The philosophy of change

Front matter

e?CV

V o o ■

V- rf\

Preface

I must warn you, reader, at the outset, of certain feats that are to be perpetrated and of certain others that are to be omitted in the course of these pages. Otherwise, as I have it on excellent authority, you may dislike or even despise me, and will be free to revile me for having shamelessly led you into a discussion such as you had no reason to look for under the cover of any book bearing a conventional title.

The purpose of this book is to show that truth has never been, and cannot now be, demonstrated by man as a whole or in any part ; that all our so-called truths are of necessity merely errors making in the direction of that universal truth which can never be attained but once, and once attained, cannot endure. But — and this is to be well noted — once this truth is supplanted by error, this error can have no other goal than universal truth. What we commonly regard as error will be seen to have been derived invariably from one of two sources : (1) that which has once been regarded as truth, and (2) conceptions of illusions impossible in fact. Hence between human knowledge and human error there vi PREFACE

is no fundamental distinction but only an apparent and practically useful one. To this statement the single exception is embodied in the first principle of this philosophy ; and it will be seen that this principle itself is not a complete or perfect truth, but is dependent for its perfection upon the unknown sum of its constituent parts.

It will be observed that time is first implied as a condition of this universal process, and is then denied the value which is commonly assigned to it. This question will form one of the interesting considerations of the book; it is, however, hardly to be approached before a more detailed investigation has supplied the necessary material and terms.

As with truth, so with happiness, which will be found to be indistinguishable from truth. It will be shown that, did we once attain happiness, our chief concern would be lest it should endure, — i.e. if we could have any concerns when we had attained absolute truth.

Finally will be considered the relation of this philosophy to our daily lives upon Earth, both now and in a conceivable distant future.

Its outcome should, I think, be called a new, rational, and workable optimism. As I have already stated, the philosophy does not explain experience in the least or most superficial of its phases. Hence you are not to expect from me particular demonstrations, or that I shall establish point after par-

PREFACE vii

ticular point conclusively and expressibly, for it will appear that I must regard such separate demonstrations and established points as mere willo'-the-wisps. Nevertheless, I make the highest pretensions; and if I can but make the philosophy intelligible, you should be able to apply its results practically in a great variety of ways, without difficulty or hesitation. For I have interpreted experience generally in the light of the single significant principle which it reveals; and I have described, in terms by no means too general, the immediate future of a race that has attained to the most rational view of life now possible.

Any who read with interest to the end of this book will perhaps divine that the task of making such announcements as the foregoing was not an altogether congenial one. I should prefer to have my conclusion stand in its proper place, as a conclusion, instead of intruding itself thus before the argument, as if it had been arrived at by intuition and then set up as a thing to be proved. For, indeed, at the outset of the investigations here to be recorded, I had no opinions worth mentioning either as to the meaning of the facts of actual life or as to the nature of truth itself. I destroyed all the notes in which I had recorded my arguments for or against the theories of some of my notable predecessors ; banished all books from my study; and with no implements further viii PREFACE

than pencil and spotless paper, a few brass pins, and a tennis-ball, I set about enquiring seriously into the destiny of man. I even tried to forget who they were that had said anything on the subject before, or that there were such things as jealousies and fashions in philosophy.

In this, of course, I was attempting the impossible. One cannot speculate on the political destiny of a race or on the material destiny of an atom wholly without regard to the individual investigators who have supplied such data as one may use. Nevertheless, some advantages appeared to lie in the elimination, as far as possible, of personal and historical considerations: as, notably, (1) conciseness, (2) the preservation of an attitude as little as possible controversial, and (3) the implied denial that the results of any philosophic thought need be measured by the amount of approval they receive or by their immediate influence upon the lives of men, or that to achieve either individual success or the melioration of mankind upon Earth is in the least necessary as a motive of such thought.

My enquiry complete and reduced to writing, I was warned that my exposition would be found lacking in lucidity by the general reader and philosophical student because in it no attempt was made to show the relation of the doctrine to the history of opinion. It was deemed inadvisable to " dismiss " — as I was accused of doing — with a few para-

PREFACE ix

graphs so large a subject, for example, as Consciousness, leaving unconsidered the numerous and thoughtfully elaborated theories that have risen around it.

Were I to admit the probable truth of this warning, the wisdom of heeding it would still be quite another matter. If, reader, you are accustomed to regard a philosophical essay as a kind of intellectual exercise leading nowhere in particular but affording you the opportunity of pleasantly overhauling and dispassionately comparing the appropriate items from out your stores of knowledge — if, in short, you are above all a liver and a reader, unalterably convinced of the solidity of the facts of actual life, you will in any case get nothing from my exposition, and I need not cater to you. If, on the other hand, you are determined to draw from your experience of life and books that which is workable and relevant to the future; if you are above all a thinker and eager only to build for yourself and others a rational basis for faith and action, I think you will agree with me, after reading to the end, that no advantage could lie in connecting the points of my doctrine specifically with those of other doctrines unless, indeed, this were done in a thoroughgoing fashion such as I at least should be incapable of. For I have, in the course of my constructive work, taken account by implication of every theory of life, matter, and thought that is known to me; and x PREFACE

though I have occasionally, and for the sake of brevity, alluded to a theory by its commonly accepted name, I have generally thought it unnecessary, and on the whole unsuitable, to define my attitude towards any theory more fully than is implied in the results of this constructive work.

For example, I may again mention my treatment of the problem of Consciousness. Some time ago I used to regard the conscious self as a thing apart and cover whole reams with definitions of it and speculations as to its origin. At present my task is quite different. This whole book is, for one thing, designed to provide rational grounds for belief in a certain general principle of which one expression, though by no means the most interesting, is u Consciousness is not a thing apart nor an essential property of, or resident in, anything; it is a symbol popular in the present age." If these grounds of belief have indeed been provided, a single sentence is sufficient to account for the origin of the term Consciousness, and for our traditional conception of this faculty as belonging to some things and not to others, and to some things in greater degree than to others. This whole book, then, is about Consciousness, although the term itself seldom appears. But if I have failed to make clear to you the general theory, no specific criticisms from me of other theories of Consciousness would be worth your while. From my own point of view they would be sheer

PREFACE xi

redundancies ; nay more, they would be in the nature of an apology such as I do not feel called upon to make.

The same would be true of any discussion in these pages of specific doctrines of divinity, world-will, or of any other universal or extra-universal force that has been cast for the classic role of final cause.

Hence — even though I should admit, in the case of more special treatises, the expediency of a more conventional method — I cannot see that the general unity of my doctrine would be rendered more intelligible by any effort of mine to assign to each phase of it a place in the history of thought.

As an aid to the presentation of this general doctrine, I will here define a certain liberty that is to be taken with the terms, theory and practice, in the ensuing pages.

In traditional speech a practical idea is generally understood as a useful one; as an idea which may, with advantage to somebody, be immediately incorporated in practice; whilst a theoretical idea, whether presumably sound or unsound, is understood as one belonging primarily to the realm of abstract speculation and not necessarily related to practice. To this usage I make no objection: it possesses obvious advantages of convenience. But, for the purposes of this work, it will be found desirable to keep the teleological aspect of the terms xii PREFACE

in question generally uppermost. By practice, then, will be understood that which must eventually be replaced by new and different practice ; by theory, that which may conceivably be translated into practice. In these pages theory shall cease to be theory when one of two things happens: when it shows itself finally incapable of translation into practice, or when it has actually been translated into practice. By practice will be understood human practice ; but its relation to theory, as here defined, will be repeated in the relation to theory of all other cosmic processes. A theory of electricity, for example, would be one which, for anything we knew to the contrary, might correctly describe electricity; and if we ever came to know that it either could not or actually did describe electricity, it would cease to be theory.

This verbal innovation need mislead nobody. Nevertheless it requires justification, — and will be justified in the first chapter, — for it not only implies the time-honoured assumption that all things change, but raises the question, What are these things that change ? Observe, in passing, some of its implications.

Something, not realised as yet but indefinitely ascertainable, will be the practice of the future to the exclusion of actual practice. That something I choose to call the subject of theoretical thought or, more loosely, theory.

PREFACE xiii

When we speak of the revival of an old practice, we speak as becomes people living in a world which may be apprehended by them only in its successive strata of appearances. Here is a hammer, and it is good to hammer with. Of this much I seem sure ; and if I must hammer with it, this much is sufficient. But if I wish to make a better hammer, I must go deeper into the matter and consider that the usefulness of the one I now have lies in the fact of its having a wooden handle and an iron head. Herein is a difference between wood and iron, and I ought to ascertain the nature and extent of this difference. I can weigh them and test their comparative toughness. Along comes somebody who takes my iron and melts it and shows me a lot of things it may do that I had never dreamt of. He explains to me the standing of its atom in the society of atoms, and he even tells me something of the internal organisation of this atom. At which point he stops, because he can go no farther towards the basis of iron in reality. But he has already taken me so far that I can never again look at a hammer in quite the same light, but must admit that it is only with reference to the business of hammering that a hammer may be called such ; and that, if the reality behind it ever came to be so well understood that the need to hammer no longer existed, nobody but an antiquary would think of calling it a hammer.

The case of the revival of an old practice is simixiv PREFACE

lar and still more obvious. By analysis of the new practice we have never found that it was, in any factor or in all, equal to the old. Moreover, none of its factors could be equal to the old, for they belong to a different period of time and have all been determined in part by events subsequent to the death of the old practice. What we think we know of either the old or the new practice is, however, very little as compared with what we know we do not know of it. Our admitted ignorance of the events that culminated respectively in the one and the other is all but complete. Since the two appearances resulting thus from processes largely unknown bear similar relations to the peculiar thought of the age or race, we find it convenient to classify them as " likes." Sometimes we use the word "identical." Any extra-terrestrial contemporary of ours who had learned something of our family history, yet was unaware that different practices often appeared to us similar, would nevertheless guess this to be the case ; for it would seem to him probable that any intelligence in which heredity counted for much would continue for long periods to respond to the same influences determining the character of events. That is to say, it would be determined by influences derived from events whose local relation to the proximately ancestral intelligence was immediate. Ignoring the vastly greater number of influences which, if known, would reveal the universal diversity

PREFACE xv

of events, the possessors of this intelligence must regard certain events as preeminently similar.

The universal diversity implied in the law of continuous change is a subject that will be frequently recurred to in these pages. For the moment, we may be content to conjecture that it would not surprise our extra-terrestrial critic to learn that a dozen of us might walk through a wood and agree that it was a very monotonous walk, while the dog that accompanied us and came upon twenty different scents found in it a fascinating variety; or, on the other hand, that the dog might be greatly bored with looking over his master's shoulder as he read. For he would suspect that the history of men or of dogs would repeat itself indefinitely during such period as purely ancestral ideas might maintain an overwhelming prominence in terrestrial thought.

Another warning: my language at times becomes colloquial. This is emphatically a serious work, and dignity or gravity of attitude has- no place in the execution of it. In another place (Chap. IX) I shall try to point out some of the dangers to the serious thinker inherent in any effort to maintain the dignity of himself or of his subject; also to account for the esteem that is generally accorded to dignity of attitude in certain professions.

Since I have at the outset been forced into a monitory attitude, I should perhaps try to give in a xvi PREFACE

few words some further positive idea of the method followed in this philosophy. Briefly, then, its central motif is expressed in the two following paragraphs.

Any doctrine of a final cause is shown to be not merely unsatisfactory by reason of its incompleteness but to be untenable even provisionally, since the cause, to exist as such, could have no contact with our universe unless it were identified with it and so ceased to be a cause. This conclusion is arrived at logically; and logic itself is shown to lose its competence as absolute truth is approached. Nevertheless, logic may enable us to reject a doctrine which logic has supplied. And the fact that logic has driven the vast majority of mankind to accept, in one form or another, the doctrine of a final cause and to cling to it — not confidently but desperately, with doubts, differences, exceptions, backsliding — through many generations is shown to furnish an additional reason for rejecting this doctrine. If a final cause is both inconceivable and useless as a hypothesis, intermediate causes are equally so; thus causation becomes merely a convenient manner of speaking doomed, even as such, to desuetude.

Bereft of causation as a means of accounting for the facts or illusions of existence — which is surely one expression of the avowed aim of philosophy — we have to look about us and enquire what is apparent in this existence. And there appear to be (1) Things, such as matter and ideas, and (2) a

PREFACE xvii

Process or Processes. But the same logic which forced us to eliminate causation (which might be numbered (3)) convinces us that (1) and (2) cannot exist otherwise than identically; and, for present suggestiveness of terms, we give to existence or the universe the name of Process. This process is described as consisting in the successive manifestation of all possible differences or illusions until perfect truth is attained. It is unconditioned by space or time, which are but two of its illusions ; and when absolute truth gives place to absolute error, the process remains the same in that fixity which implies its complete diversity.

Here, as I have said, is one statement of that central motif of the philosophy which will, in the course of these pages, be presented from a number of different points of view. And in a number of ways will be expressed the optimism of the philosopher — all of them different from the glowing phrases associated with that obsolescent mental bias which commonly goes by the name of optimism.

The book itself is divided as follows:

Chapter I shows the origin of the theory in common knowledge as well as some of its general implications.

In Chapter II are reviewed the principles which seem to underlie man's social, political, and intellectual life and moral ideals. This is done in the form of an enquiry into the possible destiny of his various activities, viewed in the light of their past.

xviii PREFACE

In Chapter III is considered the universe of matter and ether. An elementary universe (i.e. a universe in which matter has not been evolved) is postulated, as different as possible from every hypothetical universe whose relation to human thought is most obviously illusory according to the principles developed in this one and the earlier chapters. The postulated universe is, in other words, a " chaotic" one which may be indefinitely maintained in thought throughout its emergence from chaos to become the possible home of matter possessing apparent geometrical form.

With these first three chapters the philosophy is complete — complete, it will be understood, in its theoretical and generally practical aspects. No further development of the theory should be looked for in the remaining six chapters, the purpose of which is to help to define the general trend of the theory and the probable consequences of its adoption by mankind.

In Chapter IV, I have endeavoured to point out the true importance of the problems of Reason and Will.

Chapter V shows the bearing of this philosophy upon the special theory of dissolution.

Chapter VI deals with the relation between life and death.

Chapter VII treats of the manner of life of any terrestrial race who should hold as rational a view

PREFACE xix

of death as is now attainable. In it this philosophy is seen at work amongst a hypothetical race in all respects like the present generation of mankind, save that their intellectual and political leaders have made this philosophy their own.

Chapter VIII contains a series of random observations upon life as we know it, and treats of the uses of rational pessimism.

Chapter IX contains some remarks on literary style and other questions of taste and criticism.

A word, finally, as to the claims to be made for this philosophy. Its basis has already been proclaimed to be the principle of continuous and universal change; notice has been given that the universe would be found not as a thing but as a process. And it is not contended that this principle of change, as here set forth, is a complete and perfect truth. Such a contention would of course amount to repudiation of the principle itself, as would also the contention that any one of us to-day may represent to himself concretely how change may take place if there is no thing to change.

What will be claimed for this principle is that,

(1) It is inevitably derived from experience up to date.

(2) It is the most general and abstract of all principles and, as such, permits of the utmost possible amount of filling in of detail, at the same time xx PREFACE

that it is incapable of being undermined by new knowledge. That is to say, it is a fixed principle by virtue of its being capable of the utmost possible amount of that modification which is necessary to give it meaning.

(3) In the light of its implications the abandonment of outworn practices and prepossessions becomes an obvious duty. Specifically, it is the only weapon competent to overcome those influences in human society which admittedly make for the most irrational conduct, — i.e. it is the only aid to a rational view of death and suffering.

We are to begin with a synopsis of the philosophy in its general aspect.

Table Of Contents

PAGB

Preface v

CHAPTER I Illusion and Reality The two truths of highest probability 1

Significance in experience . . . . . . . 5

Change 6

Matter 7

Substance 8

Ideas 11

Time and Space .13

Change homogeneous 14

Change without antecedent, beginning, or end ... 15

Impossible illusions 15

Change a fixed principle 17

The order of illusions 18

Change and geometry 19

Recapitulation 21

CHAPTER II The Knowing Egoism and altruism 24

In politics 24

In considerations of property 41

In the pursuit of fame 43

In vices of the senses 43

In love 44

In all acts judged by ethical standards .... 48

Practice of an art for its own sake ; the pursuit of knowledge 49

xxi xxii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

The test of applicability 55

What are egoism and altruism ? 56

How the process of gaining new experience appears to us of

to-day 59

Destiny of the knowing 61

The perfect knower 62

May all the knowable be known ? 68

Thought imperishable 69

Cumulative efficiency of thought- and matter-effects . 71

Evolution and heredity 75

The ultra-evolutionary necessity 77

Time and ultra-evolutionary advantages . 80

Terrestrial knowledge evolutionary in character . . 81

Impossibility of universal devolution .... 82

CHAPTER III The Fiction of a Universe Necessity of physical and mathematical symbols ... 84

Man a " born metaphysician " 85

The universe of one dimension 86

Preliminary survey of the " cosmon " 92

The sole attribute of the "cosmoids" . . . . .94

K\ and the earliest motions of the cosmoids .... 96

The reality behind the cosmoid 101

The correspondence between the " real " and the " apparent "

cosmoid 109

Careers of the apparent cosmoids 113

The " centre-change " 116

The centre-change and the surrounding cosmon . . . 118

Self-assertiveness of the ultimate principle .... 124

The geometrical point . 127

The illusory "thing" postulated for the apprehension of motion 129

Systems of supply for centre-changes 131

Numbers and the symbolical cosmon 153

Mobile centre-changes and their inertia 157

TABLE OF CONTENTS xxiii

PAOE

Mutual attraction of centre-changes . . . . .158

The spatial necessity in the cosmon 161

" Stable groups " 165

The "primary rotation" 166

Relative mobility of stable groups 167

" Association " and " dissociation " 170

Relative stability of groups 173

Stable groups and certain attributes of matter . . . 174

Necessity of vibration of stable groups 175

The spiral line of motion of stable groups and the straight

line .177

Tha geometrical point of view 185

How a stable group would appear to an evolutionary being . 189

Vibration of stable groups 194

Elimination of waves of vibratory modifications : preliminary

survey 201

Rotary vibrations in response to conflicting inducements;

changes of rotary position without change of position

in cosmic rows ; revolutions of leagues of stable groups

about one another 209

Rotation upon an axis 218

The formation of spherical bodies in the cosmon . . . 241 Description in one-dimensional terms of the Earth's rotation

upon its axis 242

Elimination of vibratory waves (continued) .... 248 Rotary vibrations of stable groups arising from reciprocal

modifications of primary rotations . . • . . 252

_,, j heat, light, chemism . 252

Ether waves and the phenomena of < , , . ; . n ^ n

( electricity, magnetism 253

One-dimensional nature abhors a vacuum .... 254

A twofold guess as to the significance of the symbols used

in treating of the one-dimension universe . . . 255

Implications of motions of stable groups .... 256

Magnitude in the cosmon 262

Relation between the symbolical cosmon and its inventor . 263

Summary 266

Terminology . 268 xxiv TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV Reason and Will PAGE

The meaning of consciousness 269

How a thing may be aware of itself 272

True importance of the problems of Reason and Will . . 273

The will to live 274

CHAPTER V The conscientious carmen 278

Problematical future effect of man upon the evolutionary

process 279

Annihilation and afterwards 281

The ultra-evolutionary look-out 284

The developing hand of time 284

CHAPTER VI A Rational View of Death Posterity and suicide 286

The gain in gaiety and the loss in bliss 288

If I die this day, what next? 289

Relation between the ultra-evolutionary self and the evolutionary 290

Emotional aspect of the case 291

The process of gathering 293

The marriage of pain and pleasure, and the family of events 295

The miserable and the rule of destiny 296

" Those good old days when we were so unhappy ; " sinister

implications of the word " again " . . . .297

Evolutionary benefits inherent in the word " again " . . 299

Paradise and the kinematograph 300

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XXV

CHAPTER VII Immediate Implications of a Rational View of Death

The achievements of morality A rational society

The case of its drunkards

The case of its amorists

The case of its liars .

The case of its brawlers

The case of its invalids The rational society not impossible The rational society not millennial . The rational society not to be had for the asking

PAGE

CHAPTER VIII How the love of truth may be denned 348

Our racial belief in the supernatural 350

Instances of the love of truth 353

The honest theorist as an everyday liar 357

Conservatism vs. Radicalism 362

The processes of nature and of civilisation alike irreversible . 364

" Lead me to the precipice " 365

Theory, superstitions, and laboratories 366

The snubbing of theory 368

The menace of words 369

The wisdom of age 369

The plum tree of civilisation 371

CHAPTER IX Certainties and probabilities : a recapitulation . . . 376

Long sentences . 378

The generic "we" 379

The rationale of dignity 383

TABLE OF DIAGRAMS

PAGE

Chapter I

From the study of history, from the review and comparison of our own individual experiences, and from the results of all special scientific and philosophic research, we draw two conclusions or truths possessing, of all truths, the highest probability. In all ages they have been more or less clearly recognised and variously stated by men of the most widely different tempers and environments. Roughly speaking, they have acquired greater prominence almost continuously with the lapse of time; and one of the distinguishing features of the present age is the new boldness of relief in which these truths stand forth for every curious person to view. One of them, the first here to be mentioned, might be discussed at indefinite length, although one of the advantages of living in the twentieth century is that a brief statement of this truth with a few illustrations suffice to awaken the echoes in common knowledge. The second truth is generally regarded as self-evident and does not appear to permit of much discussion.

(1) Every particular experience is illusory.

This familiar object, the pencil I now hold in my hand, is not merely a complete mystery to me. It is not merely that I am in doubt as to which of my ideas of its form, the materials of which it is made, their relations to one another, etc., are true ones. I know, if I know anything, that form, materials, relation, etc., are all entirely different from what they appear to me ; that the latest or most intimate knowledge of wood and graphite in a pencil provides for its own abdication in favour of other knowledge. I know, moreover, that the real form, materials, and relation — supposing them to exist — could not appear to me at all.

The chemist dealing with his old friend, the atom of hydrogen, is in a similar case, for he knows that the familiar behaviour of this atom is merely the particular illusion which corresponds to the competence of his five senses and many instruments. If his senses and instruments were fundamentally different, — and he knows that senses and instruments have not remained, and cannot be expected to remain the same, — the behaviour of an atom of hydrogen would be something that could not be spoken or thought of by any but a historian.