The evolution of love

Chapter II. — Being, as Conceived 47

Conception not picturing, but discriminating — Conception of God — Perfect action— Perfect being perfectly self-determined— Perfect thought in perfect action — Primary unit — Whence all variety — Intentional — Unconditioned — Self-love,- the nature of perfectly self-determined egoism— Founds altruistic freedom— One with love — Involution of truth, holiness, moral authority, good — Founded by love.

Chapter III. — Being, as Conditioned 81

Relative distinguished from absolute consciousness in God — Differentiates thought from thing — The beginning — Nexus betwixt infinite unit and finite many — . Creator— Benevolent — Pantheism — Altruistic spirit — Self-determined spirit distinguished from spontaneous spirit, or disposition — Holy Spirit — Endless process of the universe — Conditioning and determining — Summary.

Chapter I. — Creation . , 115

System of divine activities upon which arise spontaneous and self -determining life, other than God — Dependent personality — Methods — Evolution of self -existent reality the main question — Conditioning action — Chosen — Purpose to realize all beneficent ideals — -Faith and utilitarianism — Love all -conditioning — Creation perfect in affording conditions to perfect universe — Ideal universe the dominating condition to creation — Determined by dependent persons — Free, harmonious, secure — Developed from lowest intelligence and power whence self-determination could arise — Disharmony — Selfishness abandons the ideal — What must love do? — ■ Supernatural intervention — Makes good conditions of correction and recovery — ■ The incorrigible — Companionship of finite with infinite.

Chapter II. — The Genesis of Evil 173

Evil not an original principle — Good elements perverted — Disordered self-love — Selfishness — First perverter — Devil — Self-love the basis of harmony — Perverted the genesis of evil.

Chapter III. — The Solution op Evil 194

Problem discriminated — Evolution of love can only afford conditions for solution — Finite persons must determine — Personality must be held inviolate — Power nor justice, but grace, only, can afford the conditions — Not an afterthought — Subjective motivity — Faith and persistence, analyzed and outlined — Six facts, basis of faith — Susceptibility to love and aversion to evil the lines of eternal security — Freedom, harmony, security the matured conditions for universal, eternal good — Cannot be created — Developed by faith — Practicable to persons of least intelligence — Objective motivity — Outer incentive — Persistence of love — Conquest of might by right — Disposition of evil results — Mastery of limitations — Uncorrected evil eliminated by self-defeat and self -limitation — Retribution — Motivity to selfishness abolished — Future state — Future probation rejected — Self -sinking of personality.

Chapter IV. — The Atoning Fact 272

Love's subjective test — Unsatisfactory theories — Lacking atoning fact — The ideal to be realized — Action which realizes — Changeless authority of ideal propitiated by action devoted to its realization — Atonement — Agony of love — Self -assumed, unimpaired in character and power — Sufficient — Parental theory — Sacrificial — Vicarious — Ransom for sinners, affording recovery from sin.

Chapter V. — The Revelation of the Atoning Fact 302

Occasion for revelation — Identification of Messiah — Human and divine nature — Internal evidence — Gradual disclosure of divine nature — Gethsemane — Calvary — ■ Resurrection — Divine attitude the real "mercy seat" — Divine agony the real "blood of sprinkling."

Chapter VI. — Eschatology 333

Doctrine of last things — Perfected universe — Not a fixed end — Equipment for future cycles — Defeat of evil — Persistence of faith, hope, love — Individual destiny — The innocent — Faithful — Selfish — Incorrigible— Penalty, fact, mode, duration — Self -sinking of personality — Perishing — Harmonious universe.

GLOSSARY OF CERTAIN TERMS, AS USED IN THIS BOOK

Absolute. Without necessary relation; a self-sufficient unit. Absolute truth. The self-consciousness of the Infinite Being; the

infinite ideal.

Abstraction. Thought, as disengaged from realities. Action. The exercise of energy; force. Actualize. To enact; to practically fill out or copy an ideal, plan,

or purpose; to realize.

Altruism. Objective action, especially benevolence toward others. Anthropomorphism. Pictured or imaginary conception of a spiritual

being as a formal organism.

Attention. Voluntarily directing thought to any object. Being. Actual existence.

Condition. A force, relation, fact, or circumstance which supports,

limits, or modifies any act, person, or thing. Conditioned. The state of being limited, modified, or dependent. Conscience. The perception of moral authority. Conscious. Self-perceiving.

Consciousness. The fact of self-perception. Conscious self-determination. Consciousness of intention in one's

own action affecting his nature or character. Determination. To enact, make, modify. Egoism. Concerning one's self.

Finite. Limited, dependent.

Ideal. A conception built up of ideas, or a conception of a perfect

thing.

Ideal being. A mental conception of a perfect being. Implications. Unperceived facts, relations, or inferences involved

with accepted knowledge.

Independent. Self-existent, self-determined, unconditioned. Infinite. Without limitation; perfect freedom. Involution. Infolding or intermingling of contents. Nescience. Denial of knowledge other than of phenomena. Ontology. The science of being. 5

6 GLOSSARY

Perfect being. Ideal being realized in perfect action.

Person. A being who determines his own nature or character in

any or all respects.

Personality. The power of self-determination. Posit. To lay down, place, or establish conditions, propositions,

or affirmations.

Reality, or, the real. That which is enacted, as distinguished from

what is only thought or planned.

Realize. To enact, actualize, make.

Self -consciousness. One's knowledge of his susceptibilities and

powers.

Self-determination. Making or modifying one's own nature or

character.

Selfishness. Chief devotion to himself on the part of a dependent

being.

Self-love. Devotement to being or becoming one's best possible

self.

Self-perception. The mind's perception of its own actions ;_ consciousness.

Thing, i. An actual object; 2. A wholly limited or dependent

obj ect.

Thought. 1. A perception, conception, idea; 2. Cognition, knowing

as distinguished from doing.

Unconditioned. Action or being to which means, conditions, or

instrumentalities are unnecessary.

Preface

Among the facts which justify publishing a revised edition of this work the following may be mentioned: First, the large number of persons who have professed to have gained specific and long-needed help from the first edition suggests there may be many others who will be similarly benefited. Secondly, the uniform and almost sole objection to the book, made by readers and reviewers, has been that its "too closely packed and condensed" argumentation makes it "hard to read." The objection demands something to facilitate the reader's grasp of its important though subtle themes. This revision seeks to supply this need by expanding over-compact statements and more explicitly indicating the relation betwixt chapters. Thirdly, besides the high appreciation which the work has received by its careful readers in general the author has derived special encouragement from the very high estimate placed upon it by distinguished thinkers and critics, among whom have been Gladstone, Iverach, and Watkinson, in Great Britain; Drs. Spaulding, Bowne, and Magoun, and Bishops Hamilton and Fowler, in America; with Drs. Stuntz and Smith, in Asiatic missions. Fourthly, from the many requests we have received to publish a revised edition, from persons whose judgment we cannot but profoundly respect, we are convinced that the demand for the work, though not wide, will be continuous, and, perhaps, will increase with the progress of thought.

This book was originally written as the author's answer to himself of questions which had been shirked, slurred over, or inadequately answered by every writer and 7

8 PREFACE

speaker he had read or heard on these themes. It pertains to the foundation convictions; asks, and aims to answer, the question, What must I think ?

In the plan of the work the Introduction seeks a clear understanding of what is meant by the question, What is truth ? and how it may be validly answered ; and, What are legitimate bounds of human inquiry? This leads to the view that whatever is necessarily implied in the fact of being must be truth; hence, Part First is an inquiry into the "Implications of Being."

In this inquiry it appears that the fact of existence, or being, is the first fact concerning which the question is met, What must I think? And as perception is our first mental act our first query is, What is our perception of being? Hence, our first chapter is entitled "Being, as Perceived."

As the next mental step following perception, in the process of knowing, is forming a conception, or idea, of things which we have perceived, we proceed in the second chapter to discriminate what conception of being we must form ; or, rather, what conception naturally or necessarily arises upon the mind from our perception of being. Therefore Chapter II is given the title, "Being, as Conceived."

Chapter III, entitled "Being, as Conditioned," is mainly a continuation of the second chapter, but more in detail, and closes with a summing-up in twenty-three propositions giving a more full and rounded statement of our conception of being. These three chapters involve what the author regards as the only philosophy of which he is aware that is successful in the sense that it clearly discriminates the "primary unit" which, in its evolution, expands into a valid system which covers and accounts for all variety.

PREFACE 9

Part Second, "Implications of Love," takes up love which in Part First appears as the nature of the "primary unit" and exhibits it as the originating and conditioning force which in its evolution is working out the problem of a personal universe, free, harmonious, and good.

While Part First involves a system of ontology (science of being), Part Second discloses a system of cosmology (theory of the world), together constituting a system of evolution, or constructive philosophy, which regards systems of physical evolution as merely incidental, whether true or false, and renders theodicy (vindication of God) superfluous. Of course, psychology and natural science are recognized and employed in the work by way of analysis or illustration, and the structural sciences, theology and ethics, are affected by its conclusions. The Bible, though quoted occasionally by way of apt expression or illustration, is not employed in the argument.

Introduction

Superstition, opinion, discrimination! Three epochal words ! The first has had its day, the second its noon, the dawn of discrimination is upon us. The spirit of our day indulges no remark with more complacency than this : "The age of superstition is past." Though a doubt may exist as to whether superstition is vanquished or has only changed its forms, we may safely believe it broken in some departments of life and largely superseded in others. But it may be well to observe what has taken its place as the mental temper in modern culture. But slight inspection is needed to convince us that the ground once held by superstition is now occupied by partisan opinion. Just as in ancient days a few tall spirits discerned great, dominating truths, set in a narrow horizon of intelligence, so now comparatively few discriminate the solid ground of verified accuracy from the quagmire and quicksands of opinion. Not unfrequently we hear the most valid truths questioned, and the crudest opinions positively asserted ; and how rarely found is he who, having ascertained real knowledge in one department of thought, is wise enough to refrain from oracular speech in other, though unstudied, departments. It is much more easy to a lazy, dishonest, or cowardly man to accept as knowledge the assertion of smart or ponderous opinion than to undergo a painstaking ascertainment of truth. The honesty required in the search for truth seems as rare a quality now as in the days when superstition held the place now occupied by flippant opinion.

Yes, the domination of superstition is past, the reign of opinion is upon us; when will the age of discrimination fully come? That it will come we have not the slightest doubt ; that it has more representatives now than in any former period is quite certain. Perhaps opinion is the transition from superstition to accuracy. Moral honesty has long been held as the rightful rule in action ; when it becomes the rule in thinking men will demand as thorough conscientiousness in forming, as in carrying out, an opinion. Then the badge of intelligence will be, not information, but discrimination. Men will not ask, "How much does he know?" but, "How well does he know?" Society will then be possessed of the spirit of accuracy as now of that of novelty.

How little honesty there is in the world is seen in that but few, comparatively, "hold fast that which is good," while almost none "prove all things." It is only half honest to adhere firmly to one's belief; the other and better half is to struggle that our beliefs be correct. To this lower stratum of honesty comparatively few dig down. The surface stratum is sufficient for popular commendation.

This apotheosis of opinion in our day seems a repetition of the state of things among the Greeks when Socrates arose in mighty protest against its frivolity, in the time of the Sophists. Then, as now, there had been the failure of materialistic philosophy; then, as now, a reaction from superstition; then, as now, the "popular rage" was a show of information, readiness to talk on the surface of any subject; then, as now, truth, justice, and good were regarded as mere conventionalities, while reality was thought to be in proportion to smartness of individual opinion. No better description of many modern leaders of popular opinion can be given than Schwegler's account of the Greek Sophists. He says :

"The Greek Sophists, like the French Illuminati of the last century, displayed an encyclopedic universality of knowledge. Their relation to the cultivated public, their striving after popularity, notoriety, and pecuniary emolument suggests the inference that their studies and activitities were, for the most part, directed and determined, not by any objective scientific interest, but by external considerations. Wandering from town to town, announcing themselves as thinkers by profession, and looking in all their operations mainly to good pay and for favor of the rich, they naturally chose those questions of general interest and public advantage, though at times also the private fancies of certain men, as the objects of their discourse. Their principal strength, therefore, lay much more in formal quickness, in subjective displays of readiness of wit, in the art of being able to rhetorize, than in positive knowledge. Their only instruction in morals consisted in disputatious word-catching or in hollow rhetorical show ; and even when their information rose to polymathy, mere phrasing on the subjects remained the main point. We cannot wonder that they descended in this respect to that empty external trickery which Plato, in the Phsedrus, subjects to so keen a criticism, and specially because of its want of seriousness and principle."

Recognizing the retirement of superstition and opinion, and the advent of discrimination, we recognize that one of the first suggestions made by this ruling word is the correct use of tests of truth. Beliefs of all thoughtful times have usually been cast in the same generic forms, five in number. These five forms have been termed philosophies.

In the railroad switching grounds there is a man whose duty it is to move a bar of iron the space of three or four inches. By this means he directs one train upon its course to San Francisco, another toward New Orleans, another to the Atlantic seaboard. Thus the philosopher operates the switch in the mental world, and largely determines the course of thought throughout the network of science, literature, politics, law, morals, and manners. A mistake at the switch means wreck to the train. Failure and corruption of manners, morals, and government, with their calamitous results, are largely due to inaccuracies of thought in the domain of philosophy.

The differences between the five forms of philosophic systems depend upon what each takes as a test of truth. It is, therefore, of no avail to advocate one system of belief or oppose another unless a reliable test of truth is ascertained. If I take the senses as the sole test of truth I must become a materialist, sensationalist, or positivist, with Spinoza, Mill, and Comte. If I take the intuitional consciousness or feelings as the only test of truth I must become a mystic with Bohme and Schelling. If, again, the logical consciousness be my only test, then, with Berkeley or Fichte, I must discredit the reality of all external things and be an idealist. Or as an eclectic I may apply the tests of "progressive common sense" and thus join hands with Maine de Biran, Cousin, and Jouffroy. Or, finally, I may reject them all and be a skeptic with Pyrrho in ancient, Hume and De Maistre in modern times. These old schools of philosophy have wrangled for centuries, but the only outcome is to make belief a matter of choice; and that is a scandal upon philosophy. The adopting one class of truth-tests to the exclusion of others is the vitiating germ of each system. But may we not find valid tests of truth upon which to found true "all-round" philosophy and abiding knowledge?

That self-evidence is the ultimate test of truth goes almost without saying. But the validity of the means by which self-evidence is recognized is the disturbing question. When a thing is seen to be self-evident we cannot ignore its truth without conscious mental or moral degradation. But how may we practically come at things so that their self-evidence may appear? The means by which self-evidence is recognized are, then, the

Practical Tests of Truth. — We may safely say that the organ or faculty through which knowledge is gained is, in a general way, the test of the correctness of that knowledge. The difference in sounds can be decided not by the eye, but by the ear. The sense of smell cannot distinguish colors ; this must be done by the eye. In like manner the correctness of perceptions and relations must be tested by the reason; and the facts of personal identity, freedom, and moral sense can only be known through the intuitional consciousness.

Then, we say that the practical tests of truth, are of two classes, generally termed consciousness and the senses — when applied in departments of knowledge in which, severally, they are the organs of knowing; not otherwise. The old wrangle of materialism, for example, arose from taking the senses as the only test of truth; and because personal identity, free will, moral obligation, or God could not be tested by the senses these truths were questioned or denied. This is the whole gist of the infidelity often vented by rhetoricians and secondhand thinkers who do not discriminate sufficiently to know what is the pother. The idealists, on the other hand, taking the logical consciousness as the only test of truth, could not affirm objects of sense. Thus these two schools shoved each other out of existence. Each denied the existence of what the other was sure.

Right application of truth-tests is the way of escape from these indeterminate systems. It consists in (1) the application of the testimony of the senses in verifying knowledge externally derived; (2) the test of consciousness in mental or spiritual phenomena; (3) the agreement or mutual corroboration of these where both classes of phenomena are concerned.

Admitting this to be a true putting of the case, how can I be certain that these tests are valid in their respective spheres? We answer: 1. Only by their use, as such, can we acquire knowledge. 2. They are felt and acted upon as necessary and final by all men. 3. Without them there can be no progress. Arts, industries, and sciences could never have been achieved except by this use of them. The progress of the world has been in, spite of the old philosophies, which abused these tests by misapplication. Instinctively, or as a matter of course, men accept truth as it appears self-evident — through the senses on the physical side, or to the inner consciousness on the spiritual side ; and where self-evidence arises from mutual corroboration of both sides the result is felt to be demonstration. If, disagreement arise, as between these poles of truth, it simply leads to the detection of inaccuracy in the perception of original facts.

But now comes up the question, Are these criteria of knowledge real ? That is to say, these tests decide what is true to us, but if we were otherwise constructed might not truth be other than what we find it to be? Or, in other words, how can we know that what conforms to our consciousness and sense is truth, independent of our structure? We answer: Sciences, arts, and industries projected and carried out in accordance with these tests, yet having for their subject-matter things and forces outside and independent of our structure, nevertheless result successfully; that is, bring about progress. Substantial progress is a practical test of tests. The law of gravitation and our consciousness of mathematical relations are true among the stars. A few years ago the planet Uranus was supposed to bound the solar system with his orbit, but his wabblings were eccentric beyond what, according to the law of gravitation, could be accounted for by the influence of known bodies. Hence astronomers believed there must be some large unknown body hovering beyond Uranus and thus affecting him. No telescope, however, had as yet discovered such disturbing force. Whereupon Leverrier set about reducing by mathematical calculation the excesses of Uranus to definite mental conceptions; and upon these conceptions of the logical consciousness he determined at what point in the heavens the unknown but disturbing influence should be located at a given time. By his direction the observatories turned their telescopes upon that point, and at the designated moment the hitherto undiscovered planet moved into plain view of the observers. Thus the rational consciousness of Leverrier, conspiring with data furnished by the testimony of the senses, detected the silent footsteps of Neptune as he trod the solitudes of immensity. Thus, it is evident, these tests are valid, not only in us, but in the existing structure of the physical universe about us. They are, therefore, the practical tests of truth.

Admitting, now, that these tests yield certitude in the relative universe — that is, the truth as it is embodied in the structure of all dependent or relative existence — may the practical truth, as thus ascertained, be affirmed as identical or in harmony with absolute truth — is truth in man one with truth in God ? This is one of the weightiest questions of speculative philosophy. German philosophy, following Kant, held that no such affirmation can be made. The philosophy of the conditioned, as expounded by Hamilton and Mansel in Great Britain, i8 INTRODUCTION

followed on the same line ; and the sensational philosophy of Mill suggested, "There may be worlds in which two and two make five."

Of the tests we have named, manifestly none can be brought to bear on this question except pure reason, the rational consciousness — unless by revelation it might be submitted to other tests. How much and what can reason decide on this question ? We answer :

i. That the "existing structure" of things harmonizes with absolute truth is at least probable.

2. This "existing structure" has the binding force of absolute truth until a contrary system is demonstrated.

3. The notion of "the true" is that truth is the rational, or formal, conception which may be explicated from a perfect thing or ideal.

4. As "absolute truth" is only another name for the infinite ideal, to suppose there may be inharmonious or contrary systems of truth is to suppose other than one infinite ideal ; which, of course, is absurd and impossible to thought.

Hence, the truths which are implied in the "existing structure" of ourselves and the universe are affirmations of absolute truth, and must be regarded as necessary "implications of being."

From the foregoing considerations we can see that a valid system of philosophy resting upon absolute truth should be quite possible. And if practicable one may profitably discriminate for himself, and perhaps outline for others, such philosophic system. But some ask, "What good is there in philosophy, anyway?" This query often spoken is more often thought and felt by, perhaps, the majority of even intelligent people. It deserves, therefore, a candid answer:

Philosophizing is the effort of reason to arrange our knowledge so as to account for things, and to this extent, at least, understand them. A complete account of the relations of any class of things may be termed a philosophy of those things. But as all classes of things appear interrelated the need is felt of an account of all things, and especially of this interrelation of all things. Hence, a sufficient accounting must find all things interrelated as arising from one source. Hence, a complete system of philosophy can be professed in only a well-discriminated unit in which "thought and thing" are one; one entity from which all things possible may be derived and all thought explicated. Such philosophy when traced outwardly into the universe of variety will become selfdiscriminated into its branches — ontology, the science of being; psychology, the science of the soul; cosmology, the science of the world ; physical science, the sciences of physical phenomena ; and, we may add, structural sciences, theology, ethics, politics, history, criticism, etc.

The chief practical value of a philosophy is that it affords a just and well-balanced estimate of the relative importance of the various departments of knowledge and active pursuit. This enables one who is learned in one branch or a few branches of knowledge to avoid underestimating other branches. It thus furnishes an antidote for narrowness and exaggerated self-consciousness of specialists in any field of study. Especially does it tend to correct that vanity which prompts masters in one line of study to pronounce oracularly upon other lines.

Again, philosophy gives warning of the ultimate failure and death of every system, practice, belief, or cult that is unphilosophic. Has it a philosophy? is the test question in the world of truth. However well backed by power, wealth, or learning any system, belief, or institution may be, it must ultimately go down, renounced by the people who have held it or with it dragging them down, if it has not a self-sustaining philosophy. Moreover, one who is conscious that his position in science, politics, or religion accords with a sound philosophy cannot easily be imposed upon by writers or speakers on these themes. The winds of doctrine which sweep over these realms of truth leave him unmoved. In his thought he has found the primary unit, the absolute One ; consequently he has found his own place in the world of truth, and does not run wild in the application of one idea, since he sees where it is modified by others.

The "primary unit" which can thus render a system of philosophy possible — by accounting for all variety — ■ is, necessarily, recognized by reason as independent. The moment it appears dependent or limited, otherwise than by self-imposed limitations, its adequacy to account for universal variety disappears. These requisites, unity and independence, impose upon any system the decisive test of its claim to rank as a philosophy. Among the later attempts to account for the universe the most conspicuous are known as theories of evolution.

"Evolution" is a term, which is applied to any theory which holds that the present is the product of the past; in the sense that no> new or late forces have been interjected at any point, but that all existing facts, energies, and phenomena are products of, or have taken their rise from, facts and forces which have always existed. While this definition of evolution as a general theory is sufficiently comprehensive, it has been unfortunate in its application in most systems which bear its name. Spencer and Haeckel apply it to the entire universe, except to its origin. They assume, without argument, the self-existence of matter and force. These two factors given, they claim the possible evolution of all phenomena under the "natural laws of action and reaction." With Spencer the assumed force seems to be identical with the God of theology, but as such, so far as physical science may affirm, must be termed "the unknowable." With Haeckel, the assumed matter and force are regarded as eternal, but unconscious. Hence, with Spencer evolution is the method by which force has developed the universe from preexistent matter; while with Haeckel it is a theory positively atheistic which would dispense with an intelligent First Cause by holding the eternal existence of dead matter and unintelligent, blind force instead of an independent Creator. It is perhaps sufficient here to say that (1) evolution, as the method of creation and of conducting the universe, may be valid in philosophy; (2) materialistic schemes of evolution, as held by Lamarck, Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, and some others, are objectionable because arbitrary and narrow. Their arbitrary assumption of "matter and force" as a starting point is unphilosophic in that an assumption is not a point where reason can rest in its study of the fact of existence. Philosophy must assume nothing. Their narrowness, in failing to consider the nature of matter and the nature of force, is inadequate to account for life and personality. And in neither force nor matter, nor in both together, do they find the "primary unit," but flounder in helpless duality. A philosophic and adequate system of evolution can exist only by a discrimination of the original unit which reason demands ; the nature of which unit involves all the possibilities of all being, and, in its evolution, all that is valid of the materialistic systems of Darwin, Spencer, Haeckel, and all like them, will appear as merely incidental, transient, and fragmentary detail. Hence, the nature of that unit, the essential basis of a self-sustaining system of philosophy, is sought to be discriminated and its evolution outlined in this book, The Evolution of Love.

The Evolution of Love is a brief outline of our conception of being, infinite and finite. It is offered, modestly, we hope, though confidently, as a self-sustaining system which arises naturally upon the mind when freed from imposing preconceptions. It offers a view of being which, better than any we have hitherto found, shows the meaning of human life, duty, and destiny; suggests a groundplan, or philosophy, upon which other knowledge and culture can be built in right relation and proportionate significance; and renders the heart more susceptible to those motives which alone can make "life worth living." It is a conception which, we believe, affords clear vision to both thought and faith, and exposes the unworthiness of that bigotry which, in the name of faith, antagonizes reason, and that charlatanry which, in the name of reason, antagonizes faith.