Logic; or, The right use of reason, in the inquiry after truth

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Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. IS CHAPTER 11

OF THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.

SECT. I.

OF BEING IN GENERAL.

\ THE object of perception is that which is represented in the idea, that which is the archetype or pattern^ according to whi«h the idea is formed ; and XYms judgments^ pro^ positions^ rectsons, and long discourses may all become the objects of perception ; but in this place we speak chiefly of the Jirst and most simple objects of it, before they are joined and formed into propositions or discourses.

Every object of our idea is called a theme^ whether it be a hehig or not-being ; for not-being may be proposed to our thoughts, as well as that which has a real being. But let us first treat of beings^ and that in the largest extent of the word.

A being is considered as possible^ or as actual.

When it is considered as possible^ it is said to have an essence or nature ; such were all things before their creation : When it is considered as actual^ then it is said to have ixistence also ; such are all things zvhich m^e created^ and God himself the creator.

Essence^ therefore, is but the very nature of any being, whether it be actually existing or not. A rose in winter has an essence^ in summer it has existence also.

'Note. — There is but one being which includes existencem the very essence of it, and that is God, who therefore actually eocists by natural and eternal necessity ; but the actual existence of every creature is very distinct from its essence^ for it may Z>e, or may not be^ as God pleases.

Again — Every being is considered either as subsisting in and by itself, and then it is called a substance ; or it subsists in and by another, and then it is called a mode or manner of being ; though few writers allow mode to be called a being in the same perfect sense as a substance is ; and some Rhodes have evidently more of real entity or being than others, as will appear when we come to treat of them. These things will furnish us Avith matter for large discourse in the following sections.

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SECT. II.

OF SUBSTANCES AND THEIR VARIOUS KINDS.

A SUBSTANCE is a being which can subsist by itself, witliout dependauce upon any other created being. The notion of subsisting by itself gives occasion to logicians to call it a substance. So a horse, a house, wood, stone, water, fire, a spirit, a body, an angel, are called substances, because they depend on nothing but God for their existence.

It has been usual also, in the description of substance^ to add, it is that which is the subject of modes or accidents : a body is the substance or subject, its shape is the mode.

But, lest we be led into mistakes, let us here take notice, that, when a substance is said to subsist without dependence upon another created being; all that we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utterly destroyed and reduced to nothing, by any power inferior to that of our Creator ; though its present particular form, nature, and properties, may be altered and destroyed by many inferior causes : A horse may die, and t&rn to dust 3 wood may be turned into fire, smoke, and ashes ; a house into rubbish, and water into ice or vapour ; but the substance or matter of which they are made stiil remains, though the forms and shapes of it are altered. A body may ceaSe to be a house or a horse, but it is a body still 5 and in this sense it depends only upon God for its existence.

Among substances, some are thinking or conscious beings, or have a power of thought, such as the mind of man, Godj angels. Some are extended and solid or impenetrable, that is, they have dimensions of length, breadth, and depth, and have also a po.ver of resistance, or to exclude every thing of the same kind from being in the same j)iace This is the proper character of matter or body.

As for the idea 01 Space, whellier Jtbe void or fuH, that i$, a vacuum or a plenum^ whether it be interspersed among all bodies, or may be supposed to reach beyond the bounds of the creation, it is an argument too long and too liard to be disputed in this place what the nature of it is : It has

Chap, II, RIGHT USE OF REASON, 15

been much debated whether it be a real substance, or a mere conception of the mind ; whether it be the immensity of the divine nature, or the mere order of co-existent beings ; whether it be the manner of our conception of the distances of bodies, or a mere nothing. Therefore I drop the mention of it here, and refer the reader to the first essay among the Philosojihical EssaTjs, by 1, JF, published m 1733,

Now if we seclude Space out of our consideration, tliere wiil remain but two sorts of substances in the world, that is, Matter and Mindy or as we otherwise call them, Body and Spirit ; at least we have no ideas of any other substances but these.*

* Because men have different ideas end notions of Su bstances, I thought it not proper entirely to omit all accounts of them, and therefore have thrown them into the margin,

Some philosophers suppose that our acquaintance with matter or mind reaches no farther than the mere properties of them, and that there is a sort of unknown being, which is the substance or the sub^ ject by which these properties o£ solid extension and of cogitation are supported, and in which these properties inhere or exist, But perhaps this notion arises only from our turning the mere abstracted or logical notion of substance or stlf-subsisting into the notiojri of a distinct physical or natural being, without any necessity. Solid extension: seems, to me, to be the very substance of matter, or of all bodies 5 and a power of thinking, which is always in act, seems to be the very substance of all spirits ; for God himself is an intelligent almightypower ; nor is there any need to seek for any other secret and unknown being, or abstracted substance, entirely distinct from these, irr order to support the several modes or properties of matter or mrnd» for these two ideas are sufficient for that purpose ; therefore I rathec think these are substances*

It must be confessed, when we say, Spirit is a thinking substance, and Matter is an extended solid substance, we are sometimes ready to imagine that extension and solidity are but n\ere modes and properties of a certain unknown substance or subject which supports them, and which we call body ; and that a power of thinking is but a mere mode and property of some unknown substance or subject which sup^ ports it, and which we call spirit : But I rather take this to be a mere mistake, which we are led into by the grammatical form and use o£ words; and perhaps our logical way of thinking by substances and modes, as well as our grammatical way of talking by substantives and adjectives, help to delude us into the supposition.

However, that 1 may nor be wanting to any cf my readers, I would let them know Mr, Locke's opinion, which has obtained much in the present age; and it is this: *♦ That our idea of [any particular sub-

Among substances, some are called simple, some are compound^ whether the words be taken in a philosophical or a vulgar sense.

Simple substances, in a philosophical seme are either spirits which have no manner of composition in them, and in this sense God is called a simple heiyig ^ or tliey are the first principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded : Elements are such substances as cannot be resolved, or reduced into two or more substances of different kinds.

The various sects of philosophers have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The Peripatetic, or followers o^ Aristotle^ made, Fire, Air, Earth, and Water, to be the four elements of which all earthly things vvere compounded ; and they supposed the heavens to he 2i quintessences ox fifth sort of body, distinct from all these : But,

stance is only such a combination of simple ideas as represent that thing as subsisting by itself, in which the supposed or confused idea ef substance (such as it is) is always ready to offer itself. It is con. junction of ideas co-existing in such a cause of their union, and makes the whole subject subsist by itself, though the cause of their union be unknown ; and our general idea of substance arises from the self* subsistence of this collection of ideas.

Now if this notion of substance rest here, and be considered merely as an unknown cause of the union of properties, it is much more easy to be admitted; but, if we proceed to suppose a sort of real, substantial, distinct being,, different from solid quantity or extension in bodies, and different from a power of thinking in spirits, in my opinion it is the introduction of a needless scholastical notion into the real nature of things, and then fancying it to have a real existence.

Mr. Locke, in his Essay of Human understanding, Book 2. chap. 22, § 2» seems to ridicule this common idea of substance, which rrten have generally supposed to be a sort of substratum, distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the support of all properties. Yet, in Book 4, chap, 3. § 6. he seenns to suppose there may be such an unknown substratum, which may be capable of receiving the properties both of matter and of mind, namely, extension, solidity, and cogitation; for he supposes it possible for God to add cogitation lo that substance which is corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If this be true, then spirits (for aught we know) may be corporeal beings, or thinking bodies^ which is a doctrine too favourable to the mortality of the soul. But 1 leave these debates to the philosophers of the age^ and will not be too positive in my opinion of this abstruse subject. See more of this argument in Philosophical Essays^ before cited^ F,5say 2d.

Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 17

since experimental philosophy and mathematics have been better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The Chemists make Spirit, Salt, Sulphur , Water ^ and Earthy to be their five elements^, because they can reduce all terrestrial things to these five : This seems to come nearer the truth 5 though they are not all agreed in this enumeration of elements. In short, our modern philosophers generally suppose matter or body to be one simple principle, or solid extension, which being diversified by its various shapes, quantities, motions, and situations, makes all the varieties that are found in the universe ; and theiefore they make little use of the word element.

Compound substances are made up of two or more simpl& substances : So every thing in this whole material creation, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or more different principles, or substances, is a compound bo-- dy in the philosophical sense.

But, if we take the words simple and compound in a vulgar sense, then all those are simple substances which are generally esteemed uniform in their nature. So every herb is called a simple^ and every metal ^.mineral; though the chemist perhaps may find all his several elements Ik each of them. So a needle is ?i simple ho Ay , being only made of steel ; but a sword or a knife is a compound, because its haft or handle is made of materials different from the blade. So the Bark of Peru, or the Juice of the Sorrel, is a simple medicine : But, when the apothecary^s art has mingled several simples together^ it beconies a compound j SiS Diascordium, ov Mithridate.

The terms of pure and mixt, when applied to bodies, are much akin to simple and compound. So a guinea is pure gold, if it has nothhig but gold in it, vvitliout any alloy of baser metal : But, if any other mineral or metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixt substance or body.

Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate^ Animated substances are either animal or vegetable,^

* NOTE. — Vegetables, as well as animals,^ have gotten the name of animated substances, because some ©f the ancients supposed herbs and plants, beasts and birds^ 5;c» to have a sort of sdul^ distinct from, luatter^ or body.

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18 LOOrC : OR, THE Part. L

Some of the animal substances have various organical or instrumental parts, fitted for a variety of motions from place to place, and a spring of life within themselves, as beasts, birds, fishes, and insects 5 these are called animals. Other animated substances are called vegetables, whiclihave within themselves the principles of another Sort of life and growth, and of various productions of leaves, flowers and fruits, such as we see in plants, herbs, and trees.

And there are other substances, which are called inani- Tiiatey because tliey have no sort of life in them, as earth, stone, air, water, &c.

There is also one sort of substance or being, which rs compounded of hody^w^ mind, or a rational spirit united to an animal ; such is mankind. Angels, or any other beiiigs of the spiritual and invisible world, who have assumed visible sliapes for a season, can hardly be reckoned among this order of compounded beings ; because they drop their bodies, and divest themselves of those visible hapeS, when their particular message rs performed, arid thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to their na- AiTes. "

SECT. Ifl.

TIAL AND ACCrDENTAL MODES.

THE Ilex t sort of objects which are represented in our ideas, are C2^\Qi^ modes or manners of being .'^

A mode \s that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but s shvays esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by the .elp of some substance, which^ for that reason, is called its subject. A mode must depend on that substance for its very existence and being ; and that not as a being depends on its cause^ (for so substances themselves depend on God.

* Ko'TE — The term mode is by some authors appUed chiefly to the relations, or relative manners of being. But in logical treatises^ it is often used in a larger sense^ and extends to all attributes 'whatsoever^ andir.cludes the most essential and inward properties^ as well as outv^^ard respects and relations^ ^nd reaches to actions themselver.^ as w€ll t^s m;vuners of action.

Chap, II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 19

their creator *^) but the very being of a mode depends on some substance for its subject^ in which it is. or to which it belongs 5 so motion, shape, quantity, weight, are modes of the body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, SLYe modes of the mind ; for the one cannot subsist without body^ and the other cannot subsist without mind.

Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances.

I. Modes are either essential or a>ccideutal.

kn essential mode ov attribute/\% that which belongs to the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it is $ and the subject can never have the same nature without it; such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in water, vitalmotion in an animal, solidity in matters, think" ing in a spirit ; for, though that piece of wood which is now a bowl may be made square^ yet, if roundfiess be taken away, it is no longer a bowl : so, that very flesh and bones, which is now an anmaZ, may be without life or inward motion ; but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal, but a carcass ; so, if a body or matter be 'Ahested o£ solidity, it is a nrere void space, or nothing; and, if spirit be entirely without ^AmArin^, I have no idea of any thing that is left in it; therefore, so far as I am aWe to judge, co7iciou$ness must be its essential attribute.* Thus all the perfections of God are called his uttributes^ for he cannot i>e without them.

An essential m&de is either primary ox secondary,

A primary essentiail mode is the first or chief thing that constitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and makes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it from all other beings : This is called the difference in the definition of things ; of which hereafter; So roundness is the primary essential mode or difference of a bowl 5 themeeting of two lines is the primary essential modfe, or the difference of an angle; the perpendicularity of these lines to each oth-

* Note— When I call solid extensionan essential mode or attribute of matter, and a power of thinking an essential mode or attributeof a spirit, I do it in compliance with common forms of speech.- But perhaps in reality these are very essences or substances themselves, and the most substantial ideas that we can form of body and spirit^ and have no need of any (we know not what) substratum^ or unintelligible subst^nce^ to sujppi^rt tJt^m in tMr -eicistence or being.

er is the difterence of a right angle : Solid eximsion is the primary attribute or difference of ma//e?'.* Consciousmssy or at least a power of thinkings is the difference or primary attribute of a spirit;^ and to fear and love God is the primary attribute of a pious man,

A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a thing which is not of primary consideration : This is called a property. Sometimes indeed it goes towards making up the essence, especially of a complex beings so far as we are acquainted with it; sometimes it depends upon, and follows from the essence of it ; so, volubility or aptness to roll, is the property of a bowl, and is derived from its roundness. Mobility y SLXiAfgiiref or shape are properties of matter; and it is the property of a pious man to love his neighbour.

An accidental mode, or an accident^ is such a mode as is not necessary to the being of a thing, for the subject may be without it, and yet remain of the same nature that it was before, or it is that mode which may be separated or abolished from its subject : So, smoothness ovroughnessj blackness or whiteriesSy motion or rest, are the accidents of a bowl; for these may be all changed, and yet the body remain a bowl still ; Learningy justice, f oily ^sickness^ health, are the accidents of a man/ Motion, squareness, or any particular shape or size, are the accidents of body : Yet, shape and size, in general, are essential modes of it ; for a body must have some size and shape ; nor can it be with^ out them : Sa, hope, fear, wishing, assenting, and doubting, are accidents of tlie mind, though thinking, in general, seems to be essential to it.

Here observe, that the name of accident has been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetic philosophers to all modes, whether essential or accidental ; but the moderns confine this word accident to the sense in which I have described it.

Here it should be noted also, that, though the word property be limited sometimes, in logical treatises, to the secondary essential mode, yet it is used in common language to signify these four sorts of modes ; of which some are me7itial, and some accidental,

* See preceding^ Not«*

Chap. II. RIGHT USE OF REASON. 21

1. Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not only to those subjects. So, yellow colour, and ductility , are properties of gold ; they belong to all gold, but not only to gold 5 for saffron is also yellow^ and lead is ductile.

2. Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to every subject of that kind. So, learnings readhig^ and writing ^ are properties oi human nature; they belong only to man, but not to all men.

3. Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only to them, but not always. So, speech or language is a property of man, for it belongs to all men, and to men only ; but men are not always speaking.

4* Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and to them only and always. So, shajye and divisibility are properties of body ; so omniscierice and omnipotence are properties of divine Nature ; for in this sense properties and attributes are the same ; and, except in logical treatises, there is scare any distinction made between them. These are called propria quarto modo in the school, or properties of the fourth sort.

Note. — Where there is any one property or essential attribute so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient to give a full distinction of that subject from all other subjects, this attribute or property is called the essential dif Jerencef as is before declared ; and we commonly say, the essence of the thing consists in it ; so the essence of matter in general seems to consist in solidity, or solid extension. But for the most part, we are so much at a loss in finding out the intimate essence of particular natural bodies, that we are forced to distinguish tlie essential difference of most things by a combination of properties. So a sparrow is a bird which has such coloured feathers, and sueh a particular size, shape and motion. So worinivood is an herb which has such a leaf of such a colour, and shape, and taste, and such a root and stalk. So beasts and fishes, minerals, metals, and works of art sometimes, as well as of nature, are distinguished by such a collection of proper- He^.

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SECT. IV.

^ THE FARTHER DIVISIONS OF MODE.

THE second division of Modes is into absolute and relative. An absolute mode is tiiat which belongs to its subject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever : But a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being has to others. So roundness and smoothness are the a&50- hite modes of a bowl ; for, if there were nothing else existing in the whole creation, a bowl might be raw»<i and smooth : But greatness and smallness are relative modes 5 for the very ideas of them are derived merely from the comparison of one being with others : A bowl of four inches diameter is very great compared v*ith one of an inch and a half: but it is very small in comparison of another bowl whose diameter is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the absolute mode of a body, but swiftness or slowness are relative ideas ; foi the motion of a bowl on a bovvlinggreen is swift when compared with a snail j and it is slow when compared with a cannon- bullet.

These relative modes are largely treated of by some logical and metaphysical writers, under the name of rela-^ tions : And these relations themselves are farther subdivided into such as arise from the nature of things, and such as arise merely from the operation of our minds ; one sort are called reciL relations, the oilier mental ; so the likenes^s of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arises from the real nature of things ; for, whether there was any man or mind to conceive it or not, one egg would be like another : But, wiien we consider an egg as a noiin substantive in grammar, or as signified by the letters egg, these are mere mf^ntal relations, and derive their v^ry nature from the mind of man. These sort of relations are called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions ^ which have no real being, but depend entirely on the operation of the mind.

III. The third division of modes shews us they arc either intrinsicaly or extnnsical. Intrinsical modes pre con-

Chap. IL RIGHT USE OF REASON. 23

ceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say a globe is round y or swift ^ rollings or at rest : Or when vyc say a man is tallj or learned^ these are intrinsic modes : But extrinsic modes are such as arise from something tliat is not in the subject or substance itself 5 but it is a manner of being which some substances attain by reason of something that is external or foreign to the subject : as this globe lies within two yards of the ivall; or this man is beloved^ or hated. Note — Such sort of modes as this last example, are called external denominations.

IV. There is ?l fourth division much akin to this, where^ by modes are said to be inherent or adherent^ that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper modes arise from the joining of some accidental substance to the chief subject, which yet may be separated from it^ so Avhen a bowl is we4, or a boy is clothed^ these are adher&nt modes ; for the water and the clothes are distinct substances, which adhere to the bowl^ or to the boy : But when we say the bowl is swift or rounds when we say the hoy is stjong or ivitty^ these ate proper or inherent modes^ for they have a sort of in-being in the substance itself, and do not arise from the addition of any other substance to it.

V. Action and passion are modes or manners which belong to substances, and sl.ould not entirely be omitted here. When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron^ the hammer and the smith are both agents or subjects of action; the one is the prime or supreme^ the other the subordinate : The iron is Xhe patient, or the subject of passion, in a philosophical sense, because it receives the operation of the agent; though this sense of the words passion ^nd patient difters much from the vulgar meaning of them.*

VI. The sixth division of modes m^ty he into physical ^ that iSj natural^ civil, moral, and supernaturaU So when we consider the a'postle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, and an inspired apostle ; his low stature is a physical mode,

*NoTE — Agent signifies the doer, patieift the suiFerer ; action is doing, passion is suffering; *\gent and action have retained their original philosophical sense, trough patient and passion have acquired a very different meaning in common language.

24 LOGIC : OR, THE Pab'T L

his being a Roman is a mn'Z privilege, his honesty is a moml consideration, and his being inspired is suptmaturaL

VII. Modes belong either to body or to 5;pm7, or to both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal beings ; and these ?Lxeshape^ size, situation orplace^ 8fc. Modes of spirit belong only to minds ; such are 'knowledge^ assent^ dissent^ doubting^ reasonings &c. Modes which belong to both have been sometimes called mixed modes, or human modes y for these are only found in human naturie, which is compounded both of body and spirit; such are sensation^ imagination, passion^ &c. in all which there is a concurrence of the operations both oi mind and body^ that is of animal and intellectual nature.

But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. Some of them are primary modts or qualities, for they belong to bodies considered in themselves, whether there were any man to take notice of them or not ; such are those before mentioned, namely, shape, size, situation, ^c. Secondary qualities, ov modes, are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on account of the various impressions which are made on the senses of men by them ; and these are called sensible qualilies, which are very numerous ; such are all colours, as red, green, blue, §c. such are all sounds, as sharp, shrilly loud, hoarse ; all tastes, ?iS sweet, bitter, sour ; all smells, Avhether jjleasant, offensive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, or such as affect the touch or feeling, namely, heat, cold, <^x. These are properly called secondary qualities; for, though we are ready to conceive them as existing in the very bodies themselves which affect our senses, yet true philosophy has most undeniably proved that all these are really various ideas or perceptions excited in human nature by the different impressions that bodies make upon our senses, by their primary medes, that is, by means of the diQerent shape, size, motion, and position, of those little invisible parts that compose them. Thence it follows that a sicondai^ qudlity, considered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power or aptitude to produce such sensations in us: See Lockers Essay on the Understanding, Book II. Ghap.8.

VIII. I might add, in the last place, that, as modes^ belong to substances, so tliere are some aUo that are but jnodts