The young man's book

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THE

Introduction

The primary object of this work is to offer some encouragement to those whose circumstances are such as to deprive them of the ordinary advantages for intellectual cultivation. Of this class are those young persons who have neither the time nor the money demanded by the usual course of education. It cannot have escaped the observation of any one that our schools, however excellent, do not meet the wants of a large portion of society. These institutions can furnish only instruction ; the means by which the student is to be supported come not within their purveyance. Now if education is to be had at school, and nowhere else, the persons to whom I allude can never be educated, because the necessary means are beyond their reach. It is useless to inform such individuals of advantages to be enjoyed under other circumstances ; they are doomed to conflict with necessity, and it can only add to their mortification to be made the subjects of impertinent directions. That education is to be had at school, they very well know ; that good books are to be preferred to poor ones, and that reading is to be conducted with diligent attention, they are also aware ; but all this has nothing to do with their case, as they can avail themselves neither of the one nor the other. It is of no use to give directions that cannot be followed, and unless suggestions can be made which will remove the embarrassments connected with this class of youth, it is but justice to refrain from insulting their misfortunes by abortive advice. Youth of this description need and desire instruction ; they feel the difficulties which press upon them, and would gladly find relief. But few, however, are able to appreciate their situation or give them that assistance which the nature of their condition demands.

Too often aspirations originating from such minds are discouraged as fruitless attempts against fate,, and the daring individual is reminded of the seemingly impassable barriers in the way of his advancement ; and then, finding himself overlooked by the popular system of instruction, he is but too apt to acquiesce in the fatal conviction that, with regard to him, education is impracticable. Believing that there is no necessity for yielding to difficulties of any kind, these pages will be devoted to the interests of unfriended youth, and will take up their hopes precisely where existing arrangements and mistaken advice would lay them down.

There is another class of persons equally large, and. equally within the range of objects comprehended by this work ; I mean those of maturer years, who are either settled in life, or engaged in business under such circumstances as measurably to exclude them from literary advantages. Most conditions of active life allow comparatively little time for literary and intellectual cultivation ; and if a person commences business with limited attainments in literature, he is almost sure to end with less. Yet this melancholy result is not invariable. Some of the most distinguished names in the annals of science were men who acquired their learning amid the uninterrupted toils of a laborious trade or profession. It is believed that what has thus been done in a few instances, ought not to be attributed solely to superior powers. Much is unquestionably to be ascribed to the transcendent abilities of these men, but they themselves could never be made to impute their success to this cause. What seemed to others a mystery was to them plain ; they knew the steps by which their eminence had been gained, and believed that others had only to make the same attempt to become alike distinguished. Modesty may, perhaps, have contributed something to this opinion, as merit is not allowed to assert its own claims ; but abating all that is requisite on the ground of undervaluation, still we are obliged to conclude that they owed at least as much to the character of their efforts as to the extent of their abilities.

Knowing the efficiency of a judicious method, it is not surprising that they forgot the peculiar advantages with which, in their own case, it had been pursued. We cannot hope that all men will so far extricate themselves from the entanglements of a business life as to profit by any suggestions of this kind ; the desire for improvement too frequently diminishes with the same pace that opportunities decrease. There are those, however, who feel more keenly as they advance, and the desires which actuated them but feebly in youth have become irrepressible in riper years. With these, the full importance of the subject was never felt until experience had confirmed the truth of early convictions and a change of circumstances assured them that the most favorable period for education had already passed. The loss of a single hour is to be regretted, and every additional hindrance is, in some sense, an evil, but it will be seen that facts authorize no discouragement, and the indomitable spirit need not acknowledge any insurmountable obstacle. Independent of these considerations there are a variety of reasons for discussing more fully the laws of mental improvement. "Were it ascertained that education is exclusively the gift of schools, we yet require to be better informed on what principles it is imparted. This is demanded not less by the philosophy of mind than by a desire for that continued advancement which is rendered necessary by the circumstances of active life. Youth cannot learn at school all that is requisite for practical purposes. Much they may acquire, but the stock of theoretical knowledge with which they enter upon the world must receive additions and corrections. They must continue to learn, and as they cannot always remain at school, it is essential that they should know whether further improvement is practicable or not. If not fully convinced of the affirmative of this question, they will think their education is completed, and rest where others have done to the great disgrace of learning. It will be the object of these pages to supply hints that may be useful even to those who enjoy all the advantages afforded by the schools.

One purpose wliicli we have in view is to impart a self-sustaining influence to the mind. More miss their way at all periods of life, and in all the varied pursuits of human existence, by mistaking their own capacity for action than from all other causes combined. The competency of mind for great undertakings is not always to be known but upon actual trial ; however, in general, the individual has a strong conviction of ultimate success. This conviction is one of the most considerable motives to perseverance, and indeed was principally influential in first directing the mind towards the object which it is seeking to accomplish. We have most reason to apprehend a failure in any effort from the decay of this species of confidence. It is a strong motive power indispensable to every enterprise. "While it can be kept in vigorous exercise, there is but little danger of defeat ; under its inspiration the person becomes unconquerable. Early life is perhaps more favorable to this kind of inspiration ; yet it properly belongs to every period, and is, if I mistake not, the natural and necessary result of observation ; it is an intuitive conviction, impracticable perhaps to others, but entirely within the grasp of its possessor. Failures have a tendency to diminish it, and on the other hand it is always increased by success.

Again, there is a certain loftiness of design to which practical efficiency is much indebted. Where the aim is too low, where great things have not even been attempted, much success must be a matter of chance. For this reason it is peculiarly desirable to elevate, and keep elevated, the standard of endeavor. Meagre attempts are justly rewarded with corresponding poverty of effects. To keep the mind resolutely engaged in proportion to its capacity, is not always practicable, at least in every case ; there will be occasionally a falling off in the most resolute natures, but vigilance re-awakens the slumbering energies and shakes off every inferior purpose. Man should not supinely sit down and revolve the gloomy conception of inability ; he ought to be thankful that there are difficulties enough to put his strength to the test — that there is an opportunity for him to develop those fine qualities which, in other ages, have given celebrity to mankind.

This essay is not intended to subserve merely theoretical purposes ; it has no interest in any system as such, nor will it aim at more than aiding somewhat the great object of the schools — mental improvement. This done, and the writer has nothing more to ask ; but he cannot believe that existing arrangements are such as to secure all that is practicable ; they may avail under certain circumstances, but there are those, and many of them too, whose interests are untouched by the ordinary course of things. For these other arrangements ought to be made, that the culture of mind may not be limited to classes of men who accidentally can command a given amount of money.

These observations render it unnecessary for me to say that this work is not designed as an attack upon the prevailing system of education. None can more sincerely recommend to youth an early and prolonged enjoyment of the advantages afforded by our schools than the writer ; none can more truly wish that these advantages were universally available. But this, it is well known, they are not and cannot be. A great revolution must occur in society — a greater than has ever yet been known — before even the lowest grade of literary institutions can become accessible to all. Something more is demanded than free tuition ; books, clothing, board, direction, and exemption from the restraints of parental authority, wherever that authority is averse to such pursuits, are equally requisite. JNTow if such difficulties are to be encountered in finding access to subordinate institutions, there are certainly much greater ones to be met when our attention is directed to institutions of a higher grade. Schools of this class are not only less frequent and less economical, but they offer their assistance at so late a period that the youthful mind is in great danger of being pre-occupied. Before the preparatory academical education can be secured, many are drawn into the vortex of active life, and lost to all the advantages of knowledge. TVe have then only to make the best of that necessity which hitherto has proved unavoidable, and give such directions to youth as their embarrassed condition requires, and the known ability of the human mind will justify.

Chapter I. Preliminary Observations On The Constitu- Tion Of The Human Mind

Evert system of education must depend for its success upon a strict conformity to the laws of mind. Peculiar circumstances might give temporary efficiency to a system wanting in philosophical adaptation, but the subsequent and general result would justly forfeit public confidence. From the limits, however, which must be assigned to this chapter, I shall aim rather to lay down principles than to discuss them.

1. The operations of the intellect are uniform in manner. By this I mean that what the intellect does, it does in one way, although the result of its action is not always the same ; it reasons, remembers, j)erceives, imagines, and performs every other act of which we know it to be capable, in the same inscrutable manner, and apparently without any plurality of organic powers. In fact, all acts of the mind are only modifications of thought, and in affirming that these acts are characterized by a certain uniformity, we merely assert that, in this respect, the process of thinking is subject to no perceptible variation. This uniformity in the practical operations of the mind shows that its various faculties have been constituted with similar perfection ; that its powers are equally endowments from the Creator, and independent of contingent circumstances. If only a part of our intellectual faculties had an inherent competency, we should be disqualified for our present existence ; for there is not a day nor scarcely an hour of active life in which the perfect use of all these powers is not indispensable. Because they are thus equally necessary, they have been constituted equally perfect, and placed with the other instinctive powers of human nature, beyond the reach of any considerable organic improvement, and wholly independent of cultivation. The attributes of the mind, like the members of the body, derive their perfection simultaneously with their existence from the creating hand. From their conservative tendency they have been made constituent parts of our being : and so far from being dependent upon education are they, that education is wholly dependent upon them. The idiot is incapable of mental culture, and every degree of imperfection in the intellectual faculties is attended with its proportionate incapacity for education. The uniformity of manner which we ascribe to the functions of the intelligent principle has too often been overlooked by metaphysicians, and they have involved themselves in numberless errors by attempting what in its nature is impracticable — an exposition of the secret springs of mental action. Not satisfied with knowing that the mind is endowed by nature with a capacity for certain acts, they have aimed to detect and bring to light its occult methods, and thereby strip its acquisitions of all mystery. Such subjects were once deemed legitimate objects for philosophical inquiry, and under the influence of this conviction the most eminent men freely entered the lists of fruitless speculation.

2. The operations of the mind are intuitive. Intuition implies the spontaneous exercise of natural powers. ¥e think as naturally, and I may add, as necessarily as we breathe, and the mind no more learns to think than the body learns to respire. Hence, whatever modification of thought may be put forth, whether it be memory or imagination, perception or reason, it is the effect of unoriginated capacity, and involved in the constitution of an intelligent nature. Some metaphysicians have very carelessly ranked intuition as a distinct faculty of the mind, whereas it is in no sense a faculty, but merely denotes the manner of all the faculties. Of this process we know nothing except its occasional dependence upon certain physical conditions, as, for instance, in perception, where the mind is mechanically assisted by the organs of vision. But as we cannot perceive how the mind operates upon these instrumentalities, nor comprehend any of its essential powers, we are forced to admit that it acts by intuition — that is, in a way which we do not understand, but which requires neither previous time nor previous preparation.

3. It is further to be observed, that these acts of the mind are naturally perfect. In this respect the strictly intellectual faculties bear a striking analogy to the corporeal senses, and to the involuntary functions of the physical system generally, none of which become more perfect by the lapse of time, or admit of essential improvement by means of cultivation. The eye is as perfect, the precision of instinct as great, and the self-regulated movements of animal mechanism as harmonious and efficient, in infancy as in manhood. And so far as the operations of intellect can be traced at that feeble period, they indicate the same measure of innate and constitutional perfection.

Not only are the faculties of the infant mind perfect, but they possess all the peculiarities which are to distinguish them in subsequent life. A remark to this effect occurs in one of Dr. Johnson's biographical pieces. "That the strength of Sydenham's understanding, the accuracy of his discernment, and ardor of his curiosity, might have been remarked from his infancy by a diligent observer, there is no reason to doubt. For there is no instance of any man whose history has been minutely related, that did not in every part of life discover the same proportion of intellectual vigor."* If we allow that the acts of the mind are intuitive, their perfection follows as a necessary consequence, because intuition places them beyond the reach of cultivation. They are the result of a process independent of human sagacity or control, and originate in this manner, that man might under all circumstances be competent to act the part of a rational creature. But for this precaution of nature, rationality would have been a contingent blessing, confined entirely to the precincts of education.

4. Mind acts necessarily, but is capable of voluntary direction. Locke observes that,

* Life of Sydenham.

"our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has a great conformity with our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary."* Action appears to be as natural and as indispensable to the intellectual as to the material part of the human system. "Whether the intelligent principle ever intermits its activity, is another question, and one, which, however it may be decided, cannot determine the mode of its operation in our conscious moments. The eye sees in all ordinary cases, by constitutional necessity, and yet its action may be suspended either by sleep or the will of the individual. It is not optional then, with the intellect, whether it thinks or not, nor is it altogether able to determine the objects about which its constant activities shall be employed. That it has the power of self-direction, to some extent, is certain, although its course is liable to a thousand interruptions. It is, however, to this capacity for voluntary direction that the mind is chiefly indebted for its scientific acquisitions. Still its method is unchanged, * Book 4, chap. 13, sec. 1.

and the knowledge which is acquired by voluntary application is gained in the same manner as that which is forced upon us by nature. All the facts which are requisite for man to know do not naturally present themselves to his observation, and he has the power therefore of bringing art and industry to increase the stock of his knowledge. But as the eye has only one method of vision for all objects, whether natural or artificial, so the intellect scans the creations of its own industry and the spontaneous productions of providence, with the same intuitive glance. Some things we must know, others we may know, but contingency neither precludes intuition nor enables us to dispense with it. The various sciences are so many instances of truth elaborated by a voluntary application of intuitive powers. Human nature is therefore invested with faculties which, if they do not admit of material improvement, are nevertheless capable of useful direction.

5. Our intellectual faculties are so constituted that the improvement of which they are susceptible, consists chiefly in the acquisition of knowledge, and not in the increase of organic power. The common impression on this subject seems to be that the mental faculties exist only in an incipient state, or as bare susceptibilities. We are accustomed therefore to look upon these powers as germs which mnst be expanded in order to form an intellectual character. It is considered the appropriate work of education to bring them to maturity by actual expansion. People have seen that the mind is capable of improvement, and have carelessly imputed to an acquired perfection of its faculties, what can only be properly ascribed to a judicious use of those faculties. Impr< >vement is something very different from an augmentation of constitutional ability; the former may be effected by industry, the latter must be the result of creative energy ; the one requires only the proper use of our powers as they now are, — the other demands their reconstruction on a larger scale. But in no department of nature is organic development entrusted to human supervision. Providence has made arrangements for the complete en-

CONSTITUTION OF THE MINT). 27

dowment of its creatures without the need of their concurrence. The seeds have not been planted to await the culturing hand of man ; whatever exists in our nature in a rudimental state is attended by influences that ensure its spontaneous development and maturity in due time for every practical purpose. It is, however, from facts connected with the history of the mind that this notion derives its effectual refutation. Education has never been known to add anything to the intrinsic ability of the human intellect. In every age of the world uneducated mind has proved itself equal to the highest efforts of genius ; and when brought into comparison with the most approved specimens of cultured intellect, the latter is found to have acquired nothing essential by the j^ocess through which it has passed. In this respect knowledge is like wealth — it adds nothing to the talents of its possessor; a man may amass property, but his physical and intellectual faculties will remain the same as before. Were it the case that our minds could be thus expanded, the results of education would be greatly modified, and every weak understanding would find a sovereign remedy in the invigorating power of science. Such a pleasing consequence of industry might be gratifying, but it has never yet occurred, and never can, until ' the laws of nature are changed. Man now brings to the study of truth, powers which gain nothing by his researches, or at least nothing more than the eye gains by seeing, or the body by exercise. Their first and their last exhibitions are equal. ]STo great character that has appeared in any department of human enterprise, has ever been less acute or less efficient in his first than in his subsequent efforts. Sir Isaac Newton made his two most important discoveries, Fluxions and Gravitation, before his twenty-fifth year. A long life, with all the advantages of constant study, did not enable him to display greater skill in scientific researches. Had his faculties been capable of such an expansion as is commonly supposed, the latter period of his life must have been marked by a corresponding brilliancy over the earlier nart of his intellectual career.

Another objection to this view of the subject is, that an increase of organic power is wholly unnecessary. "We do not need a development of new powers, but simply an application of those which we already possess. The mind has unemployed strength sufficient for all its wants. It is now competent to know every useful truth, and any addition to its ability would be as superfluous as it is impracticable.

Now although the idea of eliciting the powers of the mind, and thereby giving them a perfection not otherwise attainable, and which they did not previously possess, is obviously unphilosophical, as well as contradictory of facts, yet it remains an established truth that intellectual improvement is both practicable and necessary. "While the acquisition of knowledge has no organic effect, it still subserves all the important uses for which it was intended. Knowledge is a species of treasure accumulated to be applied as the wants of life require. It is a power which the mind has learned to employ for its own advantage. Mechanical powers add nothing to the strength of man, and yet by their means he is able to accomplish undertakings inconceivably beyond his unaided capacity. In like manner art and science contribute nothing to the mind, though through their instrumentality it can effect the most gigantic achievements. Archimedes baffled the power of armies, Columbus terrified the inhabitants of the West India Islands into submission, and La Place quieted the fears of mankind as to the " wreck of matter and the crush of worlds" from obicular derangement ; but in neither instance did these great men rely upon their unaided faculties, or wield any other power than that which science supplies to every diligent student. By nearly all that civilization exceeds a savage state, are we indebted to the transforming influence of science — an influence not restricted to superior abilities, but as universally available as anything can be which depends upon the industrious application of common-sense. The savage has powers abundantly sufficient if he would apply them ; the attributes of his mind need only a proper direction to make him the peer of civilized man. His faculties need no improvement but that which is derived from the possession of knowledge, nor does his condition require any but that which arises from the use of his faculties.

6. The acquisitions of the mind depend upon its own exertions. I shall not inquire how the first idea makes its way into the mind, nor whether such idea is innate or not ; such an inquiry appears to me both useless and absurd. We might as well inquire when the first sound fell upon the ear, or the first pulsation dilated the heart. Mind began to think when it began to exist, and its thoughts, which we term ideas, can be traced to no origin but the instinctive activity of its own nature. Man thinks because he is made a rational creature, and he will continue to think while this attribute of his constitution remains, however assisted by the suggestions of sense, or embarrassed by the want of innate ability. Rejecting speculations of this kind as too intricate to be successful, and too profitless to deserve attention, we fix upon

32 YOUNG MAX'S BOOK.

the far more important question which relates to its subsequent advancement. It is not necessary to remark here by what modification of thought, knowledge is most likely to be gained, as that subject must necessarily Come up in another part of this work. Aside from that knowledge which is inseparable from a rational being, there are yast collections of scientific truth to which the mind has only a contingent relation ; they are not among its necessary, but- its possible attainments. That the contingency involved in these acquisitions is nothing but mental exercise, is a proposition almost too plain for argument, and yet it has been overlooked in practice and in theory, until many imagine that knowledge is acquired by some mysterious and unassignable process over which industry has no control. The difference in the attainments of different individuals may, in part, be ascribed to a diversity of intellectual endowments, and, in some degree, likewise, to the character of their opportunities ; but the prevailing circumstance by which the knowledge of each is determined will be found to consist in the extent and judiciousness of personal application.

7. The acts of the mind are uniform in manner and perfect in nature, hut greatly diversified in the character of their objects. From this variety of direction, there naturally arise the various descriptions of mental character to which we give the name of genius, and which are generally supposed to imply some constitutional superiority. Intellectual parity finds few advocates, though there are sufficient reasons for believing that all minds are endowed by nature with about the same degree of strength. This conclusion is justified by the actual attainments of every rational individual. "If all human science were to be divided," as Rousseau says, " into two portions, the one comprehending what is common to all mankind, and the other only that stock of truths which is peculiar to the wise and learned, he can scarcely be regarded as delivering a very extravagant paradox, in asserting that this latter portion, which is the subject of so much pride, would seem very trifling in comparison of the other," But of this greater portion, we do not think, as he truly says, partly because the knowledge which it comprehends is acquired so very early, that we scarcely remember the acquisition of it, and still more, perhaps, because since knowledge becomes remarkable only by its differences, the elements that are common in all, like the common quantities in algebraic equations, are counted as nothing. " If we knew nothing more of the mind of man, than its capacity of becoming acquainted with the powers of so vast and so complicated an instrument as that of speech, and of acquiring this knowledge in circumstances the most unfavorable to the acquisition, without any of the aids which lessen so greatly our labor in acquiring any other language far less perfectly in after life ; and amid the continual distractions of pains and pleasures, that seem to render any fixed effort absolutely impossible. V\ r e might, indeed, find cause to wonder at a capacity so admirable. But ii we think of all the other knowledge which is acquired at the same time, even by this mind, which we have selected as one of

CONSTITUTION OF THE MIND.

DO

•the humblest, — what observations of phe-' nomena, what inductions, what reasonings downward, from the results of general observation to particular cases that are analogous, must have occurred, and been formed, almost unconsciously, into a system of physics, of which the reasoner himself perhaps, does not think as a system, but on which he founds his practical conclusions, exactly iri the same way as the philosopher applies his general principles to the complicated contrivances of mechanics, or the different arts. When we think of all this, and know that all this, or at least a great part of all this, must have been clone, before it could be safe for the little reasoner to be trusted, for a single moment, at the slightest distance from the parental eye, how astonishing does the whole process appear; and if we had not opportunities of observation, and in some measure, too, the consciousness of our own memory, in our later acquisitions to tell us how all this has been done, what a variety of means must we conceive nature to have employed, for producing so rapidly and so efficaciously, this astonishing result 1"*

The acquisitions which are thus unconsciously made by every ordinary understandin^, are no less remarkable for their character than for their extent, as they comprehend facts of every order, from the highest to the lowest that can be addressed to the human mind. lS"o greater intellectual power is requisite than has already been exercised by every individual, for there are no harder tasks than have already been performed. But, notwithstanding, while under the tuition of nature, all minds seem to possess equal ability, we find when left to themselves a marked disparity — or what appears to many as a disparity. Genius is regarded as indicating superiority of mind, rather than peculiarity of direction. It would be idle to deny that some minds have a peculiar aptitude for particular acquisitions, but it is no less absurd to suppose that such minds are correspondingly great in all other departments of intellectual effort. This ap- * Brown, Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. 2, p. 170.