The philosophical works of Leibnitz ...

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THE

PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

OF

Preface

This translation has been made with the hope of rendering the speculations of one of the greatest of modern thinkers more accessible to ordinary students. Whatever estimate may be taken of the intrinsic merits of these speculations, their influence has been too marked to allow the student of philosophy to ignore them. He will here find all that is necessary to enable him to gain a comprehensive insight into Leibnitz's own system and to understand the objections found by h|im to the philosophy of his great predecessors, Descartes,. Malebranche, : Spinoza, Locke. All the important philosophical opuscules- ,are ; given entire; also the abridgment of the Theodicce and extracts from the Nouveaux Essais. A few notes and references have been added to help the student. The translations have been made directly from the original Latin and French by my wife and myself, the only exception being the Letters to Clarke, which are republished from Clarke's own translation. In making the translations Erdmann's Leibnitii Opera Philosophica (Berlin, 1840), Janet's Oeuvres Philosophiques de Leibniz (Paris, 1866), Gerhardt's Die philosophisclien Schriften von G. W. Leibniz (Berlin, 1875-1890), and Foucher de Careil's Refutation Inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz (Paris, 1854), have been used.

G. M. D.

Yale University, Nov. 30, 1890.

Prefatory Note to the Second Edition

This work is reissued by the publishers in consequence of the continued demand for it from students and teachers of philosophy. The translations have been revised; the Preface to the Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium has been removed from the notes to the body of the work, where it properly belongs ; the extracts from the ISiouveaux Essais have been inserted among the other pieces in chronological order; and a few bibliographical changes and additions have been made in the notes, including a full list of the English renderings of Leibnitz's writings. With these exceptions the work is substantially unchanged.

G. M. D.

New Haven, 1908.

I

"One day I happened to say that the Cartesian philosophy in so far as it was true was but the ante-ehaniber of the true philosophy. A gentleman of the company who frequented the Court, who was a man of some reading and who even took part in discussion on the sciences, pushed the figure to an allegory and perhaps a little too far; for he asked me thereupon, if I did not believe that it might be said that the ancients had shown us the stairs, that the modern school had come as far as into the ante-chamber, and that he should wish me the honor of introducing us into the cabinet of nature? This tirade of parallels made us all laugh, and I said to him Tou see, sir, that your comparison has pleased the company; but you have forgotten that there is the audience chamber between the ante-chamber and the cabinet, and that it will be enough if we obtain audience without pretending to penetrate into the interior.' "

Leibnitz, Letter to a friend on Cartesianism, 1695.

Table Of Contents

Translations.

Page

I— On the Philosophy of Descartes, 1679-1680, 1

Part I. — Concerning God

Definition 1. Self-Caused is that the essence of which involves existence.

Definition 2. That a thing is finite which can be limited by another thing of the same kind, is obscure. For what is thought limited by thought ? Or what other greater than it is given ? He says that a body is limited because another greater than it can be conceived. Add to this what is said below, Prop. 8.

Definition 3. Substance is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself. This also is obscure. For what is it to be in itself ? Then we must ask, Are to be in itself and to be conceived through itself conjoined cumulatively or disjunctively? That is, whether this means : Substance is that which is in itself, also substance is that which is conceived through itself ; or, indeed, whether it means : Substance is that in which both these concur ; namely, that it both is in itself and is conceived through itself. Or it will be necessary for him to demonstrate that what has the one, has the other, when rather, on the contrary, it seems that there are some things which are in themselves although they are not conceived through themselves. And so men usually conceive substances. He adds : Substance is that, the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing. But there is also a difficulty in this, for in the following definition he says, An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence. Therefore the concept of attribute is necessary for the formation of the concept of substance. If you say that the attribute is not the thing itself, but require indeed that substance shall not need the conception of another thing, I reply: You must explain what is called thing, that we may understand the definition and how the attribute is not the thine;.

12 PHILOSOPHICAL VOKES OF LEIBNITZ.

Deeixitiox 4. That an attribute is that -which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence, is also obscure. For we ask whether by attribute he understands every reciprocal predicate : or every essential predicate whether reciprocal or not ; or, finally, every first or undemonstrable essential predicate. Vide Definition 5.

Deetnition 5. -V mode is that which is in another and is conceived through another. It seems, therefore, to differ from, attribute in this, that attribute is indeed something in substance, yet is conceived through itself. And this explanation added, the obscurity of Definition -i. is removed.

Deetnitiosj 6. Goch he says. I define as a being absolutely infinite, or a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essence. He ought to show that these two definitions are equivalents, otherwise he cannot substitute the one in place of the other. But they will be equivalents when he shall have shown that there are many attributes or predicates in the nature of things, which are conceived through themselves : likewise, when he shall have shown that many predicates can co-exist. Moreover, every definition (although it may be true and clear) is imperfect, which, although understood, allows of doubt as to the possibility of the thing defined. This, moreover, is such a definition, for thus far it may be doubted whether being does not imply having infinite attributes. Or for this reason. because it may be questioned whether the same simple essence can be expressed by many diverse attributes. There are. indeed, many definitions of compound things but only a single one of a simple thing, nor does it seem that its essence can be expressed, except in a single "way.

Defixitiox 7. A free thing is that -which exists and is determined to action by the necessity of its own nature: a constrained thing is that which is determined to existence and to action by another.

Deeixitiox S. By eternity I understand existence itself so far as it is conceived to follovc from the essence of a thing. These definitions [i. e.. 7 and 8], I approve.

As to the Axioms. I note these things : The first is obscure as long as it is not established -what to be in itself is. The second and notes ok spiwoza's "ethics." 13

seventh require no comment. The sixth seems incongruous, for every idea agrees with its ideate, nor do I see what a false idea can be. The third, fourth and fifth can, I think, be demonstrated.

Pkoposition 1. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications ; that is, modes, for in Def . 5 he said that by modifications of substance he understands modes. Still he did not explain what to be by nature prior is, and thus this proposition cannot be demonstrated from what precedes. Moreover, by nature prior to another seems to mean that through which another is conceived. Besides I confess that there is some difficulty in this, for it seems that not only can posterior things be conceived through the prior, but also prior things through the posterior. Nevertheless, prior by nature may be defined in this way, as that which can be conceived without another thing being conceived ; as also, on the other hand, the other, second thing, cannot be conceived except the first itself be conceived. But if I may say what the matter is, prior by nature is a little too broad; for example, the property of ten, that it is 6-f-4, is by nature posterior to this, that it is 6— |— 3— |— 1 (because the latter is nearer to the first of all : ten is l-f-l-r-l-|-l-j-l-(-l-j-l-|-l + l + l) and nevertheless it can be conceived without this ; nay, what is more, it can be demonstrated without it. I add another example: The property in a triangle, that the three internal angles are equal to two right angles is by nature posterior to this: that two internal angles are equal to the external angle of the third, and nevertheless the former can be conceived without the latter ; nay, even, although not equally easily, it can be demonstrated without it.

Pkoposition 2. Two substances whose attributes are diverse have nothing in common. If by attributes he means predicates which are conceived through themselves, I concede the proposition, it being posited, however, thaf there are two substances, A and B, and that c is an attribute of substance A, d an attribute of substance B ; or if c, e are all the attributes of substance A, likewise d, f are all the attributes of substance B. It is not so if these two substances have some diverse attributes, some common attributes, as if the attributes of A were c, d and of B itself were d, f. But if he denies that this can happen, the impossibility must

14 PHILOSOPHICAL WOPvKS OP LEIBXITZ.

be demonstrated. He will, perchance, in case of objection, demonstrate the proposition itself in this way : Because d and c equally express the same essence (since ex hypothesi they are attributes of the same substance. A >. and for the same reason also d and / (since also ex hypothesi they are attributes of the same substance. B) ; therefore c and / express the same essence. Whence it follows that A and B are the same substance, which is contrary to the hypothesis : therefore it is absurd to say that two diverse substances have anything in common. I reply, that I do not concede that there could be two attributes which can be conceived through themselves, and nevertheless express the same thing. For whenever this happens then these two attributes, expressing the same thing in a diverse way. can moreover be resolved, or at least one or the other of them. This I can easily demonstrate.

Proposition 3. Things which have nothing in common cannot be the one the cause of the other, by Axioms 5 and 4.

Peopositiox 4. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of their modifications. He demonstrates this thus : Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else, by Axiom 1 : that is. by Defs. 3 and 5. nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substances and their modifications. [Here I am surprised that he forgets attributes for, Def. 5, by modification of substance he understands only modes : it follows, therefore, either that he spoke ambiguously, or that attributes are not numbered by him among the things existing* outside of the understanding, but only substances and modes. Still he could have proved the proposition more easily if only he had added, that things which can be conceived through attributes or modifications are necessarily known and therefore distinguished.]

Peopositiox 5. There cannot be given in the nature of things two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

[I note here what seems to be obscure in this, viz : in the nature of things. Does he mean, in the universe of existing things, or in the region of ideas or possible essences '. Then it is not clear whether he wishes to say that many essences are not given having* the same common attribute, or whether he wishes to sav manv

NOTES OK" SPINOZA S ETHICS.

individuals are not given having the same essence. I wonder indeed why he here employs the words nature and attribute as equivalents, unless he understands by attribute that which contains the whole nature. While being posited, I do not see how there can be given many attributes of the same substance which may be conceived through themselves.] Demonstration: If they are distinguished, they are distinguished either by their modifications or ■ by their attributes ; if by their modifications, then since substance is by nature prior to its modifications, by Prop. 1, their modifications being put aside, they must still be distinguished, therefore, by their attributes ; if by their attributes, then two substances are not given possessing the same attribute. I reply that a paralogism seems to lurk here. For two substances can be distinguished by attributes, and yet have some common attribute, provided they also have in addition some which are peculiar. For example, A and B ;

erf d e

the attributes of the one being c d, of the other, d e. I remark that Prop. 1 is only useful for this. But it might have been omitted because it suffices that substance can be conceived without modifications whether it be by nature prior or not.

Proposition 6. One substance cannot be produced by another substance, for two substances, by Prop. 5, do> not possess the same attribute, therefore they have nothing in common, by Prop. 2 ; therefore, it cannot be that one is the cause of the other, by Axiom 5. The same in other words and more briefly : Because what is conceived through itself cannot be conceived through another as cause, by Axiom 4. But I reply, that I grant the demonstration, if substance is understood as a thing which is conceived through itself; it is otherwise if it is understood as a thing which is in itself, as men commonly understand it, unless it be shown that to be in itself and to be conceived through itself are the same thing.

Proposition 1. Existence belongs to the nature of substance. Substance cannot be produced by anything else, Prop. 6. Therefore it is the cause of itself ; that is, by Def . 1, its essence involves existence. He is not unjustly censured because sometimes he employs cause of itself as a definite something to which he ascribes a peculiar signification, Def. 1 ; sometimes he uses it in the common and vulgar meaning. ]STevertheless, the remedy is easy, if lie converts this Def . 1 into an Axiom and says : Whatever is not by another, is by itself or of its own essence. But here other difficulties still exist : the reasoning, namely, is valid only when it is posited that substance can exist. For it is then necessary that, since it cannot be produced by another, it exists by itself, and thus necessarily exists ; but it must be demonstrated that it is a possible substance; that is. that it can be conceived. It seems that it can be demonstrated from the fact that if nothing can be conceived through itself nothing also can be conceived through another, and hence nothing at all can be conceived. But that it may be shown distinctly, we must consider that if a is posited as conceived through b, there is in the conception of a itself the conception of 1) itself. And again, if b is conceived through c, there is in the conception of b the conception of c itself, and thus the conception of c itself will be in the conception of a itself, and so on to the last. But if any one reply that the last is not given, I answer, neither is the first, which I thus show. Because in the conception of that which is conceived through another there is nothing except what belongs to the other, so step by step through many there will either be nothing at all in it or nothing except what is conceived through it itself; which demonstration, I think, is wholly new but infallible. By this means we can demonstrate that what is conceived through itself can be conceived. But nevertheless, thus far it can be doubted whether it be possible in the way in which it is here assumed to be possible, certainly not for that which can be conceived, but for that of which some cause can be conceived, to be resolved into the first. For those things which can be conceived by us. nevertheless cannot therefore all be produced, on accoimt of others which are preferable with which they are incompatible. Therefore, being which is conceived through itself must be proved to be in actual existence by the additional evidence that because those things exist which are conceived through another, therefore that also through which they are conceived, exists. You see what very different reasoning is needed for accurately proving that a thing exists through, itself. However, perhaps there is no need of this extreme caution.

notes on spinoza's "ethics.

Proposition 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite, since otherwise it would be limited by another of the same nature, by Def. 2, and two substances would be given with the same attribute, contrary to Prop. 5. This proposition must be understood thus: A thing which is conceived through itself is infinite in its own kind, and thus is to be admitted. But the demonstration labors not only with obscurity as respects this is limited, but also with uncertainty, by reason of Prop. 5. In the scholium he has excellent reasoning to prove that the thing which is conceived through itself is one, of course after its kind, since many individuals are posited as existing, therefore there ought to be a reason in nature why there are so many, not more. The reason which accounts for there being so many accounts for this one and that one ; hence also for this other one. But this reason, is not found in one of these rather than in another. Therefore it is outside of all. One objection might be made, if it were said that the number of these is boundless or none, or that it exceeds every number. But it can be disposed of, if we assume only some of these and ask why these exist, or, if we posit more having something in common, for example existing in the same place, why they exist in this place.

Proposition 9. The more reality or being a thing has the greater the number of its attributes. [He ought to have explained what is meant by reality or being, for these terms are liable to various significations.] Demonstration: It is clear from Def. 4. Thus the author. It seems to me not to be clear from it. For one thing may have more of reality than another, as what is itself greater in its own kind, or has a greater part of some attribute; for example, a circle has more extension than the inscribed square. And still it may be doubted whether there are many attributes of the same substance, in the way in which the author employs attributes. I confess, however, that if this be admitted and if it is posited that attributes are compatible, substance is more perfect according as it has more attributes.

Proposition 10. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself, by Defs. 4 and 3. But hence it follows, as I have several times urged, that there is but a single attribute of one substance, if it expresses the whole essence. 2

15 PHTLOSOPHICAX WOEKS OP PPPBXITZ.

Peopositiox 11. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. He oners three demonstrations of tins. F >:. because he is substance: therefore, by Prop. 7. he exists. But in this he supposes both that substance necessarily exists, which, up to Pr : . 7. was not sufficiently demonstrated, and that God is a possible substance, which is not equally easy to demonstrate. Second. There must be a reason as well why a thing is as why it is not. But there can be no reason why God does not exist, not in his own nam:? for it does not involve a contradiction; not in another, for that other will either have the same nature and attribute, and hence will be God. or will not have them and hence will have nothing in common with God, and thus it can neither posit nor prevent his existence. I reply. 1st. that it is not yet proved that the nature of God does not involve a contradiction, although the author says it is absurd to assert, without proof, that it does. 2d. There might be something having the same nature with God in some things, not in all. Third. Finite being; ex:-: by experience): therefore if the infinite does not exist there will be beings more powerful than the infinite being. It may be answered, if it implies anything, infinite being will have no power at all. I need say nothing of the impropriety of c all ing the potentiality of existence a power.

Ppopositioxs 12 axd 13. Xo attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided : or substance taken absolutely is indivisible. Tor it will be

- royed by division and the parts will not be infinite and hence not substances. ]\Iany substances of the same nature would be given. I grant it of a thing existing through itself. Hence the corollary follows that no substance, and therefore no corporeal sub- - nee is divisible.

Peopositiox 14. Besides God. no substance can be granted or conceived. Because all attributes belong to God. nor are several substances having the same attribute given: therefore, no substance besides God is given. All these suppose the definition of substance, namely, being which is conceived through itself, and many others noted above which are not to be admitted. [It does not yet seem certain to me that bodies are substances. It is otherwise with minds.]

"— » 19

NOTES ON SPINOZA S ETHICS.

Coeollaey 1. God is one.

Coeollaey 2. Extension or thought are either attributes of God, or, by Axiom . . ., modifications of attributes of God. [This is speaking confusedly ; besides he has not yet shown that extension and thought are attributes or conceived through themselves.]

Peoposition 15. Whatever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived. For since there is no substance except God, Prop. 14, so all other things will be modifications of God, or modes, since besides substances and modes nothing is given. [Again he omits attributes.]

Peoposition 16. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways ; that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect, by Def. 6.

Coeoelaey 1. Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which fall under his intellect.

Coeoelaey 2. God is a cause through himself, not indeed per accidens.

Coeollaey 3. God is the absolutely first cause.

Peoposition 11. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not constrained by any one, since there is nothing outside of himself.

Coeoelaey 1. Hence it follows, 1st, that there can be no cause which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

Coeollaey 2. God only is a free cause.

In the Scholium he further explains that God created everything which is in his intellect (although,' nevertheless, it seems that he has created only those which he wished) . He says also that the intellect of God differs from our intellect in essence, and that, except equivocally, the name intellect cannot be attributed to both, just as the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, a barking animal, differ. The thing caused differs from its cause in that which it has from the cause. A man differs from man as respects the existence which he has from that man ; he differs from God as respects the essence which he has from God.

Proposition 18. God is the immanent, not the transient cause of all things. From this it follows that God only is substance; other things are its modes.

Proposition 19. God, or all his attributes are eternal. For his essence involves existence, and his attributes involve his essence. In addition, the author cites and approves the way in which he demonstrated this in Prop. 19 of his "Principles of Descartes."

Proposition 20. The essence of God and his existence are one and the same thing. He proves all this from the fact that the attributes of God because eternal (by Prop. 19), express existence (by the definition of eternity) . But they also express essence, by the definition of attribute. Therefore essence and existence are the same thing in God. I answer that this does not follow, but only that they are expressed the same. I note, moreover, that this proposition supposes the preceding, but if in place of the preceding proposition its demonstration be employed in the demonstration of this, a senseless circumlocution will be apparent. Thus : I prove that the essence and existence of God are one and the same thing, because the attributes of God express both existence and essence. They express essence by the definition of attribute, they express existence because they are eternal ; they are, moreover, eternal because they involve existence, for they express the essence of God which involves existence. What need is there, therefore, of mentioning the eternity of the attributes and Prop. 19, when the point merely is to prove that the existence and essence of God are one and the same thing, since the essence of God involves existence. The rest is pompously introduced that it may be fashioned into a sort of demonstration. Reasonings of this sort are exceedingly common with those who do not possess the true art of demonstration.

Corollary 1. Hence it follows that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. I do not see how this proposition follows from the preceding ; on the contrary, it is far truer and clearer than the preceding.' For it is immediately apparent when it is posited that the essence of God involves existence, although it may not be admitted that they are one and the same.

Corollary 2. God and all his attributes are immutable. This the author proposes and proves obscurely and confusedly.

Proposition 21. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite ; or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute. He demonstrates this obscurely and quite at length, although it is easy.

Proposition 22. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite. He says the demonstration proceeds as in the preceding. Therefore, also obscurely. I could wish that he had given an example of such a modification.

Proposition 23. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite. That is, such a mode follows from the absolute nature of some attribute either immediately or mediately through another such mode.

Proposition 24. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence; otherwise, by Def. 1, they would be the cause of themselves, which is contrary to the hypothesis. This from elsewhere is manifest ; but this demonstration is a paralogism. For cause of itself, by his Def. 1, has not retained its common meaning, but has received a peculiar one. Therefore the author cannot substitute the common meaning of the word for the peculiar one assumed by him at his will, unless he shows that they are equivalent. [Leibnitz has remarked on the margin of the manuscript : From this proposition it follows, contrary to Spinoza himself, that things are not necessary. For that is not necessary whose essence does not involve existence. — Gerhardt.^

Proposition 25. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things but also of their essence. Otherwise the essence of things could be conceived without God, by Axiom 4. But this proof is of no moment. For even if we concede that the essence of things cannot be conceived without God, from Prop. 15, it does not therefore follow that God is the cause of the essence of things. For the fourth axiom does not say this : That without which a thing cannot he conceived is its cause (which would indeed be

22 PHILOSOPHICAL WOKKS OP LEIBNITZ.

false, for a circle cannot be conceived without a center, a line without a point, but the center is not the cause of the circle nor the point the cause of the line) , but it says only this : Knowledge of the effect involves knowledge of the cause, which is quite different. For this axiom is not convertible ; not to mention that to involve is one thing, not able to be conceived without it is another. Knowledge of a parabola involves in it knowledge of a focus, nevertheless it can be conceived without it.