Some reminiscences

Contents

CHAPTER PAGE

I The War 9

II Events in Richmond — Duelling 65

Chapter I The War

I was born on November 15, 1844, at my father's place, Mount Ephraim, in the lower end of Fauquier County, Virginia. Our home was, in summer, the most beautiful place I have ever seen. It was a large brick house situated upon a commanding bluff directly on the Rappahannock River, with broad low grounds directly in front and high bluffs heavily timbered upon the Culpeper side of the river, with the Blue Ridge Mountains looming up some forty miles away. We were comfortably well off, owning some fifteen slaves, a farm of one thousand acres, with enough money at interest to supply us with what the farm did not furnish. It was an ideal home and a happy one.

My grandmother, who was Chief Justice Marshall's youngest sister, lived with us. When she was a young girl she married George Keith Taylor, a very distinguished lawyer of Petersburg, Virginia. John Adams appointed him one of his midnight judges. I have always thought that those judicial appointments testify powerfully to the influence that John Marshall had even so early lo SOME REMINISCENCES

as that. Adams appointed his brother-in-law one of these judges, his brother another, and gave the pkim to John himself.

My grandmother was the most intellectual person that I have ever known. She lived in our family until 1867, when she died at the age of eightyfive, I was raised at her knee and she taught me all that I ever learned during the school period. Sir John Falstaff says, "If I know what the inside of a church is made of, I am a pepper-corn," I can say the same of a schoolhouse, I have never to this day seen the inside of one. My grandmother hated Thomas Jefferson as if he had been the Devil, and in that I have no doubt she reflected the views of the Chief Justice. But at any rate, she thought him the embodiment of all evil, I have heard her often denounce him as centering in himself all that was dangerous to the American people. Federalism versus Democracy.

In i860 the people of Virginia were strongly in favor of the Union, But when Mr, Lincoln called for troops to coerce the States south of us, opinion in Virginia changed in the twinkling of an eye. The entire population became unanimous for siding with the States to the south and resisting coercion to the death.

In March, 1862, at the age of seventeen, I volunteered as a Confederate soldier, joining Company A, Ninth Virginia Cavalry. From the foun-

SOME REMINISCENCES ii

dation of the colony Virginians have been devoted to fine horses, and in 1861 the State was as well supplied with throroughbred and partially thoroughbred horses as with sheep and cattle. The half-bred horse is the best for a saddle horse. In the Confederate cavalry the men furnished their own horses, the government agreeing to pay for them if they were killed. The young men in Virginia were all perfect horsemen, and mounted on their thoroughbred or half-bred horses they made a magnificent spectacle in regimental formation.

My regiment was as fine as any in the Confederate service, and our colonel was Wm. H. F. Lee, a splendid officer, and son of Gen. Robert E. Lee. We were very proud of this.

How the Confederate cavalry performed the feats it did perform in the early part of the war is more than I can comprehend, for not one company in ten had any arms that were fit to fight with. When I joined my company I was given a saber which I think was used in the Revolution, and this was the only weapon given me. One day in June, 1862, while my regiment was standing in a road I bantered a comrade to see which of us could cut the largest twig from a tree. I made a powerful ait and the blade of my saber broke off at the hilt. In a short time we were dismounted and ordered to clear the Yankees out of a piece of woods in skirmish formation. We marched through the woods.

but fortunately no Yankees were there. I have often wondered what I should have done, armed with that saber hilt, if I had met a Yankee armed with a Springfield musket. A comrade to whom I mentioned this said he knew what I would have done — I would have turned around and run like smoke, and I suspect he was right.

I was in the Seven Days' battles around Richmond, in Second Manassas, in Sharpsburg or Antietam, in Fredericksburg, and in Chancellorsville, besides, in that same time, in a hundred cavalry battles, many of which would have been called "great battles" in the Cuban war.

I cannot help pausing to refer to one of these, the battle of Brandy Station or Fleetwood, on June 9, 1863. That was a fight to stir the heart of any soldier. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, commander of the cavalry of Gen. Lee's army and in many respects the greatest cavalry soldier that ever lived, had collected all of his cavalry in the great plains that lie between Culpeper Court House and Brandy Station. The Confederate army was then engaged in the movement from Fredericksburg by way of Culpeper Court House to the Valley of Virginia to move forward to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

On June 7 Stuart ordered out his whole command, more than eight thousand horsemen, to pass in review before Gen. Robert E. Lee. It was a noble sight, a sight that no one could ever forget.

Next morning Stuart was hastily summoned to move down to the Rappahannock River to face General Pleasanton, who was crossing with all the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, supported by several brigades of infantry, in an effort to penetrate the operations known to be going on in General Lee's army. This resulted in an all-day battle on June 9 between the cavalry forces of the two armies. It was a great battle, nobly supported by both sides. One incident of it has remained vividly impressed upon my mind. Our colonel, W. H. F. Lee, had been promoted to brigadier-general, and my regiment was in his brigade. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon Lee put himself at the head of my regiment which was at the foot of a hill out in the open field, standing in column of fours, and gave the order to charge up the hill, he riding at the head of the regiment. I was very near to the head of the column and could see all that took place. When we got to the summit of the hill, there, some two hundred yards awav, stood a long line of blue-coated cavalry. Lee did not hesitate an instant but dashed at the center of this line with his column of fours. The Yankees were of course cut in two at once, but each of their flanks closed in on our column, and then a most terrible affray with sabers and pistols took place. We got the best of it, and we had soon killed, wounded, or captured almost all of them. They had a good many more men over beyond the hill, but the thing was over before the others could come to their assistance.

We drew off back under the hill and then commenced to take stock of the situation. It at once appeared that Capt. Tom Towson, captain of my company, was missing. The major of the regiment called for two volunteers from my company to go up on the hill and hunt for Captain Towson. Robert W. Monroe and myself rode out and said we would do it. We went up there in plain sight of the enemy, but seeing that we were on an errand of mercy not a shot was fired at us. We found Towson stone dead, and I brought him down before the whole regiment across the neck of my horse. I mention this last incident because I have heard of a braggart member of my company telling that he and I did this thing, when Monroe and I did it. He saw me come down the hill with Towson, and long after the war, when he thought most of the witnesses were dead, he thought he would be safe in playing the hero of the event.

This was the beginning of the movement to Gettysburg. The infantry and artillery crossed the Blue Ridge range of mountains into the Valley of Virginia, and the cavalry remained upon the eastern side of the mountains to mask the movement. We moved along up into the upper part of Fauquier and Loudoun counties. When we had got to Aldie in Loudoun County, General Pleasanton, at the head of all the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, thought it was time for him to be looking into the case, and he attacked us furiously there. We had two or three days of tremendous cavalry battles, in which the success of each side was about the same, and many gallant men lost their lives. Finally Pleasanton drew off without having got up on the Blue Ridge Mountains to see what was going on in the valley below.

Then General Stuart marched off on what I have always thought the wildest of wild-goose chases. Why such a splendid soldier as Stuart should have done it passes my comprehension. Obviously the thing for him to do was to put himself upon General Lee's right flank, between him and his enemy, to Inform General Lee, as far as possible, of what that enemy was doing. But Stuart marched away from Lee around the Army of the Potomac, and was entirely lost to Lee for a week or more. If any one will take a map of Virginia, Mai7land,and Pennsylvania and trace Stuart's course I feel confident he will be amazed at it. When he saw that Pleasanton had abandoned his attempt to interfere with Lee, Stuart was near Paris Gap In Fauquier County. He set out and marched straight to Brentsville In Prince William County, thence he Struck out for the Potomac at Rowson's Ford, near

Rockville, Maryland, and from there to Hanover, Pennsylvania, where he had a severe battle with the enemy's cavalry, and thence he made his way to Gettysburg, where he joined General Lee on the second day of the battle.

I consider myself qualified to speak as an expert on the battle of Gettysburg. I became so qualified in this manner: In 1895 I was the editorial writer of the Richmond Times. In one of my articles I spoke of the unparalleled heroism of Pickett's charge of Virginians at Gettysburg. Some North Carolinians took me up on this and said I was ascribing to Virginians credit that belonged to North Carolinians. I was very much shocked at this, and for two reasons. I had always understood that Pickett's Virginians had carried off the honors of the day, and I did not like to see these honors torn from my fellow Virginians. Again, the idea of having done an injustice to my comrades from North Carolina stung me very acutely. I resolved therefore to study Gettysburg and find out the facts. I got the records and carefully studied every line that had been written about it, and at the end I felt that I knew my ground and could speak with confidence upon every phase of the battle. I accordingly wrote an address upon the battle, and the Confederate Army and Navy Society of Maryland coming to know of it, invited me to deliver it before them in Baltimore and I did so on the evening of January 20, 1896.

I have received two compliments upon this address which I prize very highly. I sent a copy of it to Lord Wolseley, at that time commander-inchief of the English army, and he wrote me a very nice letter about it, in which he asked me to let him have it published in the United Service Magazine, the mouthpiece of the English Army and Navy. It can be readily imagined that I gave my consent, and it was published in that magazine for April and May, 1897, but was credited to W. S. Reyall, First Virginia Cavali^ — the glory of war, to have your leg shot off and have your name misspelled in the Gazette !

The other compliment was this. The late historian, John C. Ropes of Boston, was an intimate friend of Capt. W. Gordon McCabe of Richmond. Shortly before his death he paid McCabe a visit of several weeks, and myself and Judge James Keith, Chief Justice of Virginia, called upon him. Ropes had read my address, and he spoke to me of it in very complimentary terms, saying he had filed it away amongst his choicest pamphlets for future use and reference. When Judge Keith and I told Ropes that we had both served as privates in the Confederate Army, and that all of our fellows had done the same, he was immensely surprised and said that fact gave him more information about the Confederate armies than all he had ever read.

What I am going to say now about Gettysburg in a condensed form can be seen in detail in that address, with reference to official documents to sustain every statement. Incidentally I will say here that General Lee was considerably outmatched in the battle. He had 62,000 men while General Meade had 105,000.

The absence of General Lee's cavalry caused the battle to come on through pure accident, and without any preparations or plans for it. Heth's division of Hill's corps having arrived near Gettysburg on July I, undertook to march into the town to get some shoes. Just outside the town they met Buford's division of Federal cavalry, and a brisk skirmish commenced. The rest of Hill's corps was steadily arriving and Ewell's corps, returning from York, commenced arriving at the same time. On the Union side the First and Eleventh Corps were up, and they joined with Buford in repelling the attack, so that in a short time there was a very brisk action in progress between from twenty to twenty-five thousand men on each side. The battle was splendidly fought on both sides, but ended in a complete triumph for the Confederates, the First and Eleventh Corps being almost destroyed. There were not more than six thousand of these two corps available for duty when the battle was over.

General Lee arrived upon the field just at the conclusion of the battle, and saw the remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps scampering over the hills behind Gettysburg. While he was standing in the field watching this interesting spectacle General Longstreet rode up and reported. On being asked how near his corps was he replied that he could have two divisions, Hood's and McLaw's, up for business by daylight next morning, but that Pickett's division was nearly a day's march behind. General Lee told him then and there to get his men up as quickly as possible, as he intended to attack the enemy next morning at daylight if he was there.

The situation next morning, July 2, was this. The Twelfth Corps of the Union army arrived during the night and went into line at Meade's extreme right on Gulp's Hill. Their line was extended round the curve by the remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps and there was nothing else from their left to Round Top. About eight thousand of the Third Corps arrived at General Meade's left during the night and went in bivouac. This was the whole Federal force on the field for a battle at early morn on the second. They made about twenty-five thousand men, with an unfilled gap in their line between Round Top and the left of the Eleventh Corps.

What was General Lee's situation? All of Hill's and Ewell's corps were up and in line, and two-thirds of Longstreet's corps were near enough to be in Hne at dayHght. In some way Lee had become possessed of the information that but a small part of Meade's army had arrived at Gettysburg, and he determined to attack them at daylight on the morning of the 2nd. He gave the necessary orders to Ewell and Hill, and having personally told Longstreet on the afternoon of the ist to get his command up by light next morning, he rested on his oars waiting for Longstreet's men to arrive. Next morning he was up and had breakfast when day broke. About light Longstreet arrived with his two divisions and Lee ordered him to get ready and attack Meade's line between Round Top and Gettysburg. But as Pickett was not up Longstreet did not want to make the attack, so he entered into a warm argument with Lee in an endeavor to persuade him to postpone the attack. He upset Lee's resolution and caused the attack to be postponed until four in the afternoon, at which time all of General Meade's army was up, and the whole advantage that had accrued to the Confederates from the situation in the morning had disappeared. General Longstreet is responsible, therefore, for General Lee's failing to inflict an awful disaster on General Meade on the morning of July 2, perhaps the utter destruction of his army. If Longstreet had done what Lee wanted, the Twelfth Corps, the remnants of the First and

Eleventh Corps, and the two divisions of the Third Corps would have been routed by 5 o'clock. The Second, Hancock's force, arrived on the field of battle at 7 A. m. and it would, of course, have been routed in a very short time. The Fifth Corps began to arrive at 8 A. M. and it would have met the same fate. The Sixth did not begin to arrive until the afternoon, so that Lee would have fought Meade's army by fragments with the whole of his own army. The result of such a conflict cannot be a matter of doubt. General Longstreet, therefore, by his contumacy (the word is not too strong) lost the Confederates the battle of Gettysburg on July 2. He equally lost it for them on July 3, but before showing this there is an outside matter I wish to relate.

General Longstreet did not attack until 4 p. M., July 2. But when he did attack he fought one of the most splendid battles that ever was fought. Longstreet was a great soldier on the field of battle. His defect was obstinacy and procrastination, but when once engaged all of that generally disappeared and he was usually as prompt and fiery as Stonewall Jackson himself. On the afternoon of July 2 he handled his adversaries so roughly that they were very glad when nightfall came on.

Now General Meade had never been satisfied with the position at Gettysburg. He was in positions forced on him by chance and never selected by him. During the night of July 2 he called a council of war of his chief generals and told them plainly that he thought the army should abandon its position and get to another nearer its base of supplies. It is said that a majority of the generals wanted to stay there and fight it out but the last thing Meade said to them was, "This is no place to fight a battle." Whilst he was in this hesitating mood an Incident occurred that determined him to stay at Gettysburg and fight it out.

When General Lee started on his trip to Gettysburg he wrote Mr. Davis urging that every soldier that could be spared in other parts of the Confederacy should be collected at Culpeper Court House under the command of General Beauregard to make a threatening demonstration against Washington. Even "the effigy of an army" (his words) with Beauregard's name attached to it would afford him great relief. General Lee was so intent upon this that the last thing he did before crossing the Potomac was to write another letter to Mr. Davis urging that this should be done.

There was every reason in the world why Mr. Davis should have done what General Lee asked. In the first place it was obviously the right thing to do. In the second place, General Lee wanted it done and whatever he wanted done should have been done if it were possible to do it. He was undertaking one of the great events in the world's history with means utterly inadequate to the end, and whatever he asked for in the way of assistance should have been given him if it were possible. The student of the records will find that there were 35,000 soldiers and 125 guns along the coast that could have been easily put at Culpeper Court House before July i, as I show further on. It was inexcusable in Mr. Davis to make no effort to carry out General Lee's wish. Instead of doing this, he wrote General Lee telling him it was impossible to do what he wished, and trusted it to a single cavalryman to carry it through a hostile country to General Lee.

One of the leakiest things in the world was the Confederate War Office, and Lee had hardly asked for this force to be put at Culpeper Court House before it was known in Washington, and Meade fought the first two days' battles with the fear of an attack upon his rear haunting him. Ulric Dahlgren, son of the Admiral, was an adventurous young captain of twenty-one on Meade's staff. While the battle was in progress he, with a small command, was scouting in rear of the Confederate army, and he fell in with Mr. Davis's courier in the streets of Greencastle and searched him and got his letter. On reading the letter he saw the importance of getting it to General Meade, and so he rode hard and handed it to him just as the council of war ended. The probabilities all are that Meade was going to change his position at Gettysburg, leaving the Confederates the moral effect of a great victory gained there, but that this information relieving him from all fear as to his rear, determined him to stay there and fight the third day's battle.

General Longstreet caused the Confederates to lose the third day's battle by not carrying out General Lee's orders to him. Lee directed that artillery should be sent in front of the infantry that charged the Federal line. If this had been done the terrific artillery fire that decimated Pickett's division would all have fallen on this artillery, and when Pickett's division got to the stone wall, instead of being a mere fragment of itself it would have been in full force. As it was, it cut through the Federal line. What might not have been the result if it had been united with Anderson's division directly behind it as General Lee expected would be the case, to make good what It had won? But to understand all this my lecture must be read as printed.

There is one curious thing about this matter. The North Carolinians say they went farthest at Gettysburg. But General Longstreet says in his official report that they went to pieces under the artillery fire in crossing the field and that their principal losses were incurred In quitting their work.

Before leaving the war there are one or two phases and Incidents of it that I wish to record. I missed Gettysburg, and how I missed it opens up a much debated question and that question is, whether or not General J. E. B. Stuart is to blame for not being there with General Lee when he arrived there. My good friend. Colonel John S. Mosby, the famous partisan ranger, has written a great deal, and especially a most interesting book recently published, to prove that Stuart was not to blame for not being there, and that his absence caused no injury to Lee. Notwithstanding all he has said, however, I, for one, am of the opinion that Stuart ought to have crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and ridden on Lee's right flank all the way. The man is a fool that contends that Stuart disobeyed orders in riding around the Federal army. General Lee's orders to him plainly permitted him to do this, but the point is that Stuart ought not to have exercised the discretion conferred upon him. His hard horse sense ought to have told him to stick to Lee. That was the place where he was wanted. But what I want to point out is that the criticism of Stuart is really not criticism. It is a lamentation that so great and powerful a man as he was was not at Lee's right hand to counsel and advise with him about what was best to be done.

While Lee was moving down the Valley of Virginia with Hooker absolutely perplexed about his whereabouts, as I have said before, Pleasanton took it into his head to ride up to the top of the Blue Ridge Mountains at Ashby's Gap and take a peep over in the valley to see if Lee was really there. But when he got to Aldie and Middleburg he encountered Jeb Stuart and his cavalry right there for the purpose of preventing Mr. Pleasanton from doing that identical thing. There was tremendous fighting there for two or three days, Stuart gradually falling back to the mountains; but after awhile Pleasanton resolved to give it up. Stuart then determined to exercise the discretion that Lee had conferred upon him. He determined to ride around Hooker's army, between him and Washington City. He started straight from Ashby's Gap toward Brentville, some twenty or thirty miles. The roads there are limestone pikes. My horse having lost all of his shoes, he became so lame, on these limestone pikes, that he could not travel at all. I reported his condition to my commanding officer and asked him what I should do. He told me to fall out of ranks and go to a blacksmith's shop and get him shod, and then to follow along as best I could. I did this, and then rode over into the Valley of Virginia to follow in General Lee's track, but before I reached the army the battle of Gettysburg had been fought. I do not know, of course, how many men this ride cost

Stuart, but it is obvious that there may have been many in my fix.

I have been very harsh in my criticisms of General Longstreet for his part in the battle of Gettysburg, but it would be a mistake to suppose that Longstreet was always an inefficient soldier. Upon the contrary, when once engaged in battle there have been few more superb soldiers than he, I got that splendid gentleman and gallant soldier, Col. Wm. H. Palmer, who was Gen. A. P. Hill's chief of staff, to write me the following account of what he witnessed of General Longstreet's conduct in the battle of the Wilderness on May 6, 1864. This shows Longstreet at his best, and shows what a magnificent soldier he was upon the field of battle. He saved the day then, and if he had not been shot down by his own men at the critical moment Grant's army would probably have been destroyed, tangled up in that wilderness as it was. Colonel Palmer's letter is as follows :

Richmond, Va., May 11, igoS.

Mr. W. L. Royall, Richmond, Va.

Dear Sir: I will endeavor to repeat a conversation had with you as to some of the occurrences of the first and second days of the battle of the Wilderness that came under my observation.

We liad full notice of General Grant's movement from around Culpeper C. H. General Longstreet's First Corps vva'; near Gordonsvllle (lately returned from East Tennessee), General A. P. Hill's Third Corps was around Orange C. H., and General Ewell's Second Corps to the right of Orange C. H. General Hill moved on the plank road below Verdierville, with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions on the 4th of May, Anderson's division being left at Orange C. H. to protect our trains and rear. Ewell moved below Verdierville on our left, on the old Brock road.

Our orders on the 5th were to attack and press the enemy. I remember that our troops as they passed beyond the lines erected the previous winter at Mine Run, which they expected to occupy as before, exclaimed, "Mars Bob is going for them this time," and the poor fellows cheered as they pressed forward. About a mile beyond we came to a heavy line of dismounted cavalry. They were picked men and hard to move. We had to thicken our skirmish line. The enemy's officers behaved with the greatest gallantry, on horseback encouraging the men, and exposing themselves to hold their line; finally they gave way. We captured a number of men, and many fine horses, and moved some distance below Parker's store while waiting for Heth's division to form, as we could not drive them farther with skirmishers, and had left the infantry. Generals Lee, Hill, and Stuart rested in a large field on the left of the road (Trapp's farm). Suddenly a force of the enemy, in skirmishing order, came out of the woods on the left. General Lee walked rapidly off toward Heth's troops, calling for Colonel Taylor, his adjutant-general. General Stuart stood up and looked the danger squarely in the face; General Hill remained as he was. We were within pistol shot, when to our surprise the Federal officer gave the command "right about" and disappeared in the timber, as much alarmed at finding himself in the presence of Confederate troops as we were at their unexpected appearance.