The connection between thought and memory

Front matter

"THOU THAT TEACHEST ANOTHER \ T 'm 1/ TEACHEST THOU NOT V WW*J*, THYSELF ? "

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Preface

A short time ago a teacher complained to the author that she could not get any real help in her school-work from reading psychologies and books on education. It is hoped that the following book will give help to such teachers, not only by the central idea that stands out so prominently, but by its copious illustrations and descriptions of mental phenomena, as well as by the practical applications in the last chapters. The teacher needs descriptive psychology far more than metaphysical psychology.

Even a few simple exercises, such as those recommended on page 5 for grammar school pupils, would greatly help teachers toward appreciating the character of the mental processes with which they have to deal. Observation work thus begun will be found so interesting and attractive that it will easily lead to further introspection and study of the laws of association (cf. pp. 41, 42). But still more help will be gained if teachers will watch how their own pupils think and reason. Make notes of the observations, and compare them with such records as those reported in the Pedagogical Seminary, vol. ii. pp. 358-396.

There is nothing in all of this that any bright teacher cannot readily understand. But the mistake is too frequently made of supposing that whatever the teacher learns she must forthwith tell her pupils. Nothing could

IV PREFACE.

be more fatal to good teaching than to attempt to make the child think logically, or learn lessons by the Herbartian formal steps. But every teacher should know how children do think, and what the necessary steps in acquiring knowledge really are, so as to be able to get out of the way and not hinder the pupil's progress, as well as to be able when necessary to give just the help that is needed.

The monograph treatment is eminently adapted to a work of this kind. Two of the most helpful and suggestive books for teachers are already published in this form : Radestock's Habit and Its Importance in Education, and Lange's Apperception. It is earnestly hoped that others will follow. Until the chief points in school-work are thus treated, we cannot expect any firm basis for a general work, nor would the teachers get much assistance from such general reading. For self-instruction, the teacher needs clearness, fulness, and practical applications. These are the qualities aimed at in a monograph.

The German monograph on which the following work is based grew out of round-table conferences in a teachers' reading circle formed for the purpose of study in educational psychology. In writing a book for American teachers I have tried to keep true to the best ideals in the German, while at the same time being perfectly free to add to, omit, or modify, any statement or ideas whatever. When I visited Rector Dorpfeld in 1890, to talk over these and other matters with him, he not only gave me full permission to translate his work, but urged me to make any changes and additions I saw fit. Thus it has come to pass

PREFACE. V

that this work, while quoting very largely from Dorpfeld' s, and being based on it so far as its essential central idea is concerned, is yet in no strict sense a translation. Whenever better ideas have been found elsewhere, they have been unhesitatingly substituted. The explanation of the common origin of the two laws of memory, for instance, is radically opposed to the view expressed by Dorpfeld and all other Herbartians. But I do not believe in the Herbartian view on this point, and hence have re-written that part entirely. The same is true of many other less important parts. All of the bibliographical references, and likewise many of the illustrations, are additions.

On the other hand, everything that was essentially German and local in its allusion has been omitted. For the many controversial points with other German educators, and long explanations applicable to religious instruction in Germany only, the reader is referred to the German work. It is now in its fifth edition, in the present issue of the Collected Works of F. W. Dorpfeld, 11 vols. Gutersloh ; C. Bertelsmann, 1894-1895. Dorpfeld died in October, 1893.

In conclusion, I wish to thank President G. Stanley Hall

and Dr. Wm. H. Burnham for their encouragement and

help in the work of revision and of publication. I am also

greatly indebted to the following friends : President Charles

De Garmo, Dr. C. C. Van Liew, Dr. Charles A. McMurry,

and Dr. Frank M. McMurry, for valuable suggestions

while the book was passing through the press.

H. T. L.

Clark University, June, 1895.

Table Of Contents

PAGE

Preface iii-v

Introduction, by President G. Stanley Hall ix

CHAPTER I. Preliminary 1-7

Statement of the Problem, 1. — Orientation and Explanation of Terms, 3. — The Study of Psychology in the Elementary School, 5. — Clearness of Ideas, 7.

CHAPTER II. The Processes of Thought and Memory 8-38

A. Of Thought, 8-24.

Comparison, 8. — Conception, 9. — Spontaneous Concepts, 11. — Judgment, 12. — Reasoning, 14. — Graphic Syllogism, 17. — Formation of Sense Percepts, 19. — Elements of Thought, 21.— Simple Ideas, 23. — Bibliographical Note, 24.

B. Of Memory, 24-38.

Definitions, 25. — Examples, 26. — Memory in Conception, 28. — In Judgment, 30. — Spontaneous Judgments, 31. — Memory in Reasoning, 33. — In Perception, 34.— Apperception, 35. — Summary, 36. — Bibliographical Note, 38.

CHAPTER III. The Laws of Thought and Memory 39-88

A. Of Memory, 39-53.

Derivation of Laws of Association, 39. — Aristotle, 39. — Descartes, 43. — Herbart and the Recent Writers, 45. — Relative Importance of the Two Laws, 49. — Bibliographical Note, 52. vii

Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

B. Of Thought, 53-88.

Difference between the Laws of Psychology and those of Logic,

53. — Genetic Order of Comparison, Judgment, and Conception,

54. — The Single Thought-Process, 57. — Superordinate and Subordinate Concepts, 58. — Examples, 59. — Children's Use of Language, G5. — Language not a True Mirror of the Mental Processes, 68. — The Law of Conception, 72. — Causes of Spontaneous Judgments, 73. — Examples, 74. — Disappointed Expectation, 77. — Three Forms of Judgments, 80. — Comparison of Laws of Thought and Memory, 82. — Imagination, 84.

CHAPTER IV. Application to Pedagogy 89-127

Limitations, 89. — Steps in Acquiring Knowledge, 90. — Memory in Apperception, 93. — Ways and Means of Committing to Memory, 95. — Forms of Memorizing, 97. — Relative Value of Rational and Mechanical Association in Intensity, Extent, and Direction, 98. — Spontaneous Memorizing, 102. — Immanent Memorizing, 107. — Two Forms of Repetition, 109. — Treatment of Reviews, 112. — Advantages and Disadvantages of Mechanical Repetition, 114. — Its Service sometimes Indispensable, 119. — Recapitulation, 121. — Mnemonics, 123. — Ebbinghaus's Experiments on the Memory, 125. — Bibliography of the Herbartian School, 127.

CHAPTER V. Illustrations taken from the Subjects of the

Curriculum 128-158

First Example — History, 128-141.

Second Example — Natural Science, 141-145.

Third Example — Selections to be learned by heart, 145-148.

Fourth Example — Arithmetic, 148-158.

Introduction

Dr. Herman T. Lukens, to whom we owe the presentation in so attractive English form of this most noted work of one of the best German teachers of pedagogy, and who as I write has just been advanced in Clark University from the position of Honorary Fellow to Docent, is one of the most accomplished and promising men in that choice group of young Americans who have studied Education in a postgraduate and professional way in Europe and at home, and have deliberately chosen the work of teaching pedagogy as their calling. Unlike too many members of this group, Dr. Lukens, although thoroughly trained in Herbartian pedagogy and in sympathy with it, does not regard it as the consummate formulation of educational theory, nor attempt to apply its rubrics blindly and without change to the very different material and environment of American pedagogy, but has felt it necessary to supplement Herbart, both by modern child-study, and by some practical acquaintance with experimental psychology. It is this that makes Dr. Lukens competent to present us with a condensed digest, instead of a literal translation, and to enrich these pages with copious and valuable notes that render this volume more valuable than the original. This, and many other signs of the times pointing in the same direction, suggests how speedily our country is outgrowing its excessive

ix

X INTRODUCTION.

reverence for the German speculators of half a century ago. That there are still some to whom it seems the acme of philosophic or pedagogic attainment to interpret the tomes of these great and useful, but now obsolescent, writers is a note of provincialism from which, if all indications do not fail, we are soon to be emancipated.

Save health alone, there is no more important and practical topic for teachers to study than that to which this little book is devoted. Its subject-matter is presented in a clear and elemental manner sure to have speedy fruit in the schoolroom, and it is worthy the attention of all practical teachers, to whom I have no hesitation in recommending it. I cannot forebear laying still more stress than does Eector Dorpf eld on the distinction, not only between immanent and intentional memorizing, but between immanent and intentional thinking. The latter is, of course, chiefly dealt with in books, but the former is incalculably more important ; and to know something of the mysterious nature of memory and of thought is one of the chief objects of the new study of children.

G. STANLEY HALL.

Clark University,

Worcester, Mass., Sept. 17, 1895.

THE

connection between thought and memoey.

Chapter I. Preliminary

There are undoubtedly many more books written about the memory than about any other faculty of the human mind. Great power of retention is fascinating to most people and easily appreciated. The " memory doctors " are accordingly numerous, and reap a rich harvest, notwithstanding repeated exposures. Thinking is, however, somewhat more difficult than remembering, and therefore less attractive for most of us. But every educator, at least, is interested in both divisions of our subject, and must come to some conclusion in his own mind as to the relation that these two activities should bear to each other. For centuries past many questions relating to thought and memory have been discussed with great warmth and earnestness. Which of these two faculties is the more important for culture ? Should the memory be cultivated more at one period of life, and the development of the thinking powers be left for another period ? Is the great importance given to memory a hindrance to productive thinking ? Or, vice versa, does the too early cultivation of the thinking powers weaken the memory ? There is no topic of instruction, and no problem of moral education into which these considerations do not enter at all periods of the child's development.

Although our theme embraces, to be sure, two subjects, yet the point of view for their consideration is merely the relation in which they stand to each other. Accordingly, there is no need of presenting either all that is known about thought, nor all that is known about memory, but of each subject only so much as is requisite in order to explain the relation between these two mental activities — first of all psychologically, and then applied to practice in the school. In the second place, it must not be lost sight of that it is mainly the practical field of application that gives the subject its broad extent. Let us take an analogous example in physics. The laws of gravitation govern the material world of the whole universe. Nevertheless, the conception of the force of gravitation, together with the most important general laws relating thereto, can without difficulty be made intelligible by the help of well-chosen illustrative examples, together with something of the practical application of these general laws. It would be quite another thing, however, to trace out their application in all directions and ramifications, — in the field of astronomy, geology, meteorology, etc. ; further, of architecture, mechanics, navigation, and the many other applied arts. What is possible in physics will probably also be possible in psychology.

Let us note once more our problem distinctly. In the psychological portion of our work we have to consider the thinking process as well as the memory, in so far as is necessary to explain their mutual relation ; the practical application needs to be followed only as far as is requisite on the one hand to make the above results still somewhat

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 3

clearer, and on the other hand to help the reader to think for himself.

The mental processes or activities are, as is well known, divided into three main classes, — activities of cognition (intelligence), emotion (feelings), and volition (desires and will).

The consideration of our theme will have to do, for the most part, with the activities of cognition ; first, because thought and memory of themselves belong to this class, although they stand in very close relation to both of the others ; secondly, because the feelings and desires, being more vague and indefinite in their very nature, present much greater difficulties to closer observation and introspection.

Knowledge begins with perceptions through the five senses, — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and feeling (touch, muscular sense, etc.). 1 This is, however, not to be understood as if the sense impressions forthwith produced actual perceptions. They result first of all only in sensations. A perception does not form until a sensation has been frequently repeated, and only after certain other psychic processes have taken place.

The reader should notice from this that the formation of

1 Whoever wants to, can, even here at the outset, plunge headlong into philosophical and theological speculations, with all their old and all their new controversies. Sensualism here, idealism there, and so forth. Let the reader remember, therefore, once for all, that we are going to concern ourselves with facts of experience in psychology — not in how far metaphysical doctrines can be spun from them, but simply in so far as they are able to give clearness and support in our pedagogical practice. In this sense we may accept the old dictum: Nihil est in intellectu, quod antea non fuerit in sensu, understanding it to mean, There is nothing in the intellect that does not presuppose sense-perceptions.

clear perceptions is far from being so simple as it at first view seems and is generally considered. If a teacher is not thoroughly familiar with the subject of the origin of perceptions, he may assume as certain that in instruction he will make many mistakes, even in the very first stages of the lesson, in particular by expecting more of the pupil's power of perception than he is capable of. A step farther. If such a knowledge of psychology is required in order to give even an object-lesson properly, where things can be presented immediately to the senses, how much more necessary is it when the object must be represented in language, in which case the imagination must assist.

Besides the senses, the mind has still another source of knowledge. The senses make report only of the phenomena of the outer world ; i.e., of the things, properties, processes (and their relations) in the world of matter. They say nothing, on the other hand, of the phenomena in the mind. These latter processes, belonging to the world of spirit, make themselves known immediately through consciousness. Thus the mind gains ideas not only of the things and processes outside, but also of the phenomena of its own inner life, especially of ideation itself, of feeling, exercise of will, and the relations existing between these. How else would the science of psychology be possible? And all the other sciences of mind — logic, ethics, law, theology, pedagogy, psychiatry, aesthetics, philology, etc. — draw essentially from this second source.

There is a special reason why pedagogy should turn its attention to this second source of knowledge. Those subjects of the curriculum that have most directly to do with character-forming, as literature on its humanistic side and history, belong in so far to the field of psychology.

THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 5

This is shown by the vast array of names and expressions there met with, that refer to mental qualities, states, and processes. The usual method of presentation aims to bring these concretely before the pupils' minds by the historic events, and by associating these latter with events in the experience of the pupils. But the teacher must be concerned to see to it that meanwhile this second source of knowledge in the pupil's mind is actually at work ; i.e., that the words call up corresponding processes and states in the mind. The teacher can do considerable to help in this in two ways, the first of which is applicable throughout the whole course, from the lower grades up ; the second is only possible in the upper grades.

The former work will be accomplished if the teacher directs the pupils' attention to psychic processes and states as they occur in the lesson, and does his best to make them definite and distinct. Three objects will be gained by this : first, this kind of instruction will be in the highest degree in the interest of character-building ; secondly, the pupil learns to be observant of his inner life ; and thirdly, he is collecting in this way a desirable store of psychological material and expressions for use later.

The second part of the work consists of a number of separate lessons in psychology, using the material collected as above. In these lessons nothing more is needed than an arrangement and review of this material by topics; e.g., expressions of knowing (to deliberate, to consider, to find out ; silly, wise, ingenious ; judgment, question, statement, etc.) ; expressions of feeling (to

etc.), and expressions of willing (to resolve : stubborn ; purpose, etc.). Rightly managed, this may with profit be begun with children of ten or eleven years.

The perceptions of sense from without, together with those of consciousness from within the mind, form the fundamental stock in trade of the intellect. Out of this raw material the soul creates new forms of knowledge, — concepts and imaginary ideas, judgments and conclusions. We may compare the intellectual activities of the soul to the commercial and industrial activities of the people. We distinguish here, (1) original production, which by agriculture, mining, etc., furnishes raw material ; and on the other hand, (2) manufactures, which make the raw goods into something better ; and lastly, (3) commerce and transportation, which effect the exchange of goods of both kinds between different regions. In this comparison we would call the sense perceptions (together with the inner perceptions) the intellectual raw production, and the other activities beyond these, mental manufacture and commerce. Now we are going to include all of these higher activities of knowledge, with the exception of imagination, 1 under the name of "thinking." Ordinary usage gives to the word a wider sense ; e.g., in the expressions, Who would have thought it (expected or imagined it) ? Think of yourself in my place! What do you think of my new hat?

The word "concept" is also used in several different senses. In the following pages it is always to be understood as equivalent to "general notion." Conception is employed as the name of the process by which concepts are formed.

1 In a wider sense, imagination is included in thinking, since it, too, creates new ideas ; but these are never abstract, if the imagination alone is concerned.

USE OF TERMS. 7

"In all thought the greatest beauty is the greatest clearness." These are very nearly the words with which Rector Dorpfeld began a conversation with ine in the summer of 181)0, when I visited him to consult about the subject of this work. Every one will do well to bear this advice ever in mind, and never be satisfied with a thought until it is followed out to its logical conclusions, and is as clear as it is possible to make it. Confusion of ideas is fatal to all sound work. In an article by Fullerton, Oyi Sameness and Identity, in the Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, No. 1, there are enumerated and illustrated no less than seven different meanings of the word "same," which, one would think, should certainly keep the "same" meaning better than any other word in the language. Yet, as the author points out, this very term has led to a host of misunderstandings and false reasonings in systems of philosophy. Most of the prolonged and fruitiess discussions in which we engage are based on a difference of use in our words, and the consequent misunderstandings they occasion. This is especially true of the mental sciences.

The use of the word "concept" adopted in this book agrees with that of the great majority of writers on psychology, both in this country and in England. Indeed, I know of but two conspicuous exceptions. These are De Garmo, in his translation of Lindner's Psychology ; and secondly, perhaps following this use of concept as equivalent to idea in its generic sense, M. K. Smith in her translation of Herbart's Psychology. I call attention to this difference in use, to prevent confusion.

Chapter II. The Processes Of Thought And Memory

A. Of Thought.

As already explained, we understand by "thinking" (in the narrower sense) all of those intellectual activities which, out of the raw material of the senses and inner perceptions, produce new material ; viz., higher (abstract) ideas. These activities are usually divided into : comparing, distinguishing, forming concepts, judging, reasoning, etc. This division is not wrong ; but if we examine these I)rocesses closely, we shall find that they all agree in having essentially to do with ideas, and differ only in the manner of presentation.

Let us examine these processes singly. For simplification we will take the comparison of two objects, say two plants, that are not present to the senses. In order to compare them, they must be so well known that their mental images can be distinctly recalled to consciousness. Thereupon those properties are sought out in which they both agree. When these are found and noted, — i.e., presented to the mind singly, — the process of comparison has in so far reached its end. It is, so far as we are now concerned, the same as if the objects themselves were present to the senses. In the latter case the qualities of the objects would be presented in the mind more vividly; but otherwise the x^rocess is the same.

"We will take next the forming of conceptions ; and first

FORMATION OF CONCEPTS. 9

the so-called class-concepts (species, kind, family, order, class, etc.). The word "mountain," for instance, is associated in the child's mind at first with the perception of a single elevation, which he has seen and which he was told was a mountain. Later he becomes acquainted with several more such elevations, — small and large, wooded and bare, steep and gently sloping, rocky and sandy, etc. ; all are called mountain. Now, since those qualities wherein these elevations differed came into consciousness only in a few cases, perhaps only once, while those common to all occurred in every perception, and therefore by this frequent repetition became clearer and more firmly impressed, therefore as a result we find very naturally that those qualities occurring seldom have withdrawn, as too weak, from consciousness, while those common to all have come forw r ard in consciousness, and become distinct. Finally, these latter alone remain, and are the content of the concept. But a concept may be formed on the basis of even a single observation, whenever any one or more qualities in a new object stand out with such prominence as to fasten the attention on them, and thus separate them from the other qualities. The first time a child sees a giraffe, he undoubtedly forms a concept that serves him even if he never sees another. But such concepts are almost sure to be faulty. The mental process is purely spontaneous and involuntary. Language, although not the cause of the process, has favored it very much. In the instance cited above, the fact that two or more different things bore the same name (mountain) aroused the attention, and so led to a clearer apprehension. Secondly, the result of involuntary comparison was step by step fixed in language, and so gotten ready for use. Of course the child has not been conscious of any of these psychic processes, not even noticing that the meaning of the word " mountain " has been gradually changing, losing one after another the specific qualities, and strengthening into clear consciousness those common to all. Nor has he noticed that the word has narrowed its meaning (content), while it has broadened its application (extent).

Above is shown the involuntary, spontaneous rise of general notions or concepts. To be sure, this mode of procedure alone will never bring the concept to full completeness. For even if really so many examples presented themselves for observation that all the differing qualities could be eliminated, and only the similar ones retained, — which would be expecting a good deal, — still these latter are seldom all distinctly noticed. It is very seldom indeed that we can enumerate them separately. But besides this a second deficiency is possible. Among those qualities rightly recognized as common to all, may be found some insignificant ones ; i.e., such as do not change the nature of the concept, whether they are included or excluded. A logically complete concept must, however, omit such insignificant characteristics, and retain only such as are essential. In order, therefore, to bring to a conclusion this process of conception, and give rise to entirely clear and correct concepts, something additional is necessary. This is a conscious and voluntary investigation, so as to get rid, on the one hand, of all the accidental characteristics ; and, on the other hand, to bring into clear consciousness all those that remain and are essential to the concept. Thus in concepts of classes, or in particular concepts of individual characters; for example, if it is asked what belongs to the essential characteristics of

SPONTANEOUS CONCEPTS. 11

some historical personage (Socrates-, Napoleon, etc.), or of English nationality, this conscious and voluntary part of the work assumes a greater prominence.

From the above, it seems clear that only in the field of science can we expect to find proper, logically complete concepts. The chief intellectual intercourse, even among people of culture, has to rely on the spontaneously formed general notions, which are never perfectly definite, and frequently contain something wrong. This accounts for many misunderstandings and vain disputations. It is further plain that all words, except proper names, denote not properly perceptions, — unless it be when the child hears the word for the first time, — but general notions (concepts).

Next to the formation of concepts, comes the apprehension of the relations between things or processes, of which the causal and mathematical relations are the most important. Here, too, we make use of the word " conceive " ; and we shall find thinking, in this case also is only a particular way of presenting ideas in consciousness. "We will take an example of the causal relation. What is the origin of our conception that cold is the cause of water changing into ice ? In the beginning it is quite spontaneous. It is noticed that with a greater degree of cold, ice appears ; and again, that when the cold disappears the ice vanishes. This is, however, still by no means sufficient to give rise to the conception of a causal connection. For there are no innate ideas waiting, as it were, for outer stimulus in order to make their way into consciousness. The sequence of those two phenomena (cold and ice) is observed not only once, but again and again. This regular and invariable sequence of these phenomena produces the new idea finally that the one thing must follow the other, that the one phenomenon calls forth the other, causes it. Hereupon the relation between the two facts, which before seemed only temporal, becomes apprehended as causal in its origin ; out of post (after) has become propter (on account of, by means of). The further details of this causal relation can, of course, be learned only by an investigation into the physical nature of cold and of water. That the conception of mathematical relations, as they occur in arithmetic, for instance, in the fundamental operations, in proportion, etc., rests likewise on simple elementary perceptions, is shown sufficiently in the schoolroom.

We come now to the formation of judgments. In the simple proposition, " Snow is white," two ideas are in consciousness, — subject and predicate. We have here a so-called analytical judgment, since the subject-concept " snow " properly includes in it the characteristic " white " ; the latter, in order to direct attention to it, is separated in thought from that complex. It is the same with the proposition, " Mint is a labiate." The latter concept contains characteristics which are already in the subject-concept so far as this is completely apprehended ; but for the time being it is singled out for emphasis, that it may be once for all distinctly noticed.

Let us take now an incompleted judgment, such as occurs in the question form; e.g., How much is 3X4? Here the predicate idea that belongs with the subject is still to be sought. The ability of the pupil to answer depends on whether the percepts of the numbers, of which the predicate is composed, are so clear and so mobile in his mind, that the idea sought, which he has already learned from adding, can now arise in consciousness. If this takes place, subject and predicate stand side by side in con-