The concept of control

Front matter

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BY

Introduction

In the various attempts to render an adequate description of the world of experience as presented in the history of thought, we find recurring such conceptions as purpose, teleology, final cause, design, to denote certain features which have been deemed indispensable to an exhaustive interpretation of reality. Upon reflection it appears that these categories and their like constitute so many variants of the wider concept of control; and as such express specific ways in which control has been apprehended. That is, these different predicates are diverse methods of explaining control, of making explicit elements thought to be involved in its postulation.

In the present essay, I propose to examine various typical conceptions of control as expressed or implied in the respective theories of philosophy, with the view to determine in what facts or ultimate assumptions these conceptions have their basis. To the same end the investigation will consider the concept of control as involved in the fundamental principles of the science of biology and in the formulations of mechanical explanation.

The historical treatment of the subject falls naturally into two main divisions, distinguished, in one way at least, by their methods of approaching philosophical problems. These divisions are occupied with the metaphysical and epistemological discussions, respectively, the latter including the theory of pragmatism.

Since the science of biology, in its explanation of organic nature^ has employed certain categories generally regarded as peculiar to its subject-matter, the third section will consider the notion of control as involved in the characteristic principles of biology. Finally, mechanism, which formulates the principles obtaining in inorganic nature, or the physical world, will be treated in the fourth section.

A comparison of the results obtained from these various sources will serve to manifest those characteristics common to all the conceptions, and at the same time indicate the ground of any peculiar features deemed essential to the category. Such an analysis of the data presented will seek to determine those elements of the conception which may be retained as justifiable, and those which must be rejected as unwarranted by experience; those factors which are purely gratuitous, and those which are the outcome of a logical demand.

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Contents

PAGE

INTRODUCTION iii

Chapter I

The concept of control as a thesis of the philosophical movement expressed in the theories of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus — The thesis in the fragments of Heraclitus — Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus— The concept indicated in the ' Dialogues ' of Plato — The concept in the philosophy of Aristotle— Stoicism— Scholastic philosophy not occupied with the question of control— The concept in the philosophy of Spinoza— The concept in the philosophy of Leibniz— Comparison of the concepts in the cosmological theories 1

Chapter II

The epistemologies of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant concerned with the locus of control; these writers give speculative accounts of the teleological aspect of nature— Locke's position with respect to control in epistemology; his theory of design in nature — Berkeley's theory of control and design— Hume's position with respect to control— Kant's theory of control; his conception of purpose in nature— The concept of control in pragmatism 19

Chapter III Biological

The concept as revealed in the peculiar categories of biology 29

Chapter IV Mechanism

The concept in the method and constructions of physical science 34

Chapter V Conclusions And Remarks

Comparison of all the conceptions which have been discussed— Purpose and mechanism two diverse ways of describing control— Application of the concept in the sciences of mechanics, economics, sociology 39

IV

THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL CHAPTER I

The philosophical movement embodied in the theories of Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus may be interpreted as one of which an important function is the expression of the recognition of the concept of control in description and explanation of the world, and the discovery of such conditions as permit its affirmation. This movement accepts as a primary datum of experience general flux or change, and superimposes the further reflection that the change is regulated, that it is not merely change ; its method may be comprehended. For the detailed exposition of this interpretation we must have recourse to the respective theories of the philosophers.

Heraclitus, purporting to render an analysis of the world of experience, maintains as his grand discovery that in addition to the flux of sensible things there exists a principle of a different nature. Fragments 1 25, 26, 41 and 42, 43, 44, 62, proclaim the existence of universal change ; while in contradistinction fragment 1 announces : ". . ., tv 7ravra etvat " (all things are one) ; there is connection of these diverse sensible things. For the elucidation of this phrase we must turn to what Heraclitus deems his unique contribution.

Fragment 18 states: " Of all whose words I have heard, none has attained to this, to know that wisdom (a-o<j>6v) is from all things separate." As to the nature of this wisdom, different from all things, fragment 19 asserts : ' ' Wisdom is one, to know the thought (yvwfxrjv^ by which all things are steered through all things."

That is, this yvui^-q (thought, intelligence) is a principle 'steering,' directing the sensible flux, existing in the dynamic world and perceptible to intelligence or wisdom (<ro<j>ia). As to the specific characteristics which have afforded the ground for the observation of the existence of this yvwfx-q in all things, we learn that there is order preserved in the events, there is regulation of the happenings ; the manifold is a cosmos. (Indicated in Fr. 20) : "This order (koV/xov) which is the same in all things, no one of gods or men has made ; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be, an ever-living fire, fixed measures of it kindling and fixed measures going out." (Also indicated in Fr. 28, 29, 61.)

All diversity constitutes one process (Fr. 24, 35, 36, 39, 40, 57) by means of a principle of connection called harmony (d/a/xovi^) , whose essence is the holding of differences together, the combining of two opposites into one. (Indicated in Fr. 45, 46, 56, 59.)

The general thesis of this doctrine of Heraclitus may be summarized as follows: The world of continuous flux is described as a cosmos; succession is restrained, order and regularity must be attributed to it. Such a process can be comprehended only in terms of the principle by which it is controlled. This principle is not itself subject to the flux, but it exists as a static factor inherently in the process it controls or regulates. It is designated yvwfxrj (thought, purpose), since it is the permanent alone which is intelligible, it is by virtue of the existence of control that we can understand; the changing constitutes the incomprehensible.

In the systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras there is expressed the conviction that the world presented in immediate knowledge is one stage in a continuous process, where method is dominant. Thus Empedocles: " For know that all things have understanding (<j)p6v7]o-Lv) and their share of intelligence." 1

What is, is somehow an embodiment of what was, and what will be, is somehow contained in what now exists. To account for the world of different objects, of controlled movement, is the problem of these philosophers. Hence they first proceed to maintain that change in the sense of absolute origination and annihilation is unreal.

Empedocles : ' ' There is no origination of anything that is mortal, nor yet any end in baneful death; but only mixture (/xet£ts) and separation (o\oAAa£i?) of what is mixed, but men call this 'origination' (<£v<ns)." 2

Anaxagoras: "For nothing comes into being, nor yet does anything perish, but there is mixture and separation of things that are. ' ' 3

To explain the character of all change and the existence of distinct objects, unchanging and eternal elements must be posited. Empedocles names four of these original elements, the four roots (pt^w/xaTa) of all things, — fire, air, earth, water; and as causes of their movement, two others, love and hate, which are combining and separating forces. In addition, there is introduced a principle of measure in the mixture of elements; reason (Xoyos) governs the peculiar proportion of parts which determines the different objects. 4 Anaxagoras maintains that there is an infinite number of the perma-

X A. Fairbanks, 'The First Philosophers of Greece/ p. 186, line 231.

C0SM0L0G1CAL 3

nent existences, the seeds ( a-n-ipfWiTa ) of all things, originally together. vova- (mind), an external element, produces motion in the mixture and directs the course of movement, resulting in the world of distinct objects. "And whatever things were to be, and whatever things are, as many as are now, and whatever shall be, all these mind arranged in order." 1

Democritus is impressed with the same fact of an ordered world and is likewise confronted with the same problem— the explanation of such a world. The extent to which he has surpassed his predecessors in the superiority of his conception is evidenced in the embodiment of his formulation in the mechanical theory, which, in its main outlines, constitutes the modern physical theory. Similar to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, he posits permanent elements as the primary, necessary hypothesis for all explanation. But the nature of these elements is such that, granted their existence, all other conditions may be subsequently deduced. No external forces such as love and hate and mind are necessary to cause and regulate movement; the atoms suffice for all these functions.

Concerning the nature of these atoms, we are informed that they are infinitely small, indestructible, homogeneous, impenetrable bodies, alike in essence, but different in size and form. They are endowed with perpetual motion ( dtSio? Ktvqo-Ls ) , whose direction is guided by no disparate principle, but is due to a principle immanent in the

(and there is a certain movement of those primary bodies which is a natural movement). 2

The void (tokcvov), for Democritus, is the logical consequent of the self-moving atoms, since to render possible motion thought is obliged to conceive the void.

Thus in the doctrine of Democritus is manifested the position that thought, in its endeavor to attain explanation, is compelled to postulate permanent elements in self-regulated motion (the atoms). With this postulate granted, all subsequent constructions are necessary deductions, thereby presenting a system logical throughout, a system which constitutes the essence of explanation.

Summarizing, then, the import of the theories of Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, we obtain the following: An inspection of these theories carries with it the recognition that the same problem inspires them all. A world, the constitution of which is described in the first instance as dynamic, must in addition be characterized as a process imbued with order, or as a movement controlled. To explain this regulated world-movement there is assumed

1 Fairbanks, loc. cit., Fr. G.

2 Arist., ' de Calo,' III., 2-300 b.

in every case the existence of permanent elements in motion. In the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the regulating principle is embodied in elements other than the ones affected, while according to Democritus the movement is determined by the static properties of the atoms. In all the doctrines, however, the guiding principle is a constituent factor of the world, but the explanation of Democritus holds its superiority in being natural as well as cosmic, in contrast to the artificial account necessitated by the character of the elements in the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

This conclusion accords, then, with the doctrine of Heraclitus, in holding that explanation of the cosmos demands the existence of a permanent element determining the world change ; which principle is contained immanently in the series of events it controls.

In Plato's doctrine of 'ideas' the existence of the rational is so emphatically affirmed that to it alone is attributed the status of the real. The flux of sensible experience, the immediate, the particular, is relegated to the realm of mere becoming (y«Wis), of mere appearance. Antithetically, the ideas are eternal, universal, immutable, are manifested to reason alone and constitute the realm of real being (owia). Sensible objects are real only in so far as they 'participate' in the nature of the ideas. With the problem of the relation of these two spheres we are not here concerned.

A second feature of the ideas, and one which is no less emphatically intimated, is that of their connection and dependence. The relationship of subordination among ideas is essential to their existence and to the existence of the universe. Conceptions of measure, harmony, symmetry, order and law occupy a superior position in the structure of the world, and everywhere exhibit their dominion. Finally, supreme among ideas, the highest of all abstractions, the principle of the harmonious relationship of ideas, and thus of all 'being,' reigns the 'idea of the good.'

Thus in the 'Republic' the ideas are designated as 'fixed and immutable principles . . . neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason.' 1 That is, there is a dominating conception which preserves the subordinate conceptions in their ordered harmony, a highest rational principle, the condition of all rationality ; this is that which is termed the idea of the good. What light is to the visible object, the indispensable condition and cause of its visibility, so the idea of good, being absolute, is the principle necessary to the existence of all knowledge and truth. It is absolute science itself, attained by 'dialectic,' which is the culminating abstraction of reason. Conceptions of number,

1 Book VI., translated by B. Jowett.

COSHOLOGICAL 5

harmony, order, may be said to be contained in it, for they are subservient to this organizing principle, while it in turn is the primary condition of their being. Hence the importance which is attached to the studies of number and calculation in the Platonic scheme of knowledge. Mathematical conceptions are essentially conceptions instrumental to fixedness and order ; they maintain diverse elements within their respective limits and thus are conducive to the unity of the whole.

Evinced under a different aspect, but corresponding to the ideal good in the 'Republic,' 1 is the supreme principle of 'measure' in the 'Philebus. ' Plato conceives measure as the principle of symmetry, which is due to the regulated proportion of elements in combination, and thus may be identified with beauty. The first rank in the scale of goods is assigned to measure. For the greatest good in the world is to be sought, not in pleasure, not in wisdom, but in the 'mixture' of elements, and above all in the proportion of the mixture. Measure is identical with the principle of their ordered mixture. The universe is an embodiment of this principle of measure, for 'there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, as well as a cause of no mean power which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind. ?2 This infinite factor which enters into the composition of the cosmos is controlled by the principle of measure so that 'the assertion that the mind orders all things is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun and of the moon and of the whole circle of the heavens.'

In the 'Symposium' the supreme principle is revealed under the guise of beauty. The object of all love or impulse is the beautiful, and the object of the highest passion is absolute beauty, the principle of all concrete beauties. Beauty is the result and the condition of the harmonious arrangement of constituents. It is the source of the balancing influence of proportion ; it is the principle of harmony, of order, and is identical with the ideal good.

In Plato's suggestion of a probable cosmological theory/ it is plainly evident that he is governed by the necessity of giving such an explanation of the origin and structure of the world as will primarily account for its organized character, for the adjustment of its parts to a consistent whole. This universe is constructed after the eternal, intelligible pattern. Harmony, beauty, order, law, must be predicated of it. Hence a 'world soul,' or supreme organizing

1 Books VI., VII.

2 ' Philebus.' 8 Loc. cit.

* ' Timaeus.'

principle, is the source of its origination. This is a world reason (vovs), and is cognizable to reason alone. As the human soul directs the movements of the body, so this world soul or reason controls all occurrence in the cosmos and is the final cause of its existence. Briefly, the intent of this cosmological theory is the expression of the intelligibility of the universe, of the fact that it presents features which manifest a general subjection to regulation.

To recapitulate: While the Platonic dialogues present no attempt at a systematic world theory, the general theme of the doctrine of ideas, as indicated above, is the insistence upon the recognition of the universal prevalence of determination of all things, of the existence of principles regulating becoming or occurrence. These directing principles are intelligible and immutable, as distinguished from the sensible and alterable. They in turn are subordinate features of one supreme regulating .principle. That is, the world must be affirmed a system, not a chaos; there is a controlling element, perceptible to reason alone, obtaining in the world of diversity, which renders it a unity, an organization. Since the nature of the sensible and changeable is entirely distinct from the immutable, this controlling principle in a sense appears to be outside the process it dominates.

Aristotle, in his inquiry concerning the fundamental nature of reality, recognizes as the most apparent and immediate presentation of experience the perpetual change of sensible things. But reflection can not pause at this incomplete analysis. Reality is not a series of unrelated particulars ; it is an organic unity in which individuals function uniquely in the totality. "If there were nothing besides sensible things, there would be no principle (^pxv)i no order (Tail's), no generation (yeWis), no celestial harmony." 1 Science is an indubitable possession and bears witness to the intelligible, systematic character of the cosmos. To discover the ultimate condition of such an organic unity, to demonstrate the existence and nature of the permanently real (ovo-t'a), which is implied in its structure, is the problem of the 'Metaphysics.'

The primary reality (ova-ta ) is always manifested in the concrete individual and constitutes its essential nature ( to tl ty elvat ) . On the other hand, it must be emphasized that an adequate conception of the essential nature of a thing necessitates a transcendence of any particular embodiment, to the universal character manifested in a process (Ku/770-is). Individuals are subject to production (y(Wis) and annihilation (<f>0opd), and the essential nature of the individual can only be apprehended under genetic conditions.

1 ' Metaphysics,' W. Christ, Ed., Book A, Chap. 10.

What, then, is generation and destruction, what are the characteristics of a process, are questions which must be considered.

Every concrete individual is the result of a union of matter (vA.77) and form (elSos). Matter, the sum of conditions necessary to the actuality of the individual, is indeterminate. Form (elSos) is that which defines the indeterminate matter (vAr?) and in combination with it results in the existence of the concrete individual (to o-vvoAov). All existence is necessarily individual. Neither matter nor form can originate, nor can they cease to exist; the preexistence of both is indispensable to the realization of the thing. It is the concrete individual ( t6 <tvvo\ov) only, that which is composed of both, which can originate and perish. Now all change implies that which is the subject of change, that which subsists during differences, that which is permanent,— in a word, matter (vXrj). Matter is capable of being both of two contraries, but at different times. Thus we have attained the conception of the primary real (ovo-ia) as the essential nature (to tl tjv emu) of the individual, which is only manifested in a process. It must be noted that while the essential nature (to tl rjv thai ) is universal, it is embodied in the particular; while it is static, it is contained in the dynamic.

Further, movement or change does not occur indiscriminately, but is characterized by certain limitations evinced in its operations. 4 ' Nothing, indeed, is moved by chance. ' n This is the import of the doctrine of potentiality (o\W/ms) and actuality (evcpyeta), which is of fundamental significance in the apprehension of reality. Existence may be either potential or actual. A thing is said to exist potentially, when upon the event of certain conditions its realization or actual existence will take place. Matter (v\rj) is potentiality (Sum/xis), since it is the condition of the actuality (evcpyeia) of a thing. It is indeterminate in so far as its potential existence may or may not be transformed into actual existence, but it is a determining factor in limiting the nature of the actual in case of its realization. Thus, a seed is a plant in potentiality. For if the seed realizes its nature, that is, if appropriate conditions are forthcoming, the seed must develop into a plant and into nothing but a plant. The plant in relation to the seed, the potential (owa/u?), is actuality (cVcpyoa). It is evident that actuality (evcpyeia) must be prior to potentiality. For while the seed, from which the specific plant is produced, must have existed prior to this plant, there must have existed another plant prior to the existence of the seed, from which it was generated. Thus it is only in the case of the particular individual that the potential may be said to exist previously to

1 hoc. cit., Book A, Chap. 6.

the actual. Generically, actuality (cVepyeta) must exist prior to potentiality (8wa/us), prior in every sense of the term, in time, in knowledge, and in essence (ova fa) 9 for the actual must always define the merely potential.

Aristotle has previously predicated the eternal character of movement, on the ground that if movement or change were not perpetual, something would have to be produced from nothing,— which is inconceivable. Linked to the deduction of the eternal character of movement and a consequent of it, is the affirmation of the eternal character of time.

With the establishment of the conception of reality as a perpetual process, Aristotle has arrived at the final and ultimate stage of the inquiry: What is the fundamental condition of such a process? What is the final cause of the world order? All movement and change imply that which is capable of originating movement, for if movement were not produced by something it would have to arise from nothing. This cause of movement must exist in operation (ivepyaa) ; for if it were merely capable of producing movement, but did not operate, it would not account for movement. It must not contain any potentiality (Swa/us) in its nature; otherwise its operation would not necessarily be eternal. 'There must, therefore, be a principle, whose very nature (ova fa) is operation (cvepyeta),' 1 and which must be without matter, since it is eternal. Thus far we have derived the existence of something which is moved, and something which is the cause of movement. But, * ' Since there is something which is moved ( t6 Kivovpevov) and something which produces movement (to /avow), there must be an intermediate term; that is, there is something which produces movement without itself being moved, something which is eternal, and both existence (ova fa) and operation (ivepyeia)." 2 Aristotle's next consideration is the nature of this primary reality (ovo-ta), this eternal first mover, with the resulting conclusion that it is reason (vovs). That is, this unmoved mover operates in a manner similar to that in which the desirable and the intelligible cause movement, for that which is desired is always an intelligible object. Again, the desirable must be identified with the good, for we always desire a thing because it is good, and do not deem it good because we desire it. And the principle of will is, therefore, the good itself. Now, it is admitted that the best thing in the world is intelligence. The object of intelligence is the final cause, and this it is which is the cause of all movement and determines it as that which is loved. This mode of existence is life, ' for the operation of intelligence is life and the first

1 ' Metaphysics,' Book A, Chap. 6.

2 hoc. cit., Book A, Chap. 7.

reality (ovo-ta) . ' The Deity is eternal life. Further, what must be the content of this divine thought? If this supreme intelligence (vo^o-is) is the best thing, it can only have for its object the best; but the best is thought itself, therefore it must think itself. Its operation is the seizing of itself by itself (vo'^o-t? votjo-cws), self -contemplation.

Thought and its object are identical. Nor can this object change, for, being the best, if it changed it would cease to be the best. It is therefore perpetual self-contemplation. This mode of life, which is the eternal possession of the divine reason, is only enjoyed by man in rare moments of speculative thinking. Since all things in the universe exhibit a striving for realization, a tendency toward an end, in all things is this principle immanent, although in different degrees, varying from the lowest type of existence, that of inorganic being, through the intermediate phases of plant and animal life, reaching its culmination in the rational life of man and, peculiarly, in speculative thinking.

The way in which the universe contains this principle is comparable to the relation of a general to his army, or to the organization of a well-regulated household. The general is the cause of the order in the army, and the principle of organization is the condition of the regulation of the household. That is, the universe contains this principle as the cause or condition of its unification. For while all things in the universe exercise their distinctive functions, 'all conspire to a unique result' 1 The self-realization of the individual is identical with the process of the whole.

Gathering up the results of the whole investigation, the essential points of interest to our study present themselves as follows: The preeminent category demanded in an adequate interpretation of the universe is that of a world reason (voSs), which is evoked to explain the regulated or controlled aspect of reality. The data which have led to this induction, also the particular factors which the argument finds to be involved in the category, may be briefly stated as follows : Starting with the admission that the paramount empirical fact of the universe is change, a subsequent observation compels the acknowledgment of the existence of order in variation, of organic connection between events. These two primary assumptions, change and characteristic alteration, or method, lead inevitably to the conception of reality as a perpetual process, an eternal activity. The question then resolves into : What is the final cause, the ultimate ground, of this determinate world movement? The inquiry discovers it to be : The continuous operation of a principle which, while itself static, controls dynamic nature. Its method of operating is similar to the mode in which the object of desire, the intelligible

1 hoc. cit., Book A, Chap. 10.

object, determines human action; it influences as a goal to be attained, as an end to be realized. It is not an entity coercing from without, but is contained in the movement, contained peculiarly as an end toward which it tends, as an attraction to which it is impelled, as a result for which it is making. Now all individual things manifest a tendency toward self-realization, and all are constituent elements of the world process. The whole is a unity of its movements. That is, the determining principle, the static, universal element of reality, is identical with the tendency toward self-realization essentially characterizing all particular existences.

The metaphysics of the stoic philosophy proceeds from the thesis that reality is corporeal in nature and is limited to sensible existence. The corporeal must be defined with reference to a dynamic standpoint; force or tension (twos) is its essential character. It presents a twofold aspect: the real is that which acts (r6 irovovv), and that which may be acted upon (to irdo-xov). Corresponding to this double aspect of the corporeal there exists the difference of finer and coarser in its nature. The finer substance, called fire, ether, air, atmospheric current (Trvefyia), is described as mind, soul, reason; and the coarser is termed matter. But the finer is conceived as everywhere interpenetrating the coarser, and hence ultimately must be viewed as identical with it; reason is in all things and inseparable from them. God is described as both the active force and the subject acted upon, or these looked upon in union with each other.

The world must be considered as a series of events and their consequences bound together by an irresistible necessity, every occurrence of which is in conformity with this necessary order. Hence, the original productive force is called a 'generative reason' (Aoyos o-n-epiMiTLKos ) ? for it contains within itself the ground of the development of the whole world into its ordered multiplicity. It is 'a reasonable God or an artistic fire ( irvp rexvixov) , proceeding according to a certain method to the production of the world. n The fixed order which governs the course of events, or necessity, is denoted by the conception of destiny or fate (elfMtpfxevrj) . It must be observed that this necessity ruling all existence is no transcendental principle operating from without, but, consistent with the stoic materialism, is inseparable from the natural force and must be identified with it.

To account for this necessary character of the world movement, for the universal causal series of events, which maintains the elements of the world in perfect balance, and is thus the ground of the whole order and unity, the conception of 'Providence' (wpoVoia)