to be done morally; such knowledge, consequently, has for its object concrete, individual things and contingent truths. Speculative knowledge principally regards necessary things, and therefore its object is that which is absolute and immutable. It is manifest that an object has greater or less perfection in its own species, according to the greater or less degree in which the goodness of that object is exempt from contingency or mutability. Now, in order for that operation of the soul required for perfect bliss or beatitude to be the highest and noblest action of the soul's principal faculty, it must also have for its object that which is highest, noblest, and most necessary.

It may be affirmed, then, that human beatitude consists, principally and essentially, in the most perfect operation of man's superior powers, in regard to the highest and noblest object. In order for this object to be the highest and noblest, it must be absolutely perfect, absolutely good, and absolutely ultimate, and thus leave nothing ulterior to be conceived and desired which is greater; because the object must fill the capacity of the understanding for truth, and that of the will for goodness; otherwise, these faculties could tend towards a further term or a greater object. Also, since the intellect can not know the essence of all things till it knows the essence of their cause, it follows that its ultimate objective end must be the first cause that exists a se, or independently of all cause. Finally, the intellect and will are not limited for their objects to the finite; they can tend to what is greater and greater;

nor will this movement cease in them till it terminates in the infinite. All relative perfection implies dependence, limitation, mutability ; and, by consequence, cannot be what is most desirable. Therefore, the objective end of man which is absolutely ultimate, is God ; and his beatitude will be the contemplation and love of God as infinitely true, beautiful, and good.

The knowledge of God which a disembodied spirit might naturally have, would be greatly superior to that which man can acquire in this life; but we have no sufficient reason to suppose that it would become that of immediate intuitive vision, except by a supernatural elevation of the soul's faculties. Though it is not simply impossible for God to make a creature so perfect that intuitive vision of the divine essence would be connatural to it ; yet, as a fact, man is not such a creature.