An inquiry into the state of the nation, at the commencement of the present administration...

Introduction

SlNCE the constitution of this country acquired its present form, and public business came to be transacted regularly in the great council of the nation, it has been customary in all important junctures, for our representatives to undertake a general investigation of the state of our affairs. The method of conducting this examination has varied at different periods. Sometimes a motion for inquiry has been

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agreed to by the ministry, and their adversaries have bfeen permitted to bring forward their propositions upon the situation of the commonwealth. Sometimes thq motion for inquiry has been opposed, while a view of the public misfortunes "was given as the ground of claimiftg a solemn investigation. But in every case the inquiry has substantially been entered into, and has consisted always in the free and comprehensive discussion to which such motions gave rise.

Those who have attended to the tactics of parliamentary debate, and remarked how greatly the separation of different articles of charge assists the party accused in shifting off. the attack from any one point, will easily admit the superior advantages of such a comprehensive view of the actual posture of affairs, as we commonly denominate " a state of the nation" It happens, however, that several years have now elapsed, pregnant beyond all former experience in disstrous changes, without any discussion of this wholesome and constitutional nature* In consequence, too, of certain recent occurrences, it has been found impossible to investigate at all, even in their distinct character, those measures which occupied the government during the last vacation. Aiid thus a new ministry is formed, and a new system about to commence, before the account has been settled with the old ; before the causes of our present calamities have been ascertained ; before the nation has been able to determine, either the extent or the origin of its dangers,, Greatly as this change of men and of measures is to be rejoiced at, we may venture to question, whether it would not have secured more solid benefit to the country, had it been delayed until the wisdom of parliament had "been applied, to such a full discussion of the late calamitous interference w^ith continental affairs ; and such a comprehensive review of our present situation in every particular, as can alone furnish the ground-work of that radical change of system, in which our

B 2 only remaining chanee of salvation must be sought.

It is to be feared, however, that the change of ministry has deprived us altogether of the benefits which would have resulted from a parliamentary investigation of these grave and difficult subjects : and it becomes the more necessary to attempt such a compilation of particulars, as may assist the public in examining the question ' out of doors. — With this view the following statement is drawn up. It is a very humble attempt at providing a substitute for the information respecting the state of their affairs, which the people w^ould have received from the deliberations of their representatives, had the formation of the new ministry been so long delayed as to have given time for an inquiry into the state of the nation.

This disquisition may conveniently be arranged under three heads — as it relates to the state of our foreign relations, our domestic wconomy and our colonial ftjfairs. It is of the last importance that

STATE OF THE NATION.

the country should be able to estimate the nature and extent of its resources in each of these departments ; and to appreciate the system of management in all of them, which has given rise to the unparalleled dangers that at present surround us on every side. After examining under each head the causes of our calamities, and fairly stating their real extent, we shall shortly inquire if there are any changes of system by which the fate of the empire may yet be stayed.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS.

In discussing this primary and import* ant branch of the subject, it is necessary to dwell at greater length on points which have never been brought before the Houses of Parliament. Of these the most material* is the late continental policy of the British government. We shall accordingly begin with an examination of the various particu* lars presented by the history of the " Third grand Coalition/' We shall then take a view of the situation in which it has left our external relations. Our attention will be directed in the next place toward the remaining objects of foreign policy in the present crisis , more particularly the state of the neutral questions ; and we shall con^ elude with suggesting the change of sys-* tern which the previous deductions appear to prescribe.

I. THE LATE CONTINENTAL ALLIANCE,

1 . The first circumstance which strikes us in contemplating the system of nego->

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tiation lately pursued by the British cabinet is, that the documents laid before parliament furnish no evidence of any attempts having been made to procure the mediation of our allies for an amicable adjustment of our differences with France. As far back as May 1803, a direct assureance was given by ministers, that they w r ould solicit the mediation of Russia, and in recommending this salutary measure, all parties cordially united. A cornmunication of a pacific nature was received from the French government at the beginning of 1805. His Majesty declined entering into any negotiations until he should consult his allies, and especially the Emperor of Russia; but he expressed himself, at the same time, desirous of seeing such a peace established as might be consistent with security and honour.

It is well known that the dispositions of Russia towards this country were never more favourable, nor her sense of duty towards the rest of Europe more strong, than at the time when the king returned this answer. — Our cabinet then, with the i

concurrence of all parties, stood pledged to procure, if possible, the mediation of Russia : The dispositions of France were officially announced, at least, to he pacific. Russia was engaged in the most confidential intercourse with us : His Majesty was advised only to delay entering upon an amicable discussion with France, in conseqnenceof that intercourse with Russia. — Might it not have been expected that our cabinet would seize this happy juncture, to press for the mediation of our august ally, and thus to redeem its pledge, at least, if not secure an honourable termination of the dispute ? Yet it is not a little remarkable, that in the whole mass of papers laid before parliament with a view of detailing the history of the late negotiation, no traces whatever are to be found of any steps towards obtaining the mediatory interference of Russia.

On the contrary, our communications with that power have' been from the beginning of a war-like nature. — • The treaty of Concert, llth April, $805, the first result of our negotiations,

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is framed for the purpose of marching half a million of men against France, in the pay ofEngland, (Art. in*.) That a mediator of differences should be in a respectable state of strength, in order to interpose with effect, is not denied ; but no power can assume the functions of an umpire after forming such a concert with one of the contending parties. It deserves further to be remarked, that the pacific inclinations expressed in his Majesty's answer to the French message, appear never to have produced any effect on our negotiations. The Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburgh were Engaged in the correspondence which gave rise to the war, as far back as November, 1804. The British government was a party to this intercourse at the same time. The French message w r as communicated during these negotiations, and no circumstance appears either in the official documents, or in the conduct of the parties, tending to shew that this pacific proposal produced any effect

* Treaties, p. 9. f Supplementary Papery p. 4. • upon the progress of an intercourse avowedly hostile to France.

But it may be said that the seizure of Genoa rendered it impossible for Russia to mediate, or hold any amicable correspondence with France. To this various answers are obvious. The Russian mediation was first thought of long after the invasion of Switzerland — a violation of the treaty of Luneville infinitely more important to the interest of all parties, than the annexation of Genoa. The incorporation of Piedmont, without any indemnity to the king of Sardinia, was made in express violation of the same treaty, and in contempt of specific engagements with Russia herself: yet this neither prevented Russia from offering her mediation, nor our government from pledging themselves to accept it. But, in truth, it is absurd to lay any stress upon the seizure of Genoa, when the first article of the treaty of Concert, concluded two months before that event, bound Russia and England to league against France in measures of hostility, § * without waiting for further encroachments on the part of the French govern* ment*."

Long before the seizure of Genoa, then, we had given up every chance of Russian mediation, by our hostile league with the court of St. Petersburgh ; and that event was viewed with exultation by the friends of the new war, as an additional means of rousing Austria and Russia to join us — not with regret as an obstacle to the work of pacification, which we had pledged ourselves to undertake. Even after our allies had placed themselves in a commanding posture of military preparation, and were fully disposed to embrace whatever plarj might be most effectual for restraining the encroachments of France, no attempt was made to avail ourselves of so favourable a juncture, for effecting that object in the manner pointed out in 1803, by the united voice of parliament. Our government seems only to have been anxious that there should be a battle, and impatient but to see the fighting begin. This leads us to

Treaties, p. 8.

the next remark suggested by the history of the late coalition.

2. The league appears to have had no precise or definite object in view. To attack France, and try the issue, is the only fixed point of concert. How far the allies were prepared, in the event of their Success, to propose such an arrangement as might secure the future independence of Europe, may be determined by a consideration of the purposes for which they avow that the league was formed. These are stated in Art. n. of the treaty of Concert*. We shall begin with the independence of Holland.

By the treaty of Luneville, the independence of Holland was guaranteed, and at the peace of Amiens France pledged herself to withdraw all her troops from the Dutch territories. It is of little moment to inquire by what circumstances the -fulfilment of these stipulations was retarded. The war between France and England finally prevented them from taking effect; but France has repeatedly

* Treaties, d. 9, declared her readiness to evacuate Holland as soon as the other points in dispute should be settled. Suppose the new confederates were successful in the war, and demanded a renewal of the stipulations respecting Holland. France withdraws her troops from that country during the peace which ensues — during the period when it Is not her interest to keep troops there. But as soon as a new war breaks out — as soon as the occupation of Holland is of the smallest importance to France, or detriment to us, has she not the means of again overrunning the Dutch territories in a week ? The whole of Flanders, from Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to Wesel, is her's. No barrier remains between the 'enormous mass of the French dominions, and the little, insulated, defenceless province of Holland. The strongest part of her frontier, the triple line of fortresses which surround France on the north, is opposed to the weakest side of the Dutch territories. Long before the guaranties of Batavian independence could possibly send a man to the Rhine, the

French would take Amsterdam, and k,eep the country as easily as they can defend the rest of their provinces. The Hollanders of this age are no longer the men who inundated their fields to defend their liberty. France has a party in the councils, and in the nation of the republic, and nothing could be more chimerical than # to hope that she would meet with any resistance from the unaided patriotism and resources of this state.

When, therefore, the new alliance professes to have in view the establishment of the Dutch independence, one of two things must be meant : either that nominal independence which consists in the removal of French troops, and which was guaranteed in the treaty of Luneville — or that real independence which consists in security from French influence during peace, and invasion during war; which was obtained for the Dutch by their own spirit, and the assistance of their allies at the beginning of the eighteenth century; which they only lost by the conquest of Belgium, To make war for the first of these objects was evidently most unwise : it was attained by the treaties of Luneville and Amiens, and, when attained, was perfectly useless. To make war for the second object was quite absurd, unless those other measures were in contemplation, which alone could secure it ; and the treaty of Concert gives us no hint whatever of any such measures. We are, therefore, left to conclude that the allied powers wished to see Holland once more independent, but did not know how to gratify this desire ; that they had a general design of freeing the Dutch from French influence, but could discover no means of doing so; that, therefore, they resolved to attack France, but, if successful, they were not prepared with any specific demands in favour of Holland. In so far then as the interests of Holland were concerned, the purpose of the allies was perfectly vague and indefinite ; it was merely the purpose of beginning to fight, trying their fortune, and afterwards finding out what they wanted.

Nearly the same observations apply te the independence of Switzerland, which is stated as another object of the coalition. At the peace of Luneville, France was left in possession of the bishopric of Bale, the Frickthal, Sa\oy, and the territory of Geneya. The two first of these possessions give, her a complete command of the passes of Havenstein, and consequently of the entrance into the plain of Switzerland from the north ; while the acquisition of Savoy ^nd Geneva throws open a passage on the south. With such advantages, it might be difficult for the Swiss themselves to prevent the return of the French troops at any time. But all plans for the independence of that country must evidently be futile, which do not originate in a firm union with the inhabitants, and no such union could well be hoped for under the constitution established by the interference of France. The league for^naking Switzerland independent, however, specifies no plan by which such an object is to be accomplished. The allies seem to have thought, that after France should be conquered, they would have time to discover j-How Switzerland might be made free, and to settle whether Savoy was to be separated from France, or the Frickthal given back to Austria, or Geneva restored to independence.

The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia, in Piedmont, is another object of the coalition. This must strike every one as a strange proposition to come from the court of St. Petersburgh ; the court, which after pledging itself to obtain an indemnity for his Sardinian Majesty, carried through the whole business of the German indemnities in active concert with France, and suffered the scene to be closed without any mention of that Prince's name ; the court which began in league with France, to parcel out Germany among its dependants, immediately after Piedmont had been seized by France, in violation of her pledge to Russia. No less singular is it to observe, that the prime mover of this claim in the King of Sardinia's favour is England, which gave him up without a struggle at the peace of Amiens ;

c and then witnessed unmoved, the partition of Germany. But the singularity of the interest displayed for Piedmont is complete, when we find that the third party in the league is Austria, who now comes forward in concert with the cabinets of St. Petersburgh and London, to avenge the King of Sardinia's cause against France, when a few months before she had been dragooned into the spoliation of Germany, by that very France, with the assistance of one of those cabinets and the connivance of the other. It is easy to perceive how little credit all those parties are likely to get with the rest of the world, either for their honesty or their wisdom — for their disinterested zeal in behalf of Piedmont, or their systematic views of the general policy of Europe.

Moreover, it would be difficult to imagine any less determinate or specific scheme than that of a war, for the re-establishment of the Sardinian family on the continent, " with as large an augmen- (i tation of territory as circumstances will permit*." While Savoy belongs to France, while the Italian republic is subject to her sovereign, and the Ligurian territory is at least controuled by her influence ; the mere restoration of dominion provides no security against the sudden resumption of that province as soon as France may find it convenient. This object, therefore, is as vague and indefinite as the general plan of rendering Holland independent, while Belgium and the left Bank of the Rhine belong to France.

The bare statement of the next proposed object is sufficient to shewthat it belongs to the same class — "the future security of the kingdom of Naples." There is apparently something less vague in " the evacuation of Italy by the French forces." But if by Italy is meant Naples and the states of the church, the treaty of Amiens bound France to withdraw her troops from thence ; she had entered into the same engagement with his Sicilian Majesty, and had stipulated with Russia, in general, to respect

* Treat, p. 9. Art. L. Letter C. C 2 the independence of Naples. These obligations were fulfilled by France immediately after the peace of Amiens, and until the commencement of the present war she had no troops in the Sicilian territory. When, however, she found it convenient to occupy it again, no obstacle was thrown in her way : So slender is the " security'* which Naples can derive, from France complying with such demands as the allies had proposed to make after a successful war ! But, if by the evacuation of Italy > the allies meant the recal of French troops from the Italian republic, we may observe, that this was a most futile object of war* The whole Cisalpine territory is substantially a province of France ; whether she rules it by French or by Italian troops. Subject to her sovereign; governed by the constitution which she has imposed ; administered either by her emissaries or her creatures — that province, even if entirely freed from French armies, would continue under the influence of France, acknowledge her alliance, and receive her troops as soon as hostilities were renewed, So t

STATE OF .THE NATION. 2 I nugatory i§ it to propose, as the object of an offensive league, the single, unsupported, ineffectual measure of recalling the French army from the Cisalpine.

The last object of the allies, is only in appearance, more vague than those already considered. ff The establishment of an " order of things in Europe which may u effectually guarantee its security and ¥. independence." Here, as in the former cases, we are left to guess at the particulars, and have no means of discovering how the general end in view is to be attained by the concerted plan of hostilities. This is the character of all the branches of the scheme, except only one, " the evacuation of Hanover,"— an object in itself so trifling, as not to merit consideration, among projects for the liberation of the world ; and placed, it should seem, at the head of these plans, rather in compliment to one of the contracting parties, than from its value in the eves of the rest.

A league, then, of unparalleled expense and vast risk is concerted, without any precise object but that of beginning a war ;

without any view more specific than a vague desire of curbing the power of France; without a plan more comprehensive than that of freeing from momentary oppression, a few detached parts of the French dependencies; with no preconcerted scheme for securing their independence, or for carrying into effect the general wish that has been formed to check French usurpation. — But, it may be asked, is the situation of Europe so hopeless that no means can be devised for accomplishing the grand objects which we have been rapidly surveying ? Must Holland be united in fate with Belgium, and the Cisalpine decide the destinies of the south ?— The consideration of these matters belongs to a future stage of this inquiry. At present, it is enough to have shewn that those objects bear no relation to the mere act of commencing a hostile coalition ; that the fortune of war might drive the French troops out of Holland and Naples, without rendering those states less dependent on France; that the emancipation of Europe eould only be obtained from a war of this description, in the most improbable event of its leading to the entire conquest of France ; and that the choice of instant hostilities, without giving any reasonable prospect of success, in prosecuting the general scheme, precluded all chance of paving the way to better times, by a gradual and peaceable arrangement. The only specific object of the coalition, then, was to make war upon France, and try the event. Let us next inquire, whether this object was prosecuted with such a degree of wisdom, as bestowed any title to expect that the event would be prosperous.

3. In order to attack France with a fair prospect of success, it was indispensably necessary, that the different states of the continent should feel how much their real interests depended upon a diminution of the French power. By our inteferrence, indeed, it was possible that the moment of their recal to a true sense of policy and duty, might be somewhat accelerated. But no salutary or lasting conversion could reasonably be expected from such a sudden change as our intreaties or subsidies might work, before the natural course of events had prepared them for adopting a new line of conduct. During the whole of 1802, Russia was not only blind to the encroachments of France, she was actively assisting them ; she was leagued with that power in the new partition of Germany, which has been called the "Settlement of In clem* " nities" — in other words : France having despoiled several powerful princes of their dominions, was now pacifying them with the territories of several weaker states; and Russia, by a cordial support, enabled her to accomplish what the Germanic body in general viewed as an unparalleled violation of justice. In the same operation, Prussia, who had lost nothing, was an active coadjutor ; and these three great powers were thus, so late as the middle of 1803, leagued together, for the purpose of aggrandizing themselves or their dependants at the expense, partly of Austria and her allies — partly of other powers, who ha4 been spectators of a contest, in which their weakness prevented them from engaging. This most unpromising state of things continued during almost the whole of 1803, and until a coolness began to arise between Russia and France ; not on any solid grounds ; not because France had made new encroachments — but rather from certain trifling and personal motives. Our clear policy was to have improved this change ; confirmed the alienation of Russia ; and attempted slowly to heal the wounds which her late conduct had an evident tendency to inflict on Austria. But to push hastily at any active measures «! — to hurry on an intimate union of two powers, lately in a state almost hostile; or even to engage Russia suddenly to exchange her alliance with France, for an open rupture, was in every view the height of rashness and impolicy. Far from pressing Russia towards so premature a conduct, it was our interest to have restrained her until both her own time and the time of Austria was come ; and, instead of rejoicing, that the seizure of Genoa gave both those powers a new desire to resist the French encroachments, it was our busiaess to curb their sudden resentment, until it could be displayed with effect ; and to retard the moment of their attack upon France, until their mutual relations were cemented and their resources were ripe for so dreadful a contest.

Let us consider whether this has been our policy, The documents laid before parliament, defective as they are in various particulars, furnish a most imperfect history of the late alliance ; but they contain evidence quite sufficient to convict us of having adopted and persisted in a line of conduct, the very reverse of that which has just now been sketched.

In November 1804 * the negotiations between Austria and Russia were going on with a view to an offensive alliance, England must therefore have begun her operations at St. Petersburg!! long before that period, probably before the end of 1803 A or immediately after the union between France and Russia was relaxed. At any rate, it is certain that an alliance between this country and Russia existed as

Sr Aithur Paget 's Dispatch, Sup. Pap, p. 4.

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early as July is 04, and was the subject of common conversation during the course of that month. The British cabinet, therefore, took advantage of the very first coolat appeared between France and Russia, (chiefly on account of the Cue d'Enghien's death) to orfer subsidies and precipitate Russia towards a war. A subsidiary treaty was concluded Sweden also, at the beginning of December 1804. But, without the assistance of either Prussia or Austria, it was obviously in vain to think ot a continental war. Perhaps it was :i to think of succeeding in such a scheme, without the co-operation of both those great powers. Was it wise, then, to begin by engaging Ri and Sweden as principals, and trusting to chance for obtaining as accessories, those

3 ought to have been the princij

It was for Austria that the st i was

to be made, and by her exertions alone

that it could succeed. Her resources were

lear the shock of the war, or her e.

: raked upon its issue ; yet we do not* » Austria, hut to Russia, orn we first apply to Austria— we find she is not ready, or not willing to begin the war for her own interests ; and therefore we go to Sweden and Russia, who happen at the time to be in ill-humour with France. This was surely not the best way of securing the cordial union of Austria.

We have already noticed the terms upon which Austria and Russia were at the beginning of the Tear 1803 ; but the jealousy which had subsisted from the affairs of Switzerland in the last war, and which the business of the indemnities inflamed, received its last aggravation in May, 1804, from the promulgation of the secret convention, Oct. 1801, between France and Russia. Austria now saw a neighbour whose ambition she suspected, and whose power she dreaded, acting in conjunction with her natural enemy, as the sole arbiter of the south of Europe ; taking upon herself the guarantee of Naples, Sardinia, and Rome ; and stipulating for the general arrangement of the^ balance of Italy. Excluded by the successes of her enemy from all territorial power beyond the Adige, she now saw herself cut out from all concern in Italian affairs, by the interference of her former ally. In :he temper of mind which such a discovery was calculated to produce, she found that Russia and France were involved in a sudden quarrel. She plainly evinced her good dispositions towards the latter, by immediately acknowledging the Chief Consul's new title, which Russia and Sweden peremptorily refused ; and she took this occasion of assuming a similar dignity to herself, against which Russia and Sweden protested* — And this was the moment chosen by the British cabinet for applying to Russia as the arbiter, the saviour of Europe ; and to Sweden as the other great charnpion of the same cause ! Surely, if any principle in practical policy ever deserved the name of self-evident, it is this, that our interest was by all means to avoid

* See Talleyrand's and D'Oubril's notes of May 16, July 21, and August 23, I8O4.— Imjtefia] a.;d Swedish notes to the Diet, August 84*t26, 1804.

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whatever might give umbrage to Austria « to court her most; who must always be our best ally ; and if we could not effect a cordial reconciliation between her and Russia, at least to beware of taking such a part with the latter, as must involve us in the consequences of the disunion *.

Having, however, made common cause with Russia, our next object was to obtain, at any rate, the accession of Austria. Nor can there be a doubt, that we availed ourselves partly of the formidable influence of Russia — partly of our subsidies- — partly of fallacious representations of our own strength, and the dispositions of Russia; to force the cabinet of Vienna prematurely into a rupture with France. In order to demonstrate this, we have only to consult the Treaties and Supplementary Papers. By the first separate article of