Gettysburg and Lincoln; the battle, the cemetery, and the National park

Preface

TN the autumn of 1904, I obtained a photograph of a manuscript copy of President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. At first I supposed I had a photograph of the original manuscript, as unmistakably the handwriting was Mr. Lincoln's, and the copy was dated November 19, 1863, the date of the consecration of the cemetery at Gettysburg. But in an extended search for the facts connected with the address, it was made plain that what I had was a photograph of a manuscript copy of the address, — a copy made by Mr. Lincoln in April, 1864, — and not a photograph of the original manuscript. In the course of my investigations I obtained so many interesting facts concerning the composition and delivery of Mr. Lincoln's address that I finally decided to bring together my material in the form in which it appears in Part II of this volume. The story of the battle and the record of the development

VI

Preface of the National Park were added in order to present in a connected way the principal facts covering the period from the commencement of the Gettysburg campaign to the present time.

The principal sources of my information concerning the battle are to be found in the '' Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies." Other sources are sufficiently indicated in the foot-notes. ^ In the preparation of the part of the work pertaining to the cemetery and President Lincoln's address, I am indebted to the late Hon. John Hay, Secretary of State, and especially to an article in the Century Magazine by Mr. John G. Nicolay, President Lincoln's private secretary. Much material for an account of the development of the National Park was found in Vanderslice's History of the Gettysburg Battle-field Memorial Association^ and in the annual reports of the Gettysburg National Park Commission.

In various visits to the battle-field I have received invaluable aid from Lieut. -Colonel John P. Nicholson, chairman of the Gettysburg National Park Commission, also from his associates on the Commission. The maps indicating the position

Preface vii

of both armies July ist, 2d, and 3d, have received the correction and approval of Lieut.-Colonel E. B. Cope, the Engineer of the Commission. The illustrations are from photographs made by the well-known Gettysburg photographer, W. H. Tipton — a selection from his large collection of views illustrating the battle-field.

H. S. B.

ToGUS, Maine, July 4, 1906.

Part I. The Battle

I, — Lee Crosses the Potomac II. — Gettysburg. The First Day III. — Gettysburg. The Second Day IV.— Gettysburg. The Third Day V. — The Retreat

PAGE.

PART II. THE CEMETERY I. — Origin of the National Cemetery . 8r

II. — Arrangements for the Consecration

OF THE Cemetery . . -87

III. — President Lincoln Goes to Gettysburg ...... 95

IV. — ^The Consecration Services . . 106

V. — Impression Made by President Lincoln's Address .... 122

VI. — President Lincoln's Revision of his

VII. — Provision for the Completion and

Maintenance of the Cemetery . 136

Contents

Part III. The National Park J ^work Of The Gettysburg Battle-field

Memorial Association 11^ Work of the National Park Commission Appendix A B C D

163 190 203 204 207

"5

ILLUSTRATIONS

The Meade Statue . . . Frontispiece v

Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade ... 14 The Reynolds Statue. . . , .20,

Little Round Top ..... 34

The Peach Orchard ..... 36

RiCKETTs's Battery, East Cemetery Hill . ^8

The Warren Statue on Little Round Top . 40

Gen. Meade's Headquarters ... 44

The Scene of Pickett's Charge ... 54 Little and Big Round Tops . . .58

The Hancock Statue ..... 66 Main Avenue, National Cemetery . .82

Abraham Lincoln ..... 96

The Entrance to the National Cemetery . 102

The Graves in the National Cemetery . 136

Monument in the National Cemetery . 138 The New York State Monument in the

National Cemetery .... 144

The Swale near Spangler's Spring . . 148

The High-Water Mark Monument . . 158

The Brigade Tablet ..... 164 ^

Cross-Section, Telford Avenue Foundation 166 ,,

Tower on Confederate Avenue . . 170 / xli Illustrations

PAGE

Hancock Avenue, Looking North . .174 Confederate Avenue . . . .176

The Slocum Statue ..... 180 A Finished Avenue with Paved Guttering. 186

Diagrams

Second Day ...... 34

--^^^-— 1 mmJ

Frontispiece.

Meade Statue.

Chapter I

AFTER the battle of Chancellorsville, Hooker reorganized the Army of the Potomac. The following generals were assigned to the command of the several corps of the army: to the First, Reynolds; to the Second, Hancock; to the Third, Sickles ; to the Fifth, Meade ; to the Sixth, Sedgwick ; to the Eleventh, Howard ; and to the Twelfth, Slocum. The Cavalry Corps was commanded by Brigadier-General George Stoneman, and consisted of three divisions under Pleasonton, Averill, and Gregg, together with the Regular Reserve Cavalry Brigade commanded by Buford. On May 22, 1863, Stoneman was relieved from duty with the Army of the Potomac, as also was Averill, and the command of AveriU's division devolved on Colonel Duffie of the First Rhode Island Cavalry. To General Hunt was given the artillery command, which consisted of sixtv-five batteries, with three hundred and seventy guns. The entire force numbered about eighty-two thousand men, which at the time of the battle of Gettysburg had been increased to a Httle more than ninety thousand.

At the same time Lee divided his nine divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia, hitherto brought together in two army corps commanded by Longstreet and Jackson, into three army corps of three divisions each. Longs treet retained the command of the First, Ewell was assigned to the Second, and A. P. Hill to the Third. The artillery, which hitherto had iDcen divided among the several divisions of the two corps, was now placed under the command of General W. N. Pendleton, and comprised fifteen battalions, each composed of four batteries of four pieces, sixteen in all. These fifteen battalions were divided among the three corps, each receiving five battalions or eighty guns. With the cavalry were five mounted batteries of six pieces each. The whole gave Lee two hundred and seventy guns. The cavalry, in a single division, was under the command of General J. E. B. Stuart. Lee's whole force is estimated at about seventyeight thousand men.

While Lee was engaged in reorganizing his army, he was at the same time busy in planning an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Such an invasion promised relief to Pemberton's army besieged by Grant at Vicksburg. It was also thought that a campaign on Northern soil would be helpful to the Confederate cause abroad. The time seemed favorable for a movement of this kind. It was known that in May and June Hooker's army would lose about fifteen thousand men by the expiration of their term of service. Moreover, defeat at Fredericksburg and Chancellors ville, it was supposed, had so dampened the ardor of the North with reference to the war as to make the enlistment of new troops more and more difficult. It was also thought that the proposed invasion would furnish an occasion for developing among those who had been halfhearted hitherto a feeling of hostility to the further prosecution of the war. On the other hand, Lee was receiving enthusiastic recruits. To his men, flushed with victory and eager for an aggressive campaign on Northern soil, no task seemed too great. The failure of the Maryland campaign, in 1862, was either forgotten or lightly passed over. The right time for a successful invasion of the North seemed to have come, and Lee and his officers bent all their energies to preparations for transferring the seat of war from Virginia to Maryland and Pennsylvania. At length all was ready. Lee was at the head of a solid, strong, effective body of men. Leaving Hill's corps at Fredericksburg in order to detain

Hooker in his present quarters by the display of a large Confederate force in that place and vicinity, Lee concentrated the rest of his army at Culpeper Court-House, near his cavalry headquarters. But Hooker was not unmindful of the fact that Lee was meditating a movement northward. This he had learned from his secret-service helpers, and on May 28th he informed President Lincoln that the Army of Northern Virginia was about to make an advance in that direction.

At the same time Hooker was busy with problems having reference to his own movements for the purpose of thwarting the enemy. One thing he deemed essential in order to a successful prosecution of his plans, namely that he should have the control of all the forces operating against Lee ; and in a telegram to the President he sought to impress this suggestion upon the mind of the chief executive. ''Lender instructions from the Major-General commanding the army, dated January 31st," he said , * * I am instructed to keep ' in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them. ' In the event the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed toward the Potomac, via Gordonsville or Culpeper, while the rear will rest on

Fredericksburg. After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of the opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so?" 1

In his reply to this telegram, Mr. Lincoln, on the same date, said : " So much of professional military skill is requisite to answer it, that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promises to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side, and fight him or act on the defense,

1 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, serial xliii., p. 30.

according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own. But these are mere suggestions, which I desire to be controlled by the judgment of yourself and General Halleck. " ^

General Halleck, in his reply to this telegram, assured Hooker that by his instructions of January 3 ist, he was left entirely free to act as circumstances might require with the simple injunction "to keep in view the safet}^ of Washington and Harper's Ferry. " Should Lee leave a part of his forces in Fredericksburg, while with the head of his column he moved by Gordonsville or Culpeper toward the Potomac, he thought that such a movement would give Hooker great advantages upon his flank to cut him in two, and fight his divided forces. *' Would it not be more advantageous to fight his movable column first, instead of first attacking his intrenchments, w^th your own forces separated by the Rappahannock ?"

Lee commenced his movement for the concentration of his army at Culpeper, June 3d. A change in the encampments of the enemy was early discovered by observers within Hooker's line. On the evening of the day in which Hooker sent his telegram to the President, and received in return the above comments made by the President and

1 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, serial xliii., p. 31.

General Halleck, he informed the President that he had concluded to make a demonstration on the enemy by throwing a couple of bridges across the Rappahannock at Franklin's Crossing, in order to learn if possible what the enemy was doing. On the pontoons thus laid, Sedgwick crossed the river that afternoon, captured about fifty prisoners, who reported that the changes noticed in their camps proceeded from the reorganization of their army. It was said that all of Longstreet's command was with Lee, and that Lee had no infantry force higher up the Rappahannock than its junction with the Rapidan. But this information, which was misinformation, did not satisfy Hooker long, and on June 7th he ordered Pleasonton to make a reconnaisance in the direction of Culpeper. Two infantry brigades were added to his command. It was an opportune movement. Stuart had invited Lee to review the Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station on the 8th. The review was held, and, as Stuart designed, made an impressive display. On the evening of that day, Stuart bivouacked near the station, establishing his headquarters on Fleetwood Hill. His force amounted to about nine thousand five hundred men. The Union force was not as large. Pleasonton, in his movement, kept his communications open by means of the infantry, and directed his division commanders to rendezlo The Battle

vous at Brandy Station, supposing Stuart to be at Culpeper. While Duffie was advancing by way of Stevensburg, Buford with his division came upon the enemy between Brandy Station and Beverly Ford. A sharp contest lasting several hours followed, and then Buford withdrew. Later Gregg encountered Stuart, getting into his rear, but like Buford he fought alone, and after a brisk, sharp engagement, Gregg withdrew. But so severely was Stuart handled by both Buford and Gregg that infantry supports were required by Stuart in resisting them, a fact that revealed to Pleasonton the presence of Lee's infantry in the neighborhood, and indicated that a movement northward on Lee's part had already commenced.

In the cavalry engagement at Brandy Station, Gregg commanded his own division (the Third) and Duffie 's (the Second). Subsequently the Cavalry Corps was again reorganized, and comprised two divisions, the first commanded by Buford and the second by Gregg. Each of the divisions consisted of three brigades. Stuart's force was badly crippled at Brandy Station, while the effect of that engagement upon Pleasonton 's force was highly inspiriting.

Ewell left Culpeper, June loth, with orders to clear the valley of the Union forces then occupying its lower part. On June i ith, Milroy, who was at Winchester with a large Union garrison, when

Lee Crosses the Potomac n

informed of Confederate movements in the valley — a cavalry raid by Stuart having been mentioned in a despatch from Halleck — expressed confidence in his ability to hold his position against any force the enemy could bring against him. As late as June 1 2th, General Schenck, to whose command Milroy belonged, telegraphed to General Halleck, "Have you any knowledge or belief that there is any rebel infantry in the valley or north of the Rappahannock, or this side of the Blue Ridge? There seems to me to be yet only parties of cavalry. " On the 14th, Ewell attacked Milroy, whose force easily and speedily was " shattered and scattered," ^lilroy with the remnant of his command falling back to Harper's Ferry, abandoning his artillery and wagon-trains, also his sick and wounded.

Hooker left his position opposite Fredericksburg June 13th, and proceeded to place his army on the line of the Orange and Alexandria railroad. Reynolds was in command of the left wing of the Army of the Potomac, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps. Doubled ay succeeding him in the command of the First Corps . Hooker was with the right wing of the army embracing the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps. With the disappearance of the Sixth Corps from Stafford Heights — the last of the Union troops to leave — Hill started for Culpeper. Longstreet left Culpeper June 15th, with orders to move along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, covering the Confederate advance with Stuart's cavalry, which took its place between Longstreet's corps and the Union army. While engaged in this movement, and while Hill was entering the valley in his rear, Longstreet found that Lee had so far modified his plan as to authorize Stuart, when the opportunity should arrive, to cross the Potomac in Hooker's rear with three of his five brigades, and passing around his right to rejoin the main body of the army in its northward march — a fatal mistake on Lee's part, for in his ** nomadic ride," as Longstreet calls it, Stuart left Lee without the means of securing needed information concerning the whereabouts of the Union army, while the results of Stuart's raid were of the most meagre kind .

On June 2 2d , Lee's force was so well in hand that he ordered Ewell to cross the Potomac and move hid colvimns toward the Susquehanna by way of Emmittsburg, Chambersburg, and McConnellsburg. "If Harrisburg comes within your means," he added, "capture it." Ewell crossed the Potomac on the 23d, at Shepherdstown. Longstreet's corps crossed at Williamsport on the 24th. Hill, with his corps, was on the Maryland side one day later. The three corps came together at Hagerstown, Md. On the 2 7th, Longstreet and Hill were at Chambersburg, Pa. Rodes and Johnson's divisions of Ewell's corps had at that time advanced as far as CarHsle, while Early's division was on the way to York, via Greenwood and Gettysburg. Early pushed on rapidly, and succeeded in breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg on the 28th, but was unable to seize the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrights ville as he hoped, the bridge before his arrival having been burned by a small militia force ; and he accordingly retired to York, where he bivouacked that night. Lee, receiving intelligence to the effect that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was moving northward — ^not knowing, however, how far or in what direction he had advanced — now ordered Ewell to retrace his steps and rejoin the rest of the army at Cashtown, whither Hill was directed to move his corps on the 28th, while Longstreet was to follow on the next day.

Ewell's movement secured needed supplies for Lee's army, but at the same time it served most effectively to arouse the people of Pennsylvania to the dangers that threatened them; indeed it quickened the war spirit throughout the North as nothing else could have done. Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania called for sixty thousand men for the defence of the Keystone State, and the call was promptly answered. Enlistments were now hastened in all of the States.

Meanwhile Hooker was making his way northward, covering the capital in his march. He began to cross the Potomac at Edward's Ferry on the 25th, and the crossing was completed on the following day. The First and Third corps encamped near Middletown, while the Eleventh Corps advanced to Boonsborough. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps were halted at Frederick, while the Twelfth was sent to Harper's Ferry. In connection with this corps Hooker desired to use the garrison at Harper's Ferry in a movement on Lee's communications, but Halleck refused to give his consent, and on the 28th, Hooker, regarding this refusal as an indication that his plans would continue to be thwarted by Halleck, asked to be relieved of his command, and the request was granted.

In making his request to be relieved. General Hooker said: "My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood , respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal." 1 Hooker's desire to increase his effective force by the addition of troops at Harper's Ferry and vicinity was a reasonable one, but he

*■ Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, serial xliii, p. 60.

Maj.-Gen. Geo. G. Meade.

certainly overestimated the strength of Lee's army in comparison with his own.

General Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps, was made Hooker's successor. In his letter to Meade accompanying the order which placed him in command of the Army of the Potomac, General Halleck said: "You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington, as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive so as to give him battle. All forces within the sphere of your operations will be held subject to your orders. Harper's Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders."^

The command of the Fifth Corps was now given to one of its division commanders, General George Sykes. A reorganization of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac took place on the 28th. Kil-

1 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, serial xliii. p. 61.

i6 The Battle

patrick, who had commanded a brigade in Gregg's division, was placed in command of Stahel's division, which was then added to the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac as the Third Division. Buford was left in command of the First Division and Gregg of the Second.

On the morning of the 29th, after ascertaining the position of the several corps of his command, Meade continued the movement of the army northward, directing the left wing, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps under Reynolds, to proceed to Emmittsburg, while he advanced his right wing as far as New Windsor. The Cavalry Corps was in the advance, Buford on the left, Kilpatrick in front, and Gregg on the right.

At 1 1 A. M. on the 29th, in the following telegram to General Halleck, Meade disclosed his general purpose as follows : " If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle which I shall endeavor to do. . . . My endeavor will be, in my movements, to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some portions of Lee's army in detail. "

On the night of June 30th, the position of the Army of Northern Virginia was as follows : General

,? Lee's headquarters were at Greenwood. A part of \ the First Corps under Longstreet was at Greenii wood and a part at Chamber sburg, twenty-four |. miles from Gettysburg. A part of the Second Corps under Hill was at Heidlersburg,ten miles from Gettysburg, and the rest near Green Village, twentythree miles from Gettysburg. A part of the Third Corps under Ewell was at Cashtown, eight miles from Gettysburg, and the rest was at Greenwood.^ The position of the several corps of the Army of the Potomac on the same night was as follows : The First Corps was at Marsh Creek on the Emmittsburg road, six miles from Gettysburg; the Second Corps at Uniontown, twenty-two miles distant; the Third Corps at Bridgeport, twelve miles distant ; the Fifth Corps at Union Mills, fifteen miles distant ; the Sixth Corps at Manchester, twenty-two miles distant ; the Eleventh Corps at Emmittsburg, twelve miles distant; and the Twelfth Corps at Littletown, nine miles distant. Buford's cavalry, except one brigade guarding the train, was at Gettysburg. Kilpatrick was at Hanover, thirteen miles distant, and Gregg at Manchester, twenty-two miles distant. The artillery reserve under Hunt was at Taneytown with Meade and the headquarters of the Army 01 the Potomac, fourteen miles distant.^

iLongstreet's From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 349. 2Hunt, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iii., p. 273.

On that day, Heth, commanding a division in Hill's corps, ordered Pettigrew's brigade to proceed from Cashtown to Gettysburg in order to procure for his men a supply of shoes, which it was supposed the stores of the place could supply, notwithstanding the heavy draft Early had made upon them a few days before. As Pettigrew, about half-past nine,* was entering the town — he came as far as the crest of Seminary Hill — he probably learned of the approach of Buford's cavalry, and ignorant as to the strength of the Union force he retired without any effort to take possession of the place. Falling back to Marsh Creek, Pettigrew halted his men for the night, and then hurried on to Cashtown to report the presence of Union troops at Gettysburg.

Buford, who about half -past eleven entered the town, and moved out on the Chambersburg pike as far as the McPherson farm, likewise informed his superior officers of Pettigrew's approach and retirement. From what he learned in questioning stragglers picked up by his scouts, he was satisfied that Lee's army was not far away. His own small force of about four thousand men he placed in position as the day drew to a close, and awaited the developments which he felt sure the next day would bring.

i Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania, by Professor M. Jacobs, 1864, p. 21.

Chapter II

HAVING accomplished the concentration of his army at Cashtown, Lee now set his columns in motion toward Gettysburg. At five o'clock, on the morning of July ist, Hill, taking the divisions of Heth and Pender, was on his way to the place. On approaching Gettysburg, he found Gamble's and Devin's brigades of Buford's cavalry dismounted holding the ridges west of the town, their skirmishers well out in advance, it being Buford's purpose to hold the enemy in check as long as possible in order that Reynolds might reach the field with his infantry, while the Confederates were still on that side of Gettysburg.

The rest of Lee's army was to follow. Longstreet says Lee asked him to ride with him that morning, and that he found Lee in his usual cheerful spirits. Longstreet's column, on leaving Greenwood, had not proceeded far before it encountered Johnson's division of Swell's corps, which cut in on his front with all of E well's reserve and supply trains. Lee ordered Longstreet to halt, directing

Johnson's division and trains to pass on and join Ewell. Not long after, the report of cannon was heard, apparently beyond Cashtown, and as the firing increased Lee left Longstreet, and hurried toward Gettysburg. He knew that Meade was not far away, and the need of his cavalry, as a means of securing information, he now felt more keenly than ever.

Meade's orders for the day were as follows: The First and Eleventh Corps were to proceed to Gettysburg; the Second to Taneytown; the Third to Emmittsburg; the Fifth to Hanover; and the Twelfth to Two Taverns, Slocum being directed to take command of the Fifth Corps as well as his own. The Sixth Corps was left at Manchester, At the same time Meade ordered his engineer officers to select a battle-ground for the approaching conflict, suggesting the general line of Pipe Creek as a favorable position.

But the battle between the approaching forces was not to be fought at Pipe Creek. Events were already in progress interrupting the Union commander's plans. Buford, on the morning of July ist, had his scouts far out on the roads westward and northward of Gettysburg. As early as six o'clock reports came to him that the enemy was again approaching. The disposition of his little force had already been made. Devin's brigade, on

Reynolds's Statue.

II the right, was in Hne between the Mummasburg road and the railway cut. Gamble's brigade extended the line to the left as far as the Hagerstown road, his first line being along the banks of Willoughby Run. Those early morning hours to Buford were full of anxiety. Would Reynolds arrive before his little cavalry command would be swept away by Hill's advance? The signal officer in the Seminary tower at length discovered the approach of Reynolds' columns, and, not long after, Reynolds himself, having hastened thitherward in advance of his troops, met Buford at ^he signal station and received from him a statement as to the situation in his front. It was now fifteen minutes before ten, and the strong force of the enemy was making things lively along the whole Union line, but Buford was confident that he could hold on until the arrival of the First Corps. Both Buford and Reynolds at once rode out to encourage the men to maintain their ground, while Reynolds sent word to Wads worth to hurry forward his division which had the advance. Wadsworth, approaching the town, found Reynolds ^ awaiting him, and by his direction, leaving the road , moved his men hurriedly across fields to Seminary Ridge in front of McMillan's and Dr. Schmucker's. Advancing then to the

1 Two Days of War. A Gettysburg Narrative^ by General Henry E. Tremain, p. 12.

front, — it was now a few minutes past ten, — heat once brought his two brigades into Hne to reHeve Buford's cavalrymen. Cutler's brigade was placed on the right covering the Chambersburg pike, while Meredith's brigade — the Iron Brigade — took possession of McPherson's woods.