Theism and the Christian faith : lectures delivered in the Harvard Divinity School

Front matter

Class Bl? l Q&

Book l—

CopyrightN°_

Preface

As professor of systematic theology in the Divinity School of Harvard University, Dr. Everett gave regularly, each year, three courses of lectures which constituted together a unified body of theological instruction. In the first of these courses, he dealt with the psychological roots of religion which he found in the feelings appropriate to the three ideas of the reason, — truth, goodness and beauty. In the second course, on historical religions, his purpose was to present various systems as typical manifestations, first, of the religion of the understanding, Confucianism, and second, of religions in which one or another of the three ideas was particularly emphasized : truth, in the religions of India, especially in the Vedanta and Sankhya systems of philosophy; goodness, in Mazdeism; beauty in the religion of Greece. In the third course Dr. Everett first unfolded the philosophical implications of the three ideas in a doctrine of God as Absolute Spirit, in whom they have full realization, and then considered in the light of them the fundamental problems of theology, and presented Christianity as the Absolute Religion because comprehending in harmonious perfection all three ideas of the reason. Of these courses, the first has already been published ( The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith, edited by Edward Hale, Macmillan Co. 1902), and was so well received that the Committee of the Divinity Faculty having its publication in charge felt warranted in proceeding to issue the third course, especially as the Rev. Edward Hale, who had edited so admirably the previous volume, was willing to undertake the much severer task of preparing this course also for publication. The difficulties of the work were enormous: Dr. Everett left no manuscripts of his lectures, and the editor's sole reliance had to be upon students'

IV PREFACE

notes taken in the class-room. Moreover, these lectures dealt with profound and intricate problems, in the discussion of which much depends upon a precision of statement rarely found in class-room notes. In addition, the treatment varied from year to year, far more than was the case with lectures in the first course, according to the changing demands of theological interest and the corresponding shiftings of emphasis on the part of the lecturer. The magnitude and delicacy of the task are mainly responsible for the delay in the preparation and publication of the present volume, but it is believed that the former students and many friends of Dr. Everett, as well as all who are interested in the subjects here discussed, will welcome this literary memorial of a subtle and luminous thinker who, as his mural tablet in the chapel of the School he loved and served justly says, "showed by life and doctrine the unity of the Spirit in Truth, Goodness, and Beauty."

W. W. Fenn, For the Faculty of Divinity.

Harvard University, June, 1909.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

The thirty-five chapters into which this book is divided represent some ninety lectures, the number in the course varying a little from year to year. In preparing them for publication I have been indebted to the Rev. F. M. Bennett, the Rev. J. B. W. Day, the Rev. W. F. Furman, Professor H. H. Home, the Rev. W. R. Hunt, and Professor H. H. Williams for the use of their notes, and to the Harvard Divinity Library for the use of notes taken by the late Rev. Samuel Foster McCleary. All of these notes have been helpful, but I am under especial obligation to Mr. Furman whose careful transcription of his shorthand notes has enabled me to reproduce many passages with a fulness which otherwise would hardly have been possible.

Edward Hale.

Chapter I. Page

Agnosticism. — The Unknowable op Herbert Spencer ... 1

CHAPTER II. The Vorstellxjng 9

The Analogy between the Supernatural Element in the

Universe and the Principle of Unity in Human Life, 15 The Three Ideas of the Reason as Guides in finding a Philosophic Basis for the Term "Spiritual" as applied to the Absolute 16

CHAPTER IX. The A Priori Argument 70

The Argument from Attributes: Samuel Clarke ... 71

The Argument from Definition: Anselm 72

The Definition of Perfection 73

The Argument from the Nature of the Divine Being:

Spinoza 75

The Argument from the Nature of Man's Apprehension

of the Divine Being: Descartes 80

CHAPTER X. Positive Discussion of the A Priori Argument 83

The Argument from Universality of Belief 84

The A Priori Argument as involved in the Three Ideas

of the Reason 88

CHAPTER XL

The Positive Discussion of the A Priori Argument continued. — The Advantages of the Argument from the

Three Ideas of the Reason 98

Chapter XII

The Second General Division of the Discussion: the Moment of Negation: Creation, Freedom, Sin and Evil 105

Theories of Creation 106

Theories of Creation as having a Beginning or as without a Beginning. — The Difficulties of either Theory 107

CONTENTS IX

Chapter XIII. Page

Theories of Creation, continued. — Vorstellungen:

The Word; Body and Soul; Child and Parent .... 117 Creation in relation to the Created: Supremacy of

Spirit in the Universe the Mark of Creation . . 123

The Account of Creation 123

Scientific Theories as to the Beginning of the World 125 Scientific Theories as to the Nature of the World:

The Atomic Theory 126

Chapter XIV

Scientific Theories as to the Nature of the World, continued: Idealistic Theories 132

Mind-Stuff 133

Creation the Objectification of the Divine Idea: Limit, Impenetrability, Divisibility 135

Theory of Organic Development: Natural Selection . . 136

The A Posteriori Argument 143

Chapter XV

The A Posteriori Argument, continued. — The Need of the Teleological Principle to account for the Results

of Atomic Organization 147

The Teleological Principle and Chance 148

The Teleological Principle as involving Natural Selection 154

Are there any results that cannot be produced by Atomic Organization ? — Life. — Mind with its Powers. — the Unity of Consciousness 159

CHAPTER XVI. The Mind and its Powers, continued. — The Will 165

The Idea of Perfection 169

The Principle of Teleology as involving the " World-Soul."

— Von Hartmann's Theory of the Unconscious . . 174

X CONTENTS

CHAPTER XVI.— continued page

The Movement of the World toward Consciousness . 176 The Movement of the World toward the Three Ideas

of the Reason as Ideals 178

CHAPTER XVII. The A Posteriori Argument the Complement of the A Priori

Argument 185

Religion and the Theory of Natural Selection 189

CHAPTER XVIII. The Beginnings of Creation 194

Man's Power to think in General Concepts 199

As illustrated in the Story of the Garden of Eden . . 200

Self-Consciousness and the Sense of the Supernatural, 201

The Sense of the Comic 204

The Sense of Beauty 205

Man the Ultimate Product in the Process of Development, 207

CHAPTER XIX. The Second Stage in the Moment of Negation

The Doctrine of Freedom 210

Automatism: Reflex Action 211

Formal Freedom, or Freedom of the Will 215

The A Priori Argument against Freedom of the Will . 217 The A Posteriori Argument against Freedom of the

Will 220

The So-Called Practical Argument against Freedom of

the Will 222

The Argument in Favor of Freedom of the Will based

on Direct Self-Consciousness 223

The Argument in Favor of Freedom of the Will based

on the Moral Consciousness 224

CHAPTER XX. Freedom of the Will, continued. — Its Limits 227

Freedom of the Will as the Power to put more or less

of Earnestness into Life 229

CONTENTS XI

CHAPTER XX — continued page Effect of this View upon the A Priori and A Posteriori

Arguments against Freedom of the Will 231

Absolute Freedom 233

The Meaning of the Terms "Nature" and "Natural" . . . 234

The Divine Freedom 237

CHAPTER XXI. The Third Stage in the Moment of Negation

Sin and Evil. — The Theory of Sin dependent upon the

Theory of Freedom of the Will 239

Conscious and Unconscious Sin 240

Attainment not a Measure of the Amount of Sin . . 243

Sin Primarily a State. — Sin negative 246

Sin for its own Sake 249

Sin from the Desire to cause Suffering 251

CHAPTER XXII. Sin as Selfishness 254

Sin as Death 256

The Meanness of Sin. — Sin in Relation to the Doctrine of

Evolution 258

Theories of Sin which take away its Sinfulness 259

The Three Bases of the Doctrine of the Church in regard

to Sin 264

Chapter XXIII

The Doctrine of Evil. — Evil as independent of Sin .... 273 Pessimism: Theories of Schopenhauer and Von Hart-

MANN 276

CHAPTER XXD7.

The Breach caused by Sin and Evil: between Man and his

Environment: between Man and God 285

The Movement on the Part of Man to heal the Breach :

Sacrifice 289

Vicarious Sacrifice. Real and Formal 291

Xll CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXIV.— continued page

The Movement on the Part of God to heal the Breach :

Penalty. — Retribution and Reform 292

The Nature of the Penalties for Sin 296

The Final Healing of the Breach 300

CHAPTER XXV. The Third General Division of the Discussion

Reconciliation. — The Doctrine of the Atonement . . 301

The " Cur Deus Homo " of Anselm 303

Peter Lombard 308

Thomas Aquinas 309

The Reformation 309

The Socinians and Grotius 310

The Doctrine of the Atonement as involving the Principle of Vicarious Suffering 314

The Change of Attitude toward Vicarious Suffering: the Explanation of it suggested by Comte's Theory

of the Human Understanding 315

CHAPTER XXVI. Modern Theories of the Atonement: McLeod Campbell and

Dorner 317

bushnell and newman smyth 318

The Pauline View 320

The Doctrine of the Trinity: Dorner and Shedd 323

The Argument from the New Testament 325

The Doctrine of the Incarnation : Dorner and Ritschl . . 326 The Nature of Jesus and of the Holy Spirit considered as the Arrival of the Spiritual Principle in the

World at Complete Self-Consciousness 328

CHAPTER XXVII. Christianity as the Absolute Religion 334

The Three Ideas of the Reason the Test of Absolute Religion. — Christianity and Unity 336

Christianity and Beauty 341

CONTENTS Xlll

CHAPTER XXVII.— continued page Christianity and the Needs of the Understanding and the

Heart 342

The Teaching of the New Testament 345

Christianity and Modern Thought 349

Chapter XXVIII

Christianity as the Absolute Religion: the Practical Aspect. — The Precepts of Christianity General and

Intuitive 352

The Teaching of Christianity embodied in the Personality of Jesus 353

The Life of Jesus an Ideal for all Lives 354

The Sinlessness of Jesus 354

The Character of his Life Universal 357

CHAPTER XXIX. The Divine Appointment of Jesus 365

His Divinity ' 368

Miracles: their A Priori Possibility or Impossibility . . . 371

The Value attributed to them in the New Testament, 379

Their Value in Themselves 381

The Question as to the Actual Occurrence of the New

Testament Miracles 387

CHAPTER XXX. The Use of the Name "Christ" 391

The Question whether Jesus himself claimed the Title

of Messiah 395

The Use of the Names "Christian" and "Christianity" . . 395

The Acceptance of the Leadership of Jesus 397

Free Religion 401

The Relation of other Religions to Christianity 403

The "Quale" of Christianity 404

The Fifth Definition of Religion . 408

CHAPTER XXXIV. Immortality 465

The Argument from Reappearance 466

The Argument from Analogy 468

The Argument from Physico-Psychological Phenomena 469

The Argument from the Unity of Consciousness . . . 470

The Philosophico-Teleological Argument 473

The Ethical Argument 476

The Argument from the Sense of the Ideal 478

The Argument from the Consciousness of God .... 478

The Argument from Man's Instinctive Faith 480

Difficulties: Immortality of Animals: Pre-Existence: . . . 482

The Question of Selfishness 483

Nature of the Future Life 486

The Argument for Religion of Personal Experience . . . 488

The Sixth and Final Definition of Religion 489

CHAPTER XXXV. The Authority of the Church 490

Baptism 490

Communion 491

SYLLABUS.

i

This syllabus, furnished to students in later years, covered the first and third courses in Dr. Everett's theological instruction. The part numbered from 1 to 23 corresponds to the first course, the substance of which was published in 1902 under the title, The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith. It has been thought best to print the syllabus here entire, with page references to the two volumes.

FIEST GENERAL DIVISION.

ABSTRACT AND IDEAL.

The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith.

1. Introduction

2. Methods in Theology

3. Essential Elements of Religion 13

4. Primacy of Feeling 20

5. First Definition of Religion 51

6. Historical and Critical , "]

7. The 'position of Schleiermacher ^52

8. Spencer's Reconciliation of Science and Religion J

9. Positive Statement 86

10. Second Definition of Religion 88

1 1 . Analysis of Definition 89

12. Two Aspects of Supernatural 93

13. 1. Negative 97

14. 2. Positive 108

15. Induction of Concrete Religious Feelings with Table * . . . .

16. Practical Development of Religion by the Objectification of

facts of consciousness

17. Relation of these to Ideas of Reason shown by analysis . . .

*This table is not reproduced in the published volume.

XVI SYLLABUS

PAGE

18. Free Religious Feelings 132

19. Relation of these to Ideas of Reason 133

20. First Idea of Reason 150

21. Second Idea of Reason 170

22. Third Idea of Reason 196

23. Third Definition of Religion 208

Theism.

24. Are more positive and definite results possible ? 1

25. Historical and Critical ]

26. The "Unknowable" of Herbert Spencer J

27. Positive Statement 9

28. The use of Vorstellungen 10

29. Ideas of Reason as guides 17

30. First Idea of Reason.

31. In Time = Eternity 18

32. In Space = Immensity 26

33. Ideal Unity = Omniscience 48

34. Dynamic Unity = Omnipotence 53

35. Fourth Definition of Religion 55

36. Second Idea of Reason 56

37. Third Idea of Reason 60

38. [Relation of results reached to real Being. This examina-

tion takes form in:]

39. The First Argument:— A Priori 70

40. Historical and Critical 71

41. Positive Statement 83

42. SECOND GENERAL DIVISION.

THE MOMENT OF NEGATION.

43. I. In relation to the First Idea of the Reason.

44. a. Creation 105

45. The Second Argument: — A Posteriori 143

46. b. Freedom 210

47. II. In relation to the Second Idea of the Reason.

Sin 239

48. III. In relation to the Third Idea of the Reason.

Evil 273

SYLLABUS XV11

PAGE

49. Transition to Third General Division 285

50. a. Punishment

, 289

51. o. sacrifice

52. THIRD GENERAL DIVISION.

RECONCILIATION.

Historical and Critical |

53. The Trinity I

54. The Incarnation |

55. The Atonement j

56. Positive Statement: —

57. Christianity the absolute Religion 334

[Embodying the Three Ideas of the Reason, etc.]

58. The Person and Work of Christ 353

59. Fifth Definition of Religion 408

60. The Inner Life of Christianity.

61. A. General.

62. Inspiration and Revelation 1

63. Doctrine of the Holy Spirit j

64. B. In the life of the Individual.

66. Repentance 446

70. Immortality 465

71. The Third Argument: That from Personal Experience .... 489

72. Sixth Definition of Religion 489

73. Outer Form of Christianity "1

The Church and its rites j

THEISM AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

Chapter I. Agnosticism. — The Unknowable Of Herbert Spencer

In the examination of the psychological elements of religious faith which has already been made 1 religion was first defined as essentially feeling. To this was added in a second definition that it is feeling toward the supernatural. Both of these definitions were inclusive, covering all forms of religion. A third definition, however, was then reached, no longer absolutely inclusive but typical, that religion is a feeling toward a supernatural presence manifesting itself in truth, goodness and beauty. Although the term "supernatural" is in itself negative, 2 it was found that a positive content could be given to it in the three ideas of the reason. The recognition of this content, the perception that there is a presence which manifests itself in truth and goodness and beauty, makes possible a religion in which there is place for both obedience and worship. This third definition, therefore, offers the basis for a religion of a high order and one in which certain natures can rest satisfied. There are other natures, however, which require something further. They ask for a more intimate relation with the object of worship and trust. Is it possible

1 The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1902), the substance of a course of lectures by Dr. Everett introductory to the lectures on Theism.

2 AGNOSTICISM

to meet their demand and to substitute for the word " supernatural " in this definition the word " spiritual " ?

It is evident that if we attempt to take this further step we must face at once the position popularly known as agnosticism. We meet it in two forms. Of these one is based on a posteriori, the other on a priori considerations, or, from another point of view, there is on the one hand the agnosticism resulting from the inadequacy of our means of knowledge, and on the other hand that which results from the nature of the object as in itself unknowable. For example, we do not know whether the planet Mars is inhabited because as yet we lack the proper instruments to enable us to find out. Or again, the number of the grains of sand on the seashore is unknowable because the process of counting is too delicate and intricate to be carried through. In neither of these two cases is the object unknowable in itself, but only because the means at our command for attaining to knowledge are insufficient. On the other hand the length of eternity, or the extent of space, cannot be known, because of the very nature of the thing itself. Agnosticism of this kind, it should be observed, is a sign not of weakness or limitation in human reason but of strength. To know that no one can tell what are the limits of eternity or space because such limits do not exist, is not ignorance but knowledge. Agnosticism in regard to the Absolute is of this latter kind. It is based upon a priori considerations. The Absolute, being what it is, cannot be known. But here is the very contradiction which has just been suggested. To affirm that the Absolute is unknowable is to show that strictly speaking it is not unknowable; we know enough about it to know that it is unknowable. The term "unknowable" may be true in a rhetorical sense, but it cannot be used scientifically. The words "agnostic" and "agnosticism," as used by Huxley, express simply the attitude of one who lacks the evidence which would enable him either to affirm or to deny. 1 The Unknowable of Herbert Spencer expresses the a priori impossibility of attaining to knowl-

i Thomas H. Huxley, Collected Essays, Vol. V, p. 192. Also Life and Letters, Vol. I, p. 233, Vol. II, p. 235.

edge of the Absolute. The use which Huxley makes of his terms is scientific. Spencer's term can be used properly only in a rhetorical sense. When we say that the Absolute is unknowable, what we really mean, speaking accurately, is that in many of its aspects it is unknowable.

Although Spencer assumes that the Absolute is unknowable, he maintains, nevertheless, that we must believe in it. 1 We cannot, he says, "get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances." But what is meant by the consciousness of a thing ? I am conscious only of that of which I have had some experience. I can believe only to the extent to which I am able to conceive. Suppose, for instance, that I hear a noise in the next room. It excites in me a belief that something, perhaps somebody, is moving there, — what or who, I cannot say. At first thought it might seem that in such a case my belief went beyond my knowledge. But what is it that I believe ? That there is something there. What is my concept ? That it is situated thus or so. The concept is very vague, but so is the belief. The belief does not go beyond the concept. Or take an example of a different kind. Suppose you had never heard the word "boomerang," and some one uses it. It is the name of something. Do you know anything about it ? If not, what reason have you for believing in it ? You answer that you do not know about it yourself, but So-and-so does. Then you believe only this in regard to it, that it enters into the knowledge of So-and-so. But perhaps you say that it is a man who has travelled in Australia who knows about it. Then you conceive of it as in Australia. You are told further that it is a weapon, and your concept becomes clearer. Then you are told that it changes its course and that it is shaped so that it shall change its course. Here your concept will probably rest. Has your belief at any point gone beyond your concept ? Belief does not precede knowledge, because it does not extend beyond knowledge; our belief can go no further than our understanding.

In saying this, however, we have to guard against the confusion that arises if we take the term " understanding " as implying full

* First Principles, 4th ed., 1880, Chap. IV, § 26.

understanding. Our proposition is not what a man means when he says, "I will believe nothing that I cannot understand." He means that he will believe nothing which he cannot understand completely. But this would imply no belief at all, for there is nothing which you can completely understand. We have to distinguish here between a vague thought and an incomplete or abstract thought. All our concepts are more or less incomplete, but to the extent to which they are complete they are clear and real. When I look at a distant wood I see in one sense nothing but the leaves. In another sense I do not see the leaves at all. Yet my vision, in so far as it is vision, is real and clear.

As knowledge increases, however, the sense of mystery deepens. All that we know of any object at a given moment is the introduction of that object to a new set of relations not before associated with it. Darkness comes with the glimmering of light. So with knowledge comes the sense of ignorance. The two are bound together inseparably so far as any object is concerned which presents itself to us. If we let a represent what is known and x what is unknown, then all objects are presented to us in terms of ax. No a can exist by itself, but every a can be seen only as ax. If we knew everything, x would disappear; but as we move from knowledge to knowledge, the x increases more rapidly than the a, not necessarily in the form of absolute ignorance, but in our sense of ignorance, our recognition of what is still unknown. We need not feel mortification because our sense of mystery grows in this way as our knowledge increases. When, as appears to happen in the case of many persons, knowledge takes away the sense of mystery, we find usually that the knowledge in such cases has been only superficially grasped. Whenever we think deeply and exhaustively, we come upon the field of the mysterious, and as we try to communicate what we know, it is as though our knowledge were some little island in the vast sea of the unknown. Science is born of wonder, says Aristotle, and Hegel replies that wonder is born of science. Yet while it is true that there is no a without an x, we must also recognize as distinctly that there is no x without an a, no sense of mystery without some knowledge. Mystery is simply the other side of knowledge.

What is it, however, more precisely, that Spencer means by the Unknowable, and what is the process by which he reaches his thought of it ? Spencer's Unknowable is Absolute Being, the Substance of Spinoza, the Being of Hegel. He reaches the thought of it through a process of repeated abstractions. Beginning with that which is concrete, and then withdrawing the limits and conditions from concept after concept, he arrives finally at "a consciousness of something unconditioned," "not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, ideas or conceptions," but "the abstract of all thoughts, ideas or conceptions," "that which is common to them all." 1 Since any concept implies limitation, it follows that the Absolute, if thus unconditioned, cannot be conceived but is unknowable.

It is true, as Spencer assumes, that there is no thought without limitation. But is he right when he says of the Absolute that it is without limitation ? Is it, as he says, unclassified, unrelated, and unconditioned ? It is unclassified, Spencer says, because it stands alone. We might reply that one may constitute a class, but this would be superficial and would not cover the case. Every thought contains two elements, a positive and a negative, that which is more specific or individual and that which is more general or universal. Our knowledge of any object is obtained as we contrast it with something else, or as we bring it into some class larger than itself. Therefore if the Absolute cannot be thus contrasted or differentiated, it is unknowable.

The Absolute, however, is absolute being. Spencer, to be sure, speaks of it as "existence," but in so doing he uses the term carelessly. For existence implies that that of which it is used stands out from something else. It is the finite which exists; the Absolute is. Now absolute being is differentiated in two directions. In the first place, being is a common term in absolute being and finite being, and we have at once a classification which includes both. Secondly, when I affirm being I exclude non-being, and

1 First Principles, p. 98.

b THE UNKNOWABLE OF SPENCER

both non-being and being, whether absolute being or finite being, are thus differentiated, and the ultimate term must be, not absolute being, as Spencer with Hamilton assumes, but a term which shall include both what is and what is not, both being and non-being. This highest universal has no name, and since it cannot be carried up into a higher generalization it is beyond conception. What Spencer has assumed in regard to absolute being is true, not of absolute being, but of this highest universal. In the process of abstraction Spencer and Hamilton simply reached the conclusion, the ultimate term in the series, too soon. Absolute being is not the final term, but can be taken up into a higher class. Therefore the Absolute is not unclassified, and in so far is not unknowable. It is indeed the most abstract term which we use, but because it is abstract it is not therefore vague. Our thought of absolute being is no more vague than any other thought, but only more abstract.

Is the Absolute unrelated ? In discussing this question Spencer falls into a verbal difficulty. He speaks of the relative and the non-relative as terms of a correlation. 1 But if the non-relative is a term in a correlation, how can it be called a non-relative ? Spencer speaks of the Absolute as manifesting itself in the universe and conversely of the universe as a manifestation of the Absolute. But the universe cannot be a manifestation of the Absolute except as its forms are related to the Absolute, and if they are related to it, then in turn it must be related to them. If there is a relation of the finite to the infinite, there must be as well a relation of the infinite to the finite. There cannot be relation without correlation. Thus in point of fact the Absolute is related to everything that is. Instead of being unrelated, nothing can be more related.

Finally, is Spencer's Absolute unconditioned, and for that reason unknowable ? Anything may be conditioned or unconditioned either externally or internally. It is unconditioned externally when there is no restraint or limitation from without. In this sense the Absolute is unconditioned, for it is not dependent upon anything outside itself. Internally, however, the absolutely

1 First Principles, p. 91.

unconditioned is by the very nature of things impossible, for every form of being is conditioned by what it is; it is what it is and nothing else. The Absolute is thus conditioned internally, if only as being. But, furthermore, nothing can be without being something. A thing is only in and through its qualities and relations. If you take these away there is nothing left; the Dingan-sich is an unreality. Here, for instance, is the substance which we know under various forms as water or ice or vapor. We may call it the absolute of water and ice and vapor; it is not any one of them, although it manifests itself in one or another of them indifferently according to varying conditions. Are we to say that we cannot know it ? On the contrary, we do know it as that substance whose nature it is thus to manifest itself. In the same way the Absolute of Spencer is that which manifests itself in the universe. Although it is neither matter nor spirit, it manifests itself in both. The whole universe is its manifestation. Separate it from the universe and it would cease to be. Spencer himself allows it no freedom in this respect. In proportion, therefore, as we know the universe we know the Absolute, and, since the Absolute exhausts itself in the universe, if we could arrive at complete knowledge of the universe we should also have complete knowledge of the Absolute. Spencer's Absolute is thus in itself most knowable. If we fail to know it, the difficulty arises from the limitation of our own powers and not from anything in the nature of the Absolute itself.

In criticising Spencer's position we must not forget the great service which he has rendered in popularizing the recognition of the unknown in matter and force, and in showing that they are not to be fully comprehended, as is so commonly assumed by superficial thinkers. Spencer's difficulty lies in his failure to see that, while it is true that no knowledge is complete, it is equally true that there is nothing of which we have absolutely no knowledge. He confounds the abstract with the vague and unknowable. Hegel also takes the position that pure being is indistinguishable from non-being and so absolutely unknowable, but with Hegel this is only the first step in an argument by which he shows that the Absolute is the infinitely concrete, manifesting itself in and through all things, and thus infinitely knowable. It is to be observed also that when Spencer arrives at the thought of the principle of unity in his Absolute, he leaps a chasm which he has not bridged. The thought is true, but how has he reached it ? The only process which he recognizes is that of repeated abstraction; but this would lead, not to the principle of unity, but either to manifold being or to an abstract universal.