The problem of evil : a criticism of the Augustinian point of view

Preface

This book is not intended for the popular reader. It is a rather detailed and technical criticism of the philosophical basis of the Augustinian treatment of the problem of evil. The author does not presume to have fathomed this eternal mystery nor to have reformulated the doctrine of sin. If, however, he has set forth in a true light the historic theory which for centuries has dominated Christian thought, and has shown the absolute necessity of a reconstruction of the doctrine of sin, then in a measure he has realized his purpose. Anyone who may pick up this work, anticipating something more entertaining than a philosophical or theological discussion, would be wise to lay it down at once. If any reader does not care for the detailed arguments by which the author has arrived at his position, it is suggested that the last chapter, which summarizes his conclusions, be read first.

The present volume was written, as it now stands, while the author was still a graduate student in the department of philosophy at Yale University. Parts of it have been delivered before the George Barker Stevens Theological Club of Yale and the Manhattan Congregational Ministers' Association of New York City. While the author occupied the chair of Systematic Theology in Yale Divinity School much of the material here presented was incorporated in lectures before the students of that institution.

The present work grew out of a suggestion made to

PREFACE

the writer by the late Professor George B. Stevens. The suggestion was that there existed a distinct need for a complete and impartial statement and criticism of the speculative basis upon which the Augustinian doctrine of sin rests. Consequently it has been the definite aim of the writer to formulate such a statement, endeavoring to make it at once historical, critical and constructive. Augustine was a man of keen spiritual insight; he was also a profound philosopher. He affirmed that his mind preferred nothing to the discovery of truth. It is in keeping, therefore, with the Augustinian spirit and mode of procedure to approach our task from the purely intellectual standpoint.

The writer has sought to deal with the problem from a philosophical rather than from a religious point of view. That the problem of evil lends itself to both forms of treatment is apparent, but the task here undertaken concerns itself primarily with the rational grounds of our author's position. It is for this reason that the biblical material pertaining to the origin and nature of sin has not been given fuller consideration. The writer has not felt called upon to enter into a discussion of the questions that might be raised in regard to biblical sources. Those inquiries lie outside the scope of the present work.

The writer wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor George H. Palmer of Harvard University for valuable suggestions relating especially to the conception of evil and the problem of freedom. To Professor Charles M. Bakewell, of Yale University, the author takes this occasion to record his deep gratitude for many suggestions and criticisms which have been invaluable.

PREFACE

The end sought in compiling the bibliography has not been to offer a complete list of works bearing upon every phase of Augustine's thought, but rather to indicate those which have actually been used and have proven especially helpful in dealing with the particular aspect of the system here under examination. We include in the bibliography only a partial list of Augustine's own works, selecting such as bear directly upon the problem of evil.

Marion LeRoy Burton.

May 5, 1909.

Brooklyn — New York City.

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I. The Problem i

God, the source of all being, i. — Analysis of the conception " natura," 5. — Creation ex nihilo, 14. — Presence of evil, 18. — Relation of malum and peccatum, 21.

Chapter I

The problem of evil exists because mankind believes in a wise and benevolent Creator. It is because man in his better moods believes that the universe is grounded in love, that evil has demanded an explanation. Abolish God and evil needs no explanation. Consequently we can most readily understand what the problem of evil was for Augustine by beginning with a statement of his conception of God.

GOD, THE SOURCE OF ALL BEING.

To Augustine God was in himself the supreme existence, the author of all being, and the source of all life. At the very apex of all being is God, the only immutable nature. The nine years which Augustine spent in a vain endeavor to understand and to accept fully the principles of Manicheism resulted in his complete rejection and utter repudiation of its dualism, and in his rigorous insistence upon one and only one eternal Being. Remembering that to Augustine anything is good in so far as it exists or is, and that God is the supreme existence, we can understand why God is regarded by him as the " summum bonum." x

Furthermore God is not only the one immutable

1 " Ipse summum bonum est "— Liber de Diver. Qusest. LXXXIII. XXI.

i good, he is also the author of all life. Here we must not forget the emphasis that Augustine places upon the word " all." God is not the source of a part of the life of the universe but of the life of everything that exists. This, too, is his answer to Manichean dualism. He cannot be too explicit. He asserts that there is no life whatsoever, in so far as it is life at all, which does not find its origin in God, the one and only source of true life. " Nullam esse qualemlibet vitam, quae non eo ipso quo vita est, et in quantum omnino vita est, ad summum vitse fontem principiumque pertineat: quod nihil aliud quam summum et solum verumque Deum possumus confiteri." 2 In his Retractions Augustine takes the opportunity to explain the sense in which he wished this to be understood. While still defending the position that God is the one author of life, he insists upon a distinction between the Creator and the creature. 3 The latter is to be regarded as of Him but not as a part of Him.

In this same writing against the Manicheans he argues further that God is the author not only of all life but of all being and existence. Whatever exists, and just in so far as it exists, receives its being from God. " Omne quidquid esset, quoniam esset in quantumcumque esset, ex uno Deo esse." 4 There can be no question as to Augustine's view upon this point. Everywhere throughout his writings this conception is frequent : " qui omnium quae sunt auctor

2 De D^bus Anim. c. Manich. i.

3 " Ita dixi, ut tanquam creatura ad Creatorem pertinere intelligatur, non auetm de illo esse tanquam pars ejus existimetur." I. cap. XV. I.

4 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. g, io.

GOD, THE SOURCE OF ALL BEING 3

est." 5 The only cause of all created things, whether visible or invisible, is the goodness of the Creator. Absolutely nothing is, or has existence, except God Himself, that does not owe its existence to Him. 6 All natures and all substances, although not parts of God Himself, are made by Him, and owe their being to Him. 7

Without anticipating a section in Chapter III in which we deal with God's relation to evil, it must be pointed out at this juncture that Augustine did not regard these statements as making God the author of evil. Evil is that which tends to nonexistence, and therefore, God as the author of that which is, is in no sense the author of that which is not. 8 But what is God's relation to all the evil things which exist? Do they subsist without any connection with Him? If so, must not our author admit the necessity of the Manichean principle of evil?

As we shall see in the second chapter, evil tends to nonexistence. Everything in so far as it exists is good. This good nature it has from God. Evil is the diminution or falling away of this good nature. Therefore as the evil increases, being must decrease s Liber de Diver. Qusest. LXXXIII. XXI. 6 Enchir. IX.

7 " Item dixisti mihi, Domine, voce forti in aurem interiorem, quod omnes naturas atque substantias quae non sunt quod tu es, et tamen sunt, tu fecisiti :" Conf. XII. 11.

8 " Quo circa cum in Catholica dicitur, omnium naturarum atque substantiarum esse auctorem Deum, simul intellegitur ab eis qui hoc possunt intelligere, non esse Deum auctorem mali. Quomodo eum potest ille, qui omnium quae sunt, causa est ut sint, causa esse rursus ut non sint, id est, ut ab essentia deficiant, et ad non esse tendant ? " De Mor. Manich. II. 3.

and just as you expect to put your hand on the summum malum it vanishes into non-being. Thus all that exists, even if evil has made its inroads upon its being, still derives all its existence from God, who is the sole principle of the universe. Augustine insists upon this in the most rigorous fashion. " Ego quidem conditorem hominum omnium, quamvis omnes sub peccato nascantur, et pereant nisi renascantur, non dico nisi Deum. Vitium quippe inseminatum est persuasione diaboli, per quod sub peccato nati sunt, non natura condita qua homines sunt." 9 Here we see that Augustine, while clinging to original sin, still maintains that God alone is the Creator of man.

In another section of this same work he raises this specific question: In what sense does God create evil beings? His answer is that He creates them in the sense that He bestows on them what pertains to the goodness of nature. The very fact that a human being exists, even though he be evil, is proof that he has good which pertains to all nature and is the bestowal of God. 10 This same principle appears when our author attempts to account for the evil will possessed by man. God provides a good nature and just punishment, but the evil will man obtains from himself. 11

10 " Sic itaque creat malos quomodo pascit et nutrit malos : quia quod eis creando tribuit, ad naturae pertinent bonitatem; et quod eis pascendo et nutriendo dat incrementum, non utique malitiae eorum, sed eidem bonae naturae quam creavit bonus, bonum tribuit adjumentum. In quantum enim homines sunt, bonum est naturae, cujus auctor est Deus: in quantum autem cum peccato nascuntur, perituri si non renascuntur, ad semen pertinent maledictum ab initio, illius antiquae inobedentiae vitio." Ibid. II. 32.

11 " A se quippe habent voluntatem malum, ab illo autem

NATURA 5

Evil in man then does not owe its origin to God, nor on the contrary can either man or evil exist except as God provides the good gift of nature. Evil can only arise from nature. It has nothing to which it may attach itself, unless nature is provided, and God alone creates this substratum. 12 The vigor with which Augustine clings to this belief reaches its culmination in the assertions that vicious souls, not in so far as they are vicious, but in so far as they are souls must be regarded as creatures of God, 13 and that even the devil and all the evil angels subsist only because God provides their life and nature. 14

This is sufficient to show how Augustine's conception of God contributed to the problem of evil as he conceived it. God is the one supreme and unchangeable existence, the source of all life, the author of all being, including that being and nature into which evil has entered. 15

ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTION, " NATURA.*'

God then is the Creator. But what has He created? The answer is " nature." Here then we come upon a technical term of Augustine's. His use of the word et naturam bonam et justam poenam." De Genesi ad Lit. XL 12.

12 " Quia nee oriri malum potest, nisi ex natura ; nee ubi sit habet si non fuerit in natura. Confiteor igitur opus Dei esse qui nascitur, etiam trahens originale malum." Cont. Jul. Pelag. III. 56.

13 De Duabus Anim. c. Manich. 5.

1* De Trin. XIII. XII. 16.

15 Cf. Fairbairn who says, referring to Augustine : " There is but one God, one supreme essence from whom whatever is, holds its existence." The Phil, of the Christ. Religion, p. ioo.

" natura " must be carefully analysed if we are to understand the problem of evil as he formulated it. Augustine's thought cannot be understood apart from the controversies into which he entered, and the philosophies which he combated. This is pre-eminently true in any effort to understand his conception of " natura." That conception was formulated in his endeavor first to combat Manichean dualism and then on the other hand to oppose the over-exaltation of human nature by Pelagianism.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of Manicheism. It is sufficient for our purpose to recall that Manichseus asserted a most radical dualism. 1 The evil principle which he set over against God and made continual with Him, was according to Alexander of Lycopolis, MA^: God he affirmed to be good, and matter evil. Thus the Kingdom of Darkness was practically identified with 'vkrj. Or to state it from a slightly different point of view, VAry belonged completely to the Kingdom of Darkness and was without origin. But not only the supposition that all matter was evil and belonged to a Kingdom wholly independent of God, but also the belief that creation was a necessity for God, and that his works were made out of substances derived from other sources than himself, and that these works served as a barrier against his enemies, preventing further rebellion, 2 —

1 " Mani teaches : Two subsistences from the beginning of the world, the one light, the other darkness; the two are separated from each other. The light is the first most glorious being, limited by no number, God himself, the King of the Paradise of Light. — The other being is the darkness, and his numbers are five: cloud, burning, hot wind, poison and darkness." Fihrist quoted in Nic. and Post-Nic. Fath. IV. n,

2 Conf. XIII. 45.

NATURA 7

all of this was the background against which Augustine developed his conception of nature.

In the first section of this chapter we have seen that Augustine portrays God as the source of all life in opposition to the Manichean principle of evil, in this section we must find his answer to their belief that all created things are evil. Augustine found it necessary to so shape his idea of nature that he could take a position midway between Manicheism and Pelagianism. He would not vituperate human nature as did the Manicheans, for God was the author of all existence, nor could he credulously praise it as did the Pelagians, for his theological opinions demanded that he recognize a fatal " vitium " in all human nature. 3 It is only as we remember that Augustine was attempting to steer between this Scylla and Charybdis that we will rightly understand his notion of " natura." Thus three distinct theories are presented to us, that of the Manicheans, that of the Pelagians, and that of the Catholics as represented by Augustine.

Our author himself has attempted to draw a clear demarcation between the three positions. He says : " Catholici dicunt humanam naturam a creatore Deo bono conditam bonam, sed peccato vitiatam medico Christo indigere. Manichsei dicunt humanam naturam, non a Deo conditam bonam peccatoque vitiatam, sed ab seternarum principe tenebrarum de commixtione duarum naturarum, quae semper fuerunt, una bona et una mala, hominem creatum. Pelagiani

8 "Ac per hoc Manichaeus quidem naturam humanam detestabiliter vituperat, sed tu crudeliter laudas." Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CXXXVIII. See also ibid. III. CXLIV.

et Coelestiani dicunt humanam naturam a bono Deo conditam bonam, sed ita esse in nascentibus parvulis sanam, ut Christi non habeant necessariam in ilia setate medicinam." 4 This then is the historical setting in which we find Augustine's conception of " natura " developing.

Now what is this " natura " ? It is easier to find Augustine answering this question by telling us that there are several kinds of nature, that it is good, that it is necessary for the existence of everything, even of evil, than it is to find a definite conception as to what nature actually is. But as we go on in this discussion we shall see that nature is practically synonymous with being or existence. 5 Nature is that which is. Nature, just in so far as it is nature, exists. When, in the second chapter, we come to see what our author's conception of evil is, we shall find that it is that which is " contra naturam." But evil is that which tends to nonexistence, to non-being. Nature, therefore, is being or existence.

Nature then, from another point of view is substance, it is " substantia," the underlying something which gives being and existence to all reality, whether finite or infinite, whether physical or spiritual, whether visible or invisible. 6 At times Augustine seems to

5 " Nam et ipsa natura nihil est aliud, quam id quod intelligitur in suo genere aliquid esse." De Mor. Manich. II. 2.

6 " Dicitur homo, dicitur pecus, dicitur terra, dicitur ccelum, dicitur sol, luna, lapis, mare, ser : omnia ista substantias sunt, eo ipso quo sunt. Naturae ipsa, substantia dicuntur. Deus est quaedam substantia ; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo aliquid esse est." Enar. in Ps. LXVIII. 5-

NATURA 9

approximate closely Aristotle's conception of 'vXrj. Especially in the Confessions we find him speaking of a certain formlessness which is almost nothing and yet is not altogether nothing. It exists and is the formless something whose good is its existence and its capacity for form. 7 " Nonne tu, Domine, docuisti me, quod priusquam istam informen materiam formares atque distingueres, non erat aliquid; non color, non figura, non corpus, non spiritus? Non tamen omnino nihil : erat qusedam informitas sine ulla specie." 8 A similar conception seems to underlie the phrase " ipsam adhuc informen inchoationem verum formabilem creabilemque materiam," 9 which suggests a substance formless but capable of receiving form and making.

" Natura " then is existence or being. This becomes more apparent when our author begins to point out that nature assumes a threefold aspect. There is a mutable nature which falls into two classes, " corpus " and " anima." There is the one immutable nature, which is God, the supreme existence. 10

We are now prepared to observe how Augustine opposes this idea to Manicheism. God is the Creator of this nature, and therefore all nature is good. Even that material which is absolutely formless and without quality is not to be called evil. It possesses the

7 De Natura Boni c. Manich. 18.

10 " Est natura per locos et tempora mutabilis, ut corpus. Et est natura per locos nullo modo, sed tantum per tempora, ut anima. Et est natura quae nee per locos, nee per tempora mutari potest, hoc Deus est." Ep. XVIII. 2. Cf. De Mor. Manich. IV. 6.

io THE PROBLEM

capacity for form, and that in itself is an unquestionable good. 11 Here he is diametrically opposed to the Manicheans who held that 'vA^ belonged completely to the evil world. But Augustine does not pause with his assertion about l vX-q, he maintains repeatedly that all nature in so far as it is nature is good. 12 He uses late in life the same thought in combating Pelagianism. Thus he writes against Julianus : " Ita ut omnino nulla natura sit quae non aut ipse sit, aut ab ipso facta sit; ut quantacumque aut qualiscumque natura sit, in quantum natura est, bonum sit." 13

This doctrine reaches its fullest expression when our author argues that if the nature is purer when the evil is removed, and does not exist at all if the good is taken away, then it must be the good which makes the nature of the thing, and the evil is not nature, but against nature. " Si ergo malo illo adempto manet natura purgatior, bono autem detracto non manet ulla natura : hoc ibi f acit naturam quod bonum habet; quod autem malum, non natura, sed contra

11 " Neque enim vel ilia materies quam antiqui hylen dixerunt, malum dicenda est. — Sed hylen dico quamdam penitus informem et sine qualitate materiem, unde istae quas sentimus qualitates formantur, ut antiqui dixerunt. Hinc enim et silva grsece vXtj dicitur quod operantibus apta sit, non ut aliquid ipsa faciat, sed unde aliquid fiat. Porro si bonum aliquod est forma, unde qui ea prevalent, formosi appelantur, sicut a specie speciosi, procul dubio bonum aliquod est etiam capacitas formse." De Natura Boni c. Manich. XVIII.

12 " Quapropter quod verissime dicitur, omnis natura inquantum natura est, bona est — Omnis igitur substantia aut Deus, aut ex Deo, quia omne bonum aut Deus aut ex Deo." De Lib. Arbit. III. 36. See also Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV where he uses the same words, and De Natura Boni c. Manich. XIX.

13 Cont. Jul. Pel. I. 36 fin.

NATURA ii

naturam est — Unde intelligitur eas, in quantum naturae sunt, bonas esse: quia cum eis vicissim omne quod bonum habent detraxeris, naturae nullae erunt." 14

Here then the good is the nature, and everything so far as it is nature, is good. Remove the good and no nature remains. It is very apparent that we are dealing here with a metaphysical not a moral good. Confusion between these two conceptions and the failure to distinguish them clearly has led to much error. It is upon this distinction that the question of reality in good and evil must be based.

If we should conclude our statement of Augustine's conception of " natura " at this juncture we would do him an injustice. All nature is good but all natures are not equally good. 15 It has already been pointed out in this chapter that Augustine regarded God as the one supreme existence, the one immutable good. God then is the one nature which is supremely good. God is good not by any participation in good, but solely by virtue of his own nature and essence. 16 The things which God has created are all good but their goodness lies in their participation in God's goodness

" Cont. Ep. Manich. XXXIII. 36.

15 Cont. Ep. Manich. XXV. 27.

16 " Hoc enim maxime esse dicendum est, quod semper eodem modo esse habet, quod omnimodo sui simile est, quod nulla ex parte corrumpi ac mutari potest, quod non subjacet tempori, quod aliter nunc se habere quam habebat antea, non potest. Id enim est quod esse verissime dicitur. Subest enim huic verbo manetis in se atque incommutabiliter sese habentis naturae significatio. Hanc nihil aliud quam Deum possumus dicere, cui si contrarium recte quseras nihil omnino est. Esse enim contrarium non habet nisi non esse. Nulla est ergo Deo natura contraria." De Mor. Manich. I. 1. See also ibid. IV. 6, and De Perf. Just. Horn. XIV. 32.

and in his bestowal of nature. 17 Hence they are not equal to God. Their good is not supreme and unchangeable, and yet they are good. 18 Thus we find gradations in nature, some natures are more excellent than others, and yet all, from the highest to the lowest order, are good. 19 It is apparent here that Augustine on the one hand is endeavoring to combat the Manichean idea that all matter is evil, and at the same time to state what to-day is recognized as a truism, viz., that the creature is finite, that the very fact of being derived or created involves metaphysical imperfection. This Augustine has clearly formulated in the statement : " Ita et Deus summum bonum est, et ea quae fecit, bona sunt omnia quamvis non sint tarn bona, quam est ille ipse qui fecit. Quis enim hoc tarn insanus audet exigere, ut sequalia sint artifici opera, et condita conditori ? " 20

If one asks wherein the various natures differ, or in what sense they are all good but not equally good, the answer lies in the fact that the works of God are capable of change. Augustine attacks the Manichean belief of two principles, one good and the other evil, and asserts that both are good. Applying it to the case of man he affirms that both the spirit and the flesh are good. They differ from the highest good only in that they are capable of change. 21 Nor can we justly pause here in the analysis of Augustine's conception of nature. All nature is good and

* 7 De Mor. Manich. IV. 6.

isEnchir. X.

is Cont. Ep. Manich. XXV. 27.

20 De Mor. Manich. IV. 6. Also Acta seu Disp. c. Fort. 12 and 21.

NATURA 13

without nature, evil could not exist. 22 " Non enim potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono; quia non potest esse nisi in aliqua natura." 23 He even ventures to apply this to human nature, which he always rigorously insists is corrupted by a fatal flaw. But regardless of this original taint, human nature is not evil because it is nature, but because it is vitiated. 24 We also find the converse of this. Not only is no evil possible without some nature to which to attach itself, and thus convert its negativity and sham existence into act, but also all evil is good in so far as it is nature. 25 The secret of such a paradoxical statement lies in the failure to distinguish between " bonum metaphysicum " and " bonum morale." To assert that evil is a good in so far as it is nature, certainly does not apply to the ethical meaning of the word good. We are dealing with two separate and distinct spheres.

Augustine even uses the existence of evil and vice to prove that nature is good. The vices themselves are testimonials to the fact that nature is good. For were it not good, vices could not hurt it. 26 Indeed, evil would never have existed had not good nature, 26 though mutable, brought evil upon itself. And this

22 Enchir. XIV. Cf. also Ep. CLIII. 3, and De Nupt. et Concup. II. 48.

2 3 Op. Imp. c. Jul. I. CXIV.

24 " Natura humana, etsi mala est, quia vitiata est, non tamen malum est, quia natura est. Nulla enim natura in quantum natura est, malum est; sed prorsus bonum, sine quo bono ullum esse non potest malum: quia nisi in aliqua natura ullum esse non potest vitium." Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CCVI. See also Cont. duas Ep. Ped. II. 8.

25 Enchir. XIII. also Op. Imp. c. Jul. III. CXCVI.

26 Civ. Dei XII. 3.

very sin is itself evidence that its nature was originally good. For just as blindness is a vice of the eye, this very fact indicating that originally the eye was made to see the -light, so vices in man indicate that his nature was originally good. 27

It is now evident that to Augustine " natura " was a very definite conception. It grew out of his strife with the Manicheans and Pelagians, and formed the basis of his opposition to both these philosophies. His fundamental idea is that all nature is good. All natures are not equally good, for one is immutable, and others are capable of change, but nevertheless all nature, in so far as it is nature, is good. Indeed without nature, no evil could exist, and even evil in so far as it is nature is good. The very existence or presence of evil is testimony to the fact that all nature is good. Clearly this " bonum " must be interpreted as " bonum metaphysicum." The following sentence sums up his conception of " natura " and at the same time prepares the way for his negative view of evil. " Ei ergo qui summe est, non potest esse contrarium nisi quod non est : ac per hoc sicut ab illo est omne quod bonum est sic ab illo est omne quod naturaliter est; quoniam omne quod naturaliter est, bonum est. Omnis itaque natura bona est, et omne bonum a Deo est : omnis ergo natura a Deo est." 28

CREATION EX NIHILO.

God then is the Creator, the sole source of all life and being, and that which He creates is nature, which,

27 Civ. Dei XXII. i.

28 De Natura Boni c. Manich. XIX.

CREATION EX NIHILO 15

in so far as it is nature, is good. Have we not then a closed circle? How, under this conception of Creator and creatura can any place be found for malum and peccatum? We would fail to understand Augustine's metaphysics if, at this juncture, we did not recognize his doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and what it involves in regard to the possibility of evil. We would not rightly conceive the problem of evil as it shaped itself in the mind of Augustine, if after stating his conception of God and nature, we did not recognize this basal condition which he places over all creation. When in Chapter III we come to a consideration of the question " Whence is evil ? " we shall see the importance of this idea. Here for the sake of completeness in the statement of the problem, we need only to recognize this element in his thought, and show what it involves in regard to the possibility and existence of evil.

We find this doctrine stated repeatedly throughout the works of Augustine. In an early philosophical work written in the year 387 A. D. we find this sentence : " Deus qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti, quern omnium oculi sentiunt pulcherrimum." x The distinction upon which Augustine insists is that all created things were made by God but not of God. 2 Yet the matter out of which God created his works was not some substance not his own, nor any substance that existed before creation. 2 This doctrine then of creation ex nihilo shows evidences of having been developed and set forth in opposition to the Manichean notion of creation, which held that God