The beginnings of English utilitarianism

Preface

Perhaps no form of history is more interesting than that which has received the somewhat indefinite, because very general name, — History of Philosophy. It is evident that we may understand the field of investigation thus indicated in a broader or in a narrower sense ; and it is hardly necessary to remark that the accredited historians of Philosophy have actually differed more or less in their opinions as to the ground to be covered. Nobody would deny that the History of Ethics is a very essential part of the History of Philosophy, and, so far as ethical theories have formed an organic part of the general systems of ancient and modern philosophers, they may be said to have received due recognition at the hands of the historian. Lac, as the general tendency of English thought has been (or for a long time was) practical rather than speculative, it has happened, not unfortunately, that the progress of ethical theory in England has, on the whole, been less involved with the rise and decadence of definite systems of metaphysic than has been the case on the continent. Problems belonging distinctly to Ethics have for the most part been discussed on their own merits — except, of course, where theological issues have been raised. If English writers have not always put forth the profoundest theories regarding the nature and meaning of morality, they have at least done inestimable service in the way of clear thinking and consistent reasoning.

Now the result of this comparatively non-metaphysical character of English Ethics is tha^ it has by no means taken its true place in the general History of Philosophy. Properly speaking, we have no history of English Ethics. Dr. Whewell, indeed, published in 1852 his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England ; but this book was hardly calculated iv PREFACE.

to serve more than a temporary purpose. It everywhere shows marks of haste, as might perhaps be expected from its mode of composition, and the writer is so concerned to refute theories incompatible with his own, that his expositions, even aside from their necessary brevity, are generally unsatisfactory and sometimes quite misleading. A very different book is Professor Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, first published in 1886. This is all that a mere 'outline' could very well be; but, when it is considered that Chapter IV of this little volume, on " Modern, Chiefly English, Ethics," is only about one hundred pages long, it will readily be seen that it does not by any means pretend to be an adequate history of the subject. Other ' outlines ' might be mentioned, such as the very excellent one contained in Professor Wundt's Ethik ; but none of these really supply, or pretend to supply, a need which we doubtless all feel.

Since, then, we have no adequate history of English Ethics, the attempt has been made in the following chapters to cover a small fraction of the ground by tracing the rise of Utilitarianism in England. No one of the writers considered — not even Hume — is individually of such importance for English Ethics as Bishop Butler; but, taken as a whole, Utilitarianism may fairly be regarded as England's most characteristic, if not most important, contribution to the development of ethical theory. This being the case, its early history certainly deserves careful and somewhat extended treatment. The writer hopes that, whatever may be the shortcomings of the following historical sketch, he will not be accused of treating the subject either carelessly or in a partisan spirit. The attempt has been made to give a sympathetic exposition of each system considered, however far it may fall short of affording an ideal solution of the ultimate problems of Ethics.

Chapter I. The Ethical System Of Richard Cumber- Land. 1

WHILE the doctrine of Universalistic Hedonism has played a most conspicuous part in English Ethics since the time of Paley and Bentham, it is not commonly realized that the essential features of the system were stated and developed by a contemporary of the Cambridge Platonists. It is true that Cumberland's treatise, De legibus naturae, like most ethical works of the time, was largely controversial in character, having been written to refute Hobbes. Moreover, the jural aspect of the system, implied by the very title of the treatise, tends to obscure what for us is by far its most important feature. And even this is not all. The ' common good ' which Cumberland regarded as the end of all truly moral action, includes ' perfection ' as well as ' happiness,' which leads to serious confusion in the working out of the system. But, making all allowances for what was incidental in the external form of the work, and

1 Perhaps a word should be said regarding the relation of my own treatment of Cumberland to that of Dr. Frank E. Spaulding, in Richard Cumberland ah Begriinder der englischen Ethik (Leipzig, 1894). I had completed my study of Cumberland's system before I knew of this dissertation. Before putting my results in final form, I read the dissertation with much interest, but I am not aware that my own treatment was modified as a consequence. While I agree in the main with Dr. Spaulding's interpretation of Cumberland, and recognize in the dissertation a very thorough piece of work, my own treatment will be found quite different. I have given considerably more attention to other writers, in my attempt to show the relation of the De legibus naturae to preceding and contemporary thought, and have passed somewhat lightly over the parts of the work which seemed to be merely incidental, and not of importance for the further development of the principles involved. In particular, I have attempted, as far as possible, to separate the constructive part of the treatise from the controversial part, which has led me to exhibit the jural aspect of the system last, thus showing in how far the system is logically complete without it. Other differences will be obvious to any one who may take the trouble to compare these chapters with Dr. Spaulding's dissertation.

the confusion of two principles which have long since become clearly differentiated, it is well worth while to examine with some care the ablest, or at any rate the most successful, opponent of Hobbes and the true founder of English Utilitarianism.

It would be quite impossible adequately to treat of any important ethical system, without taking some account of the views of the author's contemporaries ; but this is particularly necessary in the case of early writers. In their works we are almost sure to find in artificial combination principles which are now regarded as logically distinct, and the only possible explanation of the actual form of the system in question is often to be sought in contemporary influences. Sometimes, of course, an investigation of this sort is difficult, and, however carefully prosecuted, yields no very certain results. Fortunately we are not thus hampered in the case of Cumberland. We shall find difficulty and uncertainty enough in certain aspects of his system, but there is little doubt with regard to the formative influences in his case. In his view of the nature of man, our author stands in the closest and most obvious relation to Grotius and to Hobbes, — his relation to the former being that of substantial agreement ; to the latter, that of opposition. We must, then, consider in the briefest possible way the ethical views of these two authors — particularly as regards the then current conception of Laws of Nature — and also notice the tendencies represented by the various opponents of Hobbes.

Of course, the idea of Laws of Nature was by no means original with Grotius. A Stoical conception at first, it had exercised a profound influence upon Roman Law, and had reappeared as an essential feature in the system of Thomas Aquinas. Here, however, as Sidgwick points out, it "was rather the wider notion which belongs to Ethics than the narrower notion with which Jurisprudence or Politics is primarily concerned." 2 It is one of the most important services of Grotius that he distinguished between the provinces of Ethics

1 Hist, of Ethics, p. 159.

and Jurisprudence, the result being as fortunate for the former as for the latter. 1 However, as Sidgwick remarks, while the distinction is clearly enough made in the body of his epochmaking work, Dejure belli et pads, still, in the general account which he gives of Natural Law, the wider ethical notion is retained. It will be important for the reader to keep this in mind.

In one of the earlier passages of the Prolegomena to his De jure belli et pacis, Grotius makes a significant statement regarding his view of the nature of man. Among the properties which are peculiar to man is a desire for society, and not only so, but for a life spent tranquilly and rationally. 2 The assertion that by nature each seeks only his own advantage, cannot be conceded. Even animals manifest an altruistic instinct in caring for their young, while children show compassion at a very early age. In adult man, that which in the lower stages of development had manifested itself as instinctive altruistic conduct, becomes self-conscious and rational. And this tendency to the conservation of society is the source of ' Jus' or Natural Law, properly so-called. 3 Natural Law would remain even if there were no God. But of the existence of God we are assured, partly by reason, partly by constant tradition. And here we are brought to another origin of 'Jus,' i.e., the free will of God. But even Natural Law, though it proceed from the nature of man, may yet rightly be ascribed to God, because it was by his will that such principles came to exist in us. 4

The relation between Natural Law and that which proceeds from the arbitrary will of God is of some importance. Apparently the latter is always in addition to the former, never in contradiction with it, 5 though it must be confessed that the author's treatment is wavering. As Sidgwick says, 6 according to Grotius, Natural Law may be overruled in any particular case by express revelation. It is to be noted, however, that

1 See Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik, vol. i, p. 102.

2 WhewelPs edition, p. xli. 3 Ibid., p. xliv. 4 Ibid., p. xlvii. 6 See, e.g., Ibid., p. lxxii. 6 Hist, of Ethics, p. 160.

this does not mean that Natural Law, as such, can be superseded by Divine Law, but rather that a special act which would ordinarily be a transgression of Natural Law may be right merely because God has commanded it. At best, however, this seems to contradict the fundamental principles of the system. But, aside from the question of a possible conflict between Natural and Divine Law, there is a further difficulty. Divine Law is what the name would indicate. In the case of such law, it may be said : God did not command an act because it was just, but it was just because God commanded it. 1 In the case of Natural Law, the reverse would seem to hold true ; but the language of Grotius on this point is somewhat ambiguous. For instance, we have seen that Natural Law may be ascribed to God, " because it was by his will that such principles came to exist in us"; but, on the other hand, Grotius holds that just as God cannot make twice two not be four, he cannot make that which is intrinsically bad not be bad. 2 The undoubted confusion which one finds here suggests the difficulty of mediating between the views later represented by Descartes and by Cudworth: (i) that moral distinctions depend upon the arbitrary will of God ; and (2) that they do not thus depend.

From the above it will be seen that Grotius insists upon the social and the rational nature of man. As to the proximate (not ultimate) origin of Natural Law, there seems to be a slight ambiguity. Now it appears to be founded upon the primitive altruistic instinct, and now upon the rational nature of man. 3 Probably it would be fair to say that, according to Grotius, the two are equally essential to human nature, which he regards as logically prior to Natural Law, just as that is logically prior to particular civil laws. The relation between Natural Law and Divine Law has just been considered. Logically, the latter should always be in addition to, never in conflict with, the former. When Grotius practically does allow such conflict, we must regard it as a natural, but not a necessary, concession to theology. Again, the relation of God to Natural Law is not

8 Cf. Cumberland, who probably follows Grotius here, as so often.

quite clear. On the whole, however, Grotius would seem to hold that certain things are right, others wrong, in the nature of things, i.e., apart from the will of God. Whether the nature of things be ultimately the same with the nature of God, we do not here need to ask. The question would hardly have occurred to Grotius.

It is probable that the ethical and political philosophy of Hobbes is not so closely connected with his mechanical philosophy as he himself would have had us believe. Certainly it is quite comprehensible by itself. Indeed, in the course of his expositions, Hobbes ordinarily refers to common experience rather than to his own first principles. The starting-point of his ethical speculation is probably to be found in the then current conception of Laws of Nature, 1 which we have just been considering. This will be assumed to be the case in what follows.

In order fully to understand Hobbes's view of the nature of man, we must distinguish (i) man's need of society ; (2) his fitness for society ; (3) his love of society, for its own sake. (1) That man has need of society, — in the sense of an organized commonwealth, — Hobbes would have been the first to insist. Out of society, indeed, man cannot continue to exist at all. But (2) man's fitness for society does not by any means keep pace with his need of the same. Children and fools need society, if possible, more than others, and yet they "cannot enter into it," in Hobbes's sense of the words. Indeed, many, perhaps most, men remain throughout life ' unfit ' for society, either through defect of mind or want of education. 2 The main reason for this unfitness, however, is man's fundamental egoism. If it be asked : (3) Does man love society for its own sake ? Hobbes replies with a decided negative. " All society ... is either for gain or for glory ; that is, not so much for love of our fellows as for the love of ourselves." 3 So much is plain, but it is not equally plain in what terms we are to express this primitive egoism. Sometimes pleasure as such

1 Cf. Sidgwick's Hist, of Ethics, p. 162.

2 See De cive, Works, Molesworth's ed., vol. ii, p. 2, note. 8 Ibid., p. 5.

would seem to be the end ; sometimes (probably more often) self-preservation.

Starting, then, with the assumption of man's original and ineradicable egoism ; and the further assumption that nature has made men essentially equal in the faculties both of body and of mind, 1 so that all may aspire to everything, — it is easy to see that the hypothetical ' state of nature' must be a ' state of war,' with all the attendant evils which Hobbes so tersely, yet vividly, describes. 2 How are men to escape the consequences of their own anti-social natures ? The possibility of deliverance depends upon the fact that man is not merely a bundle of selfish appetites, but, — as' Hobbes says, — "True Reason is ... no less a part of human nature than any other faculty or affection of the mind." Moreover, < True Reason ' is "a certain law." 3

It is natural that one should ask just what is meant by 'True Reason,' and Hobbes has a note on the subject, 4 which, however, is not particularly illuminating. " By Right Reason in the natural state of man," he says, " I understand not, as many do, an infallible faculty, but the act of reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the damage or benefit of his neighbors." He further explains that he calls reason " true, that is, concluding from true principles, rightly framed, because that the whole breach of the Laws of Nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly, of those men who do not see those duties they are necessarily to perform towards others, in order to their own conservation." 5 In a word, there is no infallible faculty of Right Reason that can be implicitly trusted. It can only be proven right by the event, and the test is the conservation of the individual.

1 See Leviathan, vol. iii, p. no.

2 Ibid., p. 1 13. For passages which seem to show that, in his description of the ' state of nature,' Hobbes does not understand that he is giving an historical account of the origin of human society, see, e.g., Leviathan, vol. iii, p. 114, and particularly the last part of the interesting note in De cive, vol. ii, p. 10.

8 De cive, vol. ii, p. 1.6. 4 Ibid.

5 See, also, De corpore politico, vol. iv, p. 225, where the author says: "But this is certain, seeing Right Reason is not existent," etc.

However, Right Reason, in the sense above explained, leads us to formulate certain Laws of Nature. Such a 'law' is defined as " the dictate of Right Reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." The first and fundamental Law of Nature is " that peace is to be sought after, where it may be found ; and where not, there to provide ourselves for helps of war." 1 From this law, all the others, — twenty in De cive, eighteen in Leviathan, — are derived. "They direct the ways, either to peace or self-defense."

We are not here concerned with the enumeration and deduction of the particular Laws of Nature, which will readily be found by referring to Leviathan, De cive, or De corpore politico. The question as to their exact significance {qua Laws of Nature), however, is of the greatest importance for the system ; and it is just here that the expositions of Hobbes are least helpful. The philosopher himself says : " The Laws of Nature are immutable and eternal : what they forbid can never be lawful ; what they command can never be unlawful." 2 At the same time, it is important to observe that in a state of nature it would be irrational for a man to obey these laws, for he would have no assurance that others would do the same. Such conduct would defeat the end which all these laws have in mind, i.e., the preservation of the individual. Indeed, as Hobbes reminds us, they are not < laws ' at all in the ordinary sense, "since they are nothing else but certain conclusions, understood by reason, of things to be done and omitted"; 3 whereas the element of compulsion is essential to ' law ' in the strict sense.

In order that there may be any security whatever, a government of some sort must be established. The many conflicting wills must be changed into one, not by a change in human nature, — which, of course, is impossible, — but by the several individuals submitting themselves either to a " council " or to " one man." In this compact, the individual gives up all but

1 De cive, vol. ii, p. 16. Cf. Leviathan, vol. iii, p. 117.

2 De cive, vol. ii, p. 46. 8 Ibid., p. 49.

the right of defending himself against personal violence. To the governing power belong the "sword of justice" and the " sword of war," and — what necessarily follows — judgment as to the "right use " of each. But this is not all. Since difference of opinion concerning "rneum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest," a etc., are productive of discord, the civil power must define the above. Also, the supreme power of the state is to be judge of all theological doctrines, in so far as they tend to practical results. In short, this power is " absolute," as Hobbes himself frankly calls it.

We must now ask: What has become of the Laws of Nature, with which we started ? We have already seen that Hobbes refers to them as "eternal and immutable." In the latter part of De cive? he says, using words that Cudworth himself could not have objected to: "Natural [Law] is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternal word born with them, to wit, their natural reason ; and this is that law which, in this whole book, I have endeavored to unfold." But suppose that civil laws should be in opposition to these Laws of Nature ? Hobbes meets the query with characteristic boldness. " By the virtue of the natural law which forbids breach of covenant, the Law of Nature commands us to keep all the civil laws. For where we are tied to obedience before we know what will be commanded us, there we are universally tied to obey in all things. Whence it follows, that no civil law whatsoever, which tends not to the reproach of the deity 3 . . . can possibly be against the Law of Nature. For though the Law of Nature forbid theft, adultery, &c. ; yet, if the civil law commands us to invade anything, that invasion is not theft, adultery, &c." 4 The conclusion to which we are brought by the philosopher himself is rather startling: Nothing in the civil laws can be against the Laws of Nature, because not only is

1 De cive, p. 77. — Note the heterogeneous items. 2 See p. 186.

3 This is only an apparent exception, for it would be precisely for the civil power to decide, in any particular case, what was, or was not, " to the reproach of the deity." 4 De cive, pp. 190, 191.

the civil power behind the Laws of Nature, that which makes them properly 'laws,' but also it is that, and that alone, which gives them their content. It makes comparatively little difference what the Laws of Nature command or forbid, so long as it lies wholly with the civil power to define the terms used.

Some pages back it was seen that there was ambiguity in Hobbes's use of ' Right Reason.' In De corpore politico », we are told : " But this is certain, seeing Right Reason is not existent, the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof." x In other words, the arbitrary use of civil power must make up for the lack of Right Reason in man. Again, in Leviathan? "The unwritten Law of Nature ... is now become, of all laws, the most obscure, and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters." But who should be the interpreter ? Hobbes candidly remarks : " The interpretation of the Laws of Nature, in a commonwealth, dependeth not on the books of moral philosophy. ... That which I have written in this treatise concerning the moral virtues . . . though it be evident truth, is not therefore presently a law ; but because in all commonwealths in the world it is part of the civil law." No amount of valid reasoning can vindicate the Laws of Nature. Nothing but their presence in the statutebooks of the commonwealths of the world can do that. And the reason why they can be said to be so universally recognized is that the same power, in each particular case, that compels obedience to them, also practically furnishes them with their content. It may also be noticed that Hobbes has proceeded deductively, — in appearance, at least, — in arriving at his Laws of Nature. If presence in the statute-book be the only test, he should have proceeded inductively. The utter confusion which we find here requires no comment. The Laws of Nature, with which our philosopher began, have vanished into thin air. We learn what is good for us as well as what is right, what is true as well as what is just, from the powers that be. There would be no place for a theorist like Hobbes himself in his own ideal state.

1 See vol. iv, p. 225. 2 See vol. iii, p. 262.

IO ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM. [Chap.

It was inevitable that a theory of political absolutism like that of Hobbes, — involving as it did a wholly egoistic system of ethics, the unlovely character of which the philosopher was at no pains whatever to conceal, — should excite the most violent opposition. But while the ethical writers of his own time and country were practically unanimous in their opposition to Hobbes, their methods of attack were by no means the same. Some were more incensed at the brutal egoism of the system, some at the arbitrary character which Hobbes had assigned to moral distinctions ; though it is fair to suppose that all were a good deal disturbed by both sides of his doctrine. A general statement like this, however, is apt to be misleading, as it does not suggest the complexity of the facts. It is probable that in periods of controversy, quite as much as in periods of constructive work, the individualities of prominent writers play a determining part in shaping their productions. Hence we must be on our guard against supposing that the conventional division of the opponents of Hobbes into ' schools ' is wholly satisfactory. For instance, Whewell classes together : (i) Sharrock, Henry More, and Cumberland, and (2) Cudworth and Clark ; while Sidgwick, on the other hand, distinguishes between (1) the " Cambridge moralists," including all the above but Sharrock, Cumberland, and Clark, and (2) Cumberland. This does not imply any essential difference in the way that Whewell and Sidgwick interpret the doctrines of the authors named. Any such classification is largely a matter of convenience and more or less arbitrary. For our present, purpose, three men may fairly be taken as typical of the tendencies represented by the opponents of Hobbes, viz., Cudworth, More, and Cumberland.

Cudworth, of course, stands for Intellectualism. He would reduce morality to a system of truths. The result is that, in his unfinished Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, we have a noteworthy system of metaphysics, rather than a direct and explicit treatment of what are ordinarily regarded as the problems of ethics. Indeed, so much is Cudworth concerned to establish a system of " eternal and immu-

I.] RICHARD CUMBERLAND. II

table " truths, among which are the truths of ethics, that never once, in the course of the treatise just referred to, does he take the trouble to combat the egoism of Hobbes. Obviously we are not concerned with his system here. Cumberland, on the other hand, is singularly devoid of metaphysical interests, and the passages in his treatise De legibus naturae which do incidentally treat of metaphysical questions, are certainly the least satisfactory part of his work. To the side of Hobbes's system which teaches the arbitrary character of moral distinctions, he replies by reproducing what we have already seen to be the views of Grotius regarding Natural Law; while, in opposition to the egoism of Hobbes, he teaches what practically amounts to the system of Universalistic Hedonism. As the first English writer standing for this principle, he has been taken as the subject of the present chapter.

More, whose Enchiridion Ethicum enjoyed an enormous popularity in its own generation, 1 is particularly hard to classify ; but it is certainly safe to say that he occupies a position logically intermediate between the other two. The fact that he so nearly refrained from publishing his own work, owing to the supposed objections of Cudworth, is in itself a sufficient indication that the two authors concerned regarded their systems as standing for very much the same principles. On the other hand, however, while Cudworth had practically neglected the affective side of our nature in his own treatise, More makes the ' Boniform Faculty ' (which is at once the touch-stone of virtue and that by which virtue in the moral agent is immediately and certainly rewarded) not only coordinate with Right Reason, but constantly suggests its primacy. It is difficult to express in a few words More's view of the relation in which these two faculties stand to each other. Sometimes he even seems to identify them, but, if one may venture upon a perilously concise statement, the case stands thus. In a 'state of grace,' the < Boniform Faculty' (which plays much the same part as conscience) is all-sufficient. No

1 See WhewelPs Hist, of Mor. Phil, in England, Lect. iii. In spite of its popularity, however, the Enchiridion has never been translated into English.

appeal to Right Reason is necessary, or desirable. But, " since there are some men who have lost all sense of God and divine things, and recognize no fixed rule in their faculties," these "must be approached in another way," i.e., by Right Reason. The author therefore draws from this store " certain principles immediately true, and in need of no proof, but from which almost all moral reasoning (as mathematical demonstrations from common axioms) may be clearly and easily deduced." These he calls 'Noemata.'